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ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE SOVIET UNION
by
Y assam an S aadatm and
U niversity o f New H am pshire, M ay 1988
How should one analyze the econom ic relations betw een advanced
c a p ita lis t

sy stem s

and

other

eco n o m ic

sy stem s?

econom ists h av e m ainly concentrated their efforts on
re la tio n s

b etw een

d ev elo p ed

c a p ita list co u n tries

So

fa r

the

studying

the

(h en cefo rth

DCs)

and the less developed countries (henceforth LD Cs) o f the world.
T h ere

has n o t,

how ever,

been

a

sig n ifican t effort in

devising

a

system atic theory of econom ic relations between DCs and the socialist
countries.

I intend for m y dissertation to be a contribution in that

direction.

It is concerned with investigating the role o f international

trade and investm ent in the countries of E astern Europe.
In the process of observing the economic relations of the DCs and
LD C s, two m ajo r schools o f thought have em erged: the dependency
school and the diffu sio n ist (m ainstream neo-classical) school.

The

latter, in general, sees the positive aspects o f the links between DCs
and th e poor countries.
hand,

The dependency perspective, on the other

argues th a t the problem s

o f the p o o r (peripheral) countries

are, in fact, th e ir econom ic relatio n s with the DCs (center).

The

e x p lo ita tio n

that

by

the

c e n te r draw s

off m o st

of

the

surplus

otherw ise might have been used in the process of industrialization of
the po o r countries.
M y dissertation begins by exam ining how these two schools of
th o u g h t

have

b een

a n o th er

dim en sio n

th e o re tica lly
of

the

su ccessfu l

econom ic

in

relatio n s

in c o rp o ratin g

yet

betw een d iffe re n t

econom ic system s- the relations between the DCs and the socialist
countries.

In addition, my dissertation w ill also focus on another

approach which I w ill refer to as the ’E astern E uropean” approach.
In the final chapter I will try to em pirically verify the validity o f the
theoretical investigations of th ese schools.
although

all the approaches discussed in my dissertation m ake some

contribution to understanding E ast-W est
e n tire ly

My conclusion is that

su ccessfu l

econom ic relations.

in

p re se n tin g

an

econom ic relations, none are
accu rate

p ic tu re of

such

INTRODUCTION

H ow

sh o u ld

one

a n a ly ze

re la tio n s

betw een

advanced capitalist countries and other econom ics system s?

So far,

the econom ists, as w ell as

the

eco n o m ic

sociologists, have m ainly concentrated

their effo rts on studying the relations betw een

advanced capitalist

countries and the less developed countries of A sia, A frica, and Latin
A m erica.

In

em erged:

this

process,

tw o

m ajor

schools

o f th o u g h t

have

the dependency school, and the m ainstream neo-classical

school (or the d iffusionist school as it is often referred to in the
d ev elo p m en t

lite ra tu re 1).

M y dissertation begins by exam ining how these two schools of
thou g h t

have

b een

an o th er

d im en sio n

th e o re tic a lly
of

the

su ccessfu l

eco n o m ic

in

relatio n s

in c o rp o ra tin g
betw een

yet

d iffe re n t

econom ic system s — the relations betw een the D eveloped C apitalist
C ountries (henceforth DCs) and the socialist countries.

In addition,

my dissertation w ill analyze another approach w hich I w ill refer to
as the 'Eastern European* approach.

It is a less em phasized view in

W estern literatu re, but it is am ong the dom inant view s in Eastern
E urope,

in

p a rtic u la r

Eastern Europe.
in

und erstan d in g

in

th e

m ore

refo rm

o rien ted

c o u n trie s

of

In my opinion, the inclusion of this school is crucial
how

som e

o f the E astern

E uropean

econom ists

1 Throughout this dissertation, I w ill refer to these two schools as the
dependency school and the neo-classical school.

2

in te rp ret the econom ic relations betw een E ast and W est and how
they view the im pact of such relations on their countries.
This dissertation w ill be divided into six chapters.

In chapters

two and three I will concentrate on the two dom inant schools' views
on th e economic relations between the DCs and the socialist countries.
In the fourth chapter I w ill exam ine the E astern E uropean countries'
view on the subject of East-W est econom ic relation, and in the fifth
chapter I w ill try to v erify em pirically the validity of som e of the
theoretical investigations o f these schools of econom ic thought.

The

em phasis will, how ever, be on the dependency school since it is the
only

school am ong the

three w hich

has

v ig orously

theorize the E ast-W est econom ic relations.
m ain ly

in

th e

1970s

th a t

the

attem pted to

M oreover, since it was

E a st-W e st

eco n o m ic

rela tio n s

flo u rish ed , I w ill lim it m y em pirical in v estig atio n to th at period.
Table (I) shows the am ount of exports and im ports of E astern Europe
with th e W estern Industrial Countries for the period o f 1970-1980.2
M y dissertation, how ever, will not be an ''empirical" one, in the
sense

th a t it does not attem pt to

models and then try to test them.
m ethodology o f econom ic

generate

elaborate

econom etric

It deals prim arily with the area of

thought applied to the understanding of

2 In the same period, in addition to conventional trade, new forms and
methods o f econom ic cooperation came into existence.
Industrial Cooperation
Agreements between the East-W est cover a wide range o f activities including:
licen sin g, turnkey contracts, subcontracting, production cooperation and
joint ventures. There will be a more detailed discussion of Industrial
Cooperation Agreements later in the dissertation.

3

East-W est interaction.

In other words, I am merely interested in

searching for methodologies adopted by different schools of thought
in the investigation of East-West economic relations and to locate the
consequences resulting from adopting such methodologies.3

In the

process I have to conduct a substantial literature survey, since it is
only through such a survey that I will be able to ascertain each
school's method of analysis.
At the end of each chapter, I will include a brief criticism of the
school discussed in that chapter.

I do not intend to present a

comprehensive criticism of these school’s arguments, since most of
the problems associated with their discussion of East-W est economic
relations

stems

from

their method

o f analysis

and

their

world

outlook in general, which in most cases have in turn been mentioned
and criticized by others.
schools'

(approaches)

I will argue, however, that none of the
discussed

here,

have

been

com pletely

successful in presenting an 'accurate' and comprehensive picture of
East-W est interactions.

By bringing

these

schools'

(approaches)

together in my dissertation and examining their problems, I hope to
contribute to both a better understanding of East-W est economics
relations, and to devising a possible "theory" of such interactions.

3 Certainly, one can choose to study how these schools of thought have
employed their methodologies in investigation o f other phenomenon.
My
interest is, however, in the East-West interactions.

4

Table (I)

Foreign Trade o f Eastern European
Countries and the Soviet Union with
the Western Industrial Countries

(millions o f U.S. $)

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

19804

10961

10775

12179 12652

14258

19847

16141

17259

18666 18759 20563

22813

Eastern
Europe:
Exports 4287

4707

5812 8297

Imports 4944

5495

7061

10850

Soviet
Union:
Exports

2393

2758

2944

5093

8269

8511

Imports

2822

2890

4150

6333

8116

13452

10392 11974 12735

26981

14357

24265

13459 16064

Source: Eastern European Economics 1981

The neo-classical approach in general sees
of

the links

betw een

4 Herold and Kozlov (1983)

the positive aspects

advanced cap italist countries

and

other

5

economic

system s.

For instance, in

investigating the

economic

relations between DCs and the poor nations of the world, the neo
classical approach argues that the latter do not possess sufficient
production, technology, skills, and values to provide their people
with goods and services necessary for raising their standard of living.
These countries, it is argued, should seek the advanced industrialized
countries' capital, technology, training, and values.

This approach

tends to see underdevelopment as a situation which all nations have
historically experienced.
rest

eventually

w ill,

Some have already overcome it, and the
with

the

help

of industrialized

countries.

(Chilcote et al. 1974 and Stevenson 1980)
In fact, the existence of a dichotomy which constitutes the
polar ends of an evolutionary development path is one of the basic
assumptions of the neo-classical approach.

At one pole, there are

traditional societies; at the other, the modern (advanced) societies.
The neo-classical approach maintains societies move along this path
from traditional to modern.
m odernization

all

societies

M oreover, since in the process of
w ill

experience

essentially

sim ilar

changes, the history of the modern nations is taken as a source of
useful generalization.

(Valenzuela 1976, Chilcote et al. 1974, Preston

1982 and Bernstein 1979)

The definition of modernity constitutes a

set of characteristics which can be applied to all societies.

Modernity

conceptualized in this way, then, may be used as a yardstick to
measure the degree of advancement of any society.

Such reasoning

leads this school to define an underdeveloped country as having

6

either a per capita income below $300-$400 or as having other
characteristics including illiteracy, hierarchy, lack of social mobility,
low level of technology and productivity as well as other specific
economic and institutional features.5

(See, for example, Chilcote et

al., 1974)
In the perspective of this school, a major impetus to modernize
in

the

now

advanced

(developed)

co u n tries

resu lted

from

technological progress which perm itted the creation of agricultural
surplus

and

its

tran sp o rtatio n .

Thus,

technology and in long distance trade

im provem ent

in

both

were essential stim uli in

cultural and institutional transformation and eventually the progress
of now advanced (developed) countries.

Since the nature of the

development (modernization) process is identical for every society
and only its pace and intensity differs, it logically follows that
econom ic

grow th

and

developm ent

in

the

poor

nations

(late

developed) can largely be generated and sped up by an inflow of
foreign

aid,

investm ents,

countries (early modernizers).

and

culture

from

the

industrialized

Just as technological progress brought

forth a new form of production and economic organization hundreds
of years

ago

in the

now developed

countries,

the

capital

and

5 The specific elements included in the definition o f 'modernity' and
'traditional* vary substantially in the literature.
For a survey o f the literature
see (47).

7

technology

introduced

by

these

nations

nations will transform the poor countries.6
T he

neo-classical

econom ic

also

into

the

underdeveloped

(Bernstein 1979)
stress

beneficial aspects of East-W est economic relations.

the

positive

and

I will argue that

such a conclusion is mainly due to the fact that these economists
establish their model at a highly abstract level.

In other words, in

their m odel, the behavioral assumption governing the conduct of
economic actors are postulated to be uniform in all economic systems
including economies of Eastern Europe.

Consequently, when free

trade is conceptualized to be advantageous to all parties involved it
will be irrelevant if one of these parties is an Eastern European
country

with

a

com pletely

d ifferen t

in stitu tio n al

persuasion.

Therefore, these economists maintain that Eastern Europe countries
and the Soviet Union conduct their trade with the DCs based on the
principle of "comparative advantage".

I will devote a part of the fifth

chapter o f this dissertation to ascertaining the validity of such a
claim.

If these countries are taking advantage of the gains from

trade, stemming from the differences in comparative costs, then one
6 A branch of the modernization approach stresses the differences in values,
outlooks, culture and norms between two polarities. Some authors go so far as
to argue that modernization is possible only when individuals transform
themselves by adopting modem values. (Portes 1976) The stress on such
differences has important implications in regards to the concept of human
nature.
The modem developed societies are characterized by the 'rationality'
o f their members, where as individuals in the developing countries behave
"irrationally" on economic grounds.
As such, this particular branch differs
from transitional economics in the assumption that rational behavior is a
universal human characteristic.
(See Valenzuela (1976) which cites an
argument by W. Moore who has pointed out the differences in the human's
nature in these two polarities.) For a general critique of this school see
Nafziger (1976) & Mohun (1979).

8

should w itness a rise in im port-dom estic supply ratios

of those

products for which DCs maintain a "comparative cost advantages" in
their production.

In other words, Eastern European countries and the

Soviet Union should rely increasingly on imports to satisfy a growing
share of domestic demand.

(Brainard 1979)

At the same time, one

should observe an increase in the export-domestic supply ratios of
those products in which these countries possess "comparative cost
advantages" in their production.

I believe by calculation the ratio of

net imports and net exports of different categories of products to
actual domestic production of these products, one can more or less
determine whether these countries are conducting their trade based
on the principle of comparative advantage.
C ontrary

to

the

n eo -classical

approach,

the

dependency

perspective stresses the negative aspects of the links between DCs
and other economic systems.

For instance, in investigating

the

economic relations between the DCs and the poor nations of the
world,

the

dependency

school stood

diffusionist tradition on its head.

much

of the

neo-classical,

In general, according to this school,

the links to the advanced countries (center, core) were the problem,
not the solution, since the exploitation by the center drew off the
surplus that otherw ise might have been used in the process of
industrialization

of

the

poor

peripheral

countries.

Instead

of

hypothesizing the underdevelopment as an original state, it asserts
that the developed

societies were never underdeveloped and the

present condition of underdevelopment was created.

It argues that

9

the development of any region must be understood in connection
with its historical insertion into the worldwide political economic
system which came into existence with the European colonialization
of the world.
1980)

(Valenzuela 1976, Chilcote et al. 1974 and Stevenson

In this view, therefore, the traditional modernity polarity has

no value in conceptualizing the relations
developed

countries.

The

presence

of

of developed and less
traditional

and

modern

features may or may not help to differentiate societies, but it does
not explain the origin and existence of modernity in some areas and
its lack in the other areas of the world.
Chilcote et al. 1974)

Instead, it argues the most important and

significant defining characteristic
economic dependency.

(Valenzuela 1976 and

of the underdeveloped areas is

Such dependency has given a particular form

to the economic, social and political systems of the periphery and has
produced features and characteristics by which underdevelopment is
perceived and recognized.

(Stevenson 1980)

Contrary to the assumption that the international division of
labor, through comparative advantage, leads to parallel development,
the dependency school argues that the different functions of center
and periphery have led to the gain of the former at the expense of
the latter.

The same process which brought progress for the center

in v o lv e d

a

p ro c e s s

of

's u b o r d in a te

underdevelopment for the periphery.7 (Stevenson

d e v e lo p m e n t'

or

1980)

7 Both underdevelopment and development are aspects of the same
phenomenon, both are historically simultaneous, both are linked functionally
and, therefore, interact and condition each other mutually.
This results in the
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The

general

view

is

that the

incorporation

of peripheral

countries into the emerging world capitalist economy, first through
direct colonialization and then, more subtly, through free trade,
resulted

in

gearing

the

production

producing exports for the center.

of

these

countries

towards

It also structured the social and

political systems of the subordinate areas in a way that ensured the
gains from this process flowed mainly to the dominant countries.
This, coupled with their concentration on primary product exports,
prevented

these

countries

from

capacity for growth and change.

developm ent

of

an

autonomous

(O'Brien 1975)

In recent decades, and with a new transformation in the center,
a new form of dependency came into existence.

With the emergence

of multinational corporations which sought new markets and cheaper
production

sites

for

th eir

growing

technological

m anufacturing

process, the dependency of the periphery acquired a new character.
In this phase, the drainage of surplus from periphery to the center
division o f the world between industrial, advanced or "central'' countries, and
underdeveloped, backward or "peripheral" countries..(cited in Valenzuela
(1979))
While the dependency perspective views the center as having a dynamic
development responsive to its internal needs, it believes that the economy of
the periphery is shaped by and responsive to the requirement or the
expansion of the center. (Ibid. and Stevenson 1980) When the center of the
system needed to acquire raw materials and sell finished goods, the periphery
responded as both supplier and market. The prime mover of this process was
capital seeking profits. The capitalists accumulated capital where this could be
done cheaply, and invested it where the return to investment was highest, and
this led to the surplus drainage from some parts o f the world to others. The
precise mechanism o f dependency, of course, will vary and it is associated with
the different periods in the expansion of the world capitalist economy. The
dependency theorists generally distinguish three identifiable periods in the
process o f the world capitalist expansion:
colonial, competitive capitalism and
monopoly capitalism.
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continues, though it now takes such forms as repatriation of profits,
royalties, other commissions, interest and transfer pricing.
1975)

(O’Brien

At this stage a new international division of labor has arisen

in which periphery

acquires capital

goods, technology,

and raw

materials from the center and exports its traditional raw materials
and

a

few

subsidiaries.

m anufacturing

item s

(Valenzuela 1976)

produced

by

m u ltin atio n al

Although in some countries in the

periphery a kind of 'dependent industrialization’ is taking place, the
social and economic costs of this are high and do not eliminate the
dependency of these societiess .

(O'Brien 1975)

Viewing, therefore, the link with the core countries as the
source o f underdevelopment of the periphery, some authors in the
dependency school tradition
center and initiating

suggest breaking

the chain with the

an independent industrialization.

However,

some demand more, and argue that development requires profound
alteration of the political social and economic system of peripheral
countries including, in particular, change of the market system and
mobilization of the domestic population in nationally oriented efforts.
In the second chapter of this dissertation I will attempt to
dem onstrate that the dependency

school's proponents

employ the

8 Based on the dependency approach, while previously the outside control was
mainly applied to the underdeveloped countries' exports, at the present stage
outside control is exercised over their imports.
Moreover, the multinational
corporations tend to centralize research, planning and deployment o f natural,
human, capital resources, and development o f science and technology as well
as decision making in the developed countries while they concentrate the
assembly and routine production o f goods in the periphery.
(Sunkel (1972)
and Sunkel (1973))
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same type of methodology, in their investigation of the economic
links between DCs and LDC's and in their analysis of the economic
relations between DC’s and socialist countries.

Consequently, they

recognize and concentrate on only the ill-effects

of these economic

relations.

The ill-effects

w hich

range from socialist

countries'

complete dependency on the import of Western technology to their
import of capitalism itself:

"the countries of Eastern Europe and

Soviet Union will (are) importing not only Western technology...(but)
will be and are already importing capitalism."

(Frank 1977)

Furthermore, the dependency school asserts that the manner in
which socialist countries insert themselves into

the international

division of labor is similar to that of the intermediate countries, i.e.
Brazil and

M exico.

In

other words,

socialist countries

import

manufactured goods from DCs and export primary goods to them; at
the same tim e socialist countries import primary goods from Third
W orld countries and export manufactured goods to them.

I will

attempt to em pirically verify this claim in the fifth chapter of the
d issertatio n .
T he

E a ste rn

E u ro p e an

a p p ro a c h ,9

in contrast to the

dependency school, but like the neo-classical school, tends to focus on
the positive aspects of the economic relations between East and West.
In particular, the imports of Western technology are highly praised
9 I have chosen this particular view of East European economists, since it has
chiefly emerged in the economic relations, and it almost dissipated with the
gradual decline of such relations at the end o f the 1970s.
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and considered to be crucial for further developm ent of Eastern
European countries.

It in large treats technology as a neutral and

impartial element which can be easily selected off the shelf in the
shopping-centers of Western countries and then be installed with no
foreseeable

problem s

in

the Eastern

European

enterprises.

In

contrast to the dependency school, the Eastern European economists'
analysis is devoid of any consideration for any existing or potential
conflict

betw een

two

different

although

Eastern

European

econom ic

econom ists

system s.

do not em ploy

Therefore,
the neo

classical school’s tools, their method of analysis leads them to almost
the same conclusion.
T he

E astern

E uropean

eco n o m ists,

how ever,

like

the

dependency school, assert that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
occupy intermediate positions in the international division of labor.
In other words, they import Western technology while in return they
export raw materials and fuels.

They argue that such a pattern of

trade, however, does not make Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
dependent on the West.

Moreover, in most cases the governments of

these countries are able to mitigate the ill-effects of economic ties
with the West.
The following table summarizes the methodology adopted by
the dependency and neo-classical schools as well as the Eastern
European approach.

It also indicates some of the consequences of

adopting these methodologies and the relevant points for empirical
investigation.

I Dependency School

Method of Analysis
a-Frank:
Extends his method of
analysis of the DCs' and
LDCs' economic relations
to those of the capitalist and
socialist-economic systems.
b-Wallerstein:
Since there exists only one
world embracing mode of
production, the capitalist
mode, there is no need for
devising a theory of socialism.

Consequences
The economic relations
between the East and the West
have resulted in the con
version of Socialist countries
into the functioning part of
the capitalist system.

International investment inten
sifies the dependency of the
socialist countries on the world's
market. Therefore, it can only
produce harmful effects for the
socialist countries.

The mere existence of the
world capitalist system implies
the impossibility of the pres
ence of any other economic
system.

Socialist countries occupy an
intermediate position in the inter
national division of labor, a
position similar to those of "semiperipheral" capitalist countries.

II Neo-dassical School
a-Non theoretical
approaches
i -Case Studies
ii -General Description
iii -Informed Specialization
iv -Taxonomical Studies

Conclusions and Relevant Points
for "Empirical" Verification

In some cases useful information
is produced. In other cases either
contradictory statements are pro
duced or illegitimate conclusions
are drawn based on limited infor
mation.

Method of Analysis

Consequences

Conclusions and Relevant Points
for "Empirical" Verification

b-Theoretical Approach

Ignores the differences in the
socio-economic systems of
capitalist and socialist countries,
and/or believes such differ
ences are irrelevant and play an
insignificant role (as far as
assumptions of economic theory
are concerned) in the investi
gation of economic relations of
the East and the West

Consumers and firms in the
socialist countries are max
imizing their utilities and
profits, respectively.

Socialist countries conduct
their trade according to the
principle of comparative
advantage.
Socialist countries in their
economic relations with the West,
in particular in their establishment
of joint ventures with Western
firms, are "profit maximizers."

ID Eastern European Approach

Acknowledges the existence of
two different economic systems
in the world, but suggests that
some form of coexistence
between them is possible.

East-West economic relations
help to solve a number of
common problems. Movements
are in the direction of mutually
advantageous trade and co
operational foster forces of
peace and socialism in the
world.

In general, their analyses are void
of any consideration for the
potential conflicts of interest
between Eastern Europe and the
Western firms.
Although the socialist countries
occupy an intermediate position in
the international division of labor,
they are not dependent on the
Western countries.

CHAPTER II

In

exploring

T he

D ependency

how

the

School

dependency

school

has

viewed

the

economic relations of the industrialized capitalist countries and the
socialist nations, one from the outset faces difficulty.

The difficulty

arises because the proponents of this approach were and are mainly
concerned with studying and investigating the relations between the
advanced capitalist countries of the world and the less developed
countries, in particular those in Latin America, and inquiring into the
cause of underdevelopm ent of the periphery.

The difficulty

is

further compounded when one considers that in recent years the
dependency school has dominated the research in the social sciences
including development economics which makes it literally impossible
to

discuss

the overwhelming

mass

of w riting

by its advocates.

Added to these difficulties are the complex roots of the dependency
analyses

w hich

draw

inspiration

from

a

variety

of intellectual

traditions ranging from Marxism to the post-1948 ECLA critique of
the

neo-classical

theory

of

in tern atio n al

trade

and

econom ic

d e v e lo p m e n t.1
1

These difficulties plus several more have been recognized by Gabriel
Palma.
(1978) His superb survey of dependency literature appeared in
World Development. ECLA is the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America, which aimed to show that the prevalent international
division o f labor in contrast to the conventional wisdom was of much
greater benefit to the center than to the periphery. There were two
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The

existence

of

such

difficulties

makes

the

process

of

generalization and classification inevitable for almost any study of
this school, especially if one wants to analyze the dependency school
view

of the relations

socialist nations.

between

advanced capitalist countries

and

Due to the deficiency of explicit references of the

dependency school’s adherents to the relations between capitalist
and socialist countries, one should mainly rely on the process of
deduction.

By the process of deduction I mean, with the help of this

school's extensive writing on the subject of the relations of advanced
capitalist countries and less developed countries, one tries to infer
how it might view the relations among advanced capitalist countries
and socialist ones.

In other words one attem pts to explore the

underlying methodology and reach by reasoning the conclusion at
which they themselves would have arrived, if they had chosen to
investigate the relations of advanced capitalist countries and socialist
nations.

This logical conclusion can then be supported by reference

to their scattered writings on the subject of my study.
Palm a (1978) has distinguished three major approaches and
categories in the dependency analyses.2

The first is that begun by

reasons for this: First, the factor and commodity markets were
oligopolistic in the center, which lead to a long-term decline in the terms
o f trade for the periphery; and the center's income elasticity of demand
for the periphery's imports from the center was increasing.
While the
periphery's income elasticity of demand for the imports from the center
was increasing, the result was a chronic balance o f payments problem.
Second, there were a number o f benefits associated with concentration in
industrial production, such as increase in productivity, which lead to the
higher wages and other factor prices in the center. Palma (1978) and
O'Brien (1975)

2

It should be mentioned that Palma uses this classification in regards to the
dependency writers who are concerned with Latin America; but since the
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Frank, and its essential characteristic is its efforts to build a theory of
underdevelopment.
Sunkel

and

The second approach is found in the works of

Furtado

and

is

distinguished

by

its

attem pts

to

"reformulate the ECLA analyses of Latin American development from
the

p ersp ectiv e

of

a

critiq u e

of

developm ent'.” (Palma 1978, P. 898)

the

o b stacles

to

'n atio n al

The third approach does not

attem pt to construct a theory of dependency; rather it concentrates
on studying the "concrete forms in which dependent relationships
develop" and examines the distinct and unique forms in which the
econom ics

and

articulated with

p o litics

o f each

country

in

those of the advanced capitalist

the

periphery

countries.3

are

(Palma

1978, p. 898)
In

my

study

I

w ill

use

the

P alm a’s classificatio n ,

with

concentration on the first and second approaches, and for the reasons
which will be stated later, in particular on the first one.

I will not

deal with the third category of authors in the dependency tradition.

bulk o f the writing in this tradition is concentrated on Latin America's
underdevelopment and others who are interested in studying the
underdevelopment o f other parts o f the periphery more or less follow the
general line adopted by the former, it seems to be accurate to accept that
Palma's classification can be applied to the dependency school as a whole.
3

I do not wish to imply that the third approach is atheoretical; rather, as
Palma has stated it "deliberately attempts not to develop a mechanicoformal theory o f Latin America underdevelopment based on its dependent
character." (Ibid., P. 898) In brief, the third approach argues that: 1)
Latin American societies are part o f the world capitalist system, as a result
"a basic element for the understanding o f these societies is given by the
general determinants o f the world capitalist system." (Ibid., P. 909) 2)
Latin American countries exhibit "social asymmetries" which is in part due
to their internal conditions.
Consequently, understanding their "internal
determinants" is extremely important. 3) Finally, it is only through a
study o f "how the general and specific determinants interact in particular
and concrete situations" that one can get an accurate picture of the Latin
American economic development. (Ibid., P. 910)
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The reason is not that 1 believe they are unim portant or their
contribution is insignificant, but rather that they have concentrated
their study on

the concrete

hence it is im possible

to

situation

deduce

of underdevelopm ent, and

w hat w ould

have been

their

conclusions if instead they had analyzed concretely the relations of
each Eastern European country with the advanced capitalist nations.
From the first categories, I will discuss the work of A.G. Frank,
and J. W allerstein, and from the second category the work of O.
Sunkel.

This selection is not arbitrary.

I have chosen Frank, since he

is one of the founders of the dependency schools and his works are
widely known among and cited by the developm ent econom ists4.
And the discussion of dependency school is so closely associated with
Frank's name and his work that some condsider him the creator of a
new

paradigm 5.

Wallerstein was

chosen since I agree with Gulap,

Haldun (1981) who argues that W allerstein's world system approach
has cleared up some of the inconsistencies which exist in Frank's
arguments, especially the inconsistency in regards to the transfer of
surplus from the periphery to the center and the attribution of
underdevelopment of the periphery to such transfer.

W allerstein's

4

Some even call Frank the founder of the dependency school. (Gulap,
Haldun). (1981) Whether he or Baran is the founder o f this school is not a
point o f my concern; however, it should be mentioned that Frank has
acknowledged profusely his debt to Paul Baran's The Political Economy of
Growth. (Baran 1957)

5

Fosten-Carter (1976) by using the Kuhnian Concept o f scientific
revolution, argues that Frank's writing represents a new paradigm which
is increasingly challenging the predominant paradigm exemplified by the
works o f Rostow. If one agrees with Carter, then the study of Frank's
writings becomes a must.
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framework of
since

he has

analysis,

however,

sim ilarly

is

attem pted

different
to

from Frank's,6

develop

a th eo ry

but
of

underdevelopment, 1 believe exploring his world system under the
same category as Frank's is appropriate. 7 In the following sections of
this chapter, I will first discuss the underlying points of argument of
each

one o f

the

previously

m entioned

regards to the relations between the

dependency analysts

in

"center" and the "periphery."

This is going to be a painstaking and rather lengthy process, but it
has to be done in order to take the second step. Second, in light of
their methodology and with the help of their writings (if any) on the
trade

and investm ents

of advanced capitalist countries w ith

the

socialist countries, I will try to distinguish how they would observe
such economic relations.

Finally, I will review the major critical

points of their arguments. 8

6 In the following section, it will become clear to the readers that Frank and
Wallerstein each employ a different framework of analysis.
7 This action contrasts with some views which maintain that the world
system approach is not
another variation o f the dependency "theory,"
since "the question o f exogenous effects on development is no longer
phrased in terms of the strength or weakness o f links between the center
and a given peripheral country.
Rather, the issue is phrasedin terms o f
the consequences o f occupying a given structural position within the
world system as a whole." (Evans 1979)
8 My purpose is not to critically evaluate these authors. They have been
criticized elsewhere. I am merely exploring their ideas. In the process, I
will attempt to show that their methodology leads them to reach the same
conclusion in both cases of LDCs-DCs economic relations and East-West
economic relations.
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P art

One*.

D ependency

&£

Ui£

"T h e o r y .

ill

U n d e r d e v e lo p m e n t :

2.1. Frank.
Frank has declared his task as participation in constructing a theory
of

cap italist

developm ent

and

underdevelopm ent.9

"My general

purpose is to contribute to the building of a more adequate general
theory

of

c a p ita list

underdevelopment."

econom ic

developm ent

(Frank 1969, P. 13)

and

p articu larly

In doing so in his analysis

of underdevelopm ent of Chile, he attributes this underdevelopment
to the four centuries of capitalist development in Chile.

In order to

show that underdevelopment is a result of capitalism , Frank starts
with the proposition that the Chilean economy (and for that matter
all of L atin America) has been capitalist since its insertion into the
world economy:

"Capitalism began to penetrate, to form, indeed fully

9 Whether constructing such a theory is possible has been questioned. For
example Henry Bernstein (1979) using Hirst's (1976) definition o f theory as
“a logical structure o f concepts which designates an object to be explained
and which provides a mechanism of explanation for that object"
argues that
a
theory o f
underdevelopment
is impossible
to
construct,
since
underdevelopment does not "constitute a coherent object o f explanation."
Arguing against a diffusionist model o f development, he states "the dualism
established
by the conceptual couple, modernity-tradition embodies a
circularity
which cannot produce
any theoretical advance, any explanation
other than that already
given by definition of the terms."
He then argues
the same is also true for underdevelopment theory.
Based on this theory
development is associated with a 'normal* capitalist development o f the
center which cannot occur since the capitalist development of the center
requires the underdevelopment o f the periphery.
"This is an effect of the
lack o f an adequate theorization and problematization o f the concept of
capitalism." The underdevelopment theorists' statement that no country in
the Third World can become another United States in fact is "a negative
theology: stating what cannot occur provides no means o f investigating what
does occur." (Bernstein, 1979)
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characterize

L atin

A m erica

as

early

as

the

Sixteenth

Century

conquest." (Frank 1969, P. xii)

2.1.1.

C o n tra d ic tio n s

o f C ap italism

and

U n d erd ev elo p m en t:

One may then ask what it is in capitalism which has generated
underdevelopm ent in these economies.

To answer this question,

Frank enum erates three contradictions of capitalism to which the
causes of underdevelopment should be traced.
are

"the expropriation

appropriation

by

of economic

surplus

few, the polarization

These contradictions
from

many

and

of capitalist system

its
into

metropolitan centers and peripheral satellites, and the continuity of
the fundamental structure of capitalist system throughout its history
of expansion."

(Frank 1969, P. 3) To explain the first contradiction

"the expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus" he employs
the definition of economic surplus as has been used by Paul Baran.
(1975) Baran makes a distinction between "actual" and "potential"
economic surplus.

The "actual" is the part of current production

which is invested, and "potential" is part of economic surplus which
has not been made available to the society because the monopoly
structure of the economy has either prevented its production or has
wasted it in luxury consumption.

"Therefore, the nonrealization and

unavailability for investment of 'potential* economic surplus is due
essentially to the monopoly structure of capitalism." (Baran 1975, P.
7) He then goes on to argue that the external monopoly describes the
manner in which Chile has been integrated into the world economy.
And since then "the external monopoly has always resulted in the
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expropriation

(and

consequently

unavailability

to

C hile)

of

a

significant part of the economic surplus produced in Chile and its
appropriation by another part of the world." (Baran 1975, P. 7)

Such

an "exploitative relation" in a chain-like manner spread the capitalist
link from
periphery.

the

capitalist w orld

to

the rem otest regions

o f the

The extraction of surplus or this "exploitive relation"

takes place not only between regions but also between

individuals

due to the exertion of the monopoly power by one region over
another or by an individual over another individual.

The implication

is then that a merchant is a capitalist who due to his (her) monopoly
power exploits a small peasant by expropriating his/her surplus.
And at the same time the capitalists at various levels may be both
exploiting

and exploited.

(Gulap,

Haldun

1981,

P.

172)

The

expropriation and appropriation of the periphery's surplus by the
cen ter

is

one

of

underdevelopm ent

the
of

the

m ajor

causes

periphery.

if

not

"The

the

cause

satellites

of

rem ain

underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus." (Frank 1969,
P. 9)
The second contradiction of capitalism which Frank regards as
a cause of underdevelopment is that "the capitalism takes the form
of polarization10

into metropolitan centers and peripheral satellites."

(Frank 1969, P. 8)

The same historical process which has created

d e v e lo p m e n t

th e

in

c e n te r

s im u lta n e o u s ly

g e n e ra te d

10 Why does such a polarization take place? Frank's answer is due
"imminent centralization o f capitalist system." (Frank 1969, P. 8)

to the
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underdevelopm ent in the periphery.

"The m etropolis expropriates

econom ic

and appropriates

surplus

from

its

satellite

it

for its

economic development." (Frank 1969, P. 9) It should be understood,
therefore, that it is the inevitable consequence o f the world capitalist
system that the development of the center takes place at the expense
of the periphery.
extends to
itself.

Frank also argues this process of polarization

the internal structure o f the underdeveloped country

"Once a country or a people is converted into the satellite of an

external capitalist m etropolis the

contradictions of

capitalism

are

created

on the dom estic level and come to generate tendencies

tow ard

d evelopm ent

in

the

n atio n al

m etro p o lis

underdevelopm ent in its domestic satellites..."

and

tow ard

(Frankl969, P.

10)

From the above analysis Frank reaches one of his major conclusions
or solutions for the ’problem' of underdevelopment.

He presents a

"subsidiary thesis" which is "If it is satellite status which generates
underdevelopm ent,
s a te llite

then a weaker or lesser degree

r e la tio n s

underdevelopm ent

m ay

g e n e ra te

and/or allow fo r

development." (Frank 1969,

le ss
more

of m etropolis-

d eep
p o ssib ility

s tr u c tu ra l
of

local

P. 11) Then he goes on to argue that at

any period of capitalist development during which the link between
center and periphery momentarily weakened, such as during periods
of

w orld

wars

and

global

depressions,

outbursts o f development in the periphery.

there

were

tem porary

Frank's delinking thesis

is both one of the weakest and at the same time the most important
point of his argument.

It is one of the weakest, since it is probably
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the most critized aspect of his argument. 11

It has been constantly

attacked by the M arxist critics; and it is one of the most important
points of his argument, because although Frank takes advantage of
every opportunity to assert that the simple process of delinking from
the world is not sufficient 12 for the development of the periphery
and it has to be accompanied by the radical changes in both economic
and political systems of these countries.

Nevertheless the simple

delinking process has haunted his work and, as it will be discussed
later, its ghost has even appeared in his discussion of economic
relations between socialist countries and the world market economy.
The final major contradiction of the capitalist system based on
Frank is the "contradiction of continuity in change."

By this he means

"the continuity and ubiquity of the structural essentials of economic
developm ent and underdevelopm ent of the capitalist system at all
times and places." (Frank 1969, P. 12)

This is a rather simple thesis

which states that, regardless o f any transform ation that capitalism
has undergone, it has m aintained its essential characteristics and
generated

th e

same

fundam ental

feature to the periphery means

contradictions.

A pplying

"emphasis on the continuity

this
of

capitalist structure and its generation of underdevelopment..." (Frank
1969, P. 13) This "continuity in change" clearly is not one of the
contradictions of the capitalist system. It however allows Frank to
concentrate

his

em phasis

on

the

tw o

p rev io u sly

m entioned

contradictions.

I will discuss the points raised by Frank’s critics later in this chapter.
However, I will argue later that Frank believes that such delinking is a
necessary condition for the development o f periphery.
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Based on what has been mentioned so far it can be seen that
Frank's theoretical scheme involves three major assertions.
is that Latin

A merica and other areas

The first

of periphery have

been

integrated into the capitalist world economy since the early period of
colonial

conquest.

The

second

is

th at

this

incorporation

has

transform ed these societies im m ediately into capitalist economies
and finally the dependent nature of such insertion into the capitalist
w orld

m arket,

w hich

has

been

accom panied

by

an

endless

m etropolis-satellite chain through which the surplus is successively
drawn off toward the center, is the cause of underdevelopment of
the periphery. (Palma (1978) & Laclau (1971))
If one agrees with Frank's theoretical assertions and then tries
to expand them to the economic relations between socialist countries
and the capitalist world economy, then the following conclusions
should be expected. Since it is the integration in the capitalist world
economy which is the determinant in defining a country's economics
system, then those socialist countries which are incorporated into the
capitalist world market are not socialist at all.
Frank, himself, does not deal extensively with the question of
socialist countries until he starts to analyze the recent crisis of the
capitalist w orld economy and emergence o f a new
division of labor.

international

To understand the connection one must first step

back and delineate the theoretical content of his treatment of the
international division of labor in general, and the new international
division of labor in particular.
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2.1.2*

S ta g e s

International
Frank

of

D ivision

distinguishes

p ro cess

of

C a p ita lis t

th&_

and

o f Laborr

three

c a p ita list

D e v e lo p m e n t

m ain

stages

in

developm ent:

the

w orld

m e rc a n tilist

em bracing

(1500-1770),

industrial capitalist (1770-1870), and im perialist (1870-1930), with
each

stage

dem onstrating

division of labor.

a

p articular

pattern

of

international

As will be discussed later, Frank in fact considers

the period of 1930 up to the present time as the neoim perialist
period.

W hether he considers this period as a new stage in the

process of world capitalist development is not clear in his writings.
The first stage was dominated by the marked increase of European
commercial activities and growth of colonial production for export.
(Frank 1979, P. 13)

In this period the world division of labor and

the pattern of trade can be "divided
Asian or Oriental and the Atlantic."

into two m ajor triangles, the

(Frank 1979,

P. 13) The Oriental

triangle involved fundamentally the export of spices and textiles to
Europe, and "their payment in bullion of European origin."

In the

Sixteenth Century with the incorporation of parts of Africa and the
New W orld into the mercantile capitalist system, part of the exports
from Asia were re-exported by Europe to America and Asia; "and an
increasingly part of the Oriental goods was paid for by Europe with
American slaves."

(Frank 1979, P.13)

In the Atlantic triangle the

African slaves were purchased by British (and Asian) manufacturers;
transported

to the plantations, they

produced sugar, cotton,

and

other raw materials which were then shipped back to Europe. To this
m ajor triangle, Frank argues, others

m ust be added such as

the

Spanish American gold and silver trade, which fed the Asian trade.
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In

short,

the

stage o f m ercantile capitalism

is

marked

by the

European search for foreign products. (Frank 1979, PP. 14-16)
According to Frank, the second stage of the world capitalist
development included a wide expansion of world trade as well as
significant changes in the international division of labor.

During this

stage, which began with the Industrial Revolution in Europe, the
search for foreign products was shifted to exploring for outlets for
E u ro p e an

m a n u fa c tu re rs.

m anufactured
m aterials

goods, in

from

international

the

division

E u ro p e

com m en ced

to

ex p o rt

particular textiles, in exchange for raw

colonies.
of labor

This

fundam ental

change

in

the

had far reaching

effects

on

the

economies of the colonial countries.

Frank believes, however, that

these changes did not take place simultaneously everywhere.
exam ple, at the end o f

the Eighteenth

A m erica

raw

the

growth

of

m aterials

For

Century, when in Latin
export coupled with

the

increase in imports of manufacturing goods led to the destruction of
local manufacturing, India was still exporting large quantities of
textiles to Europe.

The process of deindustrialization of India did not

happen until the first h alf of the Nineteenth Century when the
country became an importer of manufactured goods and exporter of
raw materials. (Frank 1979, PP. 76-78) 13
Frank concludes that in the second stage of world capitalist
development the changes in the international division of labor were
strongly to the detrim ent of the present
During this period w hile

underdeveloped countries.

Britain and later on the other European

For more information on deindustrialization o f India, see Amiya Bagcbi
(1976).
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countries and the United States were industrializing, the rest of the
w orld

becam e

specialized

in

the

production

of

food

and

raw

materials to feed the workers and industry of these countries. (Frank
1979, P. 131)
Frank's discussion of changes in the international division of
labor in the third stage of world capitalist development seems closely
linked with his analysis of such changes in the neoimperialist period,
which according to him started in the 1930s and extended to the
present time. (Frank 1972)

In his discussion of these changes one

can notice once more, the importance of the concept of "delinking”
from the capitalist w orld m arket and the central role which the
concept plays in his general argument. He continuously tries to show
how

such

"delinking"

brought

about

the

developm ent o f

the

productive forces of the

underdeveloped countries and this, in turn,

helped

a

them

to

gain

new

and

im proved

p o sitio n in

the

international division of labor.

2,1.3, -The

Im perialist

Stage

and

the

Sem i-Peripherv:

The imperialist stage is characterized by the domination of monopoly
capital in the metropole.

During this period, Frank argues the high

demand for raw materials and the lure of the protits in producing
and exporting them encouraged investm ent in the infrastructure in
the satellites. The metropolis invaded the agricultural sector of the
underdeveloped countries and if they did not get the land they
obtained its products, since they "monopolized the merchandising of
agricultural -and most other- products." (Frank 1972, P. 69)
these

products

out of

the periphery,

the

m etropolis

To

get

stim ulated
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construction of ports and railroads and public utilities to service all
these activities.

The conversion of most of the LDCs to a primary

monoproduct export economy was implemented in the colonial epoch
and consolidated by the imperialist policies.
The first World War caused a temporary cessation of foreign
trade and investment penetration in the satellite which led to some
industrial development there.

Immediately after the War, however,

the metropolis expanded its grip to include precisely those sectors of
industry, i.e. consumer goods, which had been recently initiated by
the local capital and turned out to be profitable.

Frank then goes on

to discuss another important period of isolation of the LDCs from the
world market.

The 1929 crash brought another respite from foreign

trade and investm ent which was continued by World W ar II and
lasted up to the early 1950s. Such weakening of the economic ties
with the metropole created a condition for implementing the policy
of import substitution in some of the satellite countries.
countries

began

to

previously imported.

produce

consum er

goods

w hich

they

These
had

To continue the process of import-substitution

these countries were obliged to im port industrial equipm ent from
abroad.

"That is, they simply substituted one type of import for

another, w hich renew ed their dependence on the m etropolis and
ultimately led to a renewal of foreign investments.” (Frank 1972, P.
85)
As a result of the adoption of an import-substitution policy the
nature of imports of some peripheral countries changed and led to a
significant degree of substitution of nationally produced consumer
goods for imports. The national industry, however, began to import a
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greater volume of raw materials and capital goods as inputs for the
manufacturing sector.

As a result of choosing the import substitution

policy the external vulnerability of these countries did not diminish.
Indeed,

th ese

countries

becam e

m ore

v u ln erab le

and

m ore

dependent, because of the strategic nature o f their imports. (Frank
1972, P. 86)

M oreover, they had to pay for such capital goods

imported through their exports.

In order to pay for these imports

they borrowed and eventually invited the multinational corporations
to set up operations in their country in the hope that they would
bring the capital and capital equipment into the country.
N evertheless,
underw ent

a

according

certain

kind

to Frank

some

o f industrial

of these

developm ent

countries
and

have

become to a certain extent, "economies that could be classified as
intermediate, or semiperipheral." These countries participated in the
international division of labor in a different way; they exported not
so much raw materials and simple manufactured goods but industrial
goods produced by the heavy industrial sector and especially the
armaments industry. (Frank 1979, P. 55) Therefore, a process of
differentiation

has

been

happening

among

the

countries

of the

periphery, a process which has intensified with the emergence of a
new international division of labor.

2.1.4.

The

New

In tern ational

D ivision

of

Labor

and— Ul£

Scmi-P.eriph.fiQ.;
In Frank's account another

"fundamental" developm ent has been

occurring in the international division of labor since the mid 1960s.
And it is in his discussion of these "fundamental" changes that Frank
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links the process of w orld capitalist development to the socialist
countries.

Therefore, a more detailed analysis of his discussion of

these recent developments is essential for continuing our discussion.
Frank’s

explanation

of

the

recent

changes

in

the

international

division of labor is rooted in his analysis of world economic crisis.14
"The periods of crisis in the process of capital accumulation have in
the past brought with them im portant qualitative changes in the
international division of labor.” (Frank 1981, P. 25)

And there is no

exception in the present crisis which started in the mid-1960s.

The

crisis itself means that the process of capital accumulation, in other
words growth, "no longer functions as it did in the past." (Frank
1981, P. 25)

Frank's explanation of the causes of the present crisis

centers around the increase in capital-labor ratio, and the increase in
the cost of production and in particular the wages.

"Since the mid

1960s in the industrial economies the increase in the capital-labor
ratio, as well as the associated increase in workers bargaining power
and m ilitancy have led to a decline in the rate o f profit"

and

consequently in the rate of growth. (Frank 1981, P. 114)
In order to repeat a long boom, such as that of the post war
period, the rate of profit has to increase and new technology must be
developed.

For this to happen, Frank argues the old industries have

to be replaced by new ones, "the capital needs to take investment

Frank's discussion at this point creates some confusion. It is not clear
whether each stage of capitalist development brings a
particular pattern
of international division o f labor, or whether the economic crises do so. It
is also possible he means that it is in the third stage of capitalist
development that with any economic crisis one can see a new international
division of labor. For criticism o f his theory of crisis see (Bernstein and
Nicholas, 1983)
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out of textiles and automobile and put it into new technology.” (Frank
1981, P. 51) Moreover, there has to be a significant modification in
the international division of labor, a process which has already
started.
Among the m anifestations of this new transformation in the
international division of labor is the role played by the intermediate
or subim perialist econom ies.

These countries

are able to take

advantage of the new situation and try to find a new place in the
international division of labor.

And they are becoming increasingly

the producers and exporters of machinery and capital goods. (Frank
1981, P. 21 & 4 7 )15

These

changes

developm ent for these countries.
industrialized
capital

countries,

in ten siv e

moving

in d u stries,

im ply

From

the

further

point of view

lab o r intensive

such

as

steel,

capitalist

and

of

some

very

shipbuilding,

and

automobiles to the Third W orld is advantageous, since it releases
capital from the industries which are deeply in trouble ^

and makes

it available for investment in development of technology needed for
creation and expansion of new leading sectors. (Frank 1981, P. 112 &
129)

The development of new sources of energy, exploitation of the

oceans and ocean floors for minerals, and advances in the field of
biochem istry and genetics are among the possible list of leading
sectors. (Frank 1981, P. 18 & 19)

15

Mansred Bienfeld and Martin Godfray (1982) argue that the newly
industrialized countris were able to take advantage o f very unique world
conditions in the late 1960s.
16 Because o f problems in demand and high cost o f production. (Frank 1977,
P. 112)
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A nother m ajor change in the international division of labor
according to Frank is the resettlem ent of labor-intensive industries
from developed countries to some of the underdeveloped economies.
The

transferred

industries

have

included

textiles,

clothing,

and

footwear, as well as manufacturing processes such as the fabrication
of electronic components. (Frank 1977, P. 112)

These are industries

which have become relatively labor intensive, labor intensive with
high cost, and they are displaced to low-wage areas.

From the point

of view of the Third World, this move represents a policy of export
promotion.

In these countries, foreign capital has m ainly set up

manufacturing facilities to produce solely for export, rather than for
domestic markets.

South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore

were among the first T hird W orld countries to adopt the export
promotion policy.

These economies offer cheap labor and compete

with each other in providing any forms of tax relief to attract foreign
capital.
The

export

prom otion

policy

has

led

to

some

internal

consequences which are significantly different from those of import
substitution. In the period of import substitution, maintenance and
expansion of the internal market for selling locally produced goods
aimed at the local market were essential, and import substitution
policy in turn required more or less an equal distribution of income.
The new industrial production is now to a great extent geared to
exports.

The workers are not the consumers anymore, and as a

result it is not in the interest of capital that the workers have an
income sufficiently great to provide an effective demand. The natural
consequences will be the intensification of misery and intolerable
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living conditions for the majority of the population of these countries.
(Frank 1981, P. 49)
It is important to notice that it seems for Frank the role of less
developed countries in response to the crisis of capital accumulation
in the center is primarily as suppliers 17 of cheap labor.

This kind of

argument does not distinguish between the role of less developed
countries in the period of crisis and their role during the periods of
boom in the world capitalist economy.

What is demanded of them

now is essentially the same as always. (Bernstein and Nicholas 1983,
P. 11)

Frank himself has expressed the same idea: "new dependent

export-led growth of manufacturing and agribusiness production for
the world market are in no way significantly different from the old
raw m aterials export-led growth which underdeveloped the Third
World in the first place." (cited in Bernstein and Nicholas 1983, PP.
11- 12)

2.1.5. The New International D ivision of Labor and

Socialist

C oun tries:
According to Frank, among the m ost important elements of the
new

international division

of labor is

the "reintegration

socialist econom ies into the world market."

of the

H e argues that the

socialist countries were only tem porarily relatively isolated" from
the world market.

17

This isolation was only partly due to their choice,

As was mentioned earlier, Frank believes that LDC's are also recipients of
some capital-intensive industries, but their role is primarily the suppliers
o f cheap labor.
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it was mainly forced upon them by the capitalist world in reaction to
the socialist countries' internal policy of transformation of property
rights.

The adoption of isolation policy (delinking policy) is one of

the m ajor reasons that these countries now can participate in the
world capitalist economy on a basis which is "remotely equal” to that
of the industrialized capitalist countries.
Only some 'socialist' economies can now knock on the door
o f or challenge the capitalist inner sanctum, because they
were temporarily relatively isolated from the capitalist
international division o f labor. (Frank 1981, P.138)

There were two reasons for the reintegration of the socialist
countries into the world market.

One is the pull of the West which is

in crisis; the other is the push of economic and political crisis in the
East. (Frank 1981, P. 113)

As was mentioned earlier in Frank’s

account, to restore the period of growth, the developed capitalist
countries have to transfer some of the "sick" industries and some of
the labor intensive ones to the other parts of the world. The other
parts of the world include some of the Third World countries as well
as socialist economies.

In the socialist countries as well as these

Third World countries the wages are lower and the labor discipline
is higher than in the advanced capitalist economies.

The most politically sensitive mass-production are moved
out and in this way capital can control labor in the
imperialist countries, while it can produce in the Soviet
Union not only at low wage but also with disciplined labor
and no strike. (Frank 1981, P.37)
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For this reason the automobile and steel industries are moving their
facilities to Brazil, South Korea, and the Soviet Union.

Some internal

reasons have also led to the reinsertion of the socialist economies
into

the

cap italist

international

division

of

labor.

The

most

significant of these is the economic fluctuations in investment and
income which seem to assume a pattern of cycles of about eight
years' duration.

Frank argues that an entirely satisfactory answer

for the cause of these cycles is not available.
suggestion that am bitious plans lead
These

in

turn

cause

supply

There is some

to upsw ings in investment.

bottlenecks, lags

of w ages

behind

productivity, shortage of consumer goods, which will all eventually
lead to political pressure with the resu lt of lowering the pace of
investment. (Frank 1977, PP. 109-110)
In the down phase of their economic fluctuations the socialist
countries are under great pressure to import from abroad.

Such

imports supplement the supply of goods, and in particular help to
maintain investment in machinery and equipment.
the capitalist w orld and the im portation w estern

The contact with
technology are

therefore partly due to the "inability of the socialist countries to
continue satisfactory industrial developm ent w ithout becoming far
more integrated into the imperialist economy." (Frank 1981, P. 34)
As a result of these reinforcing elements the socialist countries
are reintegrating into the world capitalist economy.

The manner in

which socialist economies insert themselves into the international
division

of

labor

is

subimperialist countries.

sim ilar

to

th a t

of

the

interm ediate

or

According to Frank, then, one witnesses
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the emergence of a kind of "social subimperialism of the Soviet Union
and a subsocial imperialism of the East European countries."

(Frank

1981, P. 34)
In other words, the socialist countries occupy an intermediate
position in the international division of labor which means these
countries

and

in

particular

advanced

technology

the

Soviet U nion

im port the

m ost

18 possible from the center. They use this

technology to develop their own industries and to produce goods for
both the domestic market and for export particularly to the Third
World.

Despite the socialist countries' payment with raw materials

and light m anufacturing to the advanced capitalist economies, the
socialist economies are increasingly showing unfavorable balances of
paym ents w ith respect to the advanced capitalist countries.
overcom e this problem

they are expanding

To

their exports to the

poorer countries, whose production forces are not developed enough
to participate at the same level in the international division of labor.
Since the socialist countries are increasingly running a favorable
balance of payments with the poor countries they can redress their
deficit with the im perialist countries through the foreign exchange
earned from LDCs. (Frank 1981, P. 35)
The socialist countries occupy an intermediate position in the
international division of labor, in this regard not unlike the most
developed
"They

18

'sub-im perialist'

im port

advanced

underdeveloped
tech n o lo g y

countries

m an u factu res

like

B razil.

from

the

According to Frank these countries cannot get access to most advanced
technology; "but they import what we might call second-level technology.”
(Frank 1981)
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industrially developed capitalist, paying for them with raw materials
and

incurring

grow ing

trade

deficit.

And

they

export

less

sophisticated m anufactures to the underdeveloped countries, with
whom the socialist countries run up a trade surplus, part of which
they use to reduce their trade deficit with the im perialist countries,
also not unlike the sub-imperialist capitalist countries.

(Frank 1977,

P. 101)

2.1.6.

E conom ic

R elatio n s

B etw een

S o cialist

C o u n trie s

and

LDCs:
Frank presents in some detail the economic relations and in
particular pattern of trade between the socialist economies and the
less developed countries. 19
relations

have

adversely

In doing so he tries to show how these

affected

the

underdeveloped

econom ies,

and how sim ilar are these relations to those of advanced capitalist
econom ies

and

the

less

developed

countries.

Frank

argues

that

socialist exports to the underdeveloped countries consist of industrial
commodities, while their imports from the underdeveloped countries
are raw m aterials.

This pattern of trade is sim ilar to the trade

between the advanced capitalist countries and the underdeveloped
ones.

The socialist countries also have a "growing balance of

payment surplus” with the underdeveloped countries.

And since the

less developed countries run a balance of payment deficit with both
the im perialist countries and the socialist countries, the growing

19

Trade is the most important aspect o f economic relations between East-West
and East-LDCs, I will come back to this point later in chapter four.
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trade relations with socialist countries only aggravate their balance
of payment problem. (Frank 1981, P. 11)
The econom ic and political advantages that East-South
economic relations confer on the underdeveloped countries
are not significantly different from the 'advantages' o f
imperialist and neo-colonialist economic relations between the
cap italist underdeveloped
and the capitalist developed
countries. (Frank 1977, P. 118)

T hese

relatio n s

tend

to

rein fo rce

the

ex istin g

p o sitio n

of

underdeveloped countries in the international division of labor, and
may even propel them further toward the new direction which is
required by the present process of world capitalist accumulation.
The economic relations between the socialist economies and less
developed ones therefore do not further the liberation of the latter
from the grip of economic dependence.
lending

support to

Indeed, in too many cases by

the m ost reactionary

regim es,

(for exam ple,

Bolivia after Banzer's military coup and Suharto regime in Indonesia)
such relations even hinder the achievement of political and economic
independence of these countries.

And in as much as these relations

strengthen the states which are at the sevice of the private capital,
the socialist countries are "giving support and protection to capital
and capitalism in the 'Third World' and in the world as a whole."
(Frank 1977, P. 118)
In summary, Frank does not see any significant difference
between the exploiting relationship which exists between advanced
capitalist countries and the less developed ones, and the exploitive
relations which exist between the socialist countries and the less
developed ones.

He in fact argues that the socialist countries extract
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surplus value from the Third World.
"conversion deals” between

the

For instance, in his discussion of
Soviet Union

and

India,

Frank

contends that, since in these deals the Soviet Union purchased cotton
from Sudan and then shipped it to Indian textile mills in return for
textiles the Soviet Union was extracting "the surplus value of Indian
labor." (Frank 1977, P. 118)
In Frank’s account the countries in the international division of
labor occupy different levels, but the intermediate countries are in a
peculiar position. On the one hand they are exploiting the countries
at the low er levels; on the other hand they are being exploited
them selves

by the advanced capitalist countries

upper rungs.

which

hold

the

The pattern of trade of the intermediate countries is an

indicator of such hierarchical exploitive relationships. W hile these
countries
countries

export

m anufacturing

and im port raw

goods

to

m aterials from

the

underdeveloped

them, the interm ediate

countries export raw materials, in particular fuel, to the imperialist
countries

and im port industrial products from

them. Frank, who

considers socialist countries as interm ediate countries, believes the
above criteria are applicable to their case.

2.1*7. The Ul-Effects of Economic Relations with DCs:
Turning to the socialist countries' economic relations with the
advanced capitalist countries.

Frank argues that the western expons

to the eastern countries in the recent decade have mainly included
m achinery,

equipm ent

and

w hole

p lan ts

em bodying

advanced

technology.

The exports of East to W est have been raw materials,

fuels and food exports as well as manufacturers produced in part
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w ith

the

im ported

equipm ent

em ploying

cheap

labor

through

thousands of "bipartite and tripartite" production agreements with
the western firms and the underdeveloped countries. (Frank 1981,
PP. 136 & 20)

As trading partners, therefore, "the socialist countries

are to the developed capitalist ones as the capitalist underdeveloped
ones are to them or vice versa!"

(Frank 1977, P. 99)

In their trading relations with the W est the socialist countries
show growing balance of payment deficit which are covered by the
official and supplier credits, by Soviet sales of gold and increasingly
by

borrow ings

from

E uro-currency

m arket.

As

was

m entioned

before, Frank argues that the socialist countries partially redress
their deficit with the W est through their trade surplus with the
underdeveloped countries. (Frank 1977, P. 98)
not,

according

to

Frank

the

only

harm ful

The mounting debt is
effects

of

growing

participation of the socialist countries in the international division of
labor.

Such participation has far reaching im plications for the

domestic policies of these countries and more importantly for the
structure of socialist societies.
For

instance,

the

socialist

importing inflation from the West.

countries

are

more

and

more

Admitting that the state absorbs

price increases through increasing subsidies on the consumer goods
in order to keep their prices stable, Frank believes that continuation
of this policy in the face of price hikes in the west has proven to be
impossible and has led to increases in the consumer goods prices in
some of the socialist countries. (Frank 1977, P. 122)

Moreover, the

socialist countries cannot escape the effects of the current economic
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crisis in the W est and its impact is being felt throughout these
countries.
T he increasing dependence of socialist countries on trade with
the advanced capitalist countries has made them vulnerable to any
recession in the W est. This dependence can easily block the path of
industrial development and increase in the living standards in the
East.

And, in as much as the domestic production has been more and

more diverted into the production exports in order to pay for the
imports and to repay the mounting debt and credits, the socialist
countries are becoming more and m ore "dependent on the West and
on the economic and political stability in the West." (Frank 1977, P.
127)
T he ill-effects of economic fluctuations and inflation of the
West on the East and the dependence of the latter on the former
seem to be minor, if one considers the m ajor effects of socialist
countries' reintegration into the w orld market, that is importing the
capitalism itself.

Frank believes "the countries of Eastern Europe and

the S oviet Union

will be im porting

not only w estern

factories,

technology, and products, but the capitalist relations embedded in
them, including speed-up of production, capitalist organization and
criteria of decision-making and capitalist wage structure and income
differentials...and capitalist class structure.
countries

In short, the 'socialist*

of E astern Europe will be and are already im porting

capitalism.” (Frank 1977, P. 127)
Indeed, Frank argues

that the economic integration of the

socialist countries into the world international division of labor, and
the related political compromises "call into question the extent to
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which the socialist world is any way separate or different from the
capitalist world." (Frank 1977, P. 93)

And the more the practices of

these countries are examined "under the plain light of day, the more
undistinguishable"

their policies become from those of national-

development" practiced by the capitalist countries. (Frank 1981, PP.
137-138) 20
It seems to Frank, then, the practical difference between the
so cialist

co u n tries,

and

'p ro g ressiv e'

countries is only matter of degree.

cap italist

less

developed

"Attempts by the latter to de-link

are nipped in the bud sooner, and re-integration with the world
economy imposed on them more easily." (Bernstein and Nicholas
1983, P. 18)
It is the peculiar definition of socialism used by Frank which
enables him to arrive at such conclusions.
to involve two m ajor steps:

one is

For him socialism appears

de-linking

from

the

world

economy, and the other is the redistribution of the political power
coupled with popular participation.

"A break with capitalism and the

transition to socialism requires a revolutionary process, an internal
transfer of power and popular participation, and the achievement of

2°

It should be mentioned that here and there Frank tries to upgrade the
importance o f the internal factors in the socialist countries which have
distracted these countries from the "true path" of socialism, as the
following quotation indicates. However, he does not in any way
demonstrate what these internal factors are and what is so peculiar about
the socialism which generates these destructive factors.
"Of course, the
international relations between the socialist and capitalist worlds are by no
means the only or even the most important factor in this question. On the
contrary, the international relations, real and desired, are only the
reflection o f internal relations o f production and other factors in the
socialist world, which
themselves raise questions about.degree o f shift
over time toward or away from 'socialism' in that part o f the world that goes
by that name.” (Frank 1977, P. 93)
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a greater degree of external independence." (Frank 1983, P. 342)
W ithout any of these socialism is not possible.

These steps have

been only taken for a short period of time in some of the countries
which

"we today call socialists."

integration

or "re-linking"

The recent process of rapid

by these countries

into

the capitalist

international division of labor indicates that if the capitalist relations
have not yet dominated the entire structure of these economies, they
are certainly im portant factors in leading them into the path of
transition to capitalism .
already

started

in

the

A process which according to Frank has
Eastern

European

countries.

O riginally,

socialism was understood to be a process of transition to communism.
It seems extrem ely difficult if not impossible today to sustain the
thesis that the ’really existing socialist societies' in Eastern Europe
are in any transition to anything today; they are more likely to be in
transition to capitalism. (Frank 1983a, P. 345)

2.1.8. F ra n k an d th e C ritics:
Frank's model, his methodology, and his conclusions have been
criticized by M arxists and non-M arxists alike.

Here, I will only

emphasize his Marxist critics; although I am well aware that Frank in
fact em phatically claims that

he is not a M arxist.

I do believe,

however, that M arxists both

have a valid point

and have most

effectively criticized him.

As Bernstein and Nicholas (Bernstein and

Nicholas 1983) argue, Frank
proposing a theory of

enters into the realm

the history of

of Marxism by

capitalist developm ent and
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m aintaining

that

socialism

is

the only

avenue

development of less developed countries.

open

for

the

Frank also uses Marxist

terms in a com pletely different conceptual framework, which gives
M arxists another legitim ate right to
which may arise from Frank's action.

try to clarify any confusion
Since there is almost no single

issue raised by Frank which has escaped M arxist criticism , I will
have to confine my review to those issues which I consider to be
essential and most relevant to the study on hand.21

Those issues, I

believe, are Frank's definition of capitalism, socialism and his concept
of new 'international' division of labor.
For Frank capitalism is synonymous with a system of exchange
relations and in particular international exchange.

It is a system of

production for market, in which the motive of production is profit
appropriated

by

non-producer

agents.

(Laclau

Capitalism is therefore an exploitive system.

1971,

P.

24)

However, Frank does

not specify the exploitive relations peculiar to capitalism; rather he
defines these relations as extraction

of surplus.

Such

a broad

definition permits him to define the capitalist exploitive relationship
as applicable to both the economic agents within a single nation and

21 Marxist critics of Frank are numerous; however, the most severe blow to
Frank's model was struck first by Laclau (1971) who pointed out that the
concept of capitalism used by Frank is erroneous from a Marxist point of
view. Brenner (1977) also demonstrated that the Frankian model by
concentrating on the market forces, sets aside the central role which class
struggle plays in economic development and underdevelopment.
Gulap
(1981) has summarized some of the im- portant Marxist terms which are
used by Frank in completely different conceptual frameworks.
Bernstein
and Nicholas (1983) have criticized Frank's concept of crisis as well as his
definition o f socialism. My review in this part mainly relies on these
important studies. There are other Marxist critics who do not primarily
deal with Frank, but with the dependency school in general. The examples
include Colin Leys (1970).
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to relations among countries on the international level.
specificity

is due to his

production.

disregarding

By doing so he ignores

capitalism

The lack of

as a mode of

the fundam ental economic

relations peculiar to capitalism: the existence of free labor divorced
from ownership of means of production, and forced to sell their labor
power in the market.

His neglect of capitalist particularities allows

him to include different exploitive relations (such as slavery, and
relations between peasants and merchants) in capitalism.
This loose definition of capitalism adopted by Frank permits
him

to

conclude

that the

Latin

Am erican countries

have

been

capitalist from their inception, since they were fully incorporated
into the world market in the colonial period.
exam ples of

participation of even the

His proof relies on the

rem otest region o f Latin

America in the process of commodity exchange.
As Frank has chosen to replace the capitalist exploitation with
the

process

conclusion

of surplus
that

at

the

expropriation, he
international

countries are capitalist exploitation.
surplus

from

the

bottom

to

the

level

can

em erge with

the

relation

the

between

It is the continuous drain of
top

of the

hierarchy

of

the

"m etropolis-satellite" relationship which causes underdevelopment in
the satellite and development of the metropolis. Therefore it is the
capitalist exploitation of the periphery by the center which is the
cause of underdevelopment.
Brenner (1977) argues that the origin of capitalism does not lie
in the rise of trade, and market expansion, but in the class structure
that

resu lted

contradiction

from
in

the

class

struggles

pre-capitalist

w hich

em erged

from

econom ic

structure

(mode

the
of
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production).

In some cases when these struggles weakened the pre

capitalist class

structure conditions became ripe

for the rise of

capitalism. In contrast, in instances, such as what we observed in
some of the Third W orld countries, these contradictions and class
struggles induce the heightening of the pre-capitalist exploitation,
which prevents the extended reproduction of capital and retards the
developm ent of capitalism .

Surplus drain could be a symptom,

rather than a cause o f underdevelopment.

A useful model is the one

which deals with the essence and not the phenomenon.
theory

does

not provide

any

means

to

study

the

Frank’s

essence,

to

investigate the specificity of class struggles in any given

social

form ation.

which

H is

m odel

observes

a particular

phenom enon

appears at the level of social formation and then generalizes these
particular events into the law of motion o f capitalism.
C o n c e p tu a l
c e n ter/p e rip h e ry

d u a lis m
w ith

the

su ch

as

fu n d am en tal

m e tr o p o le /s a te llite ,
co n tin u ity

o v er

five

centuries denies any specificity and predicts a condemned destiny
for

the

ultim ately

less

developed

trapped

dependency.

in

(H erold,

countries.

the

blind

Burbak,

A ll
alley

Kozlov

of these

countries

are

o f underdevelopm ent and
1983)

and

(B erstein

and

Nicholas 1983)
The im plications of his theory for the socialist countries are
even more telling. If it is exchange relations which determine the
nature of a country's economic system, the definition of socialism
therefore becomes synonymous
countries

w hich

have

with autarky.

established

econom ic

And the socialist
relatio n s

w ith

the

capitalist countries became capitalist themselves. His assessment of
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socialism is lim ited by his inability to take into the account the
importance of class struggle and contradictions. 22

Frank's obsession

with the delinking from the world system has led him to ignore that
socialism is a complex transitory process with specific "contradiction
both 'external' and internal', antagonistic (class contradictions) and
non-antagonistic (contradictions among the people)." (Bernstein and
Nicholas 1983, P. 19)
With de-linking as the major test of socialism, Frank reaches a
point where he rejects all socialist countries, and considers them as
failu res

eith er

on

the

"v o lu n tarist

or

d eterm in ist

grounds."

Determinist grounds of failure are exemplified by cases of countries
which have failed in the face of hopeless odds and the overwhelming
power of imperialism; e.g., the case of Nicaragua. Voluntarist failure
of socialism includes cases such as Angola, Mozambique and GuineaBissau which "have renounced any substantial delinking of their
economies from the world capitalist system." (Frank 1983a, P. 341)
T he

v o lu n ta ristic

ex am p les

c ite d

by

F ra n k

su g g e st

his

disappointments with the leaders of these countries and his lack of
awareness about the severe contradictions facing these countries in
the process

of construction

of socialism .

His

concept of the

deterministic version of failures also represents his inability to grasp

22 Frank's ignorance o f the importance o f class struggle is not explicit, at least
not in his recent works. (See for example (Frank 1979) & (Frank 1972)) Yet
when he incorporates such analysis o f his study, he continues to treat
classes as a phenomenon o f market and profit maximization. "The relations
o f production and the class structure developed in response to the
predatory needs o f the overseas and the Latin American metropolis."
(Frank 1972, P. 22 cited in Brenner 1977) For more detail discussion of this
point see (Frank 1972).
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the importance of class struggle and contradictions in these countries.
(Bernstein and Nicholas 1983, PP. 20-21)
Frank’s concept of a new international division of labor has also
been criticized by his opponents.
Frank is

able

to

explain

It is by the use of this concept that

the econom ic

integration

of socialist

countries, in particular the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, into
w orld capitalism .

Frank, who, like m ost M arxists, attributes the

changes in the international division of labor to the qualitative
changes in the capitalist development, is not able to show that the
occurrence

of

such

q u alitativ e

changes

has

led

to

the

new

international division of labor. Instead, he ascribes its rise to the
economic crisis.

Frank's critics believe that in fact such changes have

occurred in capitalism in the recent years.

And, ever since World

W ar II, the expansion of capital beyond the national boundries on
the global scale has been shaped by the internationalization

of

productive capital in the stage of state monopoly capitalism . "The
runaway shops and the export industries that have sprung up must
be viewed as an integral part of the process of capital accumulation
on a world scale that emerged in the past war era.

W hat is occuring

is simply a deepening of the international division of labor that has
existed since then." (Herold, Burbuck and Kozlov 1981, P. 9)
F ran k 's

categ o rizatio n

of

countries

as

p erip h ery ,

sem i

periphery and center based on the com position of their trade is
another symptom of his lack of emphasis on the social relations of
p ro d u ctio n .

He

lum ps

a ll

co u n tries

to g eth er,

m akes

an

undistinguishable pile out of them, with only the com position of
exports and im ports as the m ajor device for distinguishing

one
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country from another.

He regards the composition of a country's

exports as the factor determining the position that country obtains in
the hierarchy of centers-periphery.

The larger the amount of raw

materials the more indication that the country is dependent or has a
peripheral situation.

And according to him the arrangem ent of

socialist countries' exports causes them to occupy an intermediate
position in the international division of labor.

Clearly, here as in

other major points of his discussion, Frank dismisses the analysis of
social relations as determining factors in the distinction of different
economic systems.

His argument hence is a 'naturalistic' one: he

em phasizes the use value not the exchange value or the social
relations of production.
Frank's utopian concept of socialism, everything or nothing at
all, is rooted in his search for an ideal state of affairs.

Such a utopian

conception contains the seeds of its own disappointment, to a point
where he sees no alternative in abolishing the dependent conditions
of the less developed countries.
The Achilles' heel of these conceptions of dependence has
always been the implicit, and sometimes explicit, notion of
some sort of independent alternative for the Third World.
This theoretical alternative never existed, in fact, certainly
not on the noncapitalist path and now apparently not even
through so-called socialist revolution. (Frank 1981, P. 127)
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2.2. -WallferstfiiiL-.
W allerstein, in contrast to Frank, has extensively dealt with the
questions of the economic relations between socialist countries and
the capitalist nations.

Yet, in order to have a comprehensive grasp of

his analysis, one m ust start w ith the discussion
fram ew ork

of study,

since his

propositions

o f his general

about

the economic

relations of East and W est are closely linked to and are part and
parcel of his premises of "the world system" approach.
W allerstein's aims are to

establish

the origins of capitalist

development and underdevelopment and locate the genesis o f their
subsequent

evolution.

Just as Frank has sought to discover the

sources of

underdevelopment of the satellite and the role which the

center has played in creation of such underdevelopment, Wallerstein
has endeavored to find out the roots of development of the center
and its relationship to the periphery. (Brenner 1977, P. 31)

2.2.1.

Social

Systems;

Wallerstein's focus is the concept of "social system."

A societal

unit qualifies as a social system if it contains within itself a "single
division of labor" in that the essential needs of the economic actors
within the social system

are fulfilled

boundaries of this social system.

by production within

the

We take the defining characteristic

of a social system to be the existence within it of a division of labor,
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such

that

econom ic

various

sectors

exchange

w ith

or areas

w ithin

others for the

are

dependent

smooth

and

upon

continuous

provisioning of the needs of the area. The regions outside of such a
system exchange only goods which are considered luxuries with it.
(W allerstein 1974, P. 390)

In W allerstein’s scheme there are three

types of such systems: one "mini system" and two types of "world
system s."
A "mini system ” is an entity that has within it a complete
division of labor, and a single cultural framework.

Such systems are

found only in very simple agricultural or hunting and gathering
societies. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 390)

A "world system" is a unit with

a single division of labor and with multiple cultural units. Of the two
varieties of the w orld system one is characterized by a single
political

system .

W allerstein

calls

it

w orld

em pire

and

exem plified by the Persian em pires, Chinese em pires, etc.
second type of w orld

system

designated

by him

as

the

it

is
The

world

economy contains several political units which may be city states,
nation states, areas, etc.

The capitalist world economy which began

in W estern Europe in the Sixteenth Century is one example of this
type of social system.
What is common to all the social systems is that each contains
only one kind of 'mode of production' and not a com bination of
different modes of production.

A mode of production is defined by

Wallerstein as "the way in which decisions are made about dividing
up productive tasks, about the quantities of goods to be produced
and labor time to be invested, about quantities of goods to be
consum ed

or

accum ulated,

about

the

distribution

of

the

goods
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produced." (W allerstein 1979d, P. 155)

The mini-systems embody a

mode of production which was based on lim ited and elementary
specialization of tasks called the reciprocal lineage mode.
A lthough w orld em pires had many variations in regards to
their p olitical superstructure,
em pire's

p olitical

(i.e. Persian

adm inistrations

w ere

production was universal among them.

em pire's and

different)

the

Chinese
mode

of

It was a mode of production

which produced enough agricultural surplus to not only support the
artisan s

w ho

p ro duced

overarching bureaucracy.

n o n -ag ricu ltu ra l

goods,

but

also

an

The major difference between this mode

and the reciprocal lineage mode was that in the former a class which
did not produce any goods was supported.
producers

of

artisanal

and

agricultural

exchanged

goods, either reciprocally

In this mode, while the
goods

"in

som e

sense

or in local m arkets” goods

transferred from the direct producers to the "administrators" were
appropriated forcefully. (W allerstein 1979d, P. 156)
differences between

the "pre-modern"

Despite these

modes o f production, there

was a principal sim ilarity between them: neither of them

made

possible maximum production.
W allerstein indeed argues that the world empires prevented
economic development.

The prevention occured mainly through the

effects of the encompassing bureaucracies of world empires which
appropriated the economic surplus and hindered its accumulation in
the form

o f productive investm ents.

W allerstein claims

that the

essential condition for economic development was the collapse of the
world empires. (Brenner 1977, P. 29)

This had happened by the

Sixteenth Century and the onset of the world economy.

Wallerstein
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attributes the collapse of the world em pires to the "conjunctural
crisis" of cyclical, secular and climatological factors.

The cyclical

crisis was grounded in the fact that when expansion reaches its
optimal point w ithin a given technology, stagnation is bound to
happen.

The secular crisis was produced by the "diminishing return

on the land,” and this factor lim ited the capacity of the system to
"achieve the requisite level of surplus appropriation required by its
population.”

The third elem ent according to W allerstein was the

changes in clim ate which took place during the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries in Europe.
th erefo re

crea ted

a

In his view this "conjunctural crisis”

co n d itio n

expansions. (Amowitz 1981)

w hich

n e c e ssita te d

E uropean

It was the expansion of trade in the

Sixteenth Century which led to the establishment of world economy
with capitalism as the only mode of production. W allerstein argues
that the world empires "bred clusters of merchants who engaged in
economic exchange, but such clusters were a minor part of total
econom y

and

not

fundam entally

d eterm in ativ e

of

its

fate."

(W allerstein 1974, P. 391)

2.2*2.World

Economy:

It was only with the emergence of the world economy in the
Sixteenth Century that full developm ent and the predominance of
market trade could be observed.

The development of trade induced

international division of labor through the establishment of a world
"structure of unequally powerful nation states" led to development in
certain regions and backwardness in others. (Brenner 1977, P. 30)
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W allerstein, by pointing to the rise of trade as the major
stimulus in the creation of capitalism, enters into an ongoing debate
concerning the transition from feudalism.

The debate centers around

the question of whether the rise of capitalism can be attributed to
causes external to the feudalist economic system, such as expansion
of world trade, or whether the emergence of capitalism primarily
depended on the internal contradictions of the feudalist economic
system, in particular the struggle over appropriation of social surplus
between lords and serfs.

W allerstein follows the former argument,

in

system

which

the

cap italist

em barked

out

of

a

series

of

autonomous factors which were purely extrinsic to the feudal social
relations.

For him, therefore, the emergence of capitalist economics

in Western Europe on the center of world capitalism was due to
technical and natural factors exterior and mainly not peculiar to
feudalism.

As we shall see later, he follows the same line of

argument and takes it a step further by maintaining that whatever
happens in a country is explained by the contradictions that appear
in the system as a whole; in other words it is forces external to a
country which determine what takes place within that country.
The new world system is a "world economy" since the basic
linkage

betw een

different parts

meaning exchange and trade.

of

the

system

are

This is in contrast to the world empire

w here the basic linkage betw een different parts

of system was

political, that is over-arching tax-collecting bureaucracy.
1981, P. 53)

econom ies,

(Arnowitz

The mode of production which is dominant in the world

economy today is capitalist.

This mode "took definitive shape as

European w orld economy in the Sixteenth Century and came to
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include

the

w orld

geographically

(Wallerstein 1979b, P. 66)

in

the

N ineteenth

Century."

3

W allerstein’s conviction about the worldwide ascendancy of the
capitalist mode of production is one of the m ajor analytical tools he
uses in investigating the position of the socialist countries in the
world economy, as well as in their relations with the capitalist
countries.

He is indeed emphatic in his claim regarding the

23

existence of only one encompassing worldwide mode of production,
that is the capitalist mode of production in the modern time: "the
only system in the modem world that can be said to have a mode of
production

is

(W allerstein
identify

w orld-system ,

1979b, P. 74);

w ith

sev ices...is

the

feudalism ,

contained

the

w ithin

autonomous reality disappears.

the

and

"so-called

exchange
a

th a t...is

of

cap italist

cap italist

mode"

reciprocal

nexus

protection

for

w orld

we

labor

econom y,

its

It becomes rather one of the many

forms of bourgeois employment of proletarian labor to be founded in
a capitalist mode of production." (Wallerstein 1976, P. 278)
W allerstein believes that expansion of trade brought in chain
like

lin ear

expansion

fashion
o f trade

accum ulation

and

econom ic

grow th.

introduced the profit m otive and

The

the p ro fit

motive led to the development of the division of labor which through
increasin g

p ro d u ctiv ity

economic growth.

induced

in novation,

And this is capitalism.

production in "which production is

accum ulation

and

Capitalism is a mode of

for exchange, th at is, it is

23 Because most o f Wallerstein's conclusion about socialist countries are
derived from his conviction about existence of only one mode o f production
throughout the world, I will repeatedly refer to this point.
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determined by its profitability on a market, a market in

which each

buyer wishes to buy

sell dear."

cheap...but each seller wishes to

(Wallerstein 1979d, P. 15a) 2A>
W allerstein's

concept

of capitalism

relies

heavily

on

the

proposition that self-interested individuals m otivated by profits are
connected and interdependent through the exchange relations, or the
existence of a single division of labor.
means by a single division of labor:

He defines what exactly he
"We can regard a division of

labor as a grid which is substantially interdependent.

Economic

actors operate on some assumption that totality of their essential
needs-of sustenance, protection, and pleasure-w ill be met over a
reasonable tim e-span by

a com bination

activities and exchange in some form.”
It is therefore

of

their own

productive

25

logical for W allerstein to conclude that any

regions which are part of this interdependent system of division of
labor, regardless of its form of 'labor control' is capitalist. "(...I)n the
era of agricultural capitalism, wage labor is only one of the forms of

24 "if capitalism is a mode o f production, production for profit in a market,
then we ought, I should have thought, to look to whether or not such
production was or was not occurring. (In sixteenth century Europe) It
turns out in fact that it was, and in very substantial form. Most o f this
production, however, was not industrial production.through Europe.there
grew up a world-economy with a single divi-sion o f labor within which
there was a world market, for which men produced largely
agricultural
products for sales and profit.to call this agricultural capitalism."
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 399)
25 Wallerstein's concept of grid of exchange assumes a distinction between
essential exchanges and luxury exchanges.
"This distinction is crucial if
we are not to fall into the trap of identifying every exchange activity as
evidence o f a system. Members of a system.can be linked in limited
exchanges with elements located outside the system.that is, each can export
to the other what is in its system socially defined as worth little in return
for import o f what in its system is defined as worth much." (Wallerstein
1974, P. 398)
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organizing production or the modes in which labor is recruited,
slavery, coerced cash-crop production...share cropping, and tenancy
are all alternative modes.” (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401)
Once embedded within the w orld economy, all areas of the
world are conceived of as a single ongoing division of labor in which
fundamental commodities, not luxury goods, are exchanged.

Each

area of the world becomes part of a world economy when its
material livelihood is affected by interaction with the larger network.
This world economy has no overarching political system. The surplus
product can only be redistributed through the markets; hence the
m ode

of

"C apitalism

production
as a

according

system

to

W allerstein

of production for

is

capitalism ,

sale in

m arket for

profit...has only existed in, and can be said to require, a world system
in which the political units are not coextensive with the boundaries
of market economy." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 66 )

2.2.3. The Capitalist System 's Basic

Dichotomies:

According to W allerstein the operation of the capitalist system
revolves around two basic dichotomies.

One is the dichotomy of

bourgeois versus proletarian; the second is the dichotomy between
core and periphery. (W allerstein 1979d, P. 162)
The first basic dichotomy is a division between classes in which
the ruling

groups

operate

'prim arily

through

lineage rights...not

through weapons of force...through access to decisions about the
nature and quantity o f the production o f goods (via property rights,
accum ulated capital, control over technology, etc.)."
1979d, P. 162)

(W allersteon

This control is not necessarily exerted only on the
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free

laborers

who

have

lost

the

ow nership

of

the

means

of

production, and have no choice except to sell their labor power;
rather it may

take different form s.

W allerstein

conceptualizes

classes as existing within the world system as a whole, so there exists
a world proletariat which includes wage laborers as well as other
categories

such

as

sm all

com m odity

producers.

The

w orld

bourgeoisie, the controllers of the major means of production, is a
class rife with interclass conflicts.

In the conflict, the power of the

state, m ilitarily or politically is used to modify and further the
economic position of various fractions of the bourgeoisie. (Chase Dunn
1982)
The other basic dichotomy is the "spatial hierarchy of economic
specialization" between different regions of the world, in particular
differences between the core and the periphery.

The core of the

world economy is composed of societies in which are concentrated
high-profit, high technology and high wage diversified production.
The periphery is characterized by low -profit, low-technology, low
wage, and less diversified production. (Wallerstein 1979c, P. 97) The
levels of productivity and wages are therefore, the two important
factors in analyzing the core and the periphery.
According to Wallerstein in both the Sixteenth Century and the
present time "the core and periphery of the world economy were not
two separate 'economies' with two separate 'laws' but one capitalist
econom ic

system

w ith

d ifferen t

sectors

functions." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 68)

perform ing

d ifferent

However, the performance of

different functions has led the core and periphery each to exhibit
"different internal

socio-econom ic

profiles

and

hence

distinctive
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politics."

But to understand these differences one must first start by

situating them in the world economy.

This conclusion is reached

based on W allerstein's premises that the national states are not
societies that have "separate and parallel histories, but they are parts
of a whole reflecting that whole." (Wallerstein 1979a, P. 53)

The

sim ilarities of W allerstein's argument with Frank's on this point is
obvious; the only difference is that the former has replaced the
terms metropolis and satellite by the terms core and periphery.

26

According to Wallerstein, regardless of differences in the mode
of labor control in the core and periphery, both are part of the
world-economy and thus are capitalist economies.

"Free labor is the

form of labor control used for skilled work in the core countries,
whereas coerced labor is used for less skilled work in the peripheral

26 According to Wallerstein the international division of labor was due to
different responses o f each country to the European commercial expansion
o f the sixteenth century.
Some countries like England responded by
creating an industrial base, while some others like Eastern Europe
responded by developing "coerced cash-cropping.”
These responses were
not arbitrary ones, and were determined by profit maximization
considerations as well as the existing technical conditions o f each country.
These technical conditions include:
"land/labour ratio, the extent of
internal market, the geographical location o f the country, etc.” in each
area. (Gulap 1981, P. 176) Given their objective conditions, Western
European landowners chose to turn their land to pasture or lease it and
invest the money in trade and industry; landlords in the Eastern European
countries on the other hand given their conditions responded in a way
which maximized their profit and that was by intensifying the production
o f staples and increasing the investment in trade. Given objective
conditions o f each country the choice o f product which maximized the
profit o f the ruling elite determined the pattern o f the labor control in
these countries:
"Northwest Europe was better suited in the sixteenth
century to diversify to agricultural specialization and add to it certain
industries.Northwest Europe emerged as the core area o f this world
economy, specializing in agricultural production o f higher skill levels,
which favored tenancy and wage-labor as the modes o f labor control.
Eastern Europe.become peripheral areas specializing in export of
grains..which favored the use o f slavery and coerced cash-crop labor as
the mode o f labor control." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 401)
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areas." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 127)

"Western Europe, at least England

from the late Seventeenth Century on had primarily landless wageearning laborers.

In Latin America, then and to some extent still

now, laborers were not proletarians, but slaves or 'serfs'...but is
England, or Mexico, or the West Indies a unit of analysis?
have a separate 'mode of production'?"

Does each

And his answer is no, since

England, M exico and the W est Indies are all part of the world
economy and, therefore, their mode of production is the capitalist
mode of production. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 394)
In Wallerstein's accounts, it is the position of countries in the
international division of labor which determines the class structure
of each country. "In the Sixteenth Century, some monarchs achieved
great strength, others failed.

This is closely related...to the role of the

area in the division of labor within the world economy.

The different

roles led to different class structures which led to different politics."
(Wallerstein 1974, P. 157)

Therefore, in Western Europe we witness

the rise of the bourgeoisie, since that region was specialized in the
production of industrial goods.

In the case of Eastern Europe the

expansion o f the wheat-exporting economy "meant also the rise of
the political strength of the nobility." (W allerstein

1974, P. 304)

W hatever happens in a country thus essentially depends on the
contradictions that appear in the system as a whole.

Consequently,

the forces external to a country determine what happens within that
country. W allerstein grants some autonomy to the internal forces,
but in the "exterior-interior relationship, the former are determinant
over the latter."

In other words, the articulation of the countries
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w ithin

the w orld system

is

the

"prim ary

determ inant"

of what

happens within a given country. (Navarro 1982)
The development of core
co n tex t

of

and periphery has occurred in the

unequally pow erful n atio n -states.

W allerstein, in the core areas

A ccording to

the interest of various local groups

converged and led to the creation of strong

states, w hile in the

periphery the interest of the local groups diverged
developmentof very weak states. (Wallerstein 1974,

and caused the
P. 401)

In the

core countries the bourgeoisie got stronger and the landlords became
w eaker and

the former

dominated the state; in the periphery the

opposite happened. (W allerstein

1974, P. 302) "While the Sixteenth

Century was a period of rise of state power in Western Europe, it was
an era of decline for state power in Eastern Europe...As the landed
aristocracy of Poland grew stronger...and the indigenous bourgeoisie
grew weak, the tax base of the state frittered away which meant that
the

king

could

not

afford

(W allerstein 1974, P. 309)

to

m aintain

an

adequate

army."

Thus, in the West a strong state arose

which was capable of pursuing an aggressive expansionary policy. 27

27

As Amowitz (1981) argues: "At times, Wallerstein seems to argue for a
position that ascribes these differences to the existence o f a strong
bureaucracy (especially in China) whose tenure of power depended on its
ability to retard development, and was content to keep the state weak and
unresponsive to economic expansion; at other times he tries to show that
shortage o f hard currency in the West spurred the drive for exploration of
precious metal beyond national border. A third factor was the inflation of
the Sixteenth Century that, in several centuries, amounted to a
redistribution o f income and a source o f primitive capital accumulation,
while in other trading centers, strong workers' organizations managed to
prevent accumulation by keeping wages abreast of prices...His model relies
heavily on factors determining the configuration o f trade relation for
explaining both the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the
configuration o f the world system."

Once the system of unequally powerful states is established,
"we get the operation of 'unequal exchange' which is enforced by
strong

states on

weak ones." (W allerstein

1974, P. 401)

The

mechanism of 'unequal exchange' im plies the transfer of "surplus
from the producers of low-wage (but high supervision), low profit,
low capital intensive goods" to the "producers of high wage (but low
supervision), high profit, high capital intensive goods." (Wallerstein
1979d, P. 162) In other words, the workers in the periphery must
work many hours, at a given level of productivity, to purchase a good
produced by a worker in the core in one hour. (Wallerstein 1979b, P.
71)

Capitalism then not only involves "appropriation of surplus

value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of
whole w orld economy by core areas." (W allerstein

1974, P. 401)

This is the final step in W allerstein's gradual conceptualization of
development of capitalism.

Capitalism, as W allerstein sees it, is a

system o f production for market in order to make profit; it is an
economic system which embraces various forms of production.

It

includes commodity producers employing wage labor in the core
areas and coerced labor in the periphery.
view ed

as

p re-capitalist,

rather

as

The periphery is not

"integrated,

exploited,

and

essential parts of" the world economy. It is precisely the articulation
of these different forms o f production which constitutes capitalism.
W ithout

them

W allerstein 's

capitalism

is

non-existent.

This

articulation is accomplished not only by the world market exchange
of commodities, but also by the political coercion exercised by the
states in the core countries.

This political coercion can take such

forms as colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc.

The system of competing
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unequally powerful states is therefore essential for the operation of
relations of production. (Chase Dunn 1982)
The above exposition makes clear that for Wallerstein, just as
for Frank, capitalism is the "hierarchical structure of monopolistic
powers to extract surplus." (Gulap 1981, P. 180)

It is hierarchical

since the exchange which occurs within the division of labor is based
on "differential appropriation of surplus produced." (Evans
The only difference is

that w hile for W allerstein

1979)

only countries

com pose the "layers” o f this hierarchical structure, for Frank the
individual economic actors also fit into this hierarchical structure.
Similarly both authors view capitalism as a universal system that is
responsible for both development and underdevelopment; and since
the possibilities open to a given country for capital accumulation and
as a result developm ent are constrained by its structural position
within the division of labor, the peripheral countries which occupy
the

lo w er

accum ulation

ranks
and

in

the

h ierarch y are

consequently

deprived

developm ent.

of

(Evans

cap ital

1979)

and

(Bernstein 1979)
Yet, according to Wallerstein the position of no country in the
in tern atio n al

d iv isio n

of

lab o r

is

perm anent,

and

cap italist

com petition creates the rise and fall of different areas within the
system.
relative

Hegemonic core powers, such as Britian,
dom ination

to

more efficient producers.

have lost their
As the

core

countries exhibit a form of "circulation of elites" in which hegemonic
powers rise and fall so do the peripherial countries; these countries
especially during the periods of economic stagnation and conflict
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within the core find the possibility of moving up in the hierarchical
division of labor.

2 .2 .4 .

S em i-P erip hery:

W allerstein recognizes
countries

th at

occupy

international division

the

as does Frank,
m iddle

layers

a third category
in the

hierarchy

of
of

of labor. It is indeed part of the normal

operation o f the world-systems to have a "three-layered structure."
(W allerstein 1974, P. 404)

The semi-peripheral countries are this

third category in the modem

world-system. If the core production is

predom inantly

capital

intensive

and

utilizes

high

wage

skilled

workers and the peripheral production is labor intensive relying on
low wage unskilled workers, in the semiperipheral areas there is a
balance of both core and peripheral types of production.
the products

which

are produced

and

exchanged

Although

at each

zone

maintain the above criteria, they do not remain the same, and are a
function of world technology.

"If in the Sixteenth Century, peripheral

Poland traded its wheat, in the mid Twentieth Century, peripheral
countries are often textile producers whereas core countries export
wheat as well as electronic equipment.

The point is that we should

not identify any particular product with a structural sector of the
world economy but rather observe the wage patterns and margins of
p ro fit

o f p articu lar

products

at

p articlar

m om ents

of tim e

to

understand who does what in the system." (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 71)
In a system of unequal exchange, the semiperipheral countries
stand in between in regard to the kinds of product they export and
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in terms of wage levels and profit margins. (W allerstein 1979b, P.
72) 28

They also act as a peripheral zone for the core countries and

"in part they act as a core country for some peripheral areas."
(W allerstein

1979c, P. 97)

The semi-periphery thus exploits and

appropriates part of the surplus of the periphery, and in turn is
exploited and its surplus is transferred to the core countries.

Again,

at this point W allerstein resembles Frank by asserting the surplus
transfer as a main element in conceptualization of the notion of
capitalism .

To view capitalism as a hierarchical division of labor

between core, peripheral and sem i-peripheral zones led

them to

understand im perialism "as a basic dimension of capitalism rather
than as a stage or force that merely transforms precapitalist areas
into capitalist ones." (Chase Dunn 1982)
The semi-peripheral countries are essential for the operation of
the world-economy both economically and politically.

Their role is

economically essential since:
"For individual capitalists the ability to shift capital, from a
declining leading sector to a rising sector is the only way to survive
the effects o f cyclical shifts in the loci o f the leading sectors. For
this there must be sectors able to profit from the wage-productivity
squeeze o f the leading sector.
Such areas are what we are calling
semi-peripheral areas." (cited in Evans, Wallerstein, 1973, P. 3)

28

Wallerstein is vague in defining precisely what he means by semi
periphery, and as Peter Evans (1979) argues this lack o f preciseness is part
o f his general framework o f study: "Indeed, the possibility o f using the
world systems approach to provide an interpretative frame for almost any
conceivable historical sequence might be considered one of its weaknesses.
Even the concepts most central to the approach are hard to pin down with
precision. The idea o f the 'semi-periphery' provides a good example of both
suggestiveness and the frustrating lack o f definition that characterize
Wallerstein's key concepts."
(Ibid.)
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M ore im portantly is, however, the political role played by these
countries; by performing this role they help the system to run more
smoothly.
w orld

Because of the unequal distribution of surplus, in the

econom y

the

m ajority

o f those

who

are

exploited

may

overthrow the minority who "draw disproportionate benefits.” The
use of three mechanisms enables the world system "to retain relative
political stability."

"One obviously is the concentration of military

strength in the hands of the dominant forces.

(The) second is the

degree to which the staff or cadres of the system feel that their own
well-being is wrapped up in the survival o f the system."

The third

mechanism is the existence of the semi-periphery.
"One might make a good case that the world-economy would
function every bit as well without a semi-periphery. But it would be
far less politically stable, for it would mean a polarized world
system.
The existence o f the third category means that the upper
stratum is not faced with the unified opposition o f all others"
because the middle sector is both exploiter and exploited. However,
it primarily views itself as better off than the lower sectors rather
than as worse off than the upper sectors. (Wallerstein 1974, PP. 404405)

2.2.5.

Socialist

Countries;

Sem i-peripheral countries

in W allerstein's

account com prise

such countries as the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe; therefore, the
semi-periphery includes two "very different varieties of states," the
cap italist

states

and

the

'so cialist

states,'

that

is

"those

with

governments ruled by M arxist-Leninist party, which has nationalized
the basic means of production." (Wallerstein 1979c, P. 100)

In his

scheme, however, there is no need to differentiate between these
two varieties of countries, and to analyze their economic relations
se p a ra te ly .29
universal

In his world-system perspective, there is only a single

mode

production..

of production,

that is

the

cap italist

mode

of

Under this mode different juridicial forms of ownership

and kinds o f class relations and forms of production (labor control)
are

articu lated

by

the

system

of

exchange

and

unequal

and

competing states. In the different zones of this world-wide system,
the relations

between

the im m ediate producers

and their direct

controller differs, but this is not im portant in the sense that the
internal relations

and in particular the class relations in any part of

the world

only be understood by taking into account

"can

relations that exist at the level of the world _system."

the

So, in the same

manner that slavery and serfdom, as forms of labor control, were
integral parts of the earlier period of the capitalist world economy, so
are the Soviet Union's "juridically collective forms of property and
centrally determ ined investm ent decisions and income distribution"
integral parts of the capitalist system at the present epoch of the
capitalist world economy. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 34-35)

"There are

today no socialist systems in the world-economy any more than
there are feudal systems because there is only one world-system and
it is by definition capitalist...” (Wallerstein 1974, P. 415)

29 One o f the major factors which distinguishes capitalism from feudalism in
Wallerstein's scheme is capitalism's ability to integrate the disparate levels
or elements that constitute it but may be antagonistic to it. This is in
contrast to feudalism which generally was unable to integrate the systems
potentially antagonistic to it. (Amowitz 1981)
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Once the world-system

is

accepted to be

capitalism

what

appears as different forms of production are in fact capitalist in
essence.
units

As long as the m arket exchange between the production

in th e

system

continues,

the relations

of production

and

distribution as well as the division of labor and rewards to labor will
be influenced and determined by the larger market. (Chase Dunn
1982, P. 27)
(T)o emphasize that the nationalization or socialization o f all
productive enterprises within the bounds o f a nation-state is not
and theoretically cannot be a sufficient defining condition of a
socialist system ,..as long as these nations remain part o f a
capitalist world-economy, they continue to produce for this world
market on the basis o f the same principles as any other producer.
(Wallerstein 1979, P. 73)

Such nationalization or socialization "does not make the participation
of these enterprises in the world-economy one that does not conform
to

the

m ode

W allerstein

of

operation

of

a

ca p ita list

uses a hypothetical example

m arket

of U.S.

sy stem ."30

Steel suddenly

becoming "a worker’s collective in w hich all em ployees without
exception received an identical share of the profits and all stock
holders were expropriated without compensation."
not stop

This action would

U.S. Steel from acting as a capitalist enterprise operating in

a capitalist world-economy. (Wallerstein 1974, P. 413)

The internal

egalitarian

and

distribution

of the

firm 's p ro fit, w ages

salaries

eventually w ould cause managers and skilled w orkers who could

30

The conformity to the operation o f the capitalist market system implies:
"seeking increased efficiency o f production in order to realize a maximum
price on sales, thus achieving a more favorable allocation o f surplus o f the
world economy." (Wallerstein 1974, P. 413)
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obtain higher income in other firms to leave U.S. Steel.

Productivity

which at first due to workers' enthusiasm would go up in the long
run would decline, due to both the loss of skilled workers and the
dam pening

of the

early enthusiasm . T he decline in productivity

coupled w ith the higher wages at U.S. Steel w ould give competing
firms a cost advantage. The cost of production and thus the price of
U.S. S teel's products would

go up relative to

the other firm's

products. U.S. Steel would then either go bankrupt or return to the
current standard of capitalist strictness with respect to its internal
division of rewards. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 29)
The position o f a socialist country in the world system is more
or less sim ilar to this hypothetical exam ple.31

A revolutionary

society sooner or later will face a situation w hich forces it to
recognize the distribution of rewards along lines more compatible
with

the

attem pted

capitalist

labor

equalization

of

m arket,
incom e

since

in

these

distrib u tio n

countries

creates

a

the
wage

structure which does not correspond to the large labor market of the
capitalist world-economy. And eventually the possessors o f valuable
skills seek employment in the parts o f the w orld where they can
receive the greatest reward. Such techniques as moral incentives and
legal restrictions are only partially effective in preventing the labor

31

Chase Dunn (1982) uses C liffs (1974) discussion that, during the stalinist
period, production in the Soviet Union is best understood as centralized
administrative production on a national scale equivalent in its main
features to that which is organized within a single capitalist firm, except
that most products were produced for allocation and consumption within
the 'firm.' The production was for 'use* not for commodity exchange on the
world market, but the existence o f the capitalist world-economy and its
aggressive interstate system determined in important ways the nature of
the 'use,' the social needs, of the production. (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 37)
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migration, and their associated costs are heavy.

All together "these

factors, create a tendency to restratify the distribution of rewards
along lines more comparable with the world labor market." (Chase
Dunn 1982, P. 37)
W a lle rstein 's

w o rld -sy stem

d e fin itio n

im p lies

th at

the

components o f the system are related and connected by the relations
of exchange, and indeed the world-system is the world market with
the predominance of the exchange relations.

In the cases of the

socialist countries the market involvement is not the only way to be
integrated in the world economy; their participation can result from
interaction w ith other states.

For example the participation of the

Soviet Union in the interstate system, at first as defensive victim,
"later as ally in the balance of power and still later as superpower
has been its most determ inant dimension of interaction with the
capitalist world-economy." (Chase Dunn 1982, P. 40)
The

ex isten ce

of

the

aggressive

interstate

system

c a p ita list
determ ines

w orld-econom y
in

and

im portant ways

product should be produced even for internal use.32

its
what

Therefore, in

addition to devoting a substantial amount of the economical, political
and social resources to the expenditure necessary for prevention of
capital and labor migration, the Soviet Union was forced to put a
considerable effort into producing goods which were necessary for

32

For Wallerstein, the production for use and not for profit is one of the basic
aspects of any socialist system. (Wallerstein 1979b, P. 91)
33
According to Chase-Dunn, the most important developments in the recent
period "which support the thesis that there was never a separate socialist
world-system, are the recent return o f the socialist states to commodity
production for the world market and their extensive dealings with the
capitalist multinational corporations."
(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 42)
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m ilitary

survival.33

The autarky cannot prevent the stranglehold of

the capitalist world-economy.

"Everywhere, that reality has been

that fact that a movement proclaim s

the unlinking

of a state's

productive processes from the integrated world-economy has never
in fact accom plished the unlinking.

It may have accom plished

tem porary w ithdraw al which, by strengthening internal production
and political structures, enabled the state to im prove its relative
position in the world-economy.” (Wallerstein 1984, P. 107)
Wallerstein believes
within the globalsystem a
social
revolution within country
can only contribute to the faster
development o f productive forces o f that country and make
possible the movement of that country toward a higher level in the
international division o f labor.
The Russian R evolution, in
Wallerstein's account occurred in "a semi-periperal country whose
internal balance o f forces had been such that as o f the late
Nineteenth Century it began on a decline towards a peripheral
status. This was the result o f the marked penetration o f foreign
capital into industrial sector which was on its way to eliminating
all indigenous capitalist forces, the resistance to the mechanization
o f the agricultural sector, the decline o f relative military
power.the Revolution brought to power a group o f state-managers
who reversed each one o f these trends by
using the classic
techniques o f m ercantilist sem i-withdrawal
from the world
econom y...A t the end o f the second World War, Russia was
reinstated as a very strong member o f the semi-periphery and
could begin to seek full core status." (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 41)

For the U.S.S.R. as for any other semi-peripheral state, there exists
the

possibility of prom otion

within the

hierarchy

o f the

world

system.

W allerstein on occasion seems to suggest that such upward

m obility

has

been

achieved

by

the

Soviet Union:

"Cannot the

deteriorating relationship of the U .S.S.R. with the 'revolutionary'
forces, particularly in semi-peripheral regions, be the same as

the
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simple consequence of the promotion of U.S.S.R. from semi-periphery
to core and hence a change in its interest within the framework of
capitalist world economy?" (W allerstein

1979b, P. 90) Following

Frank, W allerstein argues that the role played by the socialist semi
peripheral countries is essentially sim ilar to that of the capitalist
semi-peripheral countries.
the transfer of some

Its manifestation in the present period is

"older industrial hardware"

from the

core

countries with the "high wage bill" to the semi-peripheral countries
including the socialist ones with the low er wage bill. (W allerstein
1984, P. 64)
W ithin the global system, no country can become socialist, it
can only move from the periphery to semi-peripheral status.34 The
fact that the means of production in the socialist countries are not
privately owned and belong to the public is irrelevant.
system is composed of owners who sell for profit.

The capitalist

The fact that an

owner is a group of individuals rather than a single person makes no
essen tial

d iffe re n c e .35

Unless the entire world-system changes

34 This transition from periphery to semi-periphery status is not going to
happen immediately, since "some o f the less industrialized socialist states
are still playing essentially peripheral roles in the world-economy and
must still heavily depend, in terms o f annual national income, on exports of
basic commodities.” (Wallerstein 1979 , P. 116)
35 This has long been recognized for joint-stock companies. It must also be
recognized for sovereign states. A state which collectively owns all the
means o f production is merely a collective capitalist firm as long as it
remains - as all such states are, in fact, presently compelled to remain- a
participant in the market o f the capitalist world economy.
( Wallerstein
1977b, P. 68) Chase Dunn (1982) a close associate of Wallerstein and an
advocate o f the world-system approach argues that the socialist countries
are "state capitalist." States have always been, according to him, important
in capital accumulation, and they have recently become much more
important. The Soviet Union has been able to develop an industrial base
and military machine comparable to that of core countries. This
industrialization "was organized and
mobilized by an authoritarian state
that consciously directed investment, trade and labor.” If however
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com pletely no country can achieve socialism .

"The question is

whether we shall arrive at a socialist world order by cumulating a
series of revolutionary victories state by

state until somehow a

m ajority

of

us

balance.

I simply do not believe this to be the case..." (Wallerstein

post-revolutionary

states..tips

over

some

global

1984, P. 144)
Therefore, unless the working class of the world, conscious of
its revolutionary tasks, makes a global revolution, it is not possible
for the working class of any single nation, or combination of some
nations, to transform capitalism to socialism. (W allerstein 1977)
In W allerstein's scheme the revolutionary movements and the
socialist countries have produced two contradictory effects.

On one

hand they have weakened the world bourgeoisie because they have
constrained its freedom of action, 36 (W allerstein 1977) and have
"socialism is equated with state mobilized" development, one can observe a
similar pattern o f development in the countries such as Japan and
Germany, which are not referred to as socialist countries. (Ibid., PP. 34 and
87)
36
Mainly by limiting the mobility o f capital and placing constraints on it.
(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 48)
Zeev Gorin (1985) suggests that Wallerstein’s position that the
socialist countries contribute to the survivability o f the world
capitalist
system
stem s
from
W allerstein's
"Parsonian-Type
Functionalist Analysis."
Parts o f the system (subsystems) enhance
the survivability of the total system.
Changes consists in changes o f
the subsystems and the system as a whole in direction o f a higher
level o f survivability o f die total system." (Ibid. P. 336)
Moreover
Gorin argues W allerstein's v iew that the socialist countries
undermine the capitalist countries is rooted in the theoretical
framework developed by Wallerstein.
In this framework the "system
is conceived as a contradictory one, which by its 'normal' operation
gives birth to and constantly reproduces anti-systematic forces."
(Ibid. P. 337)
Furthermore, Gorin contends that although
Wallerstein on different occasions emphasizes one o f the above
positions, at other times dialectically combines these two.
For
example, when Wallerstein declares:
A struggle like that o f Vietnam, or Algeria, or Angola on the one
hand, these colonial wars fundamentally weakened the internal
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"undermined the ideological justification in world capitalism, both by
showing the political vulnerability of capitalist entrepreneurs and by
showing that private ownership is irrelevant to the rapid expansion
of industrial productivity." (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 414)

On the other

hand, the socialist countries, similar to the earlier forms of worker
opposition (such as labor unions), come to existence "as weapons of
resistance to the logic of capitalism and they force capitalism to
expand and reorganize itself.

But eventually they become functional

parts of capitalist system rather than forces
(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 48)

of its transformation."

"(A)s their rise has resulted in coopting the

proletarian leaders into the political operation of the world system"
they have strengthened the w orld bourgeoisie. (W allerstein
And also they became a
w orld -sy stem

to

the

1977)

fundamental element in the survival of
ex ten t

th a t

they have p rev en ted

the
the

polarization of the w orld by moving to the middle strata in the
international hierarchy, and by doing so have raised the ability of

supports o f the regimes o f the U.S.A., one can ask if the net result
has not been to further integrate these countries, even their
regimes, into the capitalist world economy.
It did both o f course,
(cited in Ibid., p.340)
I do agree with Gorin that in places Wallerstein only stresses one of
the above indicated positions.
I, however, think that Wallerstein's
writing in general is more inclined toward the dialectical
combination o f these two positions
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the sem i-peripheral areas to enjoy a larger portion of the world
surplus. (Wallerstein 1974a, P. 414)37
Because W allerstein defines socialism as a mode of production
based on production for use, it cannot exist in any single country or
com bination of countries as long as the capitalist world-economy
exists.

The socialist mode of production "involves some kind of

collective decision-making about social production to which we may
give the shorthand label of ’planning.*

As long as planning is at the

level of individual states, it's ultimately planning for a firm and not
for an 'economy' and cannot eradicate the law of value. The clear
implication is that planning must be at a world level, the only kind of
p roductio n

37

fo r

use

th a t

can

elim in ate

unequal

exchange."

Zcev Gorin (1985) suggests that Wallerstein’s position that the
socialist countries contribute to the survivability of the world
capitalist system stems from Wallerstein's "Parsonian-Type
Functionalist Analysis."
Parts of the system (subsystems) enhance
the survivability o f the total system. Changes consists in changes of
the subsystems and the system as a whole in direction o f a higher
level o f survivability of the total system." (Ibid. P. 336) Moreover
Gorin argues Wallerstein’s view that the socialist countries
undermine the capitalist countries is rooted in the theoretical
framework developed by Wallerstein.
In this framework the "system
is conceived as a contradictory one, which by its 'normal' operation
gives birth to and constantly reproduces anti-systematic forces."
(Ibid. P. 337) Furthermore, Gorin contends that although
Wallerstein on different occasions emphasizes one o f the above
positions, at other times dialectically combines these two. For
example, when Wallerstein declares:
A struggle like that of Vietnam, or Algeria, or Angola on the one
hand, these colonial wars fundamentally weakened the internal
supports o f the regimes o f the U.S.A., one can ask if the net result
has not been to further integrate these countries, even their
regimes, into the capitalist world economy.
It did both o f course.
(cited in Ibid., p.340)
I do agree with Gorin that in places Wallerstein only stresses one of the
above indicated positions.
I, however, think that Wallerstein's writing in
general is more inclined toward the dialectical combination o f these two
position s
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(W allerstein

1984,

established yet;

PP. 171-172)

how ever,

Such

there

are

a

system

tendencies

has
in

the

not

been

capitalist

world-economy that move the whole system towards socialism.

The

outcome is not definite and depends on the result of interaction of
these

tendencies

with

the

other

factors,

in

operation,

but

the

existence of these tendencies is undeniable.38
W allerstein's assessment of prospects for socialism is therefore
quite different from Frank's.

Frank, who sees that the locally

controlled capitalist development in the poor countries is no longer a
possibility, seeks the only alternative in rupturing all ties with the
world capitalist system and establishing a socialist country which is
taken as synonymous with autarky.

For Frank, therefore, the escape

38 There is an
organizational imperative in which, the full development of
capitalist relations o f production with its emphasis on "the increase
surplus-value and the maximum efficiency (free flow ) o f factors of
production" m oves the system towards "a fully planned single productive
organizational network."
Also the appropriation o f world surplus in the
hands o f few results in the spread o f "antisystematic movements" and
therefore the dispersion o f socialist ideas among the direct producers.
The
existence o f the socialist movements in the individual countries which seek
to construct socialism creates "additional institutional pressures on the
world-system to move in the direction o f socialism" despite the fact that
their location in the world interstate system constrains "the kinds of
transformation they can effectuate within their boundaries o f a given
state." (Wallerstein 1984, PP. 24-25)
There are also counter-tendencies which impede the achievement of
socialism.
Among them is the "logic o f domination" by the ruling strata,
world bourgeoisie, which leads this
group to seek survival by adoption of
new social roles and new ideologies.
They are w illing "to change
everything in order to have everything remain the same," and perpetuate
themselves in a new system.
In the process o f seeking to secure their
position, the world bourgeoisie may adopt policies which result in nuclear
war.
This could bring the cessation o f the present system, but the
destruction o f most o f the world's productive forces makes the establishment
of a "socialist world order far less structurally feasible." (Ibid., P. 25)
According to Wallerstein, "(i)t is clear that the capitalist world-economy
cannot survive, and that it is in the process o f being superseded as a
historical social system."
What will be the end result is not clear and
depends on "how conjuncture o f forces at play w ill constrain the direction
of change." (Ibid., P. 26)

79

from the international hierarchy of division of labor which is only
useful to the core countries is possible, though not easily achievable.
For W allerstein, on the other hand, the international hierarchy of
division of labor with unequally powerful states is not only assumed
to

be structurally

necessary for the

continued existence

capitalist system but also to be contagious.39

of the

So no break from the

system is possible, and since the relinquishm ent of one country's
structural position implies adopting a new role in the international
division of labor, there is no evasion possible.

Even if such evasion

takes the form of autarky, the country continues to remain part of
the capitalist world-economy.

Because, the capitalist world-economy

through different channels pressures it to do so.

"Other states will

not let any individual state be totally autonomous and will intrude
directly

and

indirectly,

politically

(W allerstein 1984, P. 84)

and

m ilitarily

if

necessary."

The only alternative is the establishment

of a socialist world system.

2*2.6.- .W allerstein and

H is C ritics;

39 The role o f states is particularly important.
"The state power is used to
extract labor-power (more directly in
the periphery than in the core), but
the competitive nature o f the interstate system prevents any single state
from maintaining a statewide monopoly and subjects producers to the
necessity o f increasing productivity in order to maintain or increase their
shares o f the world surplus value.
Thus, the interstate system reinforces
the capital-wage labor relationship
in the core, and coerced labor
extraction in the periphery, and constitutes the basis o f production
relations for the capitalist system.” (Chase Dunn 1982)
And "the extraction o f surplus value is based on two modes of
appropriation: 1) the ability to use political power for the appropriation o f
surplus value, 2) the ability to produce efficiency for the competitive world
market." (Chase Dunn 1982)
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W allerstein

tries

to

th eo retically

explain

the

em ergence

and

development of capitalism since the Sixteenth Century, and in this
process he hopes to dem onstrate the hierarchical and exploitive
nature of such development.

He also proposes that the capitalist

w orld-econom y is universal and has

penetrated every nook and

com er of the world, including the socialist countries.

The only way

to eradicate this exploitive system is by a world-wide revolution and
establishment of a socialist world economy.
W allerstein, therefore, in accordance with Frank in trying to
explain the development of capitalism and contemplating socialism
as the only alternative to end the misery of the exploited classes,
enters

into

the

dom ain

of

M arxism .

In

critically

evaluating

W allerstein's scheme, then, it seems logical to concentrate on his
M arxist critics.
Methodologically, W allerstein’s starting point is a concept of
totality.

He claims that one either has to start "with the economy

seen from the point of view of the producing units, which is where
Adam Smith starts, or with the social economy as a totality, which is
w here M arx

starts.” (W allerstein

1977)

He in

fact cites

with

approval Luckacs' comment that, "the decisive difference between
Marxism and bourgeois thought (is) the point of view on totality."
(cited in Gerstein

1977) And for W allerstein a unit qualifies as

totality if within the unit there exists one single division of labor in
the sense that the "totality of essential needs of the overwhelming
majority" of economic actors are satisfied by the production within
that unit.

It is in his context that he then introduces his concepts of

the world empire and world systems.
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His methodology in contrast to his claim is not a Marxist's
m ethodology.

Marx in

scientific method:

the G rundrisse explains his

concept

of

W hile thought "appropriates" reality in all its

complexity one should construct out of this complexity the essential
abstract concepts, and then reconstruct based on these relatively
simple abstract concepts, the com plex concepts which parallel the
complex reality. Marx's

Capital is structured

in this way from a

simple abstract (i.e. commodity) to an increasingly com plex abstract
concept (i.e. capital). W allerstein,
opposite:

on the

does

the

He starts with the complex concept of the "world-system"

and gradually reduces the degree of complexity
uses.

other hand,

A rnowitz (1981, P.508) argues also

of concepts which he
that the meaning of

W allerstein’s "systems" is not consistent with the M arxist notion of
"totality" in which "the elements of a system are understood within a
matrix

of m utual determ inations."

In W allerstein's

scheme

the

system "is a structured totality consisting of relatively autonomous
elements whose interaction constitutes the whole." 40
40 One aspect o f the point raised by Arnowitz can be viewed in Wallerstein's
discussion of the emergence o f capitalism. To comprehend how and why
capitalism began is one o f Wallerstein's stated goals. His theory, however,
does not put him in a good position to explain the transition from
feudalism to capitalism in Europe. The most obvious difficulty is his lack of
any theoretical conception o f the dynamics of feudalism.
(Skocpol 1977,
P1078)
Wallerstein traces the origins o f the capitalist world-economy to
the expansion o f trade in Western Europe, prompted by a series o f
geographic, climatic, economic conditions whose conjunction gave rise to
the international division o f labor.
This is however "construction o f a
theoretical edifice using materials randomly drawn from what is at hand."
According to Arnowitz, employing such categories as climate and cycles
which are historically specifi- in explaining the genesis o f
capitalism,
leaves an impression that there is no principle involved in Wallerstein’s
analysis, since he implies that changes are not a function o f internal
contradiction "but o f sure contingency."
(Arnowitz, P. 508)
Arnowitz (Ibid., P. 508) further argues that Wallerstein "in the first place
in his analysis o f crisis o f feudalism swallows whole the premises of
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W allerstein's major interest is to construct a theory of capitalist
development as a system of exchange relations which is shaped by
its world-wide characteristic rather than by a m ixtur of national
features.

Then, logically when he cojoins secular and cyclical crises,41

the decline of feudalism could only lead to the world-economy.

And

it becomes reasonable for his theory to find the origin of capitalism
in

the

expansion

of

the

w orld

trade

and

in

the

history

of

explorations. (Arnowitz 1981, P. 509)
Critics point out that Wallerstein is a reductionist; his model is
based on a reduction of complete socio-economic structures.
view,

such

structures

are

determ ined

opportunities and market exchange.

solely

by

w orld

In his
market

He considers exchange as the

mainspring of the organic whole, and to prove the legitimacy of his
explanation he resorts to Marx's writings in order to "enlist him in
his interpretation of importance of circulating capital in determining
the organic whole." (Navarro 1982, P. 87)

What he quotes, however,

is not an accurate representation of Marx.

In contrast to Wallerstein,

classical political economy that owes its origin to A Smith and Thomas
Malthas - the law o f diminishing returns within a given technology - the
more dubious notion o f cyclical theory..and finally the remarkable
uncritically adopted idea that climatic conditions may be an independent
variable in the transformation o f social structure, unmeditated by the
structure itself. In all of these ideas there is no dynamic o f internal
relations into which the variables may be placed. That is, Wallerstein has
no theory o f social change as an outgrowth o f the crisis o f the social
relations that structure a social system."
41
Cyclical crisis implies that the expansion reaches optimal points given the
level o f technology.
Secular crisis implies diminishing return on land
which limits the capacity o f surplus appropriation of the system. The
emphasis on expansion as an imperative for feudalism makes Wallerstein's
theory ahistorical.
He generalized Marxists' argument that capitalism
requires expansion because of the logic o f accumulation and applies it to
any society, and argues the expansion is a property o f all social systems or
they must die. (Arnowitz 1981)
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Marx em phasizes the im portance of production in determ ining a
mode of production, though mentioning that within "the same mode
of production exchange can also determine the type of production."
(Navarro

1982, P. 88)42

In fact, Marx referred to capitalism as

capitalist mode of production.

This is not because he was a

reductionist, but because he believed "the relations of production
were the ones that determ ine how different moments (levels) of
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are articulated
within the mode of production or organic whole.” (Navarro 1982, P.
8 8 ) 43

42 This is the complete quotation from Marx as (has been) translated
by Vincente Navarro:
(Navarro 1982, P. 87-88)
"The conclusion we
reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption
are identical, but that they all are the elements o f a totality, different
components within a unity. From production, the whole process starts
and is reproduced...There is no doubt that exchange and consumption
cannot be determinant.
The same applies to distribution and
distribution o f products...A s
a consequence, each production
determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well
as a definite relation between those different moments.
Also
production, within its specific form, is determined by other moments.
For example, when the market, i.e., the sphere o f exchange, grows, the
volume o f production also increases and appears a more profound
division o f production...There exists a reciprocal relation among the
different elements.
This is the case with every organic whole."
(G rundrisse)

42 Wallerstein brings another quote from Marx to defend his position, but
here also Marx indicates that exchange contributes to the expansion o f the
already existing capitalist mode o f production. "I am no more
'circulationist' than Marx was when he argued that 'competition' on the
world market (is) the basis and vital element o f capitalist prodution."
(Marx Capital III. Ch.VI P. 110)." And when in the Sixteenth, and partially
still in the Seventeenth, Century the sudden expansion o f commerce and
emergence o f a new world-market overwhelmingly contributed to the fall
o f the old mode o f production. This was accomplished conversely in the
basis o f the already existing capitalist mode o f production." (Marx Capital
HI, Ch. XX, P. 333 Italics) (Wallerstein 1977)
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One consequence of W allerstein's emphasis on market exchange
is his lim ited attention to class struggle whose roots are in the
relations of production and not in the relations of exchange; the
external relations of the world market influence class struggle within
each society but do not determine them. (Navarro 1982 and Skocpol
1977) As Brenner (1977) puts it, W allerstein disregards the fact that
once a class structure as an outcome of class struggle is established in
a society, it determines the direction of change and the courses of
economic development or underdevelopment.

Brenner in the same

line argues that W allerstein's model assumes that the dominant class
is more or less free to adopt any method of labor control or form of
production, which is best suited to its interest given the exigencies
imposed by its position in the international division of labor.

He

reduces therefore the class struggle to the responses of the ruling
class to the market and ignores the power of direct producers to set
limits on such responses. Brenner's idea that "the solidarity of the
local peasant com m unities

may play

a role

in developm ent as

im portant as the pattern of international exchange" m ight appear
devastating to the world system approach. (Evans 1979)44
W allerstein's definition of capitalist mode of production has
also been criticized by Marxists. For Marxists the capitalist relations
of production are the ones in which labor has been freed from

44

According to Brenner, the international division of labor that emerged in
Europe should be explained only by interpreting the nature o f peasant
communities' resistance to the ruling class strategies in different areas.
Even when Wallerstein acknowledges the class struggles between serf and
lords the importance o f a discontented class o f capitalist entrepreneurs in
the towns of feudal Europe, he still does not credit either of these with the
vanquishment o f feudalism by capitalism. (Arnowitz 1981)
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obligation to land and is not the owner of the means of production.
W allerstein, on the other hand, focuses on capitalism as a "specific
system

of

labor

rationalization

and

unequal

exchange."

This

categorization has led him to displace the question of exploitation,
and

substitute

instead

the

inequality

derived

from

occupying

different positions in the hierarchy of international division of labor.
(Evans 1979)
exploit

It is for this reason that he argues the core regions

peripheral

regions

through

the

m echanism

of

unequal

exchange. (Petras & Trachte 1979)
Emphasis on circulation, and defining capitalism as a system of
exchange relations has also led him to have a vague notion about
sources of profit. On the one hand, profit is defined as "appropriation
of a surplus w hich was based on more efficient and expanded
productivity (first in agriculture and later in industry.)" (cited in
Gerstein 1977, P. 11)
as a whole.

Here profit is a surplus created in the system

On the other hand, profit is defined as the result of an

unequal exchange, and essentially expropriation by one part of the
world from another.45
W allerstein's technical treatment of division of labor has also
been criticized by Marxists.

He explains the division of labor simply

as so many different types of concrete activities.

This explanation is

exemplified by his attempt to show that the hierarchy of variation of
tasks constitutes the international division of labor M arxists believe
45

"Because he conceives of capitalism from the point o f view o f
circulation.he is unable to identify the roots of class struggle. This point is
epitomized by his uncertainty over the origin and nature o f profit, for the
mode of appropriation o f the surplus, based upon the relations of
production, is the constitutive element o f the mode o f production and o f the
structural definition of classes and the class struggle." (Ibid., P. 11)
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a purely technical definition of labor is inadequate since it is neutral
and "excludes any specification of the social division of labor."

The

social division of labor forms the structure of society and the basis
for the technical separations among
W allerstein speaks of.

different occupations

which

His failure to make this distinction is another

major factor for his substitution of class structure with "geographical
distribution" of different types of labor.

Since core regions are

specialized in production o f capital goods, they exploit the periphery
w hich

is

specialized in production

of less

technical

goods. 46

(Amowitz 1981, & Gerstein 1977)
Because W allerstein loses sight of the class struggles and the
process of class formation which begets change, because of his belief
that the relations of exchange determine the mode of production, and
moreover, because he is also convinced that the capitalist relations of
exchange are dominant ones in today's world, he concludes that
capitalism is the only mode o f production in the present era. Such
credence leads him to consider socialist countries as capitalist ones.

46

Gerstein (1971) uses an example to show how Wallerstein's treatment of
division o f labor has ignored the fact that each mode o f production defines
its own division of labor. Gerstein says: "The concept o f luxury production
as opposed to the production o f essentials is very important in Wallerstein's
scheme because it defines the regions that, while part o f the division of
labor of a system, lies outside o f it. However what is a luxury? The answer
cannot be given outside of a concept of mode o f production in the first
place.
Amowitz also argues that such a line o f reasoning has led Wallerstein to
conclude that the workers in the core are under a less severe coersive
system o f labor control. They are in 'relative advantage' compared to the
workers in the periphery who are working under a harsh system o f labor
control, a system o f share cropping. In doing so Wallerstein’s scheme
succeeds in blurring the distinction between workers and capitalists in the
core, and leaves entirely aside the source o f opposition that might arise in
these regions.
(Amowitz 1981)
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In addition, since the whole world is capitalist, he explains
specific events within the world system in terms of the demand of
the system as a whole.

Actors are reacting, not for "their immediate

concrete interests, but because the system dictates that they act."
(Petras and Tachte 1979)

Liberation movements thus are seen "as

arising out of the structural contradictions of the capitalist world
economy."
is

(Wallerstein 1975, P. 26)

not able to

answ er, why in

Within his framework, then, he
a given

conjuncture

there

are

revolutionary movements in some parts of the world and there are
none in other parts.47
The critics point out that: Even if one accepts
contention
modes

that the world capitalist system

o f labor

W allerstein's

incorporates different

control, the distinction between

the motives and

forces behind their emergence in the ’world capitalist system1 is
important.

Portes for instance argues: "The blue print with which the

Bolshevik party took power in Russia was quite different from that
of the Japenese

imperial bureaucracy,..It involved

not a search for

hegemony within the existing world order, but its destruction."

It is,

therefore, quite difficult to believe that "the ultimate outcome of the
Soviet

experience is simply to promote

Russia into 'core status'

within the capitalist world-economy." (Portes, P. 518)

In response

to W allerstein's claim that the socialist countries, sim ilar to other
countries,

are functioning

Szymanski argues that:
47

parts

of the

w orld cap italist system,

"While it is true that the establishment of

The Russian Revolution in Wallerstein's eyes arose due to international war
which led to the collapse of the Czarist regime which in turn caused a
spontaneous explosion of the populace and finally seizure o f power by a
minority group, the Bolsheviks. (Navarro 1982)
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socialist productive relations in the U.S.S.R. and China was very much
a product of the expansion of Western Europe capitalism into these
countries,"

their

establishm ents

were how ever

capitalist relations of production."

"reactions

against

According to Szymanski, however,

when one considers the revival of slavery or serfdom in the colonies
as a result of the expansion of capitalism, one witnesses an entirely
different

situation:

"...the

revival

of slavery

and

serfdom

integral and ongoing aspects of capitalist profit-making.

were

The sugar

and cotton produced in the Caribbean with slave labor was essential
for the growing capitalist

economies of W estern Europe and North

America...Nothing like this has been the case for social relations in
the U.S.S.R. or China, which consequently cannot be considered to be
a product of economic demand in the W est." (Szymanski 1981, P.
525)
It is obvious for the critics that all societies participate in the
world capitalist system. N evertheless, w hat they consider to be
important and decisive in

differentiating societies from one another

must be searched for "in

their class relationship

and struggles: the

external articulation (between the class structure/w orld m arket) of
these internal changes influences and shapes, but in no decisive
sense develops and initiates the basic changes that mark the scope of
the transformation to new forms of capitalist domination or socialism
and the direction of transition." 48 (Petras 1981, P. 152, cited in Gorin
1985)

48

For a critical survey of Wallerstein's views on the socialist
world-system, see Zeev Gorin. (Portes 1981)

countries

and
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Some critics argue socialism is not a mode of production, it is a
social formation in transition from capitalism to communism. This
transition

m ay

capitalism.

take

centuries,

as

did

that

from

feudalism

to

The direction of that transition depends primarily on the

struggle within the given social formation rather than on the position
of that form ation in the w orld-system .

Analysis of the socialist

countries reveals varieties of "transitional problem s and processes
within and among peoples with diverse experiences, resources, and
institutions

as these societies attem pt to chart the passage from

capitalism, semi-peripheral, or various colonial" formations.

Socialist

transitions are occurring within the orbit of the capitalist world, and
simultaneously are transforming and being transformed by it.
Appraising the significance of these internal and international
changes, however, requires abandoning utopian expectations, since
"the subsequent of cherished dreams in each case turned some of the
m o st

a rd en t

prop o n en ts

of

these

rev o lu tio n s

in to

b itte rly

disillusioned critics as incapable of perceiving the genuine advances
in each case as they had been of recognizing previous shortcomings."
(Selen 1982)

PART TW O: DEPENDENCY AS E.C.L.A .’S C R ITIC ISM O F TRADE

THEORY
2.3.

S u n k el:

The nucleus of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
Am erica's (henceforth E.C.L.A.) analysis was the critique of the
conventional

theory

of

international

trade

as

expressed

in

the

Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade.
E.C.L.A's prescription for achieving accelerated and sustained
economic growth was development of the industrial sector.

Realizing

that this process of industrialization would be inhibited by both a
pattern of international division of labor and a series of internal
obstacles, E.C.L.A. suggested a series of measures. These included
state intervention in the economy as both a direct producer and as a
formulator of economic policies.

The formulation of economic policies

includes attracting foreign investment into the industrial sector and
emphasizing import substitution policies. (Palma 1978)
In the 1960s, however, it seemed that E.C.L.A.'s prescriptions
did

not produce

the

desired

results.

substitution

seemed to

aggravate

instead

allev iatin g

them;

of

responsible for that.

The process

balance

fo reig n

of im port-

of paym ent problem s,

investm ent

w as

in

p art

In several countries income distribution was

worsening and the rate of unemployment was increasing. This bleak
picture subsequently led to some of E.C.L.A.'s members' pessimism
about the possibility of capitalist development in Latin America.

The

disenchanted members o f E.C.L.A. at tem pted to reform ulate its
thought

and

tried

to

discover

why

som e

of

th e

expected
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consequences
America.

of industrialization

were

not

happening

in

L atin

Some of them produced different versions of stagnation

theories. 49 Others, including Sunkel, however later abandoned the
stagnation

theories

and

produced

"m ovem ent

tow ards

a

more

structural-historical analysis of Latin America.” (Palma 1978, P. 908)
Sunkel

criticized

both

the

m odernization

approaches in studying underdevelopment.
m istakenly

considers

countries

as

and

M arxist

He argues the former

self-contained

econom ic

which are on a par in their international relations.

units

In the same

manner this school conceives of underdevelopment as a moment in
the evolution of society which has been economically, politically and
culturally autonomous and isolated.
Sunkel also feels that Marxists are also wrong since they have
restricted

them selves

p en etratio n

of

appropriating

to

analyzing

underdeveloped

the

international

co u n tries

fo r

the

m onopolies'
purpose

of

their econom ic surplus, and as a result they have

neglected the 'spread' and 'backwash1 effects of such penetrations.
(Sunkel 1973)
Sunkel

(1973),

how ever,

praises

M yrdal

(1957),

Prebisch

(1950), and Singer (1970), who originally initiated the study of
'spread* and

'backwash' effects, and have suggested that in the

interaction o f industrial economies with prim ary products producing
countries, the former tend to benefit more than the latter.

According

to him, their study introduces "a most important perspective since it

49

According to Palma, (1978) the most sophisticated perhaps being Furtado.
(1966)
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focuses attention on the interaction between the external agents and
the domestic economic, social, and political structures."
N evertheless,
generalization.
interaction
has

their

study

is

partial

and

req u ires

further

It is partial because in analyzing the effects of

between developed and

concentrated

exclusively

sector of the latter.

on

underdeveloped

the

prim ary

econom ies,

product

it

producing

As a result of this biased analysis they came to

the conclusion that the underdeveloped countries must industrialize
because the industrialization would result in "a cumulative process of
self-reinforcing ’spread’ effects.”

They prescribed that in order to

achieve industrialization these countries should adopt the policy of
import substitution. (Sunkel 1973,
In reality,

the policy

P. 5)

of im port substitution,

according

to

Sunkel, failed to achieve the aims of freeing the underdeveloped
countries from heavy reliance on primary exports and foreign capital
and technology.

This policy, in the initial period, stimulated rather

significant manufacturing industries and a national entrepreneurial
class.

But in the later period most o f the industrial sector was taken

over by foreign firms, w ith the resu lt that much of the benefit
associated with the industrialization has flowed abroad.

This process

of de-nationalization of the economy subsequently led to erosion of
the national entrepreneural class.
uneven developm ent:

"On

It also accentuated the process of

the one

hand, a partial process

of

modernization and expansion of capital intensive activities; on the
other, a process of disruption, contraction and disorganization of
traditional labor-intensive activities." (Sunkel 1972, P. 518)
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The recognition of the fact that industrialization has aggravated
the

problem

of

econom ic

dependence

reveals

the

necessity

of

analyzing the problem of underdevelopment not in isolation but as a
"part o f the developm ent of the international capitalist

system,

whose dynamic has a determining influence on local processes." One,
then, in Sunkel’s account must look at foreign factors "not as external
but as internal to the system, contributing significantly to shape the
nature and functioning of the economy, society and policy." (Sunkel
1973, P. 6)

In other words, the capitalist system must be viewed as

a whole, "as a global international system,
econom ies-nation-states-constitute

within which national

sub-system s."

Under this approach the developm ent process is not simply
considered "as a race which started somewhere before the Industrial
Revolution and in which some countries reached advanced stages
while others stagnated or moved slower." (Sunkel 1972, P. 519-520)
It must be realized that capitalism

from its outset has created an

international system, which has "brought
under

the

influence

of

a

few

the whole world economy

countries."

D evelopm ent

and

underdevelopment must be viewed as a "simultaneous process; tbe
two faces of the historical evolution of the capitalist system." (Sunkel
1973, P. 7)
D uring

the

colonial

period,

fo r exam ple,

the

Europeans

interfered in Latin America and in order to extract the precious
metals and obtain tropical products introduced slavery and other
forms of forced labor.

The establishment of overseas empires in this

period played an important role in European economic development
and created

the

basic conditions for underdevelopm ent in

most
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territories conquered and colonized.
specialization
production

The Industrial Revolution led to

of first Britain and later some other countries in

of m anufactured goods, w hile the rest

of the world

became specialized in production of staples and raw materials. "This
was a further step in the process of creation o f conditions for
development in the metropolitan area and for underdevelopment in
the periphery." (Sunkel 1973, P. 9)
The age of imperialism ushered in a system of rivalry among
the industrial powers and led to the eventual rise of the United
States as the dominant power. During World War II and immediately
thereafter, w hile Europe was ravaged by war and economic crises,
"the U.S. economy experienced im portant changes in its internal
structure.

Government intervention expanded considerably within

the U nited States, accelerating

growth, reducing fluctuations

and

contributing to a fantastic development of science and technology;"
all of which helped to create large business conglomerates. (Sunkel
1972, P. 501)

According to Sunkel, in the present era, "the capitalist

system is in the process of being reorganized into a new international
in d u stria l

system

w hose

m ain

in stitu tio n a l

agents

are

the

m ultinational corporations, increasingly backed by the governments
of the developed countries." (Sunkel 1972 P. 15)

The multinational

corporations tend to concentrate the planning and developm ent of
science and technology as well as entrepreneurial decision-making in
the

developed

countries,

and

the

underdeveloped

countries

are

assigned to routine production or assembly of goods designed by the
form er.

T he

im p o rt-su b stitu tio n

p o licies

of

underdeveloped
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countries were used by the multinational corporations to penetrate
into these countries and establish their subsidiaries.
According to Sunkel, the massive expansion of multinational
corporations

in

dependent nature

the less

developed countries

has intensified the

of economic development of these countries.

argues further that such intensification
different channels.

He

has taken place through

In the first place, there is a tendency on the part

of subsidiaries of m ultinational corporations not to integrate with
local suppliers or to share their technology.
within one country tend to integrate

Secondly, subsidiaries

horizontally among themselves,

and gain control over finance, credit and markets.

More important is

the fact that while at the beginning the foreign firms may make a
co n trib u tio n

in

c a p ita l,

sk ille d

p e rso n n e l,

tech n o lo g y

and

m anagem ent, overtim e the cash outflow becomes larger than the
inflow.

These are only a few of the 'backwash* effects of the foreign

investm ents

in

the less

developed countries.

(Sunkel

1972 and

Sunkel 1973)
To reverse the above mentioned trends, Sunkel suggests that in
the first place one must take away the control of the state from the
social groups which are closely associated with any benefit from the
dependent structure of the less developed countries.

After taking

over the control of the state three major steps m ust be taken in
order to correct "the main malformation inherited from the historical
process of interaction with the international system."

In the second

place, there is a need for agrarian reform, since the present structure
of the agricultural sector is "the fundam ental root of inequality,
m arginalization and

stagnation."

In the third

place, because the
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prim ary

export

accum ulation,
channeled

sector

through

is

the

m ost im portant

control

over this

tow ards expansion o f heavy

source

of capital

sector capital

m ust

be

and consum er industries.

Finally, the industrial sector m ust be reorganized, by reorienting
production from conspicuous consumption to basic consumer goods
necessary for satisfying the needs of the majority. (Sunkel 1972, P.
530)
In this process of structural reforms the foreign interests will
be

affected,

either

through

nationalization

of th eir

in terest

or

through renegotiation with them. The less developed countries have
the right to control their most essential resources, and the policies of
foreign firms do not necessarily coincide with the interest of these
countries.

Realization of this fact, according to Sunkel, has led to the

end of the era of "creating favorable business conditions for direct
foreign investm ent"

and the opening up of a new era of hard

bargaining, negotiations and "assertion of national interest of our
countries in their international economic relations." (Sunkel 1972, P.
531)
Sunkel, like Frank and W allerstein, sees underdevelopment and
development as two sides of the same coin.
is

a

global

structural

process

of

He believes development

change;

and

underdeveloped

countries have been deprived of autonomous capacity for change and
growth, and are dependent for these on the industrial developed
countries. (O’Brien 1975)

W hile historically the dependency itself

has remained unchanged, its mechanism has undergone changes.

For

example, according to Sunkel, in the past it was the interconnections
of four essential elements- "the stagnation of traditional agriculture,
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the m ono-export of primary product, the type of industrialization
policies, and the functions of state"-which had created the implacable
necessity

to

m echanism

of

H ow ever, in

the modern

developed

obtain foreign

finance,

and

dependency.

(Sunkel

1973

countries by

era

it is the

the

that

becam e the key

and

penetration

m ultinational

Sunkel
of

corporation

1969)
the less

w hich is

counted as the essential feature o f dependency. Sunkel's prescription,
however, differs from Frank's and W allerstein's and in contrast to
them he does not seek demolition of the capitalist system.
is in search of more nationalistic and reformist solutions.

Rather he
He admires

the case

of Peru in which the nationalist elements took over the

pow er

state

of

and

in

opposition

to

the

dependent nature

developm ent of their country attem pted to take necessary

of

steps.

(Sunkel 1972)
The aim, then, m ust be accomplishing "greater autonomy, in
order to achieve development without 'dependencia.'" (Sunkel 1972
P. 531)

This does not imply autarky; rather the possibility of

cooperation w ith foreign firm s

"is by no means excluded, even

though there will certainly be little place for wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries

or

private

foreign

investm ent

of traditional

kind."

(Sunkel 1973, P. 24)
Sunkel is not concerned with and has not attempted to analyze
the

relations

countries.

betw een

the

socialist

and

industrialized

One may, however, anticipate that Sunkel in the light of

his general m ethodology would probably
countries

cap italist

which

follow ed his

autonomous development.

consider those socialist

prescriptions

capable

of achieving

In fact he uses the example of 'socialist'
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Chile

and its relations

with the m ultinational corporations as a

guiding light which must be followed by the less developed countries
in their relations with these corporations. (Sunkel 1973 and Sunkel
1972)
Sunkel's analysis, like others in the dependency tradition, has
been criticized both on em pirical and theoretical grounds.

Bill

Warren, (1973) for example, employs four criteria suggested by B.
Sutcliff (1972) as the conditions of independent industrialization50
and argues that em pirical observation confirm s the strong trends
tow ard

lessening

countries.

dependence

developm ent

of

less

developed

In regards to dependence on the foreign technology,

Warren argues the importation of these technologies represents a net
gain for the Third World, and these technologies "are increasingly
assim ilated in the industrial process, and thereby contribute to the
developm ent

of

indigenous

(Bernstein 1982, P. 226)

tech n ical

cu ltu re

and

capacity."

Yet according to Warren, the very concept

of "independent industrialization" is highly ambiguous and Sutcliffs
criteria have not always been necessary or sufficient conditions of
independent capitalist industrialization.
In Sunkel's analysis the results of what may be the very effects
of

c a p ita list

in d u strializatio n -su ch

as

m assive

unem ploym ent,

immiseratio-are assimilated to symptoms of the dependent nature of
economies of the Third World countries.

Similarly, his arguments

50 These four criteria are: 1) The development of a domestic market for the
products of national-industry.
2) A diversified industrial sector with
numerous internal linkages including capital goods industry. 3) National
control over the investment o f capital and the accumulation process. 4) An
indigenous capacity for the development o f technologies appropriate to a
given country's industrial strategy.
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embody a "conceptual delusion” that there exists a "genuine" and
"national"

developm ent

process

w hich

"delivers

the

goods

of

increased social welfare, more egalitarian income distribution, full
employment, a process which benefits the majority.

This definition

virtually excludes the basic characteristic of capitalism

which is

"exploitation through the appropriation of surplus value, and creating
the conditions of such exploitation." (Bernstein 1982, P. 227)

Even in

the developed countries where supposedly this 'genuine' process is at
operation, one can observe inequalities, unemployment, poverty, as
w ell as disparities among various geographic areas, between urban
and rural areas, within cities themselves.
In summary, Sunkel's analysis only provides description and
condemnation of the symptoms and effects of capitalist. development,
rather than explaining them "in terms of intrinsically contradictory
nature of the process itself." (Bernstein 1982, P. 229)
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Summary o f First Chapter:

The dependency school, represented here by Frank and W allerstein,
m aintains

that

socialist

and capitalist countries

qualitatively different economic systems.

do

not possess

In other words, Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union cannot be considered socialist countries.
Frank and W allerstein each present different reasons for such a
conclusion. Frank asserts that integration into the world economy
defies a country's economic system, and since the socialist countries
are integrated into the world international division of labor, they can
not in any way be differentiated from the capitalist countries.
W allerstein, on the other hand, believes in prevalence of only
one mode o f production

throughout the world, and that is the

capitalist mode of production. According to him, in capitalist mode of
p ro d u c tio n ,

s e lf-in te re s te d

in d iv id u a ls

are

c o n n e c te d

and

interdependent through the exchange relations, or one single division
of labor.

Through this single division of labor, the totality of

economic actors' needs are met by a com bination of their own
production and in some forms of exchange.

Consequently, since all

regions of the world, regardless of their internal forms of labor
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control*

take

part in this single division of labor, they are all

capitalist countries.51
According to the dependency school, the manner in which
socialist countries insert themselves into the international division of
labor is similar to that of intermediate capitalist countries:
Mexico,
levels

etc.
w hile

capitalist

i.e. Brazil,

In other words, they exploit the countries at the lower
sim ultaneously

countries.

they are exploited by the

The pattern

o f trade

of the

advanced

interm ediate

countries is an indicator of such hierarchical exploitive relationships.
W hile

these

co u n tries

ex p o rt m a n u fa ctu red

goods

to

the

underdeveloped countries and import raw materials from them, the
interm ediate
countries

countries

export

raw

m aterials

and im port industrial products from

to

the

them.

developed
It is the

investigation of such a claim that will be the focus of my study in the
fifth chapter of this dissertation.

51

Although at first glance Frank's and Wallerstein's schemes seem to be
identical, in reality they are not. In Frank's version a breakout from the
capitalist system is possible, while in Wallerstein's scheme it is not.

CHAPTER III
The
In

the

dependency

previous
school,

European countries,

N eo-C lassical School

chapter,

represented
by

I

tried

by

establishing

to

Frank,

establish
argues

th at

that

the

Eastern

economic relations w ith

West, have become a functioning part of the capitalist system.

the
The

world system approach, represented by W allerstein, maintains that
since

capitalism

production,

the

is

the

nature

only

w orld-w ide

of E astern

European

em bracing

m ode

of

countries1 economic

system is not qualitatively different from those of other countries. It
is the purpose of this chapter to investigate how the neo-classical
economists address East-W est economic relations.
as

far

as

the

basic

assum ptions

of

I will argue that

orthodox

econom ists

are

concerned, the differences in the socio-economic systems of capitalist
and socialist countries are not important.
The orthodox economists have established th eir theory at a
highly general and abstract level.

Their starting point is abstract

in d iv id u als

certain set

endow ed

w ith

characteristics

which

satisfactions.

It is also

a

drive them towards

of

p sy ch o lo g ical

m axim ization

of

their

assum ed that each of these atom ized

individuals has at his/her disposal a commodity and an exclusive and
unlimited right to it.

The individuals are completely free in deciding

whether to sell their commodities or to retain them.
w orker is thus

free

in

choosing to sell his/her

An individual
services

to an
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entrepreneur or refrain from it, and may instead choose the "leisure"
of not working.

. All commodity exchanges are transacted only when

the price ratios are equated with the ratio of "subjective preferences
at the margin."
econom ists

is

Since the focus of theoretical analysis of orthodox
th e

process

of

exchange,

there

is

nothing

to

differentiate and discriminate exchange of apples for oranges, from a
worker’s sale of his/her labor power in the market.

The attention is

only on the equality of the marginal rate of substitution of apples for
oranges and their price ratio in the case of the former transaction,
and on the equality of the marginal rate of substitution of work for
leisure with the wage rate in the case of the latter transaction.
The critics of neo-classical economics argue that emphasis on
exchange and individuals (in contrast to production and institutions)
has led the orthodox theorists to ignore the m ost peculiar aspect of
the capitalist mode of production.

Workers have been denied the

ownership of the means of production and have been forced to sell
their labor powers in the market. On occasion workers may be more
or less free to sell their labor powers to whomever they choose, but
they are not free to not sell them at all.

If one loses sight of this

aspect of capitalist relations of production, one is likely to reach some
of the essential conclusions of orthodox economists' theorizing ideas
of freedom, equality and optimality.

According to these economists,

economic agents are free to sell or not to sell their commodities and
are free to leave or enter the markets; the individuals confront each
other as equals having access to equal resources and inform ation,
exchanging equal commodities; and naturally only those exchanges
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take place that cause at least one of the agents to be better off and
neither worse off. (Mohun 1979) & (Godelier 1972)
The neo-classical economists' assumption of rational, egotistical,
and maximizing human beings have been established at a high level
of abstraction that is institutional free.

According to them, all human

efforts can be reduced to the exchange of land, labor and capital in
all societies, places, and times.

Under any institutional framework,

the atomized individuals are maximizing their exogenous preference
structure (in the case of consumers) or a form of profit function (in
the case of producers). Moreover, such concepts as wages, rent and
interest are considered to be universal categories and are applicable
to both the present day economies and the economies of the past
with completely different institutional persuasions. (Hunt 1979)
categories of wage, rent and interest, then
are hedonistically 'natural' categories o f
such taxonomic force that their elemental
lines of cleavage ran through the facts of
any given economic situation...even where
the situation does not permit these lines of
cleavage to be seen by men...; so that, e.g., a
gang of Aleutian Islanders slushing about in
the wrack and surf with rakes and magical
incantations for the capture of shell-fish are
held, in point of taxonomic reality, to be
engaged in a feat of hedonistic equilibration
in rent, wages, and interest. And that is all
there is to it. Indeed, for economic theory
of this kind, that is all there is to any
economic situation. (Veblan 1961, cited in
Hunt 1979, P. 304)

The
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In the orthodox economists' view the capitalist economy differs
from all the other societies only in the sense that in the former the
universal

human

behavior,

universal

human

activities

and

"the

universal modes by which these activities were rewarded lead to the
ideal situation of equilibrium and pareato-optim ality.1
The following statements from Solow (Solow 1963), one of the
m ajor

exponents

of

neo-classical

econom ists,

w ill

clarify

the

institutional-free nature of analysis of this school.
W orkers get paid for working; what do
capitalist get paid for? For 'waiting' while
ro u n d a b o u t
p ro c e s s e s
of
p ro d u c tio n
p ercolate, or fo r 'abstaining' from some
current consumption in favour of replacing
or augm enting the stock o f capital and
m a in ta in in g
or
in c r e a s in g
f u tu r e
consumption. Since so much of the 'waiting'
gets done in expensive autom obiles and
luxurious resorts, w hile the 'abstinence'
excites little sympathy in an even slightly
cy n ical o b serv er, the w hole ap p aratu s
begins to look like a transparent verbal
trick...B ut even so, there is no excuse for
econom ists to lose the concept in their
resentm ent at the language.
One of the
elegant show piece of econom ics is its
a n a ly s is
of
th e
r e s o u r c e - a llo c a tio n
implications of a system of prices or shadow
prices.
We have
learned to free this
analysis of ethical overtones.
All that is
necessary in capital theory is to draw a
conceptual distinction between the imputed
retu rn to cap ital and the incom e of
capitalists. Here, as elsewhere in economics,
but with rather more irony here, the best
Assuming free competition and ignoring such "disturbances" as monopoly.
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way o f understanding the econom ics of
capitalism may be to think about a socialist
economy, (cited in Mohun 1979)
As far as the orthodox economists' theory is applicable to any
society with diverse institutions, the same tools and instrum ents
which are used to analyze a capitalist economy can be used to
analyze other economic systems. Under the same logic, there is no
need

therefore

to

u tilize

different

concepts

and

m ethods

for

analyzing East-W est economic relations.

And as these economists

hold

investm ents

that

the

advantageous

international
fo r

all

parties

trade

and

involved,

it

m ust

are

not

equally

make

difference if one of the parties is a socialist country.

any

It is the

purpose of this chapter to investigate the methodology adopted by
the orthodox econom ists in their study of the economic relations
between advanced capitalist countries and socialist ones and to show
the authenticity of the above statements, i.e. universal applicability
of their theory.

Furthermore, throughout this chapter,

I will attempt

to pinpoint the problems associated with the neo-classical school's
m ethodology

in

investigating

E ast-W est

econom ic

relations.

To

achieve such a goal an extensive survey of literature is necessary.
Such a task at first may seem to be difficult, since the number of
books

and

articles

subject is extensive.

published

by m ainstream

econom ists

on the

A more detailed examination, however, reveals

that there are two distinctive groups in this school which have dealt
with the question of East-W est relations.

The first group in its

analysis does not try to maintain any explicit theoretical perspectives
and mainly relies on case studies.

The second group comprises those
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orthodox

w riters

who

take

their

th eo retical

approaches

m ore

seriously and try to apply the neo-classicist's concepts and methods
in inquiring into their topic of study.
divided into two m ajor parts.

Consequently, this chapter is

In part one, I w ill review

the

methodologies adopted by 'non-theoretical' orthodox economists; in
part two, I will focus on theoretical works of these economists.

PART ONE: NON-THEORETICAL ORTHODOX ECONOMISTS:

M ost orthodox econom ists w ho have sought to

investigate

East-W est economic relations have produced works which steer clear
of m aintaining an explicit, coherent theoretical reasoning.

Instead

they have relied on case studies, informed speculation, taxonomical
e x e rc is e ,2 or general description The lack of theoretical analysis on
the part of these orthodox authors has been interpreted by M. Herold
and N. Kozlov (1983) as their realization of the inadequacy of neo
classical theoretical apparatus in dealing with the question of E ast
and W est economic relations.

"Lacking a concept o f mode of

production, it is of course difficult to conceptualize relations between
different forms of social organizations.” (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P.
17)
2

It is not the purpose of my study to find out whether these

I am using the categories employed by M. Herold and N. Kozlov (1983). I
realize that such categorization is somehow arbitrary, as in many cases
there is significant overlap between, for example, those authors who rely
on case studies and those who have devoted considerable attention to
taxonom y.
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orthodox authors abstain from theoretical investigation because of
their "intuitive grasp of this difficulty" or their lack of belief in the
universal applicability of the already produced neo-classical theory
of international trade and investment or perhaps some other reasons.
This study will try however to show that omission o f theoretical
analysis has produced various consequences.

On occasion, some of

these authors, by relying extensively on the case studies, have drawn
illegitim ate generalizations based on lim ited inform ation.

On the

other hand, the work of some authors can be illuminating and at
times useful.
m ainstream

As it is impossible to cite the works of all of the
econom ists who

have em ployed

the

approach in studying East-West economic relations,
some examples under each different category.

"non-theoretical"
I w ill only bring

1 will try to illustrate

only the works of those economists who are at least relatively wellknown in their field of study.3
Part one of this chapter is subsequently divided into four major
sections.

1- case

speculation;

4-

studies;

2- general description;

3- inform ed

taxonomical exercises. I would like to state from the

beginning that since my goal is to highlight the methodology adopted
by the orthodox econom ists and show the consequences of their
adopted methodology, I will not divide the following sections (3.1.3.4.) based on the subject (i.e., trade, investment, etc.).

3

My emphasis will be on the recent studies. For a thorough survey of
literature prior to 1974 see Holzman. (1974)

109

3.1, CASE -STUDIES;
Most authors in the neo-classical tradition who have relied on case
studies

fo r

analyzing

the

E ast-W est

econom ic

emphasized only one aspect of such relations.

relatio n s

have

Others have either

concentrated on operation of one particular company (or industry) in
Eastern Europe or have focused on the experiences of individuals.
Among the best examples of the first group is McMillan (McMillan
1981)

w ho

d escrib es

the

"in stitu tio n al

form s"

and

financial

arrangem ents which characterize industrial cooperation agreements
(henceforth I.C.A.) between East and West.
M cM illan

c o n sid e rs

I.C .A .s

as

"new

m icro eco n o m ic

relationships" which link Western firms to the Eastern state agencies
in a broad range o f activities such as research, investm ent and
marketing.

He believes assimilation o f Western technology is an

important incentive for Eastern Europeans to conclude I.C.A.s.

In

particular, for more trade-dependent Eastern countries, the exportgenerating function of acquired technology is a major additional
consideration.
The hard currency paym ents faced by Eastern countries is
another consideration which has made them interested in the "selffinancing" character o f I.C.A.s.

Under an I.C.A ., in many cases

purchases o f W estern plants and technology are partially offset by
return from Westward flows of jointly produced outputs.
McMillan also pays considerable attention to taxonomy,

and he

seeks a definition of I.C.A.s, which he thinks is important for any
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rigorous and fundamental analysis o f East-W est economic relations
especially of quantitative nature.

He then adopts the definition for

an

purchases

I.C .A .

w hich

"incorporates

of

technology

and/or

equipment (including com plete plants) on a com pensation basis, as
well as more unambiguous forms of production cooperation - and
extends to joint East-W est companies, established for a wide variety
of purposes." (McMillan 1981, P. 56)

Based on this definition he then

tries to establish the trend of I.C.A. development through the end of
the 1970s.

This task is admittedly a difficult and im portant one,

mainly due to lack of any detailed and regular official, national
statistics on the number or size of the I.C.A.s.

Nevertheless he tries

to assemble data mainly based on the secondary sources which are
"susceptible to variations in coverage by the

specialized press."

(McMillan 1981, P. 60)
The tremendous growth o f East-West trade in the first half of the
1970s was matched with an equally explosive development of I.C.A.s.
McMillan argues that in the second half of the mid 1970s, after the
initial period of dynamic growth, one might have expected I.C.A.s to
grow more slowly due to a combination of the following reasons.
more

obvious

opportunities

exploited in the first phase.

for

cooperation

would

have

The
been

M oreover, the recession of 1974-75

which created excess capacities in the West, therefore reduced the
incentive of W estern firms to add new productive capacity in the
East. Furtherm ore, the W estern companies became more interested
in new

im portant partners

for industrial cooperation,

the OPEC

countries. Finally, renewed tensions between East and W est could be

I ll

seen as an impedement to further growth of I.C.A.s.

McMillan's

studies,

an

how ever,

show

there

was

no

evidence

of

overall

slowdown in the number of new I.C.A .s after 1976, despite the
unfavorable economic and political climate. He also tries to present
the breakdown of I.C.A.s by industry in 1975 and 1980, to mark the
trend of their industrial structural changes.
In discussing the outlook for I.C.A.s in the 1980s, McMillan
believes several important and potentially constraining factors must
be considered. He argues I.C.A .s are inherently
favorable political conditions.

For

dependent upon

example, as a channel

for the

transfer of W estern technology they are vulnerable to embargoes of
technology.

In the absence of the propitious political climate he

predicts

there w ill be "concentration

in less

politically sensitive sectors.”

M oreover, due to increasing

W estern

concern

about

of

W estern

m arkets,

the

the

im pact

com pensation

on smaller, short-term

com pensatory

deals

may

be

projects

goods

on

difficult

to

implement. However, the compensation deals are very important for
Eastern countries, due to their chronic hard-currency deficits and
m ounting debts.

He also mentions the differences in the socio

economic system as a constraint on the growth of I.C.A.s.
contrast

to

F rank

and

W allerstein

who

consider

the

Here, in
econom ic

relations with the W est as a determ ining factor in changing the
economic structure of socialist countries, McMillan argues the I.C.A.
has proven not to be a substitute fo r
economic reform; it is in fact a type of
reform of Eastern foreign trade mechanism.
To be sucessful, it must be accompanied by
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complementary changes in other aspects of
both external and dom estic planning and
m anagem ent.
If such accom odation is
lacking, (I.C.A.) arrangements are like alien
bodies g rafted o n to a system w hich
ultimately rejects them .” (McMillan 1981, P.
64,)
In the absence of economic reform in those countries he concludes
that "the quantitative growth of (I.C.A.) is unlikely to be matched by
its qualitative development. (I.C.A.) would then remain stunted in its
evolution, a euphemism for the

simpler forms of subcontracting

more complex forms of barter.” (McMillan

and

1981, P. 65)

Paul M arer and Joseph M iller (1972) also are interested in
investigating the I.C.A. aspect of economic relations between East and
W est, in particular the U .S.’s participation in East-W est industrial
cooperation agreements.

They

attribute

Eastern countries'interests

in I.C.A. to their acute shortage of hard currency as w ell as the
importance of narrowing the East-West technological gap.
side their study,

On the U.S.

based on a survey of over one thousand U.S.

corporations engaged in I.C.A.s, indicates the most im portant motive
is the market penetration.
Among the interesting results o f their survey are: the majority
of U.S. corporations involved in I.C.A.s were among the Fortune 500,
almost all were multinational corporations, and nearly half have some
type of involvement in more than one country.

They also conclude

that in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe projects in chemical
and machinery industries dominate.

M oreover, they argue that the

Soviet Union exhibits a strong preference for turnkey agreements,
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whereas Eastern European countries are more interested in applied
industrial technology and know-how. In general their study is not as
comprehensive and thorough as McMillan's.
Barclay (1979) provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of
com pensation

agreem ents

in

Soviet

trade

w ith

the

W est.

He

attributes the impetus behind the rapid expansion of Soviet trade
with the W est in the 1970s to the Soviet Union's desire to acquire
capital, technology and equipment in order to explore and exploit
Siberia's natural resources and to expand the product in certain
industrial sectors, such as chemical and petro chemicals.
trade

relations

with

the

W est the

Soviets

have

In their

em phasized

the

compensation agreements, which according to Barclay offer several
advantages to them.

One important advantage is the reduction of

risk, because under the com pensation agreem ents the Soviets are
guaranteed

long-term

export

m arkets,

which

provide

protection

against W estern recession that would otherwise reduce Soviet export
earnings.

Another advantage is the creation of export industry in the

Soviet Union specialized in producing for export.
However, Barclay believes that in the second half of the 1970s
as Soviet interest in the com pensation deals had intensified, the
number of new deals concluded had decreased considerably.
en v isag es

both

the

S o v iets'

in tern al

problem s

disenchantment as the main reasons for such a decline.

and

He

W estern

On the Soviet

side he considers the following factors to be responsible for slow
proliferation of compensation deals.
trad e

b u reau c ra cy

is

First of all, the Soviet foreign

ill-e q u ip p e d

to

h an d le

co m p en satio n
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agreements.

M oreover, w hile successful conclusion of such deals

requires continuing W estern presence, ow nership, or control over
production, the

Soviet doctrine clearly does

not perm it W estern

equity participation and/or management control.

Furthermore, even

if such difficulties can be surpassed, "the primitive level of Siberian
infrastructure and the difficulties involved in taking on several large
development projects simultaneously" make it difficult to negotiate
and conclude a large number of compensation agreements. (Barclay
1979, PP. 470-471)
On the Western side he argues that first of all the Western firms
are reluctant

to accept m any Soviet products. In addition, many

agreements signed in the first half of 1970s reflected the Western
firms' eagerness to insure access to raw m aterials; however, the
recession of mid 1970s hit industries that produce the products that
Soviets would like to export. Moreover, in most cases the Soviet Union
requests
finance

harsh

financial

dem ands

including

the developm ent o f infrastructure

as

long-run
w ell as

credits

to

production

facilities; deferred payments on installments until the end of plant
construction.

Such

com pensation

d e a ls

Furtherm ore,

some firms

because

do

they

financial
fo r

not w ant

dem ands

the

W estern

are reluctant
"to

make

the

firm s

conclusion

of

less

attra c tiv e .

to enter into

such deals

sponsor additional

com petition."

(Barclay 1979, P. 472)
B arclay believes the prospect o f increasing
com pensation

agreem ents

to a

resolutions of the above problems.

larg e degree

the number o f

depends

on

the

In particular the Soviet Union
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m ust overcome "bureaucratic inertia, cut negotiation times (possibly
by abandoning the past hard line on price, guarantees, credits, and
other contract terms), and soften restrictions on the Western presence
in the domestic economy." (Barclay 1979, P. 473)

Barclay's argument

is, therefore, different from those of Frank and W allerstein, who see
the economic relations with the West as a determ ining factor in
shaping the economic structure of socialist countries.
to say the opposite.
internal

factors

Barclay seems

He argues that it is only through changes in both

and

external

factors

th a t

E ast-W est

econom ic

relations can be intensified.
Jozef Wilczynski (1977) is interested in analysing the licenzing
aspect of W est-East-W est transfer technology.

Starting with a brief

history of technological embargo during the Cold W ar era, he argues
that apart from the political considerations the support for embargo
extended to the large corporations which were anxious to retain their
world-wide leadership in the export of industrial products.

They

w ere concerned about rapid industrial developm ent in the socialist
countries and did not want to facilitate the emergence of dangerous
competitors.

However, according to him the result of embargo was "to

push smaller socialist countries into the arms of U.S.S.R. as she had
the largest range of technology as an alternative supplier."(Wilczynski
1977, P. 122)
A good part of his paper is devoted to the historical survey of
the total number of licenses sold by the Western countries to the East,
as well as to exhibiting examples of some of the best known licenses
provided by Western firms to the socialist countries.

He enumerates
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the reasons for the change of attitude of Western firms in regards to
the sales of licenses to the East.

First, the direct exports of some

goods in particular consumer products, to the socialist countries are
often complicated and not favored by officials in these countries. The
selling of licenses in these cases is a sensible alternative to direct
exports.

Second, the socialist countries are increasingly inclined to

purchase licenses on the understanding that paym ent w ill be linked
to the quantity of output sold, which may end up producing a quite
substantial amount of money.

Third, the sales of licenses in the

majority of cases will lead to exports of other products.

Finally, the

Western firms are not too much concerned anymore about the loss of
their technological lead, since in many cases they sell only dated
technology.

Furthermore, the inability of socialist countries to apply

the acquired licenses in production is another reason for the Western
firms' lack of concern for loss of their technological lead.
Wilczynski also mentions the socialist countries’ sales of licenses
to the West. According to him, in recent years, by the increase in
sophistication and magnitude of the invention made by the advanced
socialist countries, their

sales of licenses have also increased.

Most of

the buyers of socialist licenses are small or medium W estern firms,
and not multinational corporations. Such sales are important for the
East, particularly in order "to dispel the conviction in the West that
the the socialist countries are technologically backward," and also "to
demonstrate that socialism is not only a superior social system but
also

has

the

capacity

to

catch

up

and

technologically." (Wilczynski 1977, P. 132 & 134)

surpass

cap italism
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In discussing the prospects for future development o f license
trade, he believes two sets of opposite forces will be operating, one
w ith

re s tric tiv e

consequences.

e ffe c ts,

and

the

o th e r

w ith

ex p an sio n ary

Among the restrictive factors he counts the socialist

countries' realization that such "'horizontal' transfer o f technology - as
contrasted with a 'vertical' flow from domestically-sustained effort is likely to perpetuate the traditional East-W est technological gap."
(Wilczynski 1977, P. 135)
Among the expansionary factors he believes is the realization
of

the

required

w ell-know n
trem endous

fact

that

costs

investment in human capital.

additions

in

both

to

advanced

expenses

in

R

technology
and

D

and

And he concludes that "these modem

facts of technological life make the international division o f labor
imperative...It will be increasingly sensible for the .East as well as the
W est to

specialize in

certain

lines

of technology

according

to

comparative advantage, and the resources so economized can be put
to other worthy uses." (W ilczynskil977, P. 135)

This conclusion is,

however, in contradiction to his arguments in regards to one-sided
benefits which Western firms obtain in their sales o f licenses to the
Eastern countries. Socialist countries are well aware of this point and
according to W ilczynski himself, are taking some measures in order
to ensure they are not handed over technology that is dated or of
little economic consequences.
Hubert A. Janiszewski (1982) has concentrated his study on
imports of technology by Poland.

He considers it as an important

task because the "conclusion drawn from its experience may be of
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in terest

not

only

to

other

countries

which

are

im porters

technology but also to suppliers." (Janiszewski 1982, P. 165)
paper

is covered

by

axiom atic

claim s

and statem ents

attempts on behalf of the author to substantiate them.

of
The

w ith

no

Such neglect

can be partly attributed to the length of the paper, which is rather
short given the importance of the topic.
He starts his study by examining different channels through
which technology is imported to Poland, and continues by trying to
analyze the impact of imported technology on the Polish economy.
In doing so he shows that between 1971-1978 on the average, the
outflow s

related

to

technological

acquisitions

accounted

fo r

by

paym ent of fees, royalties, purchase of equipment, etc. were more
than

tw ice

of

the

inflow s

rep resen ted

by

ex p o rt

earnings.

Janiszew ski also mentions the widespread delays in implementing
technology which almost exclusively are due "to the lack of resources
for the continuation

of the individual

investm ents

and im posed

restriction on imports of spare parts, raw materials, etc." (Janiszewski
1982, P. 169)

This is an example of unsubstantiated statements

which Janiszewski does not make any effort to validate.
Janiszew ski

concludes

his

paper

by

noting

that

Poland's

attem pts to modernize rapidly by means of imports of technology
have, in general, been fruitful.
export

increases

unsuccessful.

by

the

use

However, its objective of massive
of acquired

technology

has

been

The reason, according to him, should be sought in both

the internal and external conditions.
affected Polish

Externally the world recession

exports as w ell as Polish

investm ent capacities.
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Internally

he

believes

the

heavy

em phasis

on

central

planning

"combined with national investment programs, led to poor planning
of

technology

im ports

leading

in to

huge

implementation." (Janiszewski 1982, P. 170)
his

paper w ith

another axiom atic

delays

in

p ro ject

Therefore, he concludes

statem ent which

he feels

no

obligation to back up.
John Holt (1977) takes up the study of eight U.S. agricultural
and construction equipment companies' activities in Eastern Europe.
He

tries

to

show

how U.S. com panies profit by

sharing

their

technology and know-how with Eastern European countries.

He

believes, in order to maintain or extend their markets in Eastern
Europe,

these

com panies

cooperation agreements.

have

turned

increasingly

to

industrial

According to his study these companies

consider the direct sale of their products more profitable than sale of
technology and know-how.
th e ir

field ,

the

U .S.

However, due to mounting competition in
ag ricu ltu ral

and

co nstruction

equipm ent

companies are yielding to Eastern Europeans' pressure to share their
technology, to accept payments in product, and to provide a market
for these countries' products. Other factors which in Holt's account
w ill enhance the com petitive positions of these companies include
the uniqueness and scarcity of a company's products, its reputation
for quality, its performance, and its good faith.
H olt's

survey

of

eight

U.S.

agricultural

and

construction

equipment companies indicates that not all of them are concerned
about potential com petition from
technology.

the product of the transferred

The companies have frequently chosen to protect their
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markets and technology through contractural agreement limiting the
territo rial

use

and

transferability

of

their

technology.

companies have also withheld their latest technology.
ability

of com panies to withhold is lim ited

Some

However, the

by their degree of

dependence upon the Eastern country's production resulting from the
acquired technology, as w ell as the com panies' responsibility for
marketing of the Eastern products outside these countries.
There are other authors who emphasize the legal aspects of
foreign investm ent legislation in Eastern Europe. John G. Scriven
(1980), for example, studies the joint venture regulations in Poland,
and in doing so tends to generalize based on limited information.
starts

his discussion

w ith

the claim

He

that the unfavorable trade

balances and acute shortage of hard currencies faced by the Eastern
European countries have led to new directions and developments in
the East-W est trade.
growth

Among the new developm ents, one is the

of 'counter-trade'

under w hich all purchases

o f W estern

products must be balanced by a sale of products from the purchasing
country.

The other new development is the "revival of interest in

direct foreign investm ent by W estern corporations in equity jo in t
ventures." (Scriven 1980, P. 425)

And then he turns to a detailed

study o f Poland's 1976 regulations on foreign investments as well as
Polish investment law of 1979.

Finally, he concludes that Poland, by

allowing considerable freedom to Western partners in making their
arrangements on management issues and by imposing no limitation
on profit levels and royalty rates, has gone a long way in satisfying
the

lik e ly

dem ands

of

the

W estern

firm s.

P oland's

foreign
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investm ents' regulations according to Scriven, avoid the extrem ist
position of some of the developing nations in regards to flow of
foreign

investm ents

in

th eir

country,

and

prove

"the

socialist

countries recognize their need for technology from

the W estern

dem ocracies

approach

and

w ish

to

follow

a

non-dogm atic

in

negotiating such arrangements." (Scriven 1980, P. 437)
Scriven

(1979)

in

another

Yugoslavia's foreign investment law.

article

takes

up

the

issue

of

Here, he also draws a detailed

picture of the law and tries to attribute its legislation to the 1974
political changes in Yugoslavia and resultant new constitution there.
His

analysis

leads

him

to

conclude

"Y ugoslavia's

new

foreign

investment law is in line with the current UNCTAD 4 theories of
p ro te c tio n
exploitation."

of

'T h ird -W o rld '

c o u n trie s

(Scriven 1979, P. 107)

a g a in st

m u ltin a tio n a l

However, if one tries - as

Scriven does - to generalize the Eastern European countries' approach
tow ard

m ultinational

based on attitude

corporations

and

direct

foreign

investm ent

of only one country one may reach

opposite

conclusions, as is obviously clear in regards to Scriven's studies.

In

the case o f Poland he speaks about the non'dogmatic and lenient
approach of Eastern European countries toward Western firms; in the
case of Yugoslavia he complains about their hard-line attitudes.
The contradiction is not only limited to Scriven's conclusions;
rather he also makes contradictory statements in the course of his
study.

At one point, for example, in discussing the provision which

deals with regulating the minimum amount of capital contribution of
4

United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations.
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foreign partners, he states "this provision could put an end to token
investments by foreign suppliers in joint ventures which are really
disguised sales." (Scriven 1979, P. 100)

At another point, talking

about the same law he argues "the new law will be attractive only
for these companies interested in disguised sales o f equipment and
technology." 5 (Scriven 1979, P. 106)

Summary,. Sgslign_2-J, ;
In this section I have attem pted - to dem onstrate only a few
examples of those neo-classical school economists who have adopted
the ’case study’ method of analysis. The following table summarizes
the m ajor points of their arguments and provides some information
about the consequences of their adopted methodology.

3.2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

A significant amount of literature published on East-W est economic
relations by the mainstream economists has been devoted to general
description and background information about such relations.

Some

have exclusively concentrated on studying historical developments
and upsw ings and downswings w hich these relations have
through.
5

gone

However, many have chosen this method to prove or

There are others such as William Diebold, Jr. (1979) who is interested in
analyzing the Soviet Union participation in multilateral cooperation
arrangements.
He believes increase in Soviet foreign economic activities
has not been matched by its interest in multilateral cooperation
arrangements. He tries to shed some light on the reasons for such lack of
interest and investigate the factors which might influence future Soviet
involvement in these matters.

General Description

Author

Summary

Comments

Stephen Garrett
(1987)

He provides a brief history
of evolution of East-West
economic relations, and
describes how the U.S. trade
relations with Eastern
Europe have been mistakenly
viewed by American policy
makers as an important tool
in American diplomacy.

He is more or less successful
in demonstrating that there
should never be a political
consideration in regard to
whether trade or not to trade.

Jiri
Dobrovolny
(1983)

He believes the inability of
Eastern Europe to generate
foreign exchange is one of
the main considerations
behind the decline in the
East-West trade.

He provides some data
concerning East-West trade
relations.

Richard Porter
(1981) '

He produces contradictory
He believes that Eastern
statements. (For examples
European countries in their
see the text)
'macro-economics' are
behaving like the rest of the
world. In the 1970s, these
countries raised investment
without cuts in consumption,
while their terms'of trade
were polling. Hie result was
huge hard currency deficit

SUMMARY OF
GENERAL
DESCRIPTION

Sankar L. De
(1975)

He concentrates his study
on die activities of Amer
ican multinational corpora
tion in the Soviet Union.
He dtes the reason behind
the Soviet intrest in econ
omic relations with die West
is:
1-Obtaining Western tech
nology.
2-Gap-filling.

He provides an overview
of the volumes and dimen
sions of U.S. multinationals
in the Soviet Union.
He argues national sovereignty
of the Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries are
strengthened rather than
weakened by their relations
with MNCs.
He claims that the Soviet Union
favors relatively smaller and
weaker corporations over the
stronger ones.

L. Evrawick
(1979)

He is interested in investigating the role of MNCs
in East-West economic
relations.

He provides a comprehensive
analysis of East-West economic
relations.
He cites different reasons for
the socialist countries' interests
in dealing with MNCs; he claims
that the highest percentage
of East-West exchange is realized
by MNCs.
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disprove a given hypothesis.

A good example of such an approach is

that of Stephen A. Garrett. (1982)

Garrett tries to show how the U.S.

trade relations with Eastern Europe have been mistakenly viewed by
American policy makers as an important tool in American diplomacy.
"During the earlier period, it was seen as a 'stick' with which the
U nited

States

could pum m el and

weaken

the E astern European

regimes; in more recent times it has been viewed as a 'carrot' that
would facilitate a new American relationship with the countries of
the region." (Garrett 1982, P. 490)
Garrett argues that immediately after 1948, the countries of
Eastern Europe were viewed as hostile to the U nited States and
deserving

some response.

Given this assum ption,

normal trade

relations with these countries were considered not in the interest of
the U nited States.
this judgement.
supposedly
developm ent,
system,

allow

He believes there were considerations underlying
Imports by the Eastern European countries would
them

w ould

to

shift

strengthen

capital

the

and m ost im portant of all

resources

technological

to

base

m ilitary
of

th eir

"would save the com munist

regimes from the consequences of the inherent flaws in their political
economic structure." (Garrett 1982, P. 490)

An embargo on trade

was suggested since it would obstruct their economic and m ilitary
progress

as w ell

instability."

as

"accentuate

a process

of internal political

Accompanying the embargo was a boycott of Eastern
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European exports w ith the belief that it w ould also impede the
progress of these countries. 6
The change of U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe in the 1960s,
and the doubt about the effectiveness of the use of combination of
embargo and boycott, eventually led the U.S. government to use
trade as a 'carrot1 rather than as a 'stick.'
that increased trade would help to
relative

m oderates

in

the

Arguments were advanced

support the position

governm ents

of E astern

of the

Europe.

In

addition, increased trade with the United States would provide these
countries another alternative to total economic reliance on the Soviet
Union, therefore contributing to loosening the Eastern bloc structure
with significant political advantages for the U.S.
trade

w ould

encourage

d ecen tralizatio n

of

Finally, Western
E astern

E uropean

economies. As a whole, policy-makers felt there was an 'organic link'
between internal economic reform in Eastern Europe and the latter's
participation in the 'international division of labor.'

(Garrett 1982, P.

493)
G arrett then sets up the goal of m easuring the degree of
success of each of these policies and reaches the conclusion that the
"level of American exchange with Eastern Europe could hardly have
any decisive impact on the overall political equation.” (Garrett 1982,
P. 499-500)
6

The United States has never been a significant factor in

For more information on the history of the U.S. government's control on
trade with the East see Bayard. Pelzmand & Perez Lopez. (1982) These
authors also attempt to demonstrate under what conditions it may be
feasible for the Western countries to inflict some economic costs to the
Soviet Union and Eastern European nations through export control.
For
some o f the recent development on the U.S. goverment trade policy toward
the Soviet Union see Brougher. (1982)
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the general trade situation of Eastern Europe. The com bination of
several factors has created "tangible limits to development of trading
relations between the U nited States and Eastern Europe.

Among

these lim iting factors he considers the relative distance between the
U nited

States and Eastern Europe when com pared w ith W estern

European countries. Moreover, he believes the market in the United
States

for E astern European products has

been and w ill likely

continue to be small and as a result these countries will "not be able
to sustain the inevitable balance of payments that a large expansion
of American exports...would entail." (Garrett 1982, P. 498)
Garrett's conclusion is that the use of trade as a 'stick' in the
early phase of American policy toward Eastern Europe was politically
unsuccessful and led to a large expansion of intra-East European
trade.

Adoption of this policy also resulted in the Soviet's increased

"control over economic and ultimately military capabilities of Eastern
Europe;" what the United States has always feared. (Garrett 1982, P.
503)

According to Garrett, the use of trade as "carrot" in the belief

that expansion o f trade with Eastern Europe will gradually mean
taking the "economic prize away from the Soviet Union" is not
ju stifiab le

either.

In

the

econom ic

relations

betw een

E astern

European countries and the Soviet Union, the form er "came to
acquire as many if not more obligations to Eastern Europe in a
material sense as rewards from it.” (Garrett 1982, P. 506) Therefore,
Garrett concludes there should never be a political consideration in
regard to whether to trade or not to trade.

"This has always been the

sort of judgement which essentially could and should be decided on
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trad itio n al

grounds

of

com p arativ e

econom ic

advantage

and

maximization of economic opportunity."(Garrett 1982, p.508)7
Jiri Dobrovolny (1983) uses data as East-West trade relations in
order to demonstrate that the recent deterioration of the "economic
and political environment pertaining to East-W est trade is not only
due to explicit sanctions by the West." (Dobrovolny 1983, P. 337)
The essence of his argument is the growing Eastern European trade
deficit in the 1970s has led these countries to take some measures in
order to reduce the burden of debt.

Their endeavors began to bear

some fruit in 1980, but the deficit still continues to be large.
only

escape

out of the foreign

exchange

squeeze

The

according

to

Dobrovolny "consists of sharply cutting back imports from the West
and promoting imports in non-convertible currencies."

He believes

the quality and flexibility of East European countries’ exports do not
come up to the requirements of Western markets, and therefore does
not permit them to generate enough hard currencies.

The inability of

Eastern Europe to generate foreign exchange and the increasing
reluctance of W estern banks to grant them new credits must be
considered

when

one

tries

to

study

the

causes

of

the

recent

deterioration of East-W est economic relations.

7

L.J. Brainard (1979) also believes the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union
has been unsuccessful. He argues for example that such policy since 1975
has focused on the denial of most favored nation status, "of Eximbank
credits and selected Soviet technology purchase. The Soviet Union has been
able without much difficulty to deny U.S. any political benefit from the
policy and lost sales by U.S. business have imposed economic costs. In turn,
we have been unable to deny their access to credit and technology in other
countries."
(Ibid.,p. 109)
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Richard Portes (1981) also deals with the question of EastWest economic relations, concentrating on their development in the
1970s. According to him the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia in
1968 marked a change of direction in the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance and its relations with the rest of the world.

It not only set

limits on how far decentralization of Eastern European economies and
their approaches toward the West can go, but it also determined the
process of further growth fo r these countries.
toward rationalization and integration
throughout the bloc.

Em phasis turned

of m anufacturing production

This integration did not exclude industrial

cooperation with Western firms, and the purchase of technology was
to become a key element in the process.
M ore or less at the same tim e the new Polish government
which came to pow er after riots of 1970 was considering that the
only way to deal with economic constraints which had led to the
discontent was to invest heavily in modern technology fo r several
years without reducing consumption.

They decided upon massive

purchases of W estern plants and equipment on credit. Moreover, the
commodity price increase of 1972-1974 put great pressure on the
smaller Eastern European countries.

These factors, coupled with the

flowering of detente atmosphere, led to an acceleration of imports by
Eastern Europe, which was mainly financed by Western credits.
accum ulation

o f petrodollar deposits

in W estern

banks

The

and the

recession beginning in 1974 which caused both bankers and capital
goods exporters to seek customers were important factors in a sharp
increase in Eastern hard currency imports. Portes seems to suggest
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that the reason for the increase in Eastern European imports in the
1970s should be sought in a combination of several factors, both
internal to their system and external to it.
In contrast to "conventional wisdom," Portes believes Eastern
Europe's hard currency deficits of the past several years were more a
"m anifestation of excessive pressure at the m acro-econom ic level
(excess real demand) than a policy response to the 'technological
gap'."

He argues "if there had been a decision to substitute Western

for CMEA produced machinery, this could have been accomplished by
cutbacks of other imports from the West," and then he tries to show
that the composition of East-W est trade did not show such a trend.
(Portes 1981, P. 331)

He emphasizes the evidence indicates that the

Eastern European countries in their "macro- economies" are behaving
like the rest of the world, in the sense that aggregate excess demandresults in an import surplus.

In the 1970s, Portes believes the East

E uropean

investm ent

countries

raise d

w ithout

"holding

back

consumption," while their terms of trade were falling. The result was
huge hard-currency deficits.
According to Portes, the acceleration of hard currency deficits
has not been the only consequence of importing Western technology;
the other consequence is in a good number of cases that very little
technology of value has actually been transferred to the East.
E astern

European

countries

have

realized

often

th eir

The

W estern

partners in the I.C.A. were merely "trying to recoup some of the
development costs of a product or process which is already on its
way out in the West, or possibly seeking access to Eastern markets
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with simple commodity exports which can cheaply be given a final
stage of processing in the East," (Portes 1981, P. 342)
Portes

sees

two

different

alternatives

through

which

the

Eastern countries can deal with the problems o f trade-deficits and
shortage of credit.

They can choose either an import restriction or

export promotion policy.

Import restriction on food and consumer

goods, according to him, will have political consequences; restrictions
on m aterials may cause immediate bottleneck effects on production;
restrictions on capital goods may cause long-run effects on East
European technical progress,8 competiveness and growth.
believes

that

a

successful

Western markets is unlikely.

export

prom otion

drive

Portes also
to

penetrate

For an export promotion policy to be

triumphant "there would have to be institutional changes of a fairly
radical nature;... decentralization in decision making in production"
and "much greater scope" for I.C.A.s.

He finds such institutional

changes highly improbable, and in fact he argues increased "EastWest trade in the 1970s has been in part a substitute for economic
reforms." (Portes 1981, P. 332-333)

Immediately, however, in the

next paragraph, Portes seems to suggest another point of view.

He

argues that the logic of Eastern Europe's centralized economy dictates
"the increased trade dependence on unstable W estern economies will
motivate somewhat greater centralization.”

And he continues by

suggesting that perhaps the only internally consistent" method of
embarking on a successful export promotion policy would be to treat

8

One should notice that Portes suggested earlier that "little technology of
value has actually been transferred to the East."
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this as high priority activity like military production."

He is here

implying the creation of enterprises which are separated from the
rest of the economy and are specialized in production for export.
was

m entioned

p rev io u sly ,

Portes

also

m akes

As

co n trad icto ry

statements when he discusses the subject of transfer of technology to
the East.

On the one hand, he states that very little technology of

value has actually been transferred to Eastern Europe.

However, on

the other hand, he argues that any im port restrictions by Eastern
Europe may have long-term effects on the technical progress of these
countries.
Aside from making contradictory suggestions, Portes has also
been criticized for not correctly distinguishing the main problem
facing Eastern Europe in its efforts to mount a successful export
prom otion policy. Eidem

(1981), for example, believes the main

problem "is not to establish production units in the East that can
produce to any specification (like spaceships).

Instead, the main

problem is to find the specification or product that can become
successful in the market in the West."

For example, to be successful

in the W est, the Eastern European producers must have scattered
repair shops in the W est in order to be accessible to consumers.
They

also

delivery

m ust

becom e

conditions,

know ledgeable

com petitors' rebates,

consumers' recognitions.

about

such

and brand

aspects
loyalty

as
and

"This means that the traditional attempts to

launch products through agents in the W est and try a new one each
year is doomed to failure." (Eidem 1981, P. 359)
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Sankar L. De (1975) has also concentrated on studying the
economic relations between East and W est and in particular the
activities of American multinational corporations in the Soviet Union.
After giving a general overview of the volume and dimensions of the
U.S. multinationals in the Soviet Union, he tries to explore the factors
behind Soviet interest in increased East-W est trade.

Apart from

Soviet interest in obtaining Western technology and know how, he
argues the most im portant factor which explains their interest in
economic relations with the West is "an attempt at 'gap-filling'."

By

'gap-filling,' he means "an attempt to overcome shortages in supplies
by import from abroad, and to pay for the augmented imports by
exporting such relative surplus as may be on hand." (De 1975, P.
1096)

The duration of the gap may be seen as either short-term or

long-term .
In the short-term gap-filling imports mainly consist of primary
raw materials and intermediate goods as well as essential consumer
goods.

Imports connected with the long-term gap-filling consist of

capital goods.

A gap in supplies, according to De, may be planned, or

it may arise in the course of plan fulfillment due to either planning
errors or various setbacks in the execution of plans.

It may also

arise as a result of revision of plans and priorities.9
As the imports are mainly geared to the "gap-filling" purposes,
De argues obtaining W estern credits gains significant importance.

9

He uses examples o f the increased importation o f consumer goods
immediately after Stalin's death and the sharp increase in the purchase of
chemical industry equipment from the West after Khrushefs decision in
1959 to 'chemicalize' the Soviet economy.
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The Western credits make it possible for the "gap-filling imports to
take place in the short run before resources can be reallocated to
yield

the counterpart in the exports," and to the benefits from

external finance for long-term projects." The same benefits can be
flown to the Soviet Union through the product pay-back deals.

For,

by having the W estern partner take its repaym ent in the form of
eventual products, the Soviets

"create additional and economical

export capacity to finance gap-filling imports in the future." (De
1975, P. 1096)
De (1975) is also interested in investigating the possibility of
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries becoming
gradually and slowly "the willing prey of the new imperial system"
as a result of W estern capital presence there.

He argues that even

the m ost ardent supporter of m ultinational corporations

such as

Grossman (1974) "grudgingly" adm its that the national sovereignty
of the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries, is strengthened
rath er

than

corporations.

w eakened

by

th eir

relatio n s

w ith

m u ltin atio n al

Grossman notes that American collaboration with the

Soviet Union has acted as an alternative to economic reforms and
reduction in m ilitary expenditures.
De, follow ing

Gabriel (1972), argues

that m ultinational

corporations accept the jo in t venture agreements from the positions
not of strength but of weakness.

These corporations "when faced

with outright prohibition of full

ownership of local enterprise, or

when frightened by threats of property seizure of discrim inatory
regulations" typically respond by "acquiescing - or actively seeking -
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joint ventures with local partners." (Portes 1981, P. 1127-1128)

The

common features of a majority of joint venture agreements signed by
the

Soviet Union

and Eastern European countries

multinational corporations are:

with W estern

(i) ownership remains in whole or in

controlling part in the host country's hand, (ii) "The duration of
foreign company presence is limited." (iii) The terms of agreements
are negotiable at specified intervals.

Based on these characteristics,

De concludes that "the U.S. - U.S.S.R. joint ventures, presage a new
chapter in international economic relations marked by domination of
a national government and subjugation of foreign monopoly capital."
(De 1975,

P. 1128)

There are two other important factors, according to De, which
help the U .S.S.R.
relationship

with

to

assume

m ultinational

the position

of dom inance

corporations.

F irst,

in

the

its

vested

interests, both political and economic, which thrive on multinational
coporations' operations, are usually the champions of multinational
corporations’ operations in

th eir countries.

In

a politically

less

cohesive country of the Third W orld it is easier to find

such

sympathetic interests than in the Soviet Union.

In fact, there are

reasons to believe that in the case of East-W est trade, this trend has
been in the opposite direction. As Grossman (1974) argues

"vested

interests have grown in the U.S. which will seek to maintain the
profitable Soviet trade and resist any change in the arrangements
which may jeopardize their credits tied up in the U.S.S.R." (De 1975,
P. 1128)

Second, "the Soviet Union plays a game of checks and

balances" in signing agreements with multinational corporations.

The
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Soviets

usually

favor relatively

sm aller and

weaker corporations

over the bigger and stronger ones; and they usually do not place all
of their contracts in the hands of one giant corporation. Furthermore,
De (1975) argues the supreme advantage of the Soviet Union from
the point of view of pure economic theory is its monopolistic position
and its bargaining power with the multitude of competitve firms.
In

the

fin al

section

of

h is

paper,

De

is

interested

in

investigating the relations between the Soviet Union and the Third
World.

He believes, based on current evidence, there is no sign

which indicates the Soviet Union intends to be a partner in the
imperial system.

He cites the example of the Soviets' purchase of

natural gas from Iran 10 as the only instance which shows "the rise of
sophisticated m ultinational dealings across East-W est boundaries at
the expense of Third W orld nations.” (De 1975, P. 1129)
another

example

of orthodox econom ists

De is

w hose conclusions

are

diametrically opposed to those reached by the dependency school.
Frank and W allerstein believe that the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe are considered prey of the world capitalist economy, while De
believes the opposite.

As was discussed above, De argues that in

most cases it is the Soviet Union which acts as a predator by playing
a game of checks and balances w ith MNCs and also by using its
monopolistic position.

10

Also, in contrast to the dependency school's

The Soviet Union negotiated the purchase of natural gas from Iran in 1966.
The Soviets purchase price was 19 cents per thousand cubic feet, while its
resale price was nearly twice as much - 37 cents. De (1975) argues this deal
was also advantageous to the U.S., which without this arrangement would
have had to pay 87 cents per thousand cubic feet to Algeria for such a
p u rch ase.
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proponents,

De

believes

that the

E ast-W est

econom ic

relations

strengthen the national sovereignty of the Soviet Union.
L. Evraw icki (1979) is also among

those authors

who is

interested in investigating the role of multinational corporations in
East-W est economic relations.

H e starts his discussion with the

argum ent that the highest percentage of East-W est

exchange

realized by multinational corporations (henceforeth MNCs). 11
attributes this phenomenon to the

following:

is
He

1) The MNCs are able

to offer the socialist countries the most advanced technology and
research and developm ent.

2) The large output and diversified

capacities of MNCs enable them to undertake large and sophisicated
contracts.

A medium size company or combination of some medium

size companies is not able to meet the needs of such large markets as
the Soviet Union and Poland.

Moreover, the socialist countries prefer

to deal with only a few partners as opposed to many.

This tendency

reflects their interest in greater efficiency and sim plicity and "fits
better the general framework of socialist planning and management."
(Evrawicki 1979, P. 129) 3)

As MNCs pursue global operations they

are more flexible and have more experience in adapting themselves
to different and changing environments.

Therefore, it is easier for

them to establish closer links with the socialist countries. 12

4) To a

11

One should notice that Evrawicki's claim that the highest percentage o f
East-West exchange is realized by MNCs, is in contrast to De's (1975) claim
discussed earlier.

12

Evrawicki believes that MNCs are more flexible than other companies, but
in socialist countries the MNCs flexibility and freedom o f operations is more
limited than they are in other countries. This limitation is mainly due to
"state's control over all economic decisions.” As a result, any alteration in
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certain extent, in large corporations such as M N C s, planning and
management techniques are sim ilar to those which are applied by
the socialist governments in their countries.
turn

facilita tes

the

n eg o tiatio n

and

"This phenomenon in

realiza tio n

of

long-term

contracts." (Evrawicki 1979, P. 129)
E vraw icki
advantages"

then

which

tries

to

shed

light

socialist countries obtain from

economic relations with the W est.
show

some

"eventual

their different

In this process he attempts to

the im portant role that MNCs play

acquisition of these benefits.

upon

in socialist countries'

He starts with imports, and argues

Eastern importation from MNCs means the possibility of preventing
and reducing their balance of payment deficit.

Because the activities

of MNCs are dispersed geographically, they can export from different
subsidiaries representing

distinct currency

areas.

Therefore, the

paym ents for im ports may be effectuated in the currency
country which favors socialist countries' exports.

of a

Furtherm ore, the

socialist countries dealing with a particular MNC can purchase their
im ports at low er prices at the least expensive m arket supplied by
the corporation.

Moreover, owing to the scope and variety of their

activities, MNCs are more likely to be interested in various kinds of
compensation deals.

However, almost immediately he expresses the

idea that MNCs try to avoid compensation trade commitments as in
m ost

cases

products.

the

W estern

custom ers

are

not

attracted

to

these

He believes the fact that the MNCs succeed in finding

consumers for these products, while it is more difficult for socialist
the previously agreed upon activities have to be reviewed and accepted by
the socialist authorities.
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countries themselves, may indicate both the quality of these articles
and the superiority of the marketing network, skills and know-how
of these corporations. (Evrawicki 1979,

PP. 132-134)

Turning to the socialist countries' exports and their relation to
MNCs, Evrawicki argues that socialist exports alone do not create
close links with these corporations, even though these exports are
often channeled by specialized agencies owned jointly by socialist
and capitalist partners.

These mixed capital companies enable the

socialist countries to enter Western markets on equal terms with the
local competitors.

This form of activity according to Evrawicki, has

not attracted MNCs mainly due to the following reasons: 1)

MNCs are

not interested in engaging in activities which will encourage more
com petitors. 2)

The scale of this operation is still small and

discourages potential volunteers among MNCs.
A fter dealing with socialist countries' exports and imports,
Evrawicki discusses licensing agreements.

The licenses not only

permit introduction of "technical organizational experience" relating
to the production of specific products while substituting for potential
and actual imports, but can also be used as stimuli to expand Eastern
countries' exports.

In regards to the latter, Evrawicki argues that

generally the marketing possibilities for the products manufactured
in the East under licensing agreements in the West are not promising
because of the heavy em phasis the W estern com petitors put on
product differentiation, tradem arks, publicity and sales promotion,
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which socialist countries have almost no experience in.13

Among the

disadvantages of licensing agreements, he believes, is the fact that
MNCs are aware that their exports of consumer goods will shrink as
modem technology develops in the East, and aquisition of licenses
only accelerates this process.

As a result, these corporations tend to

offer licenses to the East which are obsolete, incomplete or too costly;
they may even try to keep socialist countries dependent on the
continuous supplies of indispensable components.
Evraw icki, after presenting a thorough picture of costs and
benefits of licensing agreements, directs his attention to I.C.A.s.

In

contrast to licensing agreements which are used to a certain degree
as a substitute for direct imports, I.C.A.s according to him are an
alternative for direct export of final products to the West.

He then

enumerates the advantages and disadvantages of I.C.A.s.

Among the

advantages,

interest

he

believes,

are

the

W estern

partner’s

in

supplying the latest technology, as well as the possibility of socialist
countries' entry into highly monopolized capitalist markets.
the disadvantages of I.C.A.s he counts the following:
consum ers
W estern

generally

purchase

m anufacturers,

producers.

articles

unaw are

of

bearing
the

Among

1) The Western

the

id en tity

tradem ark
of

of

so cialist

In such cases the expansion of socialist exports is limited

by the strategy of the W estern partner.

2) The socialist countries

becom e

cycles

dependent

economies.
13

upon

the

business

of

the

W estern

The risk is increased, he argues, by the fact that the

He believes only sharp price competition and/or the improvement of the
original technology or o f the product itself might bring results.
Even then
the risk of being confronted with anti-dumping regulation is high.
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highly specialized components manufactured in the East fit only the
final product of a particular firm .14
Evrawicki also spends some tim e studying jo in t ventures in
Eastern Europe.

He believes the MNCs are not too eager to establish

jointly owned enterprises because jo in t ventures imply MNCs not
only lose the exclusive control over the production, but oblige them
to share the profit with the partner.

He then takes up the study of

joint ventures in different Eastern European countries.
Evrawicki's analysis is comprehensive and covers a variety of
economic relations between W est and East.
various motives

He believes there are

behind East-W est relations.

These motives are

penetration of mutual markets, the reduction of manufacturing costs,
and the transfer of technology.
circum stances

specified

in

These targets "are due to the

the concrete

aims

and

term s

bargained for during negotiations." (Evrawicki 1979, P. 131)

to

be

Thus,

he argues the bargaining power of Eastern and W estern partners
plays a major role in achievements of either party’s goals, and needs
considerable attention in any analysis of East and W est economic
relations.

S um m ary o f Section

3.2..: In this section, I have attempted

to analyze only a few examples of those neo-classical

school’s

economists who have adopted the 'general description' method of
analysis in the study of East-West economic relations.
14

The following

To minimize the effects o f Western business cycles on the local economy,
Evrawicki suggests that socialist countries must seek the most stable,
reliable, large and diversified partners.
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table shows a brief summary of their arguments.

Although some of

these econom ists have been successful in producing a relatively
comprehensive historical background of East-W est relations, a lack of
any theoretical reasoning has led others, while concentrating on the
same subject, to arrive at different conclusions. For instance, while De
(1975) maintains that the Soviet Union prefers smaller corporations
over the giant ones, Evrawicki (1979) exerts a great deal of effort to
convince the readers that MNCs realize the highest percentage of
East-W est exchange.

Richard Portes (1981) is another example, his

reliance on the description of events, without following any theory,
has led him to make contradictory statements.

3.3. INFORMED SPECULATION:

A nother

form

of

an aly sis

adopted

by

the

'n o n -th eo retical'

mainstream authors is the "on the one hand,...on the other hand"
style of informed speculation.

This form of analysis usually consists

of choosing one position or other and developing arguments in order
to show its plausibility.

In this process the author sometimes ends

up supporting opposite and/or contradictory conclusions at the same
time. Raymond Vernon (1979) can be classified among those authors
who have embraced this style of investigation.

In his discussion of

the future possibility of Soviet foreign direct investment, Vernon,
who is mainly concerned with analysis of East-W est trade, states:
U nder present conditions "substantial foreign direct investment" by

SUMMARY OF CASK
STUDY:

McMillan
(1981)

He describes the institutional
forms and financial arrange
ments which characterize
ICAs.
Argues EE. are intrested in
ICAs for the following
reasons: internal factors.
1-Assimilation of Western
technology.
2-"self-financing" character
of ICAs.

-Provides excellent data about
ICAs; break down of ICAs by
industry in 1955-1980,to marie
the trend of their industrial
structural changes.
-Emphasis of the importance of

PaulMarerA
Joseph Miller
(1972)

He describes U.S. participation
in East-West ICAs.
Argues EJL countries are
interested in ICAs due to:
-narrowing East-West techno-

-Survey of one thousand U.S.
corporations engaged in
ICAs.
-Providing information
about different branches of
industry4n which ICAs are
most frequently used.

-to alliviate the shortage of
hard currency.
Barclay
(1979)

Sees the resolution of
both internal and external
problems important in
increasing East-West economic
relations.

143

He analyzes the role of
compensation agreements in
Soviet trade with the West;
he argues that in the 1970s the
Soviets' increased their trade
with the West in order to:
-acquire technology to explore
and exploit Siberia's natural gas
resources.
-cites advantages of compensa
tion agreements for the Soviet
Union.
-cites inhibiting factors (both
from Western and Eastern sides)
which led to reduction of such
agreements in die late 1970s.

SUMMARY
STUDY!

CASE

Jozef Wilczynski
(1977)

He is interested in analyzing
the licensing aspect of WestEast-West transfer of technology.
Westerners are interested in
licensing agreements due to the
fact that selling licenses is a sen
sible alternative to direct exports,
and selling licenses will lead to
exports of other products.

Historical information about
total numbers of licenses sold
by the Western countries to
the East

Hubert A.
Janiszewsld
(1982)

He deals with the imports of
technology by Poland.

The paper is covered by axio
matic claims with no attempts
to substantiate them.

John Holt
(1977)

He studies eight U.S. agricultural The nature of an industry can
play a role in whether transfer
and construction equipment
of technology is possible or not
companies in Eastern Europe.

G. Scriven
(1980)

He studies ioint venture legisla
tions in Poland, and concludes
that Poland's example proves
that "Socialist countries
recognize their need for tech
nology and wish to follow a nondogmatic approach in negotiating
such arrangements.''

He derives illegitimate con
clusions about Socialist
countries' attitudes toward
Western countries based on
one case study.

G. Scriven
(1979)

He studies Yugoslavia's foreign
investment laws.

He derives illegitimate con
clusions about Socialist
countries' attitudes toward
Western countries based on
mie case study.

14 4

145

the Soviets is unlikely.
expands,

"the country

On the other hand, if their foreign trade
will be pushed

to

set up

servicing

and

assembling facilities in some of its overseas markets." (Vernon 1979,
P. 1038)

He, again, uses this style when he is inquiring whether the

Soviet Union, in its economic relations with the West, is "in a position
to

exercise

its pow er

as sole

supplier or sole purchaser...thus,

capturing most or all o f the gains from trade."

His reply is: "As

buyers, the Russians are not all that important to the West; and as
sellers, they contribute only marginal quantities of any given product
to the West.

Accordingly, they are seen as price takers."

On the

other hand, the com petition among W estern firms along with the
institutional structure in the Soviet Union induces strong temptation
on behalf of Western firms to cut prices greatly. (Vernon 1979, PP.
1 0 4 0 -1 0 4 2 )
Barkas and Gale's (1981) study of joint ventures in Yugoslavia
is another

example of the inform ed speculation type of analysis.

They start

by stating the fact that importation of capital goods by

many less

developed

paym ents

problem .

countries
To

reduce

has exacerbated
the

pressure

their balance of
on

th eir

foreign

exchange reserves, many LDCs are seeking MNCs involvement via
equity investment or licensing agreements.
The authors believe that Yugoslavia traditionally has favored
licensing over direct foreign investment, since it minimizes the risk
of MNCs domination.
country is

Moreover, through licensing agreements, "the

able to produce modern technology

investment funds."

w ithout tying up

However, in recent years a growing proportion of
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the

country’s

balance

of paym ent d eficit can

licensing royalty payments.

be

attributed

to

This factor along with other economic

factors has forced Yugoslavia to shift toward encouraging direct
foreign investment.
sim ultan eo u sly

"Direct foreign investment has the advantage of

providing

Y ugoslavia

w ith

hard

currency

and

increased production/technology capacity." (Barkas and Gale 1981, P.
31)

After counting the benefits which result from establishment of

jo in t ventures, they argue, on the other hand, in the cases where
"joint venture is producing high-technology products that require
components, ingredients or other materials" which are not produced
inside Yugoslavia, the joint ventures produce additional revenue for
MNCs.

In other words, Yugoslavia's imports of intermediate goods

w ill increase and put further pressure on the balance of payment
deficit.
In their

discussion of various motives behind MNCs interest in

establishing jo in t venture in Yugoslavia, Barkas and Gale exhibit
another instance of inform ed
addition to providing

speculation.

They

argue that

"in

access to raw m aterials, a Yugoslav joint

venture may enable the MNC to produce needed product at lower
cost."

This

low er

cost w ill

mainly

Yugoslavia’s lower salaries and wages.

be

achieved

because

of

Nevertheless, "this advantage

may be offset by the lower productivity of the Yugoslav worker."
Consequently, there exists a trade off between on the one hand lower
wages, and on the other hand low productivity. (Barka and Gale
1981, P. 34)
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In regards to benefit derived from access to raw materials,
they argue in many cases sufficient amounts of raw materials and
intermediate goods are available at reasonable prices in Yugoslavia.
But on

the other hand, it is estim ated

currently have a 35 percent import content.

that "Yugoslav

exports

Therefore, there may be

only lim ited opportunities for the joint venture to secure lower-cost
raw material supplies." (Barka and Gale 1981, P. 34)
Likewise, Philip Hanson (1978) argues, on the one hand, that
imports of Western technology act as a marginal stimulus to Soviet
econom ic

growth.

T herefore,

their

im portance

in

the

general

performance of the Soviet economy is insignificant and negligible. In
his words:

"These imports are a comparatively small input to a large

economy" (Hanson 1978, P. 30) and "technology transfer represents
only a very small share of Soviet equipment investment." (Hanson
1978, P.

25)

On

the other hand, it

seems he suggests such

technological transfer exerts an im portant effect on the economic
performance of the Soviet economy.

"The bottom line for all of this

is, of course, the size of economic benefits the U.S.S.R. has been
deriving from its purchases of Western machinery and know how...it
would not be surprising if these effects were shown to be relatively
large." (Hanson 1978, P. 28)

This statem ent is followed then by

presenting different studies which have shown significant benefits
gained by the Soviet Union as a result of its economic relations with
the West.
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Sum m ary o f Section 3.3. :

In this section, I have studied only

a few examples of those neo-classical authors who have adopted the
'informed speculation' method of analysis.

These examples, however,

give a full support to my original claim that a large number of the
orthodox economists who have chosen the non-theoretical method of
investigation

tend to produce contradictory

statem ents.

All the

authors cited in this section, regardless of their subject of study, fall
into

the trap

o f contradicting

instance, in investigating
Union is a price traker.

them selves.

Vernon

(1979), for

East-W est trade, states that the Soviet
However, on the other hand, he seems to

claim that the Soviet Union can enjoy a bargaining position due to the
competition among the western firm s.

Another example is Philip

Hanson (1982), who is interested in the study of the importation of
western technology by the East. On the one hand, he argues that
im ports of w estern technology acts as a marginal stimulus to the
Soviet economic growth. However, on the other hand, he suggests
that

technological

transfers

exert

an

im portant

effect

on

the

economic performance of the Soviet economy.

3.4. TAXONOMTCAL STUDIES:

M any

"neo-classical”

taxonomy.

authors

d ev o te

considerable

attention

to

In fact, one can claim that the tendency toward taxonomy

is a characteristic of the majority of the studies discussed previously.
It is, therefore, fairly difficult to select only a few authors and
classify

their studies under 'taxonom ical studies.'

For example,
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Hayden and Nau's (1975) analysis of East-West technology transfer is
infused with a com bination
reliance

of taxonomical fervor and excessive

on case studies. They

divide the

East-W est transfer of

technology into two broad categories, short-term and long-term, with
each comprising different economic relationships.
instance,

the

long-term

technical assistance,
technical

tran sfer

of

In their view, for

technology

incorporates:

a-

b-technical assistance plus trademark rights,

c-

assistance plus tradem ark rights plus resultant product

purchase.

They argue that the

experim ent

w ith

short-term

Soviet Union is

relatio n sh ip s

more inclined to

w hile

E ast

European

countries prefer the long-term variety mainly because they do not
have the wealth of the Soviet Union to afford the payments for
Western technology on a "one-shot"

basis.

They then present one

case study under each variety of short and long term relationships.
And from these case studies they conclude and generalize about U.S.
corporate preferences in regards to different m odels of technology
transfer.

"If the firm wants a cheaper manufacturing source, or if it

is using the cooperation vehicle as a market entry vehicle, a Model C
arrangem ent is m ost likely...

But if

the

technology unavailable from other suppliers, it

firm has

a propriety

willmore

likely insist

on a Model A or B arrangement." (Hayden and Nau 1975, P. 79)
L ik e w ise ,

E d w ard

H e w e tt’s

(1975)

ap p ro ach

tow ard

investigating imports of W estern technology by Eastern European
countries can be categorized under 'taxonomical studies.'
with distinguishing technology from know how.
"specific

know ledge

about

physical

He starts

Technology includes

production,

em bodied

for

15 0

example in machines, designs, formula, etc."
general

and

coordination

com prises

"o rg an izatio n al

Know-how is more

p ro cedures

in production, procurem ent, m arketing,

concerning
and research

and development (R & D)." (Hewett 1975, P. 377)

According to

Hewett, in the 1960s Eastern European countries mainly sought to
im port W estern technology through the direct purchase of licenses,
machinery and equipment and complete plants.

In recent years, he

argues, in the small East European countries a new and more complex
institutional arrangem ent has come into existence - the Industrial
Cooperation

Agreem ents

(I.C .A .s).

H ew ett Tecognized

different

specific forms of I.C.A.s. One is "simple purchases of complete plants
or licenses in exchange for later paym ent with resulting products."
The second is subcontracting "in which the western partner provides
technology

and

possibly

some

inputs

for

producing

a

com ponent and the Eastern European partner repays in
amount of components."

certain
a fixed

The third is "coproduction or comarketing,

where the partners specialize in parts of a single production process,
assemble the final product in one or both countries, then divide up
marketing areas."

And finally, Western companies participated with

East European in establishing joint ventures either in a third

market

or in Eastern Europe. (Hewett 1975, P. 378)
Hewett argues that although Eastern

European countries have

considered I.C.A.s as the most efficient form of importing Western
technology, in fact the I.C.A.s by "following the dictates of static
com parative

advantage...serve

to

perpetuate

some of

the

m ajor

weaknesses of the Eastern enterprise, rather than eliminating them."
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(Hewett 1975, P. 380)
point.
sm all

He uses the case of Hungary to prove his

He argues almost all of the I.C.A.s in force in Hungary are
subcontracting

E uropean
com ponents
m aterials,

p artn er

or coproduction

usually

em ploying
and

possibly

produces

substantial
some

arrangem ents.
the

least

am ounts

im ported

The

capital

intensive

of im ported

W estern

East

W estern

capital.

The

production mainly takes place by using the Eastern partner's excess
capacity, then almost all the products go back to the Western partner
to be used as inputs or to be marketed.
the Hungarian enterprise

Therefore, the end result is

is involved only in production, and the

W estern enterprise is involved in research and developm ent and
m arketing.
This process tends to reinforce the weakness of Hungarian
enterprises in marketing and research and developm ent.

Hewett

even goes so far as to say that many I.C.A.s are nothing but
traditional trade under the name of cooperation.

This process is

quite profitable for the Western partners, since they shift the less
p rofitab le,

m ore

labor

intensive

processes

to

an

semiskilled and skilled labor is relatively inexpensive.
there

are other attractive features of these economies

W estern corporations interested in I.C.A.s:

area

w here

Moreover,
which make

A reliable labor force

which has been denied the right to strike and the possibility of
avoiding tariff and non-tariff barriers.
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Sum m ary o f Part One:
In Part One of this chapter, I have attempted to review the
work o f those orthodox econom ists who have adopted the 'nontheoretical' method of investigation of East-W est economic relations.
This part was divided into four m ajor sections.

Throughout these

sections, my goal has been

consequences

to investigate

adopting such a method of analysis.

the

of

My examination reveals that,

regardless of the subject of study, the omission of theoretical analysis
has produced various consequences.

Some of these authors have

been successful in producing useful and illuminating studies, but a
large number of orthodox economists have either drawn illegitimate
generalizations

based

contradictory statements.

on

lim ited

inform ation,

or

have

m ade

Moreover, we have seen cases where two

authors have chosen an identical subject of study, but lack of any
theoretical reasoning has led them

to arrive

at very

different

conclusions.15

PART TWO: THEORETICAL STUDIES

The orthodox authors who have taken their theoretical approaches
seriously

have

em phasized

either

the

aspects of East-West economic relations.

trade

or

the

investm ent

In this process the majority

of them have assumed the same principles which govern the conduct
of consumers and producers in the Western countries to be also at
work and applicable in investigating the behavior of consumers and
15

See, for instance, examples o f De (1975) & Evrawicki (1979)
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producers in the Eastern countries.

As a result they have employed

the same techniques and methods used in analyzing the foreign
trades and investments under conditions of perfect com petition, in
studying the foreign trades and investments of socialist countries. 16
I will start the following sections with a discussion of some of the
m ost im portant theoretical undertakings of m ainstream economists
in regards to East-W est trade relations and try to demonstrate that
trade in general is conceived of as beneficial to all engaged parties.
It is, therefore, assumed to be advantageous to both East and West.

3.6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES;

H olzm an

(1968)

and

Brown

(1968)

are

usually

cited

by

the

mainstream econom ists as among the first econom ists who have
attem pted to

apply

the neo-classical tools

of international

theory in analyzing the foreign trade of socialist countries.
and

Brown

relatively

generally

"insensitive

when planners
volum e

*6

of

view
to

centrally

external

planned

m arket

im p o rts.17

Holzman

econom ies

to

developm ents,"

m anipulate exports in order to maintain

be

except
a fixed

Their argum ents, how ever, have

Holzman (1974) seems to suggest the same idea: "this literature deals
so abstractly with trade problems that it applies generally to all
economies, whether free market or centrally planned, and therefore
does not elicite research from economists dealing with the latter, Or
it builds models that are based on price and market mechanisms,
largely irrelevant to C.PJE.'s except insofar as they may occasionally
serve as normative models or as the basis for empirical studies to test
the rationality of C.P.E. trade practices." (Ibid., P. 1)

17 See Thomas Wolf (1982).
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criticized

fo r

lacking

a

rigorous

theoretical

fram ew ork.18

For

instance, Holzman's writings (1974), (1976) have been described as
an incisive description of socialist foreign trade theory and practice
aimed at the general reader." (Rosefield 1977, P. 99)

According to

his critics, even when he attempts to be more theoretical, such as
Holzman (1974), he in fact produces nothing but a repetition of his
previous works with no com prehensive methodology. As Rosefield
(Rosefield 1977) argues, Holzman in (Holtzman 1974) "did not seize
the

opportunity...to

provide

a

general

and

rigorous

theoretical

framework for evaluating the comparative merit of centrally planned
foreign trading systems." (Rosefield 1977, P. 100)
Batra (1976) endeavors to overcom e this deficiency
rigorously

apply

conventional

international

trad e

and to

theory

to

an

analysis of trade between market economies and centrally planned
economies.

He analyzes two different cases.

analysis

conducted

is

under

the

assum ption

In the first case, his
that

the

centrally

planned economies of a small country possesses no monopoly power
in trade; in the second case, however, the country is assumed to be
large and has monopoly power in trade.

In both cases, it is assumed

that the planners are faced with a "social utility function" which he
assumes to be the same "as planner's own utility function for the
society."
When the country has no monopoly power in trade, the external
term s of trade are given and fixed for the country.

Under these

conditions, the planners, in order to maximize the 'social utility
18

See Batra (1976), Wolf (1982) and Rosefield (1977).
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function,' choose a level of consumption and production at which the
marginal rates of substitution and transform ation are equal to the
given world terms of trade.

Batra's solution in this case is similar to

the one which would prevail under the free trade in a market
economy and would satisfy the "pareto-optimality" conditions. The
following diagram represents his solution.

%

X i-

figure (1)

In this figure II' is the transformation curve and the terms of trade
is represented by the line PC.

Given the 'social indifference curve' of

U i , the planners will choose production at P and consumption at C.
PT is the amount of Y i exported
imported.

and CT is the amount of Y 2

In a market economy also producers would produce at P

and consumers would consume at C.
The complete sim ilarities between the market economies and
centrally planned economies end when Batra adds the assumption
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that the centrally planned country has monopoly power and the
terms of trade are determined by the volume of trade.

In other

words, in order for the country to sell more it has to charge a lower
relative price. Batra's solution, in this case, is that the country must
operate like a profit maximizing m onopolist/m onopsonist which in
effect pursues an optimum tariff policy.
Batra's solution can be presented by the use of the following
figure.

figure (2)

The offer curve of a market economy is given by OF.

Facing this

offer curve, the planner in the centrally planned economy optimizes
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by selecting the consumption point A, where the 'social indifference
curve' U i is tangent to OF. At this point the amount of Yi exported is
equal to OB and the amount of Y 2 imported equals AB.

The terms of

trade are given by the slope of OA.
Batra then goes on to show that such an optimal solution is
parallel to that requiring an optimum tariff in a market economy.

He

considers the case o f trade between tw o m arket economies, with
offer curves of OF and OH. Under free trade the economy with offer
curve of OH will maximize its welfare at point C on the social utility
curve of U.

This economy, in Batra's view, can increase its welfare

and move on to the social utility curve of U i,

by imposing an

optimum tariff on its imports, so that its offer curve shifts to O H i. It
is in this sense that a centrally planned economy and a monopolist
under decentralized conditions operate similarly.
One conclusion can be reached from this line of arguments
which is that the Eastern countries in their trade relations with the
W est enjoy a strong bargaining advantage because the planners can
simply choose point A, while a market economy "has to follow the
route of ta riff to capture the advantage of monopoly pow er and
dissuade its trading partner from benefiting from its own optimum
tariff." (Batra 1976, P. 370)

Meanwhile, the market economy does

not know w hat the centrally planned economy's offer curve looks
like, because like the m onopolist's supply curve, it is not well
defined.

Consequently, the market economy pursuing an optimum

ta riff policy in trade with a centrally planned economy cannot be
certain that with a given increase in its tariff its terms of trade will
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improve.

Based on this analysis,

Batra proceeds to recommend that

the m arket economy should adopt "some kind of non-tariff barriers
like

production

and

consum ption

taxes

or

subsidies

or

m ore

significantly the institution of a state trading corporation to deal with
the centrally planned economy."
B atra

applies

socialist countries.

his

(Batra 1976, P. 374)19

analysis

to

the

trade

relations

between

In such cases Batra argues the terms of trade are

settled by the planners through bilateral bargaining and the party
with greater power will be able to get the favorable terms.

This can,

in part, according to Batra, explain "Russia's economic exploitation in
the part of some of Eastern European nations." (Batra 1976, P. 374)
Batra's basic assumption that the socialist countries follow the
same pareto optimal marginal rules is so astonishing that it has even
aroused the criticism and ridicule from some members of the neo
classical school, not so much because the pareto optimal marginal
rules are presumably the necessary conditions for the optimum in
the perfectly competitive market economy but because Batra "simply
ignores the vast literature on the 'irrationality' of domestic price
structure" in the centrally planned economies. (W olf 1978,
F urtherm ore,

he

has

been

criticized

hypothetical centrally planned econom ies
those

for

suggesting

P. 988)
that

of his model resem ble

o f the real world, and consequently presenting

misleading

conclusions and making irrelevant policy recom m endations.
(1978),

for instance,

argues

that

when

the

B atra

stresses

that

W olf
the

centrally planned economies with the external market power do not
19

Presumably any kind of barriers which will not affect the terms of trade.
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have

w ell

theoretical

defined
point

offer

but

one

curves,
of

B atra

doubtful

makes
policy

"an

interesting

relevance."

By

implication he is suggesting the market economy’s offer curve is well
defined theoretically and "it is actually 'known' to the policy makers"
in the centrally planned economies.

W olf argues that in the real

world to the extent that a country pursues optimum tariff policies,
they

are

im plem ented

through

trial-an d -erro r

and

not

through

knowing for sure the shape of the offer curve of its counterpart.
Moreover, W olf believes that Batra's assertion in regards to
trade

am ong

cen trally

planned

econom ies,

and

the

resu ltant

exploitation of Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union is
mistaken.

Indeed, W olf argues that "it is generally accepted today

that for various political and institutional reasons Soviet terms of
trade with its CMEA partners deteriorated throughout much of the
post war period."

Thus, Batra's model also does not explain the

development in terms of trade among socialist countries. (Wolf 1982,
P. 990)
Elsewhere, W olf (1982) somewhere else presents a model of
foreign trade for the centrally planned economies.

In contrast to

Batra's model which assumes price-sensitive planners, W olfs model
assumes planners who are price-insensitive in the short-run.

This,

W olf believes, is a realistic assumption, since once the plan is
adopted the "planners are unlikely to upset (it) on the production
side in response to what may be short-lived world-market terms-oftrade changes. Likewise, it is doubtful the allocations of goods for
dom estic

consum ption

will

be

made

on

the

basis

of short-run
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fluctuations in world-market prices per se." 20 (Wolf 1982, P. 39)
W o lfs model o f a price-insensitive centrally planned economy is
therefore based on two assumptions.

The first one is the adopted

annual production plan is rigid and unresponsive to world market
prices.

As a result, "while from a purely technical standpoint the

(cen trally

p lan n ed

continuously

econom y)

differentiable

m ight

production

be

co n sid ered

p ossibilities

to

have

frontier,"

(as

shown with dotted line in the following figure), it is assumed that
planners limit the economy to a fixed production point.

So, if the

planners have to decide on the production mix between two goods
one importable M and one exportable X, they choose a point like P as
the fixed production point. (Wolf 1982,

P. 38) Wolf also assumes that

the "domestic consum ption of these goods...is determ ined by the
p la n n ers’
consumers."

p referen ces

ra th e r

than

the

p referen ces

of

actual

And the planners are assumed to allocate these goods (X

and M) in predetermined proportions.

In other words, they "have a

fixed coefficient preference function.” (Wolf 1982, P. 39) He traces
the consum ption

possibilities

of such economy

by

the incom e-

consumption path of OH (as is presented in the following figure).
A ssum ing

the

planners

are

rational

they

therefore

"attem pt

to

maximize their own welfare by attaining the highest possible point
on OH."

20 To support his point W olf brings some support from Soviet literature.
For instance, he argues Shagalov (1973)
"attests to the lack o f
integration,.bet ween consumption plans and dom estic opportunity
costs on the one hand, and foreign-trade prices on the other.” (W olf
1982, P. 39)
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Starting with these two basic assumptions, W olf proceeds to
show in contrast to Batra's conclusion, the offer curve of such an
economy

can be determ ined, and is well defined, regardless

whether or not it is a large country.

of

To show this he places the origin

of the rest of the world's (ROW) offer curve (OCR) at production point
P (as is shown in the following figure). Given his assumption the
planners will produce at point P and consume at point C.

As a result

they plan to export PR of the exportable good for CR of importable
good, achieving welfare level Wi .

i

Figure (3)

16 2

To derive the socialist country's offer curve, W olf assumes the
ROW offer curve to pivot on a fixed point P.

As OCR intersects

consumption path OH to the right of C, the socialist country must give
up

larger

importable.

quantities

of its

exportable

for

sm aller

am ounts

of

As OCR intersects the consumption path to the left of C,

the country must give up smaller quantities of its exportable for
larger quantities of importable.

Looking at the right-hand panel of

the above figure, the price-insensitive socialist country's offer curve
will fall between OT and VT.

At a point like Y (in the right-hand

panel of above figure) the planners' marginal propensity to consume
the importable good approaches 1.00, giving offer curve VT.

At a

point like E, as the marginal propensity to consume the importable
approaches zero, the offer curve approaches horizontal line OT.
Given all of his assumptions, W olf argues that the "optimal"
foreign trade for a price-insensitive socialist country can be achieved
by attaining the "highest feasible point" on its offer curve.

And the

feasibility is determined by the shape of the rest of the world's offer
curve.

Observe the following figure; if the ROW's offer curve is

elastic (OCR), a socialist country with offer curve OCS can maximize
its welfare according to Wolf by trading at point F.

At this point the

planners are indifferent as to whether or not they have monopoly
power, and consequently their trade offer remains the same. 21

21

W olf also considers another case in which the ROW's offer curve is inelastic
at its intersection with OCS. Under this condition the socialist country can
impose what he calls "implicit revenue maximizing ta riff which is
different from optimum tariff, because based on the tariff theory Wolf
argues the "tariff imposing country always operates in the elastic portion
of the ROW offer curve." (Ibid. P. 42) Since it is the first case (ROW with
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OCR,

Figure (4)

The im portant point in W olfs account is that in contrast to the
m arket

econom y

or

B atra's

p rice -se n sitiv e

c e n trally

p lanned

economies which if they are large, "may decide to impose optimum
tariff," a price insensitive planned economy facing an elastic ROW's
offer curve has a well defined offer curve, regardless of its size.

As a

result it appears to be vulnerable, and the ROW "could safely predict
the impact on the terms of trade of unilaterally restricting trade, and

elastic offer curve) that has allocated almost all o f W olfs attention, I have
only described this case.
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it need not fear retaliation" by centrally planned economy. (Wolf
1982, P. 42)
The policy implication is that in the event that a centrally
planned economy has m arket power on the W estern market, the
planners "may not have the motivation to use their power so as to
earn monopoly profits at the expense of Western firms," not because
they

are

irrational,

W olf

different trading criteria."

argues

but

because

"they

may

have

Consequently, "it would be incorrect to

argue that the Soviet Union obtains a disproportionately high share
of the gains of trade simply by virtue of its state of monopoly over
foreign trade."

(Wolf 1982, P. 51) 22

W olf starts his discussion by criticizing Batra's model primarily
for B atra's

lack

of consideration

for

differences

implanted in a market and planned economy.

in

institutions

However, he ends up

by falling into the same trap, essentially, because he addresses his
criticism not to the roots of Batra's problems but to the problems
which appear at the sarface.

Like Batra he follows the neo-

classicals' marginal rules and extends them to the conditions of a
planned economy.
human

beings,

He assumes planners, the same as any other

choose

rationally

among

alternatives

confronting

them. In other words, he perceives a set of indifference curves for
planners, which he takes to be identical with those of society in
22 Wolf in another article argues the same point that "despite the Soviet
monopoly of foreign trade, we found little theoretical or empirical support
for the claim that the U.S.S.R. is systematically capturing monopoly profits
at the expense o f the U.S. firms and U.S. consumers. In many respects, the
Soviet Union is not significantly different, in its trade with the West, from
many other countries with very small shares of world trade." (Wolf 1979, P.
337)
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general.

It is then the combination of limitations imposed by the

country's technology and its natural endowments along

with the

planners' indifference curves and their maximizing behavior which
determines the country's pattern of trade.
significantly

different from

those

which,

These conditions are not
according

classical tradition, prevail in the market economies.

to

the

neo

Therefore, even

though W olf tries to take into account the existence of different
institutional frameworks in the socialist countries, his methodology
forces him to apply the same omnipresent rules to both capitalist and
socialist economies.
A nother

group

of

econom ists

who have

taken

the

basic

assumption of the neo-classical tradition to be applicable to both a
capitalist country and a socialist country are Canto and Laffer (1982).
In their model, the behavioral assumption governing the conduct of
economic actors are posulated to be uniform between Eastern and
W estern

econom ies:

"the

people

respond

to

incentives"

and

"everything's being equal, individuals allocate resources according to
after tax yields."

Furthermore, the "consumers maximize their well

being and producers maximize profits." (Canto and Laffer 1982, P.
60)

Canto and Laffer then produce a theory in which the pattern of

investm ents in both East and W est is determ ined by changes in
prices through their effects on wages and the rate of return on
capital.

The

purpose of their analysis is, however, to

study "the

economic effects of a commodity trade embargo under alternative
assumptions regarding technological differences across countries as
well as different degrees of factor mobility." (Canto and Laffer 1982,
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P. 60)

In the following, I will analyze two of the scenarios presented

by them and which are closely connected to the economic relations
between East and West.
The first scenario describes a world with factor mobility within
the national boundaries, but not across countries.
existence

of

commodities.

tw o

factors

of

production,

They assume the

w hich

produce

three

Furthermore, they postulate a total of three countries,

one the U.S., which has an efficient technology in production of all
three commodities.

The second, the East, has an inferior technology

in production of one commodity (C).

And the rest of the world has an

inferior technology in production of commodity B.

They moreover

assume that the three countries always engage in "free trade in at
least

two

com m odities,"

since

this

guarantees

the

factor

equalization across countries. (Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 62)

price
Under

these conditions, if the U.S. embargoes the exportation of commodity
C, the U.S. production of C can now be used to produce the other
commodities.

Meanwhile, the rest of the world, which is as efficient

as the U.S. in production of C, will increase the production of C and
consequently reduce the production of commodity A.
export more of C and import more of A.

Thus it will

The East, on the other hand,

will be unaffected and will simply import commodity C from the rest
of the world instead of from the U.S.

"Because factors are mobile

within countries, and at least one other country
equivalent to that of the

has technology

U.S., world prices and world consumption

will not be altered by the U.S. embargo." (Canto and Laffer 1982, P.
62)
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In another scenario they assume the export restrictions are
totally effective and labor is mobile across industries while capital is
immobile.
w ill

In this case "a U.S. embargo on the export of commodity C

rem ove

foreign

dem and

for

the

em bargoed

com m odity,”

Consequently, there will be a decline in the domestic price of C as
w ell as a decline in the rate of return on capital employed in
production of commodity C both in the U.S. and the rest of the world.
At the same time, in the East the price of C as well as wages paid and
rate of return on capital used in its production will rise.
Their conclusion is interesting: "The U.S. industry’s incentive
would be to invest less in the embargoed sector, while for the
country East the opposite would be true."

Therefore, they predict the

identical reactions in response to similar situations in both East and
W est.

"As investm ent occurs in the activities with the highest

returns, the rate of return to capital in each sector will again be
equalized.

Trade in the remaining two commodities assures factor

price equalization."

Summary

(Canto and Laffer 1982, P. 63)23

of Theoretical

In v estig atio n

o f E ast-W est

Trade:

It has not been my purpose to offer a full critique of each
model presented

here; rather an attem pt has been made to put

forward some of the methodological problems of each model.

And

Canto and Laffer's model probably more aptly than any other models
presented here reveals one of the major inadequacies in the neoA group o f neo-classical economists have emphasized the organizational
aspect of the socialist countries foreign trade. Appendix (I) shows an
example of such a discussion.
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classical methodology:
institutions

and the

The lack of consideration for differences in
ways

socio-economic conditions.
'rate

of

retu rn

on

the economy

operates under different

Declaring that in the East a rise in the

cap ital'

in

any

branch

of

industry

w ill

automatically and necessarily bring an increase in investment in that
particular branch, if nothing else proves the ignorance and lack of
know ledge

of

the

authors

about

how

the

decisions

regarding

investment priorities are made in the centrally planned economy.
A brief review of the theoretical investigation of East-W est
trade in this section reveals the following points:

First, the orthodox

econom ists tend to ignore the differences in the socio-econom ic
systems of different countries.

Consequently, they extend the neo-

classical's marginal rule to the conditions o f a planned economy.
They perceive consumers, in a planned economy, as maximizing their
utility, and firms as maximizing their profit. A more sophisticated
orthodox economist, such as Wolf (1982), takes planners' indifference
curves to be identical to those of society in general. He then argues
that the com bination of these indifference curves with

planners'

m axim ization behavior, as w ell as the lim itation im posed by the
country's

natural

endow m ents,

determ ine

a

planned

country's

pattern of trade.
Secondly, since the same rules can be applied to both a market
and a planned economy, then one is correct to conclude that the
socialist countries conduct their trade according to the principles of
com parative

advantage.

Consequently, in

socialist countries,

one

should witness a rise in import-domestic supply of those products for
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w hich

DCs

m aintain

production.

a

'com parative

cost

advantage1 in

their

I will investigate this point in the fifth chapter of this

d issertatio n .
Thirdly,

trade

capitalist countries.
th e

dependency

m aintain s

th a t

can be

advantageous

to

both

socialist and

Such a conclusion is in complete opposition to
school's

the

argum ent.

so c ialist

The

co u n trie s'

dependency

p a rtic ip atio n

school
in

the

international division of labor has led to the exploitation of these
countries

by

DCs,

as

discussed in

the

second

chapter

o f this

d issertatio n .

^ T H E O R I E S O F INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENTS
AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES:

It is difficult to find a common thread running through all of the neo
classical

school's

studies

w hich

have

attem pted

to

theoretically

investigate the international investments in Eastern Europe.
lack

of com m on denom inator can in

part be

attributed

This
to

the

existence o f a variety of theories presented by the neo-classical
economists fo r explaining the international investments in general.
This problem becomes even more apparent when one focuses only on
these

econom ists'

theoretical

investments and production.

explanations

of international

direct

John H. Dunning (1973), for instance,

enum erates in a survey article at least five different approaches

17 0

presen ted

by

the

n eo -classical

school

in

response

to

'why

international direct investment and production?'
In recent years, however, a dom inant theoretical approach
seem s

to

be

em erging

in

the

in tern atio n al

direct

investm ent

literature; and it is the study of the application of this theory to
Eastern Europe which will be the focus of most of this section.

Based

on this theory, the multinational corporations are considered to be
the result of internalization of real costs within imperfect markets.
The analytic basis of the argument is derived from Coasian theory of
firm. (Coase 1973)

The argument, reduced to the simplest terms, is

that when transaction costs associated with the market exchange are
high, the firms tend to internalize the transaction.

Coase recognized

two modes of implementing an economic transaction; through firms
or through markets. "In certain cases the market entails transaction
costs significantly in excess of those that would be incurred if the
firm

in te rn a liz e d

the

tra n sa c tio n s."

C o n seq u en tly ,

M N Cs'

establishm ent of subsidiaries in other countries can be viewed as
internalizing markets across the national boundaries and is due to
efficiency considerations. (Coughlin 1983, P. 28)
D evelopm ent of new
(1975),

generates

strong

technology,
in cen tiv es

according
fo r

to

W illiam son

in te rn a liz atio n .

A

combination of factors makes the sale of new technology by means of
m arket

transactions

d ifficu lt.

For

exam ple,

the

seller

of

the

technology holds significant advantages over the outside buyers due
to access to information about details of the technology.

There exists,

therefore, a tendency on the part o f the seller to not represent the
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accurate value of the technology.

Consequently, it is difficult for the

interested parties to reach an agreement.

Furthermore, the seller of

technology may also find out that the price which the outsiders are
willing to pay "yields a lower return to the firm's R & D expenditure
than does its own exploitation of the technology." (Brada 1981, P.
210)

The com bination of these factors encourages the firm to

establish foreign production rather than sell their technology, and
thus internalize the costs of allocating the technology. (Coughlin
1983, P. 130)
In what will follow I will start with a discussion of those
studies which have employed the above theory in investigation of
East-W est industrial cooperation agreements.

Referring to them as

the model of cost internalizing, I will then discuss those studies
which have attempted to explain I.C.A.s with the use of mathematical
m odels.

3.7.1. Cost Internalizing Models:

Josef C. Brada (1981) is interested in a theoretical appraisal of the
transfer of technology to Eastern Europe by means of I.C.A.s.

Brada’s

main hypothesis is that the pattern of transfer of technology through
I.C .A .s

can

be

explained

by

the

"economic

param eters"

which

determine the way that firms organize their international operations
and "exploitation of technology" as well as the type of technology
that the firms use.
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Brada distinguishes two types of technology which firms use in
support of their m arket position: product technology and process
technology. This distinction is important in elaborating his theory.
"Product technology" is concerned with developing new products
which are unique and have few or no close substitutes.

The firm's

advantages derive solely from the ownership rights over technology
which yield the firm monopoly profit.

The process technology, on the

other hand, deals with production and marketing of a given product.
In this case, the firm’s advantages over its competitors are due to its
ability to produce the same product at a lower cost or to produce a
sim ilar but better product at the same cost incurred by its rivals.
Brada believes that in some industries the competition is exclusively
based on process technology, and in others competition is on the
basis of product technology.

He further believes that the type of

technology competition which is predominant in a given industry will
be reflected in the manner that the firms in that industry organize
their international operation.

Firms that com pete based on the

product technology tend to be centralized, vertically integrated, and
unwilling to transfer technology.

On the other hand, firm s that

compete based on the process technology tend to be decentralized,
horizontally integrated, and willing to transfer technology and as a
result good candidates for I.C.A.s.
Brada uses the 'cost internalizing model' discussed earlier and
argues that firms which compete mainly through the innovation of
unique products

should experience

"the

need

to

internalize

the

technology transfers more intensely” than firms which compete on
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the basis of process technology. 24 Brada believes the majority of
"information costs" associated with development of new and unique
products are absent in the case of firms involved in improvement in
process technology.

Innovation in process technology usually takes

place on the factory floor and does not require expensive research
laboratories;

m oreover,

engineers and

"the innovation

technicians

is

who m ay have

often
routine

carried

out

by

production

or

design functions in addition to their R & D responsibilities." (Brada
1981, P. 211) Consequently, innovation in process technology is much
cheaper than the development of a unique product.

It is also easier

to determine the price of innovation in a particular process, partly
because by definition it must have at least one substitute for the
previous technology for producing the product. These factors plus a
cou p le

more

reduce

the

"inform ation

co sts"

of

transferring

24 Brada believes there are several reasons for such a tendency.
First, the
firms whose innovative activities are focused on development o f new
products spend heavily on R & D and employ highly trained specialists and
modem and specialized facilities.
Second, development of new and unique
products by nature is risky; a new product may or may not appear as a
result of a certain amount o f R & D expenditure, and even if it does it may
not gain acceptance in the market.
It is, therefore, difficult for a firm to
allocate R & D costs precisely to a successful new product. The managers
consequently allocate arbitrarily the total amount o f a firm's R & D
expenditure on its successful new products.
T h ere
are
other
fa cto rs
w h ich
in c r e a se
th e
u n certainty
surrounding the transfer o f technology.
The uniqueness o f a new product
makes it difficult to set a price for it, mainly because there is no close
substitute for the new product.
Thus there is no market price that the
inter-and intra-company transfers could be based on.
Furthermore, the
uniqueness o f a new product complicates the process o f determining the
economic benefits which it may bring to the owner, particularly because
"the monopoly profits derived from a product's uniqueness are subject to
erosion from generally
unpredictable successes o f the firm’s rivals."
(Ibid., P. 212) It is the combination o f these factors which creates the need
for internalizing the transfer o f technology.
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technology and as a result reduce these firm s' tendency toward
internalization and make them good candidates for I.C.A.s.25
Brada's

theory

indicates

an

im portant

factor

in

a firm 's

behavior. "The willingness of firms to undertake any action, including
I.C.(A.), is to a large extent objectively determined by its competitive
position and the technology and material means of production at its
disposal." (Brada 1981, P. 227)
The policy implication of Brada's theory is obvious: Eastern
Europe should seek I.C.A.s with those Western firms which compete
based on prices and services, and avoid those firms which operate in
25

Brada, after postulating the main points o f his arguments, takes up the
case studies o f two different industries, which he believes are the polar
cases -the pharmaceutical industry and the construction-equipm ent
industry.
W hile the former according to Brada relies heavily on
promotion o f new drugs, the latter relies on improvement in process
technology to promote competition among firms.
Consequently the
pharmaceutical industry as his theory predicts, must be reluctant to
transfer technology.
Indeed, Brada argues
”(t)he lack o f inter-firm
transfer o f technology and inputs evident in the pharmaceutical industry
is reflected in the attitude of pharmaceutical Firms toward
I.C.A. in East
Europe." (Ibid., P. 215) He then cites the conclusion arrived by Holt (1977)
in studying a number o f pharmaceutical firms in Eastern Europe, as
supportive o f his argument.
Holt characterizes these Firms' behavior as
one o f "limited cooperation."
In contrast to the pharmaceutical industry, within the construction
equipment industry there are several factors which facilitate I.C.A.s.
"The
greater certainty about the price o f components and the value of
technology greatly aid negotiations and the development of trust between
the two partners."
Second, because the construction equipment industry
clearly uses intensive intra- and inter-firm transaction of technology it
can transfer technology across national boundaries more cheaply than
drug industry.
According to Brada, International Harvester "has
developed important skill in transferring its standards, design needs and
technology" to suppliers in Western markets. Thus "it is likely to find
similar transfers to" the Eastern European companies "much cheaper and
easier to carry out than would a firm which had no experience in interfirm technology transfer."
(Ibid., P. 217) Brada mentions International
Harvester and BUMAR's cooperation as an excellent example o f a
successful I.C.A. conducted by a firm operating in an industry where
competition takes the form o f development in process technology.
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industries where competition is based on innovation in new products.
However, he acknowledges that such policy may not be in accordance
with the development plans in Eastern European countries.

These

countries may perceive the participation in industries where the new
product development is highest as important "in order to maintain a
dynamic industrial structure. However, they should be aware that
participation in such industries is not likely to be aided by I.C.(A.)
but will require, instead, indigeneous efforts." (Brada 1981, P. 219)
Coughlin (1983) is interested in an economic analysis of joint
ventures in Yugoslavia. He believes that the Yugoslavs have been
disappointed by

the W estern corporations’ response

ventures legislation.

to the joint

It is his purpose to shed some light on possible

reasons for the Western firm s' lack of interest in participating in
Yugoslav joint ventures.

He starts with a more or less complete

description of Yugoslavia’s current joint ventures legislation.26
Coughlin then proceeds by reviewing all the studies which have
attem pted to explain

the reasons behind the

Yugoslavia in attracting foreign investments.

lim ited

success of

Huff (1972) and Gupta

(1978), for example, believe the "foreign exchange restrictions have
hindered the repatriation of profits and, consequently, have deterred

26 Some o f the important aspects of this legislation are as follows: Joint
ventures are allowed in all sectors except in insurance, social services,
domestic and foreign trade. Foreign ownership is restricted to 49% o f
investment and most joint ventures are expected to be export oriented. The
joint ventures contracts must specify a ceiling on annual profit transfer.
"Firms have three alternatives concerning the disposition o f profit
exceeding the maximum." They can consider these profits as repatriation
of capital; they can reinvest these profits in the joint ventures until the
49% limit is reached, or they can invest the funds in another joint venture
in Yugoslavia. (Ibid., P. 14-15)
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foreign

investm ent."

(Coughlin

1983, P.

31)

Others

argue the

inflexibility of jo in t ventures legislation in response to potential
areas of conflicts discourages foreign investm ent.

According to

Coughlin, however, the analysis of the im pact of the minorityow nership restrictions

on foreign

investm ent has

generally

been

neglected by the majority of the studies; and it is the purpose of his
study to analyze the effects of such restrictions.
Coughlin believes some of the deficiences of the previous
studies can be overcome by taking into the account the theory of
firm behavior.
joint

Since the Western MNCs are the prime actors in the

ventures,

"an

underlying

theory

of MN's

is

essential

for

understanding joint venture investment." (Coughlin 1983, P. 26)

He

chooses the "cost internalizing" theory discussed previously as the
corner-stone of his arguments; furthermore Coughlin accepts Magee's
(1977) theory that "development that is not easily im itated is a
primary goal of the MNCs.
increase the probability

The difficulties associated with imitation

that the firm can capture a satisfactory

return on its research and development.

Given the incentives for

secrecy, the MNC will tend to exploit any new technology via wholly
owned direct investment." (Coughlin 1983, P. 27, emphasis added)
Coughlin argues that the preceeding theories can provide a
num ber

of

Yugoslavia.

im p o rtan t

in sig h ts

about

fo reig n

in

"The most important revolve around the implications of

restricting foreign ownership to a minority position."
P. 27)

in v estm en t

(Coughlin 1983,

According to him the ownership restrictions affect not only

the magnitude but also the distribution of foreign investments.

To

1 77

support these arguments Coughlin uses the inform ation about the
am ount of the U.S. foreign investments in Y ugoslavia and other
developing

co u n tries.

com paratively

sm all

The
in

am ount

Y ugoslavia

of

relativ e

developing countries, and he concludes:
fo re ig n

in v estm en t,

rela tiv e

to

such
to

investm ent
th at

in

is

other

"(T)he reduced flow of

situ atio n s

w here

ow nership

restrictions are less prominent, follows directly from the theory."
(Coughlin 1983, P. 28)
Coughlin also provides information about the ownership and
distribution of the U.S. global foreign investm ent between
1975.

1967-

His study shows, for example, that 91% o f the printing

industry's foreign investment was in the wholly owned subsidiaries.
His data indicate that "(i)f ownership restriction exists, the printing,
drugs

and cosm etics, wood and furniture, and beverages

sectors

provide poor prospects" for foreign investments, because over 75% of
foreign investment in each of these industries goes to wholly owned
subsidiaries. (Coughlin 1983, P. 28)

Consequently, one would expect

to find no or limited participation of these industries in Yugoslavia’s
joint ventures.

Coughlin submits supporting data: as of the end of

December 1978, these industries accounted for only 9 out of 150
joint ventures in Yugoslavia.
M oreover, Coughlin is interested in studying the transfer of
technology to Yugoslavia.

Following Brada (1981), he argues that

first, the transfer of technology should be biased toward process
technology instead of product technology due to Yugoslav restricting
foreign

ownership to a m inority position.

Second, the product
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technology transferred to Yugoslavia should be relatively old.27

To

support these points he brings evidence from the case studies of the
G illette Company and the Dow
technology.
industry

Chemical

Company's

transfer of

The Gillette Company, according to him, is involved in a

w here

com petition

is

based

on

developm ent

of

new

products. Coughlin argues in 1973 Gillette transferred a technology to
Yugoslavia which was being utilized in the 1960s in the West. Dow
Chemical's involvement in Yugoslavia provides similar evidence. Dow
has

signed tw o joint venture agreem ents,

and in both cases

it

transferred technologies which were relatively old.
Gupta (1978), in contrast to Coughlin, dismisses the importance
of the majority of wholly-owned subsidiaries for MNCs, because he
believes these corporations are able to adapt to different situations.
Moreover, if the majority ownership was an important consideration
for MNCs, one expects that they would attem pt to increase their
ow nership

to

the

legal

m axim um .

Yet,

despite

the

Y ugoslav

authorities' encouragement, these corporations have not attempted to
do so.
P. Artisan and P. Buckley (1984) also argue Gupta's point.

"The

absence of urgency among firms to increase their share of joint
venture's capital to the

legal maximum

of 49.9 percent"

is

an

indication "that there is little concern (among these firms) about
minority participation.’’

They support their argument with a survey

of 42 Western European and North American firms which have joint
27 In another paper Coughlin endeavors to
See (Coughlin 1983)

present the

same arguments.
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venture investments in Yugoslavia.

Eighty percent of the firms in

their sample do not consider the m inority

participation rule in

Yugoslavia as "an impediment to their potential investment."
m inority

of

firm s-10 percent-consider

restrictions

as

deterrent to their investment activities in Yugoslavia.

an

Only a
initial

And even for

them the "equal representation on the joint management board had
subsequently

allayed their fears

and Buckley 1984, P.

of under-representation. (Artisan
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Peter F. Cory (1982) establishes his theory based on the "Cost
Internalization"
"validate

and

m odel.

A lthough

substantiate"

this

he

argues

model

that

and

to

attem pts
specify

to
the

circumstances under which it may apply have been numerous, it is
the "eclectic theory of international

production" which offers a

com prehensive fram ew ork

a

for such

task .28

The eclectic

theory's "principal hypothesis is that a firm will engage in
direct investment if three conditions are satisfied:
1. It possesses net ownership advantages vis a vis
firms of other nationalities in serving parti
cular markets. These ownership advantages
largely take the form of the possession of intangiible assets, which are at least for a per
iod of time exclusive or specific to the firm
prossessing them.
2. Assuming condition (1) is satisfied, it must be
more beneficial to the enterprise possessing
these advantages to use them itself rather than
to sell or lease them to foreign firms, for it is

28 The 'eclectic theory' is fully discussed by Dunning. (1980) & (1979)

foreign
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to internalize its advantages through an exten
sion of its own activities rather than ex
ternalize them through licensing and similar
contracts with independent firms.
3.

Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied,
it must be profitable for the enterprise to
utilize these advantages in conjunction with at
least some fact or inputs (including natural
resources) outside its home country; otherwise
foreign markets would be served entirely by ex
ports and domestic markets by domestic produc
tion. (Dunning 1979, P. 275)

Cory's principal purpose is to explain the industrial cooperation
agreements and joint ventures within the framework of the above
mentioned theories.
He starts his analysis by raising the same issues and concerns
expressed by Coughlin.
establishing

w holly-or

E uropean

co u n tries,

restricted ,

thereby

elim ination

He argues the MNCs' strategic option is
m ajority-ow ned
how ever,

elim inating

affects

"the

subsidiaries.

foreign
MNCs

quantity

ow nership
preferred

and/or

is

severely

option.

quality

transmitted, and the manner of their utilization."

In E astern

of

Such

resources

Yet, he asks, given

the existence of a set of "intermediate contractural relations," which
I.C.A.s and joint ventures signify, how great will this effect be?
to

w hat

ex ten t

will

these

"interm ediate

contractural

And

relations"

provide some benefits of full internalization ("with respect to the
m aintenance

of

decision-m aking

authority

and

control

and

the
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lowering of transaction costs")?

Such agreements as licensing fail to

ensure these benefits. (Cory 1982, P. 131)
Cory believes that these "intermediate contractural relations"
may under some circumstances evolve into de facto internalization
mainly because over time m utually dependent, intim ate relations,
understanding

and

tru st can

emerge

between

Eastern

European

enterprises and MNCs. Cory argues that of course important decisions
in regards to utilization of resources and allocation of rewards are
subject to negotiation
contractural agreements.

and bargaining

and are part of long run

But over time, as the intimate relations are

established among the parties, "the transaction costs associated with
negotiating and enforcing such agreements, and adapting them to the
changing circum stances, may decline substantially."

Furthermore,

within the climate o f mutual trust, understanding and fam iliarity,
MNCs may attain control "through the 'exercise of influence,' rather
than exclusively via the 'exercise of authority’ through specified
contractual terms." (Cory 1982, P. 131) Consequently, the benefits of
full internalizing in regards to

both m aintenance of control and

lowering o f transaction costs w ill be achieved. Cory’s arguments are
in contrast to Coughlin's finding that the restrictions imposed on
w holly-or

m ajority-ow ned

ow nership

are

the

m ain

deterrent

to

foreign investment in Yugoslavia.
Cory's second step is to empirically validate his arguments by
using the information concerning MNCs' activities in Yugoslavia.

He

intends to discover to what extent the I.C.A.s and joint ventures
between this country and MNCs can "be classified as significant
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'interm ediate

m echanism '

for

resource

allocation,

as

de

facto

internalization?" (Cory 1982, P. 137)
He presents some aggregate data on the levels and patterns of
various

technology

corporations.

He

transfers

betw een

next consider

the

Y ugoslavia
developm ent

contractual relations within a few industries.29

and

W estern

of inter-firm

His focus on these

industries is partly due to the fact that the sub-contracting and co
production within I.C.A.s and joint ventures are more common in
these industries.
Cory's empirical investigations reveal that a very large number
of agreements have been concluded between Yugoslavie and MNCs in
the last few decades. They also indicate a rapid expansion of foreign
subsidiary production vis-a-vis licensing production.

Moreover, they

denote that the establishment of the intimate relations between two
parties in most cases have started from sim ple im port-export or
licensing

agreem ents.

Furtherm ore,

they

d isclose

a

integration of Yugoslav enterprises into Western industries.

significant
In most

instances these relations appear to be m otivated by a desire to
m aintain

or to expand the

Yugoslav

local m arkets. The export

activities resulting from those arrangements are frequently due to
increasing the local pressures on companies to produce for export.
N evertheless, there are im portant examples which represent some
notable "subcontracting or sourcing role" for some Yugoslav firms.
The production of small tractors by Pobeda, production of Fiat autos
29

He chooses the following industries: The engineering, motor vehicles,
parts and accessories; tractors; household appliances; office and
telecommunication equipment; bearings; and razor blades.
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and vans by Zastava are examples of arrangements which have made
it possible for a Western firm to "phase out its own production of
items that have become superseded in its production programme."
(Cory 1982, P. 166)
On the basis of his em pirical research, Cory concludes that
because the number of instances where the MNCs got involved in
joint ventures in order to "exploit sophisticated, advanced, valuable
proprietary
eventually

technology"
all but

is

a small

sig n ifican tly
m inority

large,

of MNCs

ownership restrictions imposed by Y ugoslavia.30

it

appears

will

that

accept the

This acceptance

according to him, does not signify the "sacrifice o f effective control;
rather, it implies that (joint ventures) arrangements can incorporate
the

essential

elem ents

of internalized

relationships

between

the

parties." (Cory 1982, P. 167)
John
I.C.A.s. 31

H olt (1976)

provides

another interesting

analysis

of

His stated goal is to offer a theoretical framework for "a

more system atic

study, explanation, and prediction of East-W est

industrial cooperation."

(Holt

1976, P.

71)

However, what he

produces in fact are a description of possible areas of conflicts in
30

Provided that "the stakes, in terms of local market size, are high enough."
(Ibid., P. 167)
31 Holt is not follow ing the cost internalizing m odel, and, therefore,
presenting his mode in this section may seem inappropriate.
I have
however presented his paper in this section for two reasons: First, because
I believe he is a prominent scholar in East-West economic relations and it is
important to be familiar with his work, and in particular with the analysis
provided in this particular paper especially because here it is his stated
goal to provide a theory of the East-West I.C.A.s; second, the second section
o f this part is devoted to presenting the mathematical models of theories of
direct investment in Eastern Europe, and because Holt's investigation is
certainly not a mathematical one.

184

conducting an I.C.A. and some recommendations for their resolutions,
as well as a description of the factors which influence each party's
decision in regards to participation in the I.C.A.s.
An I.C.A. requires connecting a market oriented enterprise with
a centrally planned enterprise.

According to Holt, linking a "profit-

oriented Western company with" an Eastern enterprise which
operates based on the requirements of central plans "requires
adjustments and entails costs, reducing the net benefits of industrial
cooperation." (Holt 1976, P. 72)

In the same manner that for a

Western firm flexibility in responding to changes in market prices is
compulsory,

for an Eastern firm adherence to the central plan is

compulsory; and "(F)lexibility in meeting an unpredictable

market

constitutes a cost to Eastern enterprise compare with the advantage
of a long run production for achieving centrally planned production
goals."
problem

(H olt 1976, P. 73)
th a t

the

E astern

In Holt's view, it is to overcome this
governm ents

in

some

cases

have

decentralized foreign trade negotiations and have exempted those
enterprises engaged in I.C.A.s "from five-year plan allocations and
requirements in varying degrees." (Holt 1976, P 73)
I.C .A .s also require linking enterprises
systems o f ownership.

under two different

For the Western firms a maximum return on

investm ent traditionally requires ownership and managerial control.
The I.C.A.s, therefore must not only preserve the Eastern countries'
principle
provide

o f social ownership,
some sense

but at the same tim e they

of security

for the W estern partners.

must
To

overcome this problem, the Eastern countries in most cases provide
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guarantees and higher returns to the Western partners.

According to

Holt, in fact, "the Eastern countries are accepting in varying degrees
the hypothesis that" in I.C.A.s "the prospects of mutual benefit will
increase
capital

with W estern com pany sharing
and

technology

but

also

in

not only the supply of
m anagem ent,

disposable rights over assets." (Holt 1976, P. 75)
accordance

with

the

belief

w hich

incom e

and

Their actions are in

postulates

th at

transfer

of

technology will be most efficient if it is accompanied with Western
firms’ participation in capital and management.

Holt's thrust of

argument is, therefore, ”(t)he greater the bargaining power of the
Western firm, the higher its prospects of participation in the rights of
ownership; the more extensive these rights, the greater the prospect
for mutual economic advantage from industrial cooperation.” (Holt
1976, P. 76)
A part of Holt's study is devoted to describing factors which
influence W estern com panies' and Eastern countries' decisions in
regards

to participating

in I.C.A .s.

The nature

of transferred

technology, for instance, will determine the possibilibity of some
types of I.C.A.s.

"(T)he ease with which the industrial process can be

broken down for an economical division of labor and managed in
separate
feasibility

locations

or

by

of specialization,

(Holt 1976, P. 79)

separate

m an ag em en ts....effects

co-production,

and

the

subcontracting."

Holt believes the technology life cycle also plays a

role in Western companies' degree of interest in I.C.A.s.

Western

companies prefer to transfer those technologies which are at the
stage of introduction in the Eastern markets.

At this stage, however,
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the technology is usually widely available to the Eastern countries
from

other

sources;

therefore,

the

bargaining

pow er

of

these

countries will increase.
The size of the firm is also important.

Holt cites a study which

shows the larger the Western firm, the more likely it is to engage in
I.C.A.s.

Another study observes that the m iddle-size firms more

engaged

in

licensing

agreem ents,

and

the

largest

firms

more

engaged in scientific-technical cooperations.
After enumerating some other factors which he believes affect
the Western firms' decisions to embrace I.C.A.s, H olt reaches an
im portant conclusion:
bargaining

It is eventually the degree o f each party’s

pow er w hich

determ ines the

benefits resulting from I.C.A.s.

allocation

of costs

and

Their bargaining power, in turn,

depends on "their resources, priorities, and available alternatives."
(Holt 1976, P. 84)

Summary;.
The authors who have employed the "cost internalizing" model
are interested in determining what factors influence a Western firm's
decision to undertake an ICA with an Eastern European country.
Although in some cases they arrive at contradictory conclusions (see,
for example, Gupta and Coughlin), in most cases they are able to
provide useful inform ation
Europe.

about conducts

of MNCs in Eastern

Cost Internalizing Model
Author
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Summary

Brada (1981)

He distinguishes two types of technology:
1- Product technology
2- Process technology
Firms who compete based on product technology
experience the need to "internalize" the cost of
transfer technology. Consequently, these firms are
reluctant to transfer technology. In contrast, firms
involved in process technology can transfer
technology across national boundaries.

Coughlin (1983)

The ownership restrictions in eastern Europe
prevent MNCs from seeking investment ventures
there. Using Brada's (1981) argument, Coughlin
argues that firms involved in "process technology"
are more likely to transfer technology to Eastern E

Gupta (1978)

He down plays the importance of the majority of
wholly-owned subsidiaries for MNCs because he
believes these corporations are able to adapt to
different situations.

Artisan and Buckley (1984)

They dismiss the importance of wholly-owned sub
sidiaries in the MNCs1decision as to whether or not
they should invest in Eastern Europe.

Peter Cory (1982)

The MNCs' strategic option is establishing whollyor majority owned subsidiaries. However, ICAs
provide some benefits of full internalization, mainly
because over time mutually dependent, intimate
relations are established between the parties, "the
transaction costs associated with negotiating and
enforcing such agreements may decline substantially."
Furthermore, eventually MNCs may attain control
"through the 'exercise of influence,' rather than
exclusively via the 'exercise of authority." Con
sequently, the benefits of full internalizing in regards
to both maintenance of control and lowering of trans
action costs will be achieved.
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3.*L2._ The M athematical Model:

There are some neo-classical economists who have chosen to discuss
the subject by the use of elaborate

m athem atical models.

For

instance, Brada's purpose (1977) is to demonstrate that despite the
similiarity in legal and organizational structures of joint ventures in
Rum ania,

H ungary

countries

"differ

and
in

Y ugoslavia, the jo in t

term s

of

criteria

for

ventures

resource

in

these

allocations,

economic motivation of the participants, and the nature of economic
benefits about which the partner must negotiate." (Brada 1977,

P.

168)
Brada presents in the case of each of the three countries a more
or less comprehensive description of joint ventures regulations.

Also

in each case he derives an objective function from the standpoint of
each partner involved in the jo in t venture.

Brada's purpose is to

show that although both W estern and Eastern partners are after
m aximizing

their objective functions, as their objective functions

differ the allocations resources will be suboptimal, and are strongly
influenced by the structure of property rights as well as the extent
that prices are determined by the market in the socialist country.32
B rada's

model

clearly

dem onstrates

the

valid ity

of

the

argum ent presented earlier in this chapter, namely that the neo
classical theory is established at such a high level of abstraction
which is institution free.

32

Brada assumes the firms in both capitalist

For a mathematical explanation o f his model see appendix II.
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and

socialist

countries

are

"m axim izers."

The

capitalist

firms

maximize their profit, and as a result they are efficient and allocate
inputs efficiently.

The socialist firms, on the other hand, maximize

either income per worker or their profit plus the income which they
derive from the sales of inputs.

Such a generalization provides

models which are incapable of explaining the reality.

For instance,

the majority of studies which have dealt with the question of EastW est I.C.A .s have counted alm ost every reason

but maximizing

profits as the motivation for East European involvement in a joint
v e n tu r e .33

Even some researchers such as Artisan and Buckley

(1984) question and raise doubts about the generation of profit, at
alone

the m axim ization

of profits, as the prime motive of the

W estern firms' participation in the joint ventures in Eastern Europe.
Using a sample of 42 West European and North American firms, they
found

that

33

firm s

cited

growth

as

their

main

objective

for

investment in Yugoslavia; and only 4 firms obtained higher profits in
Yugoslavia than in home based operation.

The majority of firms,

they argue, "did not wish to forego the medium - and long-term
benefits of an enlarged market solely for the purpose of shorterterm superior profits.”(Brada 1977, P.165)
Jan Svejnar and Smith (1982) criticize Brada's analysis within
the neo-classical framework, using the variable bargaining power
model, in order to show that the behavior of joint ventures in Eastern

See, for example almost all the studies presented previously under section
3.7.1.
of this chapter
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Europe is quite similar.34

Their conclusions indicate that in the case

of Rumania, partners jointly allocate resources so that the "marginal
value of each input equals the corresponding per unit cost of input."
(Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 159)
"socially
conclude

efficient allocation
"the

jo in t

of

venture

As a result their actions lead to
resources."

operating

Consequently,

in

a

'R om anian

they
type'

institutional system can thus be expected to be pareto-efficient from
the private point of view of the two partners as well as from the
social vantage point." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 159)
They also apply their model to Hungary using the same profit
function

presented

by

Brada

and

taking

into

account the

new

changes in the Hungarian joint ventures regulations and conclude
that the allocational and distributional conditions in

the "revised

Hungarian model" are identical w ith those in the "Romanian-typemodel."
Furthermore, they use their model and substitute for the profit
functions presented by Brada (1977) for the W estern and Eastern
partners

involved

in

a

jo in t

venture

in

Y ugoslavia.

They

consequently conclude that the ’’resources are allocated so that the
marginal value products of all non labor inputs are equated to the
per unit acquisition costs of these inputs.

In this respect the

Yugoslav joint ventures behave like their Romanian or Hungarian
counterparts." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 164)

Like Brada, they

find out that in contrast to Rumanian and Hungarian joint ventures,

34 For a mathematical explanation of their model, please see appendix II.
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the Yugoslav jo in t ventures equate the marginal value product of
labor input to the income per worker.

As a result, they argue, "the

actual allocation by a given joint venture is pareto-inefficient from
the social point of view." (Svejnar and Smith 1982, P. 165)

C onclu sio n :

W hat was presented above was only a ’lim ited’

discussion of orthodox economists' arguments.

Nevertheless, even

such a limited overview clearly supports the underlying theme of
this chapter:

The neo-classical economists' belief in the universal

applicability of their theory eventually leads them to treat every
country in exactly the same manner regardless o f the differences in
their

socio-econom ic

maximization govern
society.

system .

The

"laws"

of

profit

and

the behavior of firms and consumers

utility
in each

If this is so, then there must be no separate laws which

regulate W estern trade with and investm ents in Eastern European
countries and distinguish them from those of any capitalist country.
Every country's pattern of trade is mainly determined by its factor
endow m ent,

and

the

changes

in

such

patterns

can

m ainly

be

explained by the "growth," in other words the changes in its factor
e n d o w m e n t . 35

M oreover, the Eastern European enterprises’

investm ent decisions

are induced by

the same kind of incentives

35 This statement can be verified by Rosefielde's (228) attempts to apply
the
Hecksher-Ohlen model to the Soviet economy. He shows that in terms of factor
content the post war development o f Soviet foreign trade has been by and
large consistent with the shift in factor proportions in the Soviet economy
over the same period. Investments in Eastern Europe are not in any way
qualitatively different from those in any other country organized by a free
market economic system.
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which motivate the Western firms.
d irect

investm ents

in

E astern

Finally, the Western companies'
E urope

are

not

in

any

way

qualitatively different from those in any other country by a free
market economic system.

CHAEIER IY
Eastern

As

was discussed

in

European

Views:

Chapter two, the

dependency

school

m aintains that the economic relations between the East and West
have entailed the socialist countries' conversion into a functioning
part of the capitalist system.

The world system approach, on the

other hand, asserts that the mere existence of the world capitalist
system

im plies

the

economic system.

im possibility

of the

presence

of any

other

The neo-classical approach in contrast to the

above approaches seems to ignore the differences in the

socio

economic systems of capitalist and socialist countries, and/or to
believe such differences are irrelevant and play an insignificant role
(as far as the basic assumptions of economic theory are concerned) in
the investigation of economic relations of the East and the West.
another

po sitio n

is

expressed

m ainly

by

the

E ast

Still

European

economists who acknowledge the existence of two different economic
system s in the world, but suggest that some form of economic
coexistence between them is possible.

They believe not only that

East-W est economic relations help to solve a number of common
problem s,
m utually

but

that

progressive

advantageous

trade

m ovem ents

and

in

cooperation

the

direction

between

the

of
two

systems will foster forces of peace, democracy and socialism in the
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world.

It is the purpose of the fourth chapter of my dissertation to

focus on the discussion of this final approach.
This group's views in part reflect the changes in the role of
foreign trade in the Eastern European economies.

Foreign trade itself

in these societies is, however, only significant as part of a larger
process, the process of construction of socialism.

In order to get a

better understanding of Eastern European economists’ views, I will
therefore start with a brief discussion o f the evolution of this
process, tracing it from the outset to the October Revolution, to the
reform of the 1960s w hich marked the beginning of an increased
interrelationship with the West.

EART OWE ‘.GENERAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will be divided into two major parts.

In the first

part the historical rational for autarky will be discussed.

In the

process I will attempt to highlight the following points:
1.

The role of foreign trade in Eastern Europe, particularly the

Soviet Union was determined by changes in the material conditions
of these countries.

It was the interaction of both internal and

external factors which led to adoption of one policy and the rejection
of others.
contrast

For instance, I will try to show that adoption of autarky, in
to popular belief,

was

not due

to

one

m an's choice.
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Moreover, in contrast to Frank's argument, it was not mainly forced
upon them by the world market capitalist economy.
2.
model of

One o f the m ost important characteristics of
development was the fact that there

the Soviet

was no attempt to

direct trade according to the principle of comparative advantage.
3.

The accepted principle was, and to a large extent still is, to

import only when there was a shortfall in domestic production, and
to export

only the surplus goods which were

imports.

Furthermore, these

enough to finance

countries continue to rely minimumly

upon trade with capitalist countries and on Western technology.
In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the recently
emerged doctrine of openness in Eastern Europe.

In the process I

will attempt to show:
1,

How

dissatisfaction

the

w ith

recently

em erged

philosophy

explains

the autarkic m odel of developm ent,

its

and the

alternative it seeks.
2.

How the new doctrine views the role of Eastern Europe in

the international division of labor.
Pre-Revolutionary Russia was a backward semi-feudal country.
The majority of the population consisted of peasants who had been
recently freed from the obligations of serfdom.

In the late 1800s, as

a result of government policies some industrial progress was taking
place; consequently the industry gTew at an average annual rate of
5.8 percent over the period 1885-1913, and the industrial working
class grew to the estimated number of 2.5 million in 1913.
of industrial
countries:

progress,

R ussia

was,

however,

behind

In spite
industrial

its industrial large-scale output was only 6.9 percent of
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American gross industrial output (Nuti 1979, P. 236), and in terms of
industrial output per-capita Russia ranked with the poor Western
European countries.

(Gregory & Stuart 1981, P. 18)

In regard to foreign trade Russia was an exporter of raw and
agricultural products and an importer of manufactured goods.

More

than fifty percent of Russia's total exports was of cereals and other
food stuffs.

The imports of manufactured goods were so important

for Russia that it continued to import from Germany even during the
F irst World War, explicitly exempting imports of such products as
chem icals, m etals and machinery from the general prohibition of
trade with enemy countries.

(Dobb 1978, P. 37)

Russia was also an im porter of capital from the West.

It

imported on the average an annual amount of 200 million roubles in
the two decades prior to the First World War.
capital

invested

in

Russian

industry

before

The total foreign
the

R evolution

is

estimated at more than 2 billion gold roubles, and a further 5 billion
in state and municipal and state-guaranteed loans.
38)

Foreign

capital

accounted

for

40

percent

(Dobb 1978, P.
of

industrial

investment, and 15-20 percent of total investment at the end of the
Tsarist era.

(Gregory & Stuart 1981, P. 32)

The W eakness of Russia's industries and agriculture and its
"dependence” on the foreign sector were not the sole difficulties
faced by the Revolutionary government which took power in 1917.
The country was devastated by the war, and the start of civil war
and the capitalist powers, aggression intensified the extent of havoc.
The Soviet leadership's first step was to strengthen and stabilize its
political position and to rebuild the economy to its pre-war levels.
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Once this step had been accomplished, the government had to strive
with

the

dual

construction."

tasks

of

"economic

developm ent"

(Doane, Jr. 1983, and Ellman 1968)

and

socialist

To complete these

tasks the Soviet leadership not only had no model to emulate, but
also had limited options to pursue.

The Soviet leadership's ideology

prevented the Soviets from accumulating capital through colonial
exploitation, foreign investments, or military conquests.

Moreover,

the repudiation of Tsarist foreign debts diminished, if not completely
destroyed the chance of the new government's obtaining any new
loans.

Most importantly, the anticipated revolution in the industrial

capitalist nations of W estern Europe did not take place.

It was

expected that if the revolution had come true it would have provided
an important source of economic and technological assistance to the
Soviet economy.

4iL

Prelude to Autarky as Model for the Foreign Trade:
On April 22, 1918, less than six months after accession to

power, the Soviet government declared the nationalization of all
foreign trade.

This was the first time that in peace time, a modern

state had sought to expand its control over foreign trade to such a
great extent.
intervention

Whereas previously governments had lim ited their
in

foreign

trade

to

im posing

tariffs

and

enforcing

prohibitions, now the Soviet government was assuming the task of
conducting all imports and exports by itself.

The fundamental reason

for the Soviet government's nationalization of foreign trade was the
fear that unrestricted and uncontrolled foreign capital might prevent
them from "constructing" a socialist economy.

(Quigley 1974, P. 34)
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The

m onopoly

of

foreign

trade

m ust

synonymous with aversion to foreign trade.

not

be

taken

as

In fact, Lenin seized

every opportunity to argue for the importance of foreign trade in
rebuilding the war tom economy, as well as for the development of
th e

pro d u ctiv e

fo rces

and

consequently

achieving

econom ic

independence:
our economic crisis is so deep that we cannot, on our own,
reh a b ilita te our ruined econom y w ithout m achinery and
technical aid from abroad. (Lenin 1977a, P. 182)
It was the extent of the crisis that made him willing to offer granting
very important concessions to the West.
The calam ities and havoc of the Seven-year War and the
overstrain due to the virtually superhuman exertion on the part
of working class . . . have now so aggravated that they demand
urgent measures on the part of the Soviet power. (Lenin 1977a,
P. 268)
Among such measures are:
We could grant concessions to the biggest imperialist trusts on
a wider basis: say a quarter of Baku, . . and a quarter of our
best forest reserves . . . in return for this we shall be getting
badly needed machinery . . . (Lenin 1977a, P. 183)
We are proposing maximum concessions, and
be in our interests to sign a trade pact and
possible dispatch some of the essentials for
the railw ays (i.e., locom otives), for the
industry, and for electrification. (Lenin 1977b,

we believe it
purchase with
the restoration
rehabilitation
P. 473)

to
all
of
of

I know no reason why a socialist commonwealth like ours
cannot do business indefinitely with capitalist countries. We do
not mind taking their locomotives and farming machinery, so
why should they mind taking our socialist wheat, flax and
plantinum?
We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for
peace, our need for peace and our desires to give foreign
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capital the most generous concessions and guarantees.
1977c, P. 177)

(Lenin

Lenin also considered the importance of foreign trade for economic
developm ent w hich

is

the

precondition

for

achieving

econom ic

independence:
Through trade with Italy, America . . . you must exert every
effort to develop the productive forces. (Lenin 1977a, 317)
Our aim now is to obtain trade agreement with Britain so as to
start regular trade and be able to buy as soon as possible the
machinery necessary for our extensive plan to rehabilitate the
national economy. The sooner we do this the greater will be
the basis ensuring our economic independence of the capitalist
countries. (Lenin 1977b, P. 472)
4.1.1.

The Concession Policy:
The concession policy, therefore, became the first attempt by

the Soviet government to attract foreign capital and technology.
There were different types of cooperation with foreign enterprises
under the concession policy.

In one form of cooperation, the Soviet

government leased the enterprise to the foreign interest, and shared
the profit.

The enterprise was run by the concessionaire.

Every

aspect of the enterprises' activities—production, employment, trade—
was regulated

by contracts.

The enterprise

was com m itted

by

contracts to restore the idle equipment and provide the enterprise
with the most advanced technology.
production

specifications

stipulated by the contract.

and

the

The amount to be invested, the
project’s

deadline

were

all

In this form of cooperation the priority

was given to the former owners o f the enterprises.

The most
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significant of the concessions given to the former owner was the one
to the British Lena Goldfields that had run thirteen plants on a vast
territory, and when liquidated, its wealth was estim ated at $89
million.

It employed almost 12,000 people, yielded 30% of the Soviet

gold output, and had an even greater share in Soviet silver in 192526.

(Koves 1976, P. 160)
Another form of cooperation was the establishment of mixed

companies, in which the Soviet government held 50 percent of the
shares, and directly participated in running the company.

The mixed

companies were prim arily created in the fields of foreign trade,
tim ber production and transportation.
Yet the significance of such cooperations in the development of
factors of production was only limited.

In 1928, for example, when

the number of these cooperative ventures reached their peak, only
110 existed.

In

the same year these enterprises em ployed 20

thousand people and produced only 6 percent of the total industrial
output.
lack

(Koves 1976, P. 162)

of

W estern

agreem ents

firm s'

with the

There are several reasons cited for the

in terest

in

participation

Soviet governm ent;

among

in
them

concession
are:

the

uncertainty about the internal conditions of the Soviet Union, the
Western propaganda against the concessions and later, in the 30s, the
unfavorable

effects

of

the

G reat

D epression.

Internally

the

concessions policy also faced strong opposition, partly because from
the political and ideological point of view it was not yet decided
whether such forms o f cooperation with the industrialized W est were
acceptable.

Moreover, the intensity of dispute was enhanced by the
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specific form of concessions, in particular the aspect of concession
policy calling for the cooperation with the pre-revolutionary owners.
Notwithstanding, in 1928 a comprehensive concession program
was elaborated, predicting the probability of 80 m illion roubles of
foreign investment annually.
capital into

the branches o f

The program hoped to attract foreign
the industry

in

w hich

the

Soviet

governm ent could not afford to invest; and it hoped to involve
foreign capital in "reconstruction, replacement and modernization" of
state enterprises.1

This program was not implemented, and during

the first five-year plan period the concessions virtually ceased to
exist; by then, offering the concessions
undesirable both politically and economically.

became more and more
Under the condition of

a planned economy in which the intention is to "concentrate all
detectable resources on the creation of new plants, and to control the
inv estm en ts

and

th e

w hole

production

by

m eans

of

direct

instructions, concessions appeared to be intolerable foreign bodies."
(Koves 1976, P. 163)

4.1.2.

C o n tro v ersy O ver S tate M onopoly of F o reig n T ra d e :
Despite the state monopoly of foreign trade, in practice during

the period of war communism (1918-1921) a considerable amount of
foreign

trade

(Nuti 1979)
1

was conducted

through

non-governm ental channels.

And indeed by the beginning of the New Economic

Some foreign firms were involved in technical assistance contracts. Under
this arrangement a foreign firm made no permanent investment, but
provided technical expertise for a fixed fee. For more information on the
activities o f the foreign firms in the Soviet Union at that period, please see
(McKay 1974).
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Policy (NEP 1921-1928) many leading party and government figures
questioned the necessity of retaining the monopoly of foreign trade
itself.

The

principle

contention

of

those

who

attacked

the

government monopoly of trade was that the state agency responsible
for conducting the foreign trade (i.e. the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade) was incapable of successfully performings its tasks.
Bukharin, for example, argued:
neither Lenin nor Krasin says a word about the incalculable
losses that are borne by the economy of the country as a
consequence of the inefficiency of the People's Comissariat of
Foreign Trade, due to the principles on which it is organized;
they do not say a word about the losses incurred because we
ourselves are unable (and will not be able for a long time for
quite understandable reasons) to mobilize the peasant's stock
of goods and use them for international trade. (Quoted in Lenin
1976, P. 455)
Bukharin's opposition to the monopoly of foreign trade, therefore,
stemmed from his belief in

the monopoly

system's

inability

to

effectively encourage the peasants to produce and sell for exports.
Considering the unavailability and high cost of consumer items in
Russia itself, "only the lure of cheaper foreign consum er goods
offered by private traders could stimulate the peasant to improve his
production and to market goods in large quantity."

(Quigley 1974,

P.P. 29-30)
Lenin, while advocating the monopoly of foreign trade, was the
first to adm it its inefficiency.

But such deficiency for him was of

secondary importance.
The question of the inefficiency of the people's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade is only a minor one. For this inefficiency is only

203

p art and parcel o f the inefficiency o f all our People’s
Commissariats, and is due to their general social structure; to
remedy this we shall require many years of persistent effort to
improve education and to raise the general standard.
(Lenin
1976, P. 455-56)
The fundamental reason for maintaining monopoly of foreign trade
in Lenin's mind remained the same as when he in 1918 decreed such
monopoly:
powers.

to protect the country from the imperialism of Western

(Quigley 1974, P. 30)

In the epoch of im perialism when there are m onstrous
co n trasts betw een pauper countries and im m ensely rich
countries . . . the only system of protection w orthy of
consideration is the monopoly of foreign trade. (Lenin 1976, P.
457)
L enin

at

the

same

tim e

believed

that

the

problem

of

inefficiency of the Foreign Trade Commissariat could and would be
resolved.

One of the remedies he suggested was:

learning from foreign traders participating in the m ixed
companies. The system of mixed companies is the only system
that can really im prove the poor staff of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Trade, since under this system foreign
and Russian merchants work alongside each other."
(cited in
Quigley 1974, P. 31)
The

opposition

to

the

foreign

through the remainder of the decade.

trade

m onopoly

continued

Although such opposition was

not successful in abolishing the monopoly, it did force important
concessions.

As a result of these concessions, a number of agencies

outside the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade were allowed to
engage in direct foreign trade.2

These included private Russian

Quigley (1974) attributes the establishment o f mixed companies in the field
o f foreign trade to the insistence o f anti-Foreign Trade Monopoly forces.
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citizens

and

com panies,

cooperatives,

foreign

citizen s,

m ixed

companies and state-owned agencies.
It was stipulated that a Russian private citizen who owned or
leased an enterprise could under exceptional cases apply for a license
to import items necessary for his enterprise's production, or export
goods that the government was particularly anxious to sell abroad.
(Quigley
Russian

1974, P. 34)
citizens

w ere

Another channel through which private
perm itted

to

becom e

involved

(although

indirectly) in foreign trade was by allowing them to deal with
concession firms inside Russia.

(Quiqley 1974, P. 35)

Another major

achievement of the opposition was forcing the government to grant
admittance to a large number of state agencies to get involved in
foreign trade activities.

4.1.3.

Volum e and

Structure o f Foreign

Trade

1917-1928:

Soviet foreign trade almost ceased in 1918 and 1919 and was
still very small in 1920-21.

The economic recovery commenced in

1921, at the beginning of the NEP period, and was accompanied by
the growth of foreign trade.

Foreign trade grew sharply during the

NEP; it however never reached its 1913 level.

By 1927, exports (in

1913 prices) had risen to only 34.7% and imports to 38.9% of their
1913 level.

(Holzman 1963, P. 286)

Throughout the period imports increased more rapidly than
exports, and the country was faced with large balance of payments
d e f ic its .3
3

Holzman (1963) argues that the Soviets would have

Except for the years 1923, 24 and 26 which showed small surpluses.
(Holzman 1963, p. 86)
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imported even more to speed the country's reconstruction, but their
efforts were hampered by their inability to increase exports more
rapidly than

im ports

and/or to obtain

long-term credits.

Their

deficits were financed by exports of gold and other precious metals
and by short-term credits obtained on difficult terms.

(Holzman

1963, P. 287)
The inability of government to increase the exports was mainly
due to the structure of landholding in the Soviet Union during the
NEP period.

In this

period the small peasant farms replaced the

large state, nobility, and church estates of the pre-revolutionary era.
These estates were previously the main producers
surpluses for exports.
unable to

Furtherm ore, the

induce peasants to produce

of the

grain

Soviet governm ent was

and more

im portantly

to

market grain at the pre-war level, m ainly because manufactured
goods were
su b stitu te

scarce, and also
hom em ade

manufactured products

because

the peasants

m an u factu res,

w hen

the

could

easily

g overnm ent's

were not offered at sufficiently low prices.

Although grain remained the number one export, it never reached its
pre-w ar

lev el,

and

the

chronic

shortage

of

grain

and

other

agricultural products repeatedly disrupted the government's plan to
increase export.

(Furtado 1966, Dohan 1976, and Quigley 1974)

The

Foreign Trade Commissariat's problems were aggravated by the fact
that the domestic prices of such important export items as timber,
flax

and grain

often

exceeded

world prices.

The

government,

nevertheless, continued to export, selling abroad at a loss, because
the primary goal was to import items needed for reconstruction and
not to make a profit.

(Quigley 1974, P. 46)
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However, the chronic balance of payment problems eventually
forced the Soviet government to cut back on imports.

The biggest

cutbacks happened on the consumer goods items, and the imports of
many industrial outputs also were curtailed.

Yet the imports of

industrial output crucial to the reconstruction and development of
the economy increased and surpassed the pre-war levels.

(Holzman

1963, P. 287)
The decade of the thirties brought im portant changes in the
Soviet economic model of development as well as its foreign trade
policy and institutions.

Autarky as the Model of Foreign Trade:
A hallmark of Soviet economic development over the years has
been

the

em phasis on

self-sufficiency.

Self-sufficiency

became

prom inent during

the 1930s, when foreign trade became negligible,

and it continued

into the 1950s. As Holzman

(1979)

argues, the

desire for self-sufficiency exists in all nations to some extent, partly
because of the reasons o f military security, partly due

to economic

consideration—i.e. to achieve self-sufficiency in those

commodities

produced at a com parative disadvantage.4
4

It seems, however, the

Holzman (1979, p. 263) argues such desire is stronger in the centralized
economies and is intensified by the following reasons: first, because of
complicated inout-output interrelationships among intermediate products,
central planners try to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers and insulate
the economy from the vagaries of the world market. Second, the irrational
price system o f these economies often makes it difficult for planners to
decide what to trade.
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adoption of autarky as the model of foreign trade by the Soviet
government was motivated by more complicated factors.

4.2.1.

The First-Five Year Plan (1928-33):
In

1928 the Soviet planners drafted the first five-year plan

(1928-33).

One of the basic goals of the plan was the expansion of

the foreign trade; exports were projected to increase 21% every year,
imports w ere also to be expanded rapidly, especially machinery
imports called for by import substitution policy.
vehicle

fo r industrialization

economic independence.

of the country

Imports became a

and

achievem ent of

In the words of a Soviet scholar

Im ports into the USSR are planned so as to aid in quickly
freeing the nation from the need to import. . . [and] in the
execution of the plan for socialist industrialization [it is
necessary to] import the most finished equipment and newest
machines . . . for the organization of our own production of
these very m achines, to secure our technical-econom ic
independence from capitalist nations (cited in Holzman 1963,
P. 302)
M oreover, the plan projected an annual trade surplus in order to
replenish depleted reserves.

The planners furthermore attempted to

change the

structure of exports and to rely particularly on the

exports

in d u stria l’ raw

of

m aterials

such

manganese in the first three years of the plan.
to

be necessary because

grain,

as

tim ber,

oil

Such a move was felt

the traditional export item ,

proved to be unreliable during the NEP.

and

had

The government, however,

planned to increase grain exports in the fifth year of the plan, on the
expectation of increased output and marketing of a modest number
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of collectivized farms that were to be established.

(Doham 1976, P.

6 1 1 -6 1 2 )
Throughout the plan there was no indication that the foreign
trade would be cut back or discontinued after the completion of the
p la n .5

In fact it was a combination of several external and internal

factors which led to an extensive cutback in the foreign trade by the
end of the plan period.

This contention that foreign trade was cut

back because of economic forces is in contrast to the popular belief
that Stalin deliberately pushed for the adoption of autarky.

It is true

that, in the XlVth Party Congress in 1925, Stalin said that the Soviet
Union "today can't help" but to import machinery; such a necessity,
he added,

should not be interpreted as

development perspective.”

"a principle, theory, or

According to Stalin, imports were at that

tim e essential in assisting the Soviet Union to move rapidly from the
stage of developm ent in w hich it

"must im port equipm ent and

machines instead of manufacturing them" on its own.
1976, P. 171)

(cited in Koves

His formulation, which can be well interpreted as

advocacy of the policy of import-substitution industrialization in the
hope of achieving economic independence, ten years later became a
theoretical base for the adoption of autarky.
There

is

no

doubt

th at

the

realiza tio n

of

"econom ic

independence" was the goal of the planners in drafting the first fiveyear

plan.

H ow ever,

the

planners

never

m eant

econom ic

independence to imply a complete isolation from the outside world:
5

Except in a few cases, the increase in the domestic output permitted such a
cutback or cessation, such as cotton, zinc, paper and yam. (Dohan 1976, p.
612)
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In the field of international relations we must not start from
the empty slogan to develop these relations in the widest range
(a consistent application of this slogan issued by the opposition
would mean the end of foreign trade monopoly, as w ell as
economic and m ilitary capitulation before the international
bourgeoisie), nor from the slogan to cut the economic relations
with the Capitalist world (which, if implemented, would mean a
strong retardation of the rate of our economic development in
general).
In this field we must start from having the widest
ranging relations provided that these relations (foreign trade,
foreign credits, extending concessions, draw ing in foreign
engineers and technicians, etc.) increase the economic power of
the Soviet Union, make it increasingly independent of the
ca p ita list w orld, expand the so cialist bases for further
developing the Soviet industries; widest ranging relations may
exist only within these frameworks, (quoted in Koves 1976, P.
171)
Foreign firms, in fact, continued to be active and play a role in
construction and operation o f new capacity associated with the fiveyear plan.

For example, Freyn Engineering Company of Chicago,

according to McKay (1974), directed all aspects of construction of the
Kuznetzk steel plant, and Arthur G. McKee and Company of Cleveland
directed the Magnitogorsk steel plant.

The autarky, then, as will be

shown was not pursued as a result of one person's wishes; it was
rather a pragmatic response to the balance of payments crisis.

The

alternative would have been, as Dohan (1976) suggests, the reduction
of "investment and output programs to a level appropriate to import
capacity until the export position improved."

(Dohan 1976, P. 633)

This policy, if it had been adopted, would have postponed the
achievement of the highly desirable goal of "realization of economic
independence" to the unforeseeable future.
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The period of the first five-year plan was a troubled time for
Soviet foreign trade.

The Great Depression in the W est had an

adverse effect on the Soviet international terms of trade mainly
because the world price of Soviet exports fell more than the price of
Soviet imports.

According to Holzman (1963), the index of the prices

of Soviet exports fell from 100 in 1929 to 48.7 in 1932, while the
prices o f its imports declined from 100 in 1929 to 68 in
D espite

such

adverse developm ents, the

1932.

Soviet volume of trade

increased tremendously in the same period.

According to Holzman

(1963), the volume of exports increased 46 percent, and the volume
of im ports 61.5 percent, from 1929 to 1931.

As a result, trade

deficits were incurred in every year from 1928 to 1932, except in
1929 when there was a small surplus.

These deficits were financed

in part by shipments of gold and other previous metals but primarily
by

high -co st

short-term

cred its

and

som e

long-term

credits.

(Holzman 1963, P. 290)
In response to the unpredicted large trade deficits, the original
plans for 1930 and 1931 were abandoned, imports for light industry
and consumer goods were cut sharply, and the government initiated
another campaign to economize on imports:
essential machinery needs domestically.

to attempt to meet most

This campaign turned out to

be ineffective, and the imports continued to grow faster than exports
and led to even further depletion of foreign exchange reserves and
accumulation of even more short-term foreign credits.
The Great Depression had another adverse effect on Soviet
Foreign trade.

The D epression-hit capitalist countries, in order to

protect home industries, sought to reduce imports through imposition
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of high tariffs and other trade barriers.

The Soviet government,

desperate for foreign exchange, nevertheless, continued to expand
the exports, regardless of exports' prices.

Consequently a vigorous

campaign was waged in many W estern countries against the Soviet
"dumping policy" which induced the imposition of discrim inatory
tariffs, quotas and other restrictions against Soviet products.

(Dohan

1976

Soviet

and

Q uigley

1974)

A lthough

the

outcry

against

"dumping policy" diminished by the summer of 1931, the general
efforts of the capitalist countries to protect themselves from the
widening Depression suffocated the policy of free trade and replaced
it with "protective trade."
months

before had

been

As a result, the policies which a couple of
merely

discrim inatory

m easures

against

Soviet products became W estern countries’ general trade policies,
and by the end of 1931,

Soviet products like any other nation's

became thoroughly "enmeshed in general trade barriers that not only
depressed export volume and prices, but also began to force the USSR
toward bilateralism, which was to characterize its trade in the post
World War H years."

(Dohan 1976, P. 622)

Another adverse development for Soviet foreign trade in late
1931

and

1932 was the

decreased

availability

of credit.

The

Western creditors began to refuse to grant new credits to the Soviet
governm ent

and

outstanding debt.

requested

at

least

the

partial

liquidation

of

Borrowing in the international market played an

important role in financing Soviet imports from 1928 up to 1931.
6

Dohan (1976) believes the Soviet economists o f the time were correct in
arguing that the capitalist countries were moving toward autarky.
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The Great Depression made access to foreign credits easier for the
Soviet Union, and in 1931 about 25 percent of imports was financed
by net increase in borrowing.7

In addition, as a large portion of

exports increasingly became committed to retiring the existing short
term

credits,

the "im ports had

decline in credit supply.”

become

very vulnerable to

any

Such vulnerability, according to Dohan,

(1976) was a significant factor in reduction of im ports after 1931,
especially after Germany and other W estern creditors discouraged
new credits to the Soviet Union.8

(Dohan 1976, P.P. 624-626)

These m ajor adverse international developments were not the
only obstacles to the maintenance of Soviet foreign trade at the
desired levels; there w ere also som e domestic factors which spurred
the cut back in foreign trade after 1931.

One of the most important

internal contributing factors was collectivization.
som e believed,

depressed the

output of

Collectivization,

agricultural

outputs

for

exports, and unpredictably increased the im ports for the agricultural
sector.

On the exports side Quigley, (1974, P. 61) for example,

believes

that

p ro te ste d

by

peasants

who w ere

slau g h terin g

"forced

liv e sto c k

into collective

and

p o u ltry ,

farm s

th e re b y

The Soviet debt in October of 1931 was about 811 million roubels. Dohan
(Ibid.) adds to the figure the amount of credits secured by the Soviet exports
warehoused abroad and its future liabilities for machinery on order, and
reaches the total real and contingent liabilities for the Soviet Union as
about 1400 million roubles. He concludes with long-term credits and good
prospects for refinancing. This would not have been a problem, but such
was not the position of the Soviet Union.
Another effect of the Soviets' increasing dependence on credits was that
they ended up purchasing only from a limited number o f foreign
suppliers, especially Germans, who were willing to supply credit. These
suppliers were able to take advantage of their positions and charge higher
prices on Soviet orders.
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complicating

considerably the procurement of eggs and

im portant export com m odities."

butter, two

Considering that the exports of

animal products were 16% of total exports in 1927/28 and they were
expected at least to double by 1932/33, the slaughter must have had
a devastating effect on the export earnings.

(Dohan 1976, P. 619)

The slaughter of horses and oxen had another adverse effect as far as
exports

are

concerned, because

m echanization of agriculture.

they

led

in

p art to

a

sudden

The mechanization, in turn, implied

diverting the petroleum products from the export m arket to the
agricultural sector in order to meet its increasing needs for fuel.

On

the

an

im ports side,

unanticipated
equipment.

the

sudden

increase

in

loss

im ports

of

of

draft

tractors

pow er m eant
and

other

heavy

Added to these problems were the massive crop failures

of 1931, 1932 and 1933 which

worsened the export crisis of the

agricultural outputs.
In addition, the overambitious plans are also cited as another
factor w hich

intensified

the balance

of paym ents crisis,

mainly

because planners turned to imports in order to cover the inevitable
shortages due to the underfulfillment of the plans.
To ease the foreign

trade crisis, by late

1931 the

Soviet

government undertook an extensive campaign in order to find ways
to

reduce

or to tally

machineries.
production of

elim inate

im ports

of raw

m aterials

and

As a result the Soviets began a reduction of imports,
domestic versions of the imported m achineries, and

redesigning products to eliminate the imports.

The first step toward

establishm ent of the "autarkic" model of development was taken.
The character

of the

measures

adopted can be illustrated

by a

214

directive addressed to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry
in early 1932:
To stop and to prohibit henceforth the import of the following
kinds of equipment for which orders to the value of 21 million
gold rubles were to be placed in the course of the next
fortnight within the country: transformers, all types of trucks
and railw ay en g in es, m o to r v eh icle s, cran e s, in tern al
combustion engines, generators and spares for any equipment
already imported. (Cited in Koves 1976, P. 172)
The government did not intend the adoption of such policies at the
time of their initiation to be a complete isolation from the outside
world; they hoped such policies would assure the economic growth
and defense of the country.

In the words of a Soviet scholar at that

tim e:
E conom ic independence m eans that the m ost im portant
branches of the national economy are assured domestic raw
m aterials and installations in a degree which makes them
independent from individual nations of the capitalist world . . .
But industrialization is, of course, not designed to reduce
imports in general, and imports of machinery and installation
in particular. The extent of the imports of USSR . . . will be
determined by what and under what conditions one will sell to
us. (cited in Dohan 1976, P.P. 633-634)
The

"anti-im port"

policies

were

therefore

praised

because

they

helped to achieve economic independence.
The initiation of autarky as the model of foreign trade spurred
the reinforcement of the government monopoly of foreign trade.
p riv ate

citizens,

m ixed

com panies

and

non-com m issariate

All
state

organizations once again were banned from conducting direct foreign
trade.

(Quigley

1974, P. 62)

And the adoption of centralized
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economic planning put an end to the debate over the desirability of
government monopoly of foreign trade.

4.2.2. The Reinforcem ent of the Autarky:
By the end of the first five-year plan, there were many factors
at work which prevented increases in Soviet foreign trade.

As far as

the capitalist countries were concerned, their attitudes toward the
Soviet Union and trade in general remained the same.

Domestically,

however, the huge imports of machineries and large investm ent in
the basic plant and equipm ent of the first-five year plan period
made the Soviet Union more independent of the other countries.
According to Holzman "without question, the Soviet Union could in
1933 come much closer than ever before to satisfy its requirements
in

a re a s

c o n s id e r e d

(Holzman 1963, P. 304)
produce

m ost

of

its

im p o r ta n t

by

th e

p la n n e r s ."

Therefore, the Soviet Union’s ability to
strategic

requirem ents

internally

was

an

important factor in their unwillingness to expand their foreign trade,
especially under the conditions when terms of trade were still very
disadvantageous to the Soviet Union.
urgent

needs

fo r

m achinery

and

"Having satisfied their most
equipm ent,

it

seem s

m ost

reasonable for the Soviet Union to have decided that the costs, in
terms of export, of many less urgently needed imports had become
too

high."

(Holzm an

1963,

P.

305)

M oreover,

the

Soviet

governm ent's desire to end food rationing and improve domestic
food

consum ption

agricultural products.

increased

the

p ressu re

to

cut

exports

of
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There were other factors at work which made the contraction
of foreign trade desirable.
foreign

For example, putting less emphasis on

trade was advantageous from

planning.

the perspective

of central

Because foreign trade is less amenable to prediction and

control, its reduction minimized the possibility of the disturbance of
the national economic plan.

(Doane, Jr. 1983)

Furtherm ore, the

campaign for the reduction of imports, which had been adopted as a
pragmatic response to the balance o f payments crisis, now became a
v irtu e.
Consequently the role of foreign trade was reduced to marginal
importance.

The country imported only when there was a shortfall

in domestic production, and exported only the surplus of goods which
were enough to finance the imports.

In the words of a Soviet scholar

at that time:
The basic task of Soviet exports . . . to earn foreign exchange to
finance expenditures on imports and to accumulate the foreign
exchange reserves of the country . . . the USSR exports its goods
only in order to pay for a com paratively small quantity of
imported goods which are necessary for the speedy execution
of the national economic plans. Therefore, the dynamics of the
quantity o f exports is defined by the plan which is constructed
in connection with the planned volume of imports,
(cited in
Holzman 1963, P. 362)
In practice, however, at times the import requirements proved
to be higher than expected, and the exportable commodities had to
be created either by reducing domestic consumption (Koves, P. 114)
or by planning for export production.

(Holzman 1976, P. 33)

The

most salient feature of the Soviet model remained the fact that there
was no attempt to specialize and direct the foreign trade based on

217

the principle of comparative advantage.
and imports continued to decline.

And the volumes of exports

By one index they only reached

their 1913 levels in the I950s.9

4.2.3.

World W ar II and its Aftermath:
Among the im portant foreign economic developm ents during

the war years was the lend-lease shipments from the United States
to the Soviet Union in the amount of $10.8 billion.
according to Koves (Koves

These shipments,

1977), were not restricted to military

equipment but also served to aid the continuous operation of Soviet
industries, in particular heavy industry, as well as to help the
"reconstruction of destroyed factories."

However, the reemergence of

the economic relations with the West did not last long and the Cold
W ar

brought

a

universal

W estern

system

of prohibitions

and

restrictions of trade with the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, in the post 1945 era the economic and political
isolation of the Soviet Union came to an end by the addition of the
Eastern European countries to the ranks of socialist countries.

The

Soviet Union started to import what it needed from these countries.
The East European countries, along with the Soviet Union followed
the same economic concepts which had dom inated Soviet foreign
trade policy since 1931:
9

that is they would rely only marginally on

Based on this index (1913=100) the volume of exports started to decline in
1933 and continued to decline until 194S and since then has been steadily
growing. The volume of imports, on the other hand, fluctuated widely
between 1933 and 1945; it reached its highest level in 1948 and its lowest in
1943, and it has grown since the end of World War II. (see Gregory & Stuart
1981, p. 267)
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trade with capitalist countries, on W estern technology, and would
take into account the effects of economic ties with the West in the
solution of the economic problems of growth only to a minor extent.
(K oves

1977)

M oreover,

these

countries

had

attem pted

to

industrialize as rapidly as possible as had the Soviet Union, in the
hope that each would achieve self-sufficiency.
these countries consequently

sacrificed

In Holzman's words,

"mutually profitable

trade

based on comparative advantages” in the "pursuit of a higher degree
of self-sufficiency."

(Holzman 1963, P. 308)

In addition, the Eastern

European countries, like the Soviet U nion, considered exports as
"necessary evil" in order to cover the shortfall in domestic production
(Doane Jr.

1983), or/and pursue the policy of im port substitution.

(Brown & Marer 1973)
(1 9 6 3 ),

to

even

th e m s e lv e s .10

the

Such a policy extended, according to Holzman
trade

relations

am ong

these

countries

In any event, the emergence of Eastern Europe as

socialistic countries led Stalin in 1931 to expound the theory of
emergence o f two opposed, parallel world markets.
It should be observed that the U.S.A., and Great Britain and
France, themselves contributed—without themselves desiring it
. . . to the formation and consolidation of the new, Parallel
World Market.
They imposed an economic blockade on the
U.S.S.R., China and the European people’s democracies . . .
thinking thereby to strangle them.
The effect, however, was

In terms o f foreign trade the economic relations among these countries
are of major importance. However, the manner that the trade among these
countries takes place in is a manner qualitatively different from that
between the socialist and the capitalist countries, or among the capitalist
countries themselves, and it is a subject which is beyond the discussion of
this dissertation. Among the recent studies which deal extensively with
such trade relation is that of M. Herald. (1985)
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not to strangle, but to strengthen the
(Stalin 1971, P. 566)

new w orld

market.

In Stalin's view the most significant aspect of the "socialist world
market"

was that it would result in

development in these countries.

"a fast pace of industrial

It may be

confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development,
it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in
no need o f im ports from cap italist co u n tries, but w ill
themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for
their surplus products. (Stalin 1971, P. 566)
Furthermore, the existence of the "socialist world market," according
to Stalin, would imply the loss o f opportunity for the Western
countries, to sell in this market.
. . . that [capitalist countries'] opportunities for sale in the
world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be
operating more and more below capacity. . . . This is felt by the
capitalist themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to
feel the loss of such markets as U.S.S.R. and China. (Stalin 1971,
P. 566)
In contrast to Stalin's belief, Soviet trade with the industrialized
Western countries as a portion of total Soviet foreign trade started to
increase in the 1960s and it reached roughly 40% in 1978.
& Stuart 1981, P. 272)

(Gregory

Indeed, during the 1960s, East-W est trade

increased more rapidly than the intra-socialist trade, albeit from a
smaller percentage base.

While the socialist countries continued to

trade with each other and the level of their trade remained low, the
first sign of a new development had emerged:

the participation of

the socialist countries in the international division of labor, (Holzman
1974, P.P. 127-129, Doane Jr., p. 9) and by 1978 the volume of EastWest trade exceeded $60b.

(NYiri 1982, P. 21)
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One corollary of the increased East-West trade was a change in
the perception of the role of foreign trade in socialist countries.
W hile the autarkic model of developm ent viewed imports to be
significant as long

as they cover the

shortfall in the domestic

production, the recently em ergent philosophy stresses participation
in the international division of labor and promotes the "outward
looking" model of development, which seeks to increase the imports
of Western technology in order to enhance the level of productivity
and

efficiency

of production.

Some

even

argue the

economic

development must be geared into specialization in production of new
products

for

export

to

the

W estern

countries

(export

oriented

d evelopm en t).
I will devote the rest of the chapter to establishing how the
recently emerged philosophy in Eastern Europe views the following
m a tte rs :11
1.

The

g enesis

of

th e

"outw ard

looking"

m odel

of

development, and its implication for the construction of socialism.
2.

The role of Eastern Europe in the international division of

labor.
I will demonstrate that this approach holds that the autarky
was
11

a

condition

m ainly

forced

on

socialist

countries

by

an

I realize that my survey will be limited in extent, because I will
concentrate only on those studies which are available in English.
However, I believe there is an adequate amount of study available to enable
one to get an accurate picture o f the entire literature. Acta Oeconomica and
Problems o f Economics are among the best sources, one published by
Hungary, the other by USSR. International Affairs (Moscow) and Current
Digest o f Soviet Press can be used for such purposes. In any event, the rest
o f this chapter will be entirely based on the Eastern European sources.
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environment hostile to the Soviet Union and later to the rest of
Eastern Europe, a view similar to that of dependency schools.

This

view

was

contends

successful

that

th e

in amassing

autarkic

m odel

of

developm ent

the domestic resources, rebuilding the war

torn economies and achieving the desired industrial transformation.
It proved,

however, to

have some lim itations in particular for the

smaller Eastern European countries.

These limitations, along with the

shortage of labor and raw materials and rising capital output ratios,
suggested the need for a transition from extensive growth (i.e. via
increases in scale) to intensive growth (i.e. via modernization and
increases in productivity) based on imports.

On the other hand, the

Western governments finally realized the failure of the Cold War and
the economic blockade of Eastern Europe.

Such realization led to the

creation of the political context of detente, which facilitated the
implementation of the "outward" looking model of development.
With regard to the place of the Eastern European countries in
the international division o f labor, it is argued that these countries
occupy an

intermediate position.

Their economic relations with the

advanced

ca p ita list

resem ble

periphery.

co u n tries

(Nyiri 1982, and Eckstein

those o f

1980)

cen ter

and

This resemblance,

however, does not mean that advanced capitalist countries exploit
Eastern European countries:

it rather im plies establishm ent of a

mutually advantageous relationship.

In regard to their economic

dealing with the LDCs, it is argued that although at the surface the
Eastern European countries may resemble DCs in their relations with
the LDCs, in fact Eastern European economic relations with LDCs "will
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serve the socio-econom ic progress of people
colonial yoke.”

liberated

from

the

(Smith 1979, P. 310)

PART TW O : THE NEW APPROACH TOWARDS FOREIGN

TRADE
The principle prem ise of the Eastern European economists'
v i e w s 12

in regard to the role of foreign trade is that it is

indispensable for the economic development of any given country,
m ainly because:

Now adays individual countries—and even whole groups of
countries—can no longer grapple successfully with world-wide
problem s such as those connected with raw m aterials and
power supplies. Alone and unaided, they are not in a position
to elim inate the more dangerous and w idespread diseases,
ensure supplies of foodstuffs . . . and exploit resources of the
seas. . . . For this reason, economic links and a division of labor
at the international level are assuming increasing importance
for individual countries, irrespective of their stage of economic
development. (Shiryaev and Sokolov 1979, P 289)

By the Eastern European economists, I also mean those Soviet economists
who adhere to the new paradigm.
Therefore, "Eastern Europe" henceforth
includes the Soviet Union.
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There are other factors at work which make development of
even

the

w ealth iest

impossible:

countries

w ithout

foreign

trade

virtually

"the assortment of goods produced is so diversified while

the range of social needs is so wide, that a single economy cannot
produce

by

itse lf

functioning of

all

the

society."

goods

indispensable

(Rosati 1979, P. 53)

for

the

norm al

Some of

these

economists even go further and in accordance with the theory of
comparative advantage argue:

the "production for the world market

taken in the widest sense may result in considerable advantages for
any country, independently of its size.

Buying abroad goods which

cannot at all or only too expensively be produced domestically will
earn the biggest profits for a national economy if it is accompanied
by the export of goods that can be produced w ith
advantag es in that national economy."

sig n ific a n t

(Koves 1979, P. 325 emphasis

ad d ed )
In

addition,

the countries

productive resources

"including

are different in term s
[their]

of

their

natural resources, clim ate

conditions, and classical factors such as labor and capital,"

which

intensify the need to participate in the international division of labor.
(Koves 1979, P. 53)

Moreover, such participation will resolve the

"economic problems of raising the efficiency of production," (Goldian
1984, P. 3) and "promotes the acceleration of technical progress."
(Klochek 1979, P. 10)

The importance of such participation is further

enhanced, when one considers it from a political point of view:

the

"development of economic cooperation between East and W est is not
merely an economic interest for the partner-countries, but also an
important factor of peaceful coexistence."

(Kador 1977, P. 153)

The
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policy of peaceful co-existence or "the course towards the easing of
international tensions," is believed to be "inseparably linked with the
expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation . . . among countries
with different social systems."

(Bogomolov 1979, P. 305)

According

to these economists, the importance of East-W est cooperation was
predicted and stressed by Lenin also.

For example, Lenin declared

that "[t]here is a power that is greater than the desire, will, and
resolve of any of the hostile governments or classes.

This power is

common worldwide economic relations that compel them to enter
into [economic relations] with us."

(quoted in Bogomolov & Dostal

1974, P. 56)

He also stated that the "[e]conomic need will itself point

the way . . .

the development of regular trade relations between the

Soviet Republic and the rest of the capitalist world must inevitably
continue.''

(quoted in Goldian 1984, P. 11)

Autarky and

its Achievements:

In the light of the Eastern European economists' attribution of
such im portant roles to the economic relations between E ast and
W est, one

may w onder how

do

they

explain

the

adoption

of

"autarky" in the Soviet Union and later on in the rest of the Eastern
European countries.

The most frequently cited reason for the Soviet

Union's adoption of the policy of ’autarky' is the Western powers'
trade blockade and economic em bargo.13
13

D. Rosati (1979) believes along with the
other factors were also responsible for the
foreign trade. Such decreases in the years
were "the result of the acceptance o f a set
independence of the Soviet economy from
(Ibid., p. 52-53)

capitalist countries' pressures,
decreases in the Soviet Union's
1930-39, according to Rosati,
o f views concerning the
the world capitalist market."
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For many years the predominant view held in the socialist
countries on the role of foreign trade in socialism was that the
sole purpose of foreign trade was to satisfy needs which cannot
be supplied by dom estic production; and exports should
develop only as far as is necessary to cover import necessities.
This view was the product of a period when, between the two
W orld W ars, the capitalist countries tried to_ isolate the
economy of the Soviet Union totally bv imposing an .economic
blockade. . . . (Szita 1974, P. 282, emphasis added)
the imperialist powers, according to Klockek (1979), at first militarily
intervened against the Soviet Union and refused to establish any
econom ic contact with

the young Soviet Republic, and later on

through their economic blockade tried to impede the growth of the
Soviet Union's foreign trade.
Union

"has a lw a y s

Nevertheless he argues that the Soviet

resolutely

opposed the concept of autarkic

developm ent and proceeds from the need for the broad, mutually
advantageous cooperation of countries in the realm of economic,
trade, science and technology."

(Klockekl979, P. 18 emphasis added)

According to Koves, (1981) another explanation seems to stem
from the W estern capitalist countries' economic conditions at that
tim e.

The w orld economy of the thirties, Koves believes, was

characterized by "disintegration, slow technological and economic
development,” and the existence of the capitalist system itself was in
jeopardy.

Therefore, the price to be paid by the Soviet Union for not

trading was not really so high.
It is, then, generally conceived that the policies of the Western
powers forced the Soviet Union to embrace autarky.

"It had been the

political tension that made the Soviet Union and other countries to
withdraw into themselves and that had not allowed them to progress
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toward a widening cooperation."

(cited in Koves 1978, P. 115)

Such

a conception is more or less similar to that of the dependency school
which maintains that autarky was mainly forced upon the Soviet
Union by the world capitalist economy.
M ultiple reasons are, however, cited in order to explain the
conditions which stimulated the adoption of autarky as the model for
the econom ic

developm ent in

the rest of E astern

Europe

after

WorldWar II.

"The heritage of the past, war damages, tensions of the

Cold War, [and] an almost complete isolation from the world market"
are generally perceived as the main reasons for such adoption.14
(Mandel & Muller 1974, p. 37)
In B. Radar's view (1977), for example, the Eastern European
countries
internal

shaped
and

extrapolatio n

their

regional
of

developm ent
autarky

experiences

strategy

along

the

"partly

in

consequence

obtained

in

the

path

of

of

the

restricted

world

economic relations between the wars and partly in response to the
political embargo."

(Kadar 1977, P. 155)

The Hast European economists maintain the policy o f autarky did not entail
completely abandoning foreign economic relations; it rather meant to curb
Western economic relations and to create an almost complete isolation of
the economy from the influence o f the world market. (Tardos 1981, p. 222)
M. Mandel and J. Muller (1974) in fact argue that the development o f the
socialist countries after World War II took place in a framework where
"dynamism of foreign trade was so significant that formally this should
exclude the qualification of the economic policy as autarky." They believe,
however, employing the terminology of autarky is still justified because
the foreign trade was carried on under the conditions o f regional co
operation in order to satisfy the "quantitative needs o f the rapid
industrialization accomplished parallelly and at the same time in the
individual countries."
In addition to the socialist regional co-operation,
development policies were based on import substitution.
Mandel and
Muller believe that in "consequence of these two factors the main
tendencies o f development policy can be qualified as autarkic despite a
significant growth in foreign trade.” (Ibid., p. 36)
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J. Bognar (1979) counts both internal and external conditions as
stim uli for adoption of autarky.

He argues in the late 1940s the

'external' w orld was very antagonistic and hostile to the socialist
countries.

Politically, the Cold War was raging with full force and the

danger of transforming the Cold W ar to an actual war between East
and West was mounting.
em bargo

w hich

participation

in

Economically, the United States declared an

was

follow ed

by its

the

international

allies.

division

Eastern

o f labor

European

was

further

restricted by the fact that the colonial system was still strong, the
new national states were only just beginning to come into existence,
and economically they were approachable only through the Western
m etropolises.

Under these conditions, "the preference of 'internal'

trade was not only a policy but the only possibility, and import
substitution

(substitution

of W estern

im ports)

conception but the only possible solution."

was

not

only

a

(Bognar 1979, P. 3)

In regards to internal conditions, Bognar refers to the economic
underdevelopm ent of the Eastern European countries, in particular
the smaller ones, and the existence of an ample labor surplus as the
co nditio n s

w hich

m ade

the

adoption

of

ex tensive

econom ic

development in order to bring about an industrial structure not only
logical but necessary.
Rosati (1979) and N. Shmelev (1979) also consider the Cold
W ar and the Western imposition of the economic blockade as the
im portant factors for the Eastern European reliance on the use of
domestic productive forces for the purpose of economic development.
Yet Rosati (1979) believes the doctrinal considerations promoting an
excessive adaptation of the Soviet experience of the thirties were

also a significant factor.
the same issue:

B. Rasdar (1977, P. 155) more or less raises

After the second W orld W ar the W estern countries

wanted to restrain imports from the socialist countries and prevent
th e ir

econom ic

dev elo p m en t

by

ap p ly in g

an

em bargo

considerations connected with foreign policy and strategy.

fo r
"The

exports of socialist countries were limited by the so-called customs
escalation

policy

of W estern countries,

products

in creasin g

p a ra lle l

w ith

by

the

duties

grade

on
of

individual
p ro cessin g,

discriminative restrictions with reference to market disturbance and
various adm inistrative obstacles."

The effect of W estern pow ers’

restrictions resulting from political hostility was strengthened by the
different

ideas

in

regard

to

developm ent

strategy

economies in Western and Socialist countries.

and

foreign

In the view of East

European economists, it was under the above mentioned conditions
that

the

autarky

becam e

the

"creed

of

econom ic

p o licy ."

Consequently the socialist countries came to the conclusion and the
belief that they had to isolate themselves from the effects of the
world economy, since only unfavorable and dangerous consequences
could come from such a hostile environm ent.

They devised the

theory that maintained after the Second World War, a socialist world
market independent of the capitalist world market had come into
existence, and that the rapid econom ic developm ent o f socialist
countries needed no more than an intensive division of labor among
them selves.

The

strategy

developm ent

considered

chosen

the

in

h ig h est

this context fo r economic
possible

degree

of

self-

sufficiency of the individual countries and of the entire community.
(Koves 1981, P. 113)
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According to this conception, trade with the outside w orld—
m ainly DCs—had only marginal im portance.

From the DCs the

socialist countries would have to import only commodities of which
they are partially and/or temporarily short.

Thus with a low import

level, the E ast European economists hoped that there would be no
obstacles to achieving a balance of trade.

It would be sufficient to

export to the capitalist countries what was left over after satisfaction
of domestic needs.

(Koves 1981, P. 113)

This naturally w orked out less smoothly in reality.
requirem ents

often proved to be

Import

higher than expected, and

the

exportable com modities had to be created not from some excesses
but by trimming domestic consumption.

(Koves 1981, P.P. 113-114)

The essence of the conception was nevertheless fully asserted:
self-sufficien cy

becam e

opportunity

to

establish a division

disregarded

in

development.

the

gist

determ ining

the

(Koves 1981,

P.P.

of

econom ic
of

goals

labor

policy

w ith (DCs)

and trends

113-114)

and

There

the
was

of econom ic
was, then, no

attem pt to specialize according to the requirements and possibilities
of a world m arket which was

exposed to cyclical fluctuation and full

of hostile political interests.

(Kadar 1977, P. 155)

grow th,

then,

employment,

relied

on sources

of fuel

like

The

the increase

in

and volume of investments or what later came to be

known as the "extensive economic development."
324)

The engine of

(Koves 1979, P.

developm ent became characterized by a very

strong

quantitative approach, and the development policy emphasized new
projects, for employment and regional development.
P. 167)

(Berend 1975,

The main economic task of the time became the creation of
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full em ploym ent,

through

subsistence level

as rapidly

national defense capacity.

industrialization,

raising

as possible, and

(Nyiri 1982, P. 19)

the

minimum

creating

a strong

Industrialization was

carried on based on the policy of import substitution, and economic
planning became the rule.
According to the Eastern European economists, at that time the
adoption of all these policies was logical, and their implementation
was conceivable.
Kovacs

(1976)

For example, using the case of Hungary, G. Y.
argued

that

during

the

first

phase

of

socialist

industrialization, characterized by an extensive development, the fast
rate

of

econom ic

growth

was by

no

realization or production considerations.

means

lim ited

by

either

The demand on the home

market, he argues, surpassed the supply and consequently there was
no problem in regard to selling goods domestically.

In addition, the

markets in other socialist countries provided unlim ited realization
possibilities even for the products which did not completely satisfy
the "internal technical param eters."

On the production side also

there existed plenty of factors which promoted extensive economic
growth.

First o f all, there

were ample lab o r reserves, mainly

released at the first stage of socialist industrialization
agricultural sector and households.

from the

Second, the growing raw material

and energy needs of the country were satisfied by im ports from
other socialist countries and in particular from the Soviet Union, in
exchange for industrial products resulting from extensive industrial
development.

Furthermore, Kovacs believes, "since the fixed assets

and technological requirements of quantitative growth were not in
the first place determined by criteria of realization on a competitive
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market," capacity expansion was possible in many instances with not
the most up-to-date fixed assets and technologies coming from home
production or from other socialist countries.

(Koves 1976, P. 52)15

Furtherm ore, Eastern European econom ists maintain that the
adoption of autarky and all other supporting policies was either
justified or inevitable at that time.

The adoption of central planning,

for instance, was justified because, as S. Pasztor (1980, P. 90) argues,
the autarkic endeavours can be only enforced in a framework of
direct plan instructions.

It was further justified, as Berend (1968,

P.P.. 76) explains, because it was the only feasible solution to the
problem
countries.

of

traditional

backw ardness

of

the

E astern

European

These countries, he asserts, had never passed through an

industrial revolution in the Western sense, and with the exception of
C z ec h o slo v ak ia,
character.

p reserv ed

th e ir

ag rarian

and

sem i-ag rarian

The predominantly agricultural character of this part of

the European continent made capital accum ulation im possible and
kept the level of investment low.

Consequently the economic growth

of these countries was no more than m oderate in the inter-w ar
period, and "these countries were completely unable to change their
economic structure or solve the dramatic social contradiction in their
societies."

Against this historical background Berend believes central

planning seemed to be "a possible weapon against backwardness and

^

A. Koves (1981) argues more or less the same points when he states: "it
could still be reasonably expected that the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries possessed all the internal conditions, beginning with
apparently boundless opportunities to increase the volume o f investment
and employment, for dynamic economic growth." (Ibid., p. 115)
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poverty, and presented a drastic method to forte a 'take o ff period,
to use Rostow's expression."16
Im port-substitution, given the context of the Cold W ar, was
intended to reduce imports at both national and regional levels.
(C saba

1983,

and

Mandel

&

M uller

1974)

Its

adoption

was

inevitable not m erely because the Soviet U nion's industrialization
was based on im port-substitution policies, but because it had deep
historical roots in Eastern Europe.
the

in te rw a r

industrialization
concept.

p erio d

in

invariably

According to L. Csaba (1983), in

C entral
was

and

based

S outh-E ast
on the

E urope

all

im port-substituting

This policy had a foundation in the 'economic nationalism'

of the successor-states to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

These

states, in the name of self-reliance, in a political climate of animosity,
did w hat was in their pow er "to dism antle the integrated large
economic entities o f the form er empire."

Consequently, each state

embarked on the policy of import substitution for the purpose of
creating all of the branches of industry domestically in order to
protect itself from the "undesirable consequences of dependence on
the neighbouring states."

Given such a background, Csaba believes

that with the emergence of the Cold War and Western embargo
policy, reemergence of the import substitution policy was inevitable.
16

It is important to know that this point is not shared by all the Eastern
European economists. I. T. Berend, (21S) for instance, maintains that the
adoption o f central planning was wrong from the time o f its inception:
"the method of compulsory plan directives, in spite o f significant results,
had some very decisive disadvantages from the first dav o f its adoption.
There can be no doubt that this method was harmful, nor can the damage
caused by mistaken aims be clearly separated from the damage caused by
mistakes in planning." (Ibid., p. 83 emphasis added)
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The Eastern European economists (with qualification) admit
that the adoption of autarky and all concomitant policies induced
decisive changes in the structure of Eastern European economies.
in stan ce,

the

d r a s t i c a l l y ,17

agrarian

ch aracter

of

th ese

so cieties

For

changed

the share of industry in the net national product

increased tremendously, and the structure of the industry altered.
Countries that once produced consumer goods, mainly food, began to
produce capital goods.

In addition, all these countries experienced a

phenomenal economic growth; according to official figures, the gross
national product during the 1950s more than doubled in the majority
of Eastern European countries.
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(Berend 1968, P.P. 80-82)

Autarky an d _ Its Consequences:
Yet, the Eastern European economists maintain that not all

these economic achievements must be attributed to the adoption of
the

autarky.

L.

Csaba

(1983),

for exam ple,

argues

that

the

impressive growth rates achieved by the socialist communities in the
period o f the 1950s and 1960s were influenced by several factors:
"Besides the undeniable m obilizing effects o f the victorious new
system, the socialist ideology, the introduction of the system of
macroeconomic planning,"

there were other factors at work; for

example agrarian over-employment, female labor and chronic w hite
and

b lu e-co llar

w orkers'

unem ploym ent

provided

an

excellent

This pan o f Europe, Berend (1968) argues, with the exception of
Czechoslovakia, preserved its agrarian character even after World War II.
After World War II about 75% of the population in the Balkan countries and
50% - 60% in Poland and Hungary derived their income from agriculture.
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untapped pool of labor which was to be used as a source of extensive
economic growth.

A major share, Csaba believes, must be attributed

to the possibilities inherent in a low starting level, as well as to the
requirem ents of the reconstruction period.
M. M. Tardos (1981) raises another issue.

He argues that a

great part o f the industrial development in small countries of Eastern
E urope in

the

accum ulated
extensive
factories

1950s was

fostered by

the

technical know ledge

earlier prior to W orld W ar U and

contact

w ith

the

W estern pow ers.

as a resu lt of
Among

nationalized in these countries, Tardos

the

first

m aintains,

were

those operating with foreign capital and technologies, at a time when
econom ic

relations

with advanced cap italist countries

flourished.

Most of these factories later proved to be among the most dynamic of
any

given

satisfacto ry

in d u stry .18
base

fo r

This technical knowledge provided a
rapid

industrial

developm ent

in

H ungary

animated by a growing domestic investment demand and by demand
from

o th er

E astern

E uropean

countries.

F or

exam ple,

after

nationalization, the MAVAG and Ganz plants were more or less easily
retooled fo r the production o f engines and freight cars m eeting
Soviet demand.

Shipbuilding had developed prior to World W ar II

and had produced river-sea and deep-sea vessels; in the 1950s it
received orders from the Soviet Union for the production o f ships

18

In Hungary, for instance, a decisive pan in the expansion o f the capital
goods industry was played by the production o f rolling stock, which had a
long history. The MAVAG and the Ganz Wagon and Machine Works had
produced engines and freight cars in large quantities during the AustroHungarian Monarchy.
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suitable

fo r

coastal

trade, in

quantities

perm itting large-scale

production unprecedented in this branch.
Tardos' belief that the industrial developm ent in
countries

of Eastern Europe was prim arily

learning

o f new

advanced technical

the small

promoted, not by the

expertise,

but

rather

by

knowledge accumulated before and during the second W orld W ar—
leads him to the conclusion that the scope and extent of industrial
developm ent

in

these

countries

was

greatly

lim ited

by

this

traditional expertise.
Tardos' conclusion directs us to a point which is more or less
shared by almost all the Eastern European Econom ists

[that is]:

despite the achievements of autarky and its concom itant policies,
they produced several negative consequences in all sectors of the
economies as w ell as in the foreign trade sector; indeed, these
policies were

imbedded with contradictions. As J. Bognar (1979)

argues, "the fact that some developm ent alternative (decision) is
inevitable and justifiable" at one time "does not save us from the
consequences" and their negative effects.
T he

heavy

em phasis

on

(Bognar 1979, P. 4)

in d u stria liz atio n ,

fo r

instance,

generated profound unbalances in the structure of the economy.
First of all, the pace of industrialization was "irrational."
1968, P. 83)19
19

(Berend

In Hungary, for example, there was a bias against

Berend (199) asserts that the first five-year plan envisaged a 210 percent
growth in industry. During the same period he maintains that almost half
of all investment was concentrated on industry, with the emphasis on the
primacy o f heavy industry, and only 13 percent went into the agricultural
sector.
Berend (1975) argues this conception o f industrialization, initiated
in the middle o f the 20th century, was based on an idea reflecting the
requisites o f the turn o f the century in regard to the structure o f the
industry and the necessity o f heavy industry.
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the agricultural sector, along with other policy measures involving
compulsory delivery of agricultural products at low prices, excessive
taxation and unrealistic pace of collectivization led to the stagnation
of this sector.

(Berend 1975 and Berend 1968)

Such stagnation, in

turn, resulted in an acute shortage of agricultural goods which hurt
and weakened the traditional export base of the country and created
"a perm anent crisis in supplying the population with its needs."
(Berend 1968, P. 83)

It is believed, therefore, that the decline in the

agricultural goods available for export caused great difficulties as the
need

for

im ports

investment.

grew

trem endously

as

a resu lt

of

intensive

Some Eastern European economists believed that the

system of central planning also produced damaging consequences.
Among the most im portant of such dam aging consequences was
"inefficient investment."

"The lack of incentive to produce for

market," these economists argue, created a complete "disinterest in
the cost of investment and consequently [led] to the overextension of
investm ent in new plants and underinvestm ent in technology and
replacem ent."
characterized

(Berend

1968, P. 84)

the production as well.

W aste and low efficiency
For the enterprises

were

interested only in fulfilling the plan, and they were not concerned
about cost
20

of production.20

Furtherm ore, the planning system

Berend (1968) argues that in fact, according to the terms o f the plan, the
value o f production could be achieved by using greater quantities of raw
materials, or more expensive ones. The fact that the most important plan
directive was fulfillment of the total planned value of production was
harmful in still another way. The enterprise did not produce all the
articles called for, but only those which could be manufactured in the
easiest way.
Superfluous quantities o f the most material-intensive articles
were produced.
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hindered technological development.

Because the enterprises were

not interested in modernizing, "the position of enterprise in the
internal market was monopolistic, and not even in foreign trade was
it exposed to the risks of competition.

The artificial price system and

the elimination of any kind of incentive for marketing formed a ring
of protection around the economy against not only the unfavorable
effects of the world market, such as major fluctuations, but against
any pressure for rationalization.”

(Berend 1968, P.P. 84-85)

The "ring of protection” led also to the technical isolation of the
Eastern European countries
Such

isolation

had

from the advanced capitalist countries.

extrem ely

harm ful

effects

for

the

sm aller

countries of Eastern Europe as far as their technological advancement
is concerned.

Their main provider of technology became the Soviet

Union and other more advanced countries of Eastern Europe, whose
growth pattern o f m anufacturing and engineering industries
not in line with the world market requirements.

were

(Tardos 1981)

The Eastern European economists furtherm ore claim that the
low

efficien cy

of

investm ent

and

characteristic of any policy of autarky.
and

in e ffic ie n c y

industrialization."

is

in h e re n t

(Berend

in

pro d u ctio n

is

the

m ajor

"Needless to say, such waste
the

1968, P. 83)

a u tarch ic

view

of

Or, the "endeavours to

produce in one country (or even a group of countries) all necessary
products that can be produced there, or whose production can be
organized through great efforts sooner or later, unavoidably lead to
low efficiency."

(Koves 1979, P. 325) This low efficiency stems from

the fact that in almost all

cases the size

of the country makes it

impossible "to utilize economies of scale, and the too wide range of
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goods produced lead to inefficiency in individual fields, in addition to
the

n eg lect

of th e

advantages

from

according to comparative advantages."

international

specialization

(Saba 1983, P. 62)

It is

therefore argued th at under the condition of autarky, on the one
hand, the production takes place on a small scale because it has to
meet only the needs of the domestic market, which in turn is limited
in its purchasing power; on the other hand, production is based on
the domestic production apparatus whose technical standards cannot
be high in all areas.

In addition, autarky cannot stimulate the use of

modern and advanced production techniques because of the small
scale of production, and also because the need to develop production
in all areas causes a dispersion of the resources for research.

As a

result the internal possibilities for raising the level of quality of
production is almost non-existent.

Furthermore, the low quality of

goods prevents the effective com petitiveness on the world market
and makes exporting difficult and consequently lim its the imports.
The insignificant size of imports does not allow a full satisfaction of
consumer needs, and as a result, the provision of goods and services
to society is considerably impaired.
for im port-substitution.

(R osati

This became a further incentive
1979)

Im port-substitution

itself,

however, led to the further dispersion of productive resources, and
in fact as it has been shown historically it in creases the import needs,
and

dem ands

a steady

rise

in

perm anent growing import needs.

exports

in

order

(Rosati 1979

to cover

the

and M andel &

M uller 1974)
It is, therefore, autarky per se which leads to the low efficiency
and crisis in foreign trade, notwithstanding that it is implemented in
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the framework of centralized planning and is accompanied with a
strong emphasis on heavy industry.

The problem, however, is that in

Eastern Europe all these policies were adopted at the same time with
the consequence of, as far as foreign trade is concerned, "weakening
of the traditional expoTt base, insufficient com petitiveness of the
exported finished goods, difficulties in pooling the necessary export
resources

under the conditions

of over-strained dom estic

conditions, a not rational enough import structure, . . . "

supply

(Bogmolov

1979, P. 306) to name only a few of the problems enumerated by the
Eastern European economists.
w hich

the

advocate

Eastern

It is the culmination of these problems

European

another form

econom ists

of econom ic

claim

incited

developm ent,

them

the

to

"outward-

looking" model of development.
The Eastern European econom ists' view on autarky and its
consequences is diam etrically opposed to that of the dependency
school.

As was discussed in the second chapter, Frank maintains that

the adoption of 'isolation policy' is one of the major reasons that the
S oviet U nion

and

E astern

E urope

can

now

participate

in

the

international division of labor on a basis which is 'remotely equal' to
that of developed capitalist countries.

(Frank, 1981)

W allerstein

also argues that autarky enabled the Soviet Union to convert itself
from a weak semi-peripheral status to "a very strong member of the
sem i-p erip h ery

and

w ould

(W allerstein 1974a, P. 41)

begin

to

seek

fu ll

co re

status."

240

,,Q lltw a r^ ^ o o k in g ,, M odel o f D evelopm ent:
The Eastern European econom ists maintain that by the late
1960s, it became clear that "the price of autarky is too high and not
worth ’paying’.”

(Pasztor, P. 90)

These economists believe that by

the late 1960s, changes in the following objective factors led to the
creation

of

condition

in

which

abandoning

autarky

becam e

a

necessity:
—Labor shortage
—D ifficulty

of intra-technology

transfer among

the Eastern

E uropean
countries
—Acceleration of the scientific and technological development
—Shortage of raw material and energy
—Difficulty of exporting 'low quality' goods among the Eastern
European countries.
The policy of autarky can only be consistently maintained if all
the factors of production are available dom estically, and it was
precisely this element which was changing.

By the late 1960s and

early 1970s the sources of extensive development, a characteristic of
the

policy

E xtensive

of autarky, were exhausted.
developm ent

production factors:

met with

(Koves

difficulties

from

1979, P. 324)
the

side

of

first of all the labor shortage almost rendered it

im possible to continue the policy of extensive economic growth.
(Kovacs 1976, P. 54 and Nyiri 1982, P. 19)
has changed to overemployment."

Indeed, "full employment

There were no longer any labor

surpluses to a point that indeed in "the dynamic sectors and in
services 'anticipatory investments' have to be im plem ented in the
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interest of releasing the necessary labor."

(Bognar 1976, P. 229)

In

addition, in the production of any given product in Eastern Europe,
an unjustifiably high amount of labor was consumed, which under
the condition of exhaustion of labor reserves, further necessitated
the call for fast technological progress and substitution of modem
technology for manual labor and inefficient production techniques.
(Bognar 1979, P. 5 and P. 10)
M oreover, the conditions of intra-technology transfer among
the East European countries became less favorable (Kadar 1983, P.
308), if not

impossible.

reg ard

m odernized

to the

(Csaba

1983, P. 55)This was mainly true in

tech n o lo g y ,

fo r

tran sfer

becam e

particularly difficult basically because of a
"levelling up of technical standards, the large extent of parallel
fe a tu re s in
in d u s tr ia l- te c h n o lo g ic a l
s tr u c tu re s ,
th e
underdeveloped state of in ter-en terp rise relations and
of
technical transfer capacities indispensable for an efficient
cooperation in technology-intensive activities, the financial
limits to the trade in technology, and the difficulties of having
the technical m odernization and q u alitativ e developm ent
recognized in prices, it is n o t ju stifie d to expect that
cooperation in the technology-intensive fields can be promoted
considerably." (Kadar 1983, P. 308)
These factors,
in

along with the "low efficiency" of production inherent

the policy of autarky, demanded the raising of productivity

finding

by

additional sources of supply of modern technology, and

creation of export capacities in comformity

with the import demand

of the new markets.
According to the Eastern European economists, the need to
acquire modern

technology

from

W estern

advanced

countries

is

further enhanced in the period of "acceleration of the scientific and
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technical development."
productio n
relations.

has

They argue that theoretically any efficient

alw ays

dem anded

ex ten siv e

w orld

econom ic

However, they maintain that when the scientific and

technical development was less dynamic, it was justified to assume
that keeping pace with technical progress particularly if limited to
only

a

few

transaction.

b ran ch es—is

p o ssib le

through

in d iv id u al

im port

Such actions, they argue, did not require constant and

regular economic relations with the West; nor did they require
maintaining direct and permanent production relations with Western
companies.

Economic relations could be restricted for domestic or

foreign political and economic considerations for a short or long
period

of

tim e

w ith o u t

technological progress.

fear

of

any

perm anent

dam age

to

That was indeed the situation in the 1930s

when the Soviet import substitution policy of the first five-year plan
period was followed by a decline in trade relations.

Practically the

same conditions occurred in the period of the Cold War, when the
international political

situation

and W estern

em bargo

led

to

an

almost total halt in the trade relations between Eastern Europe and
the West.

(Koves 1978, P. 116)

The situation became different by the late 1960s and early
1970s.

The acceleration of technological and scientific development

entailed a perm anent renewal o f economic structure and product
patterns, and made the above mentioned approach obsolete.

Since

the most modem equipment purchased today becomes out of date
tom orrow,

only

the

econom ic relations
progress.

establishm ent
with

of long

the W est could

term

and

perm anent

guarantee technological

A dynam ic increase in im ports of m achinery became
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necessary because it was not possible any more to import just a
"prototype" which would then be adapted to home conditions and
m anufactured accordingly.

Such

an act requires

tim e and is a

complicated task which may lead to uneconomic manufacturing and
to

the

"conservation

of

backw ardness"

(Koves

1978,

P.

116)

Therefore, the acceleration of scientific and technical development,
coinciding with the lim ited possibility of intra-technology transfer
among the Eastern European countries, became another factor in
indicating

a

need fo r

establishm ent of econom ic

ties

with

the

advanced capitalist countries.
Accelerated W estern Technological and economic development
made them [the socialist countries] realize that they could
maintain the dynamism of growth and could keep pace with
the scientific and technological rev o lu tio n only if they
encourage the development o f trade with nonsocialist countries
also. (Koves 1981, P. 116)
The need for meeting the requirem ents of the technical and
scientific revolution made it necessary to ensure the inflow of
technological processes, technical experiences and know how
which can be taken over from the Western countries . . . by
norm alizing and developing the economic relations with the
capitalist countries. (Kozma 1974, P. 344)
There were other indications

that the sources

of extensive

economic growth were being depleted in the socialist countries.

The

E astern

raw

E uropean

countries,

in

m eeting

their

dem and

for

materials and energy, were facing more and more constraints, partly
because of physical lim its to supply within the region, and partly
because the world-wide increase in prices of these factors made
tempting their exports to the non-socialist regions for the purpose of
earning hard currency.

(Kadar 1983, P. 308)

Given the fact that in
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these countries the energy and raw material inputs of almost every
product are high, the need for an improvement in efficiency became
even more urgent.

(Kadar 1983, P. 307)

The reduction in energy

and raw m aterial consum ption, through the em ployment o f more
efficient production techniques, is not ju st due to economizing in the
costs of production, but because "no body on the world market," not
even the socialist countries, are w illing to purchase "equipments
'devouring' energy, fuel, or raw materials."
Furtherm ore,

the

(Bognar 1979, P. 10)

sale o f products not matching

the

world

market standards became increasingly difficult on the markets of
socialist countries

and within the country itself,

provide unlimited marketing possibilities.

which

used to

(Kovacs 1976, P. 54)

The

Soviet Union, hitherto a secure market for the increasing industrial
output of the Eastern European countries, sought from its partners
major innovative improvements in various fields.

(Tardos 1981, P.

255)

The same pressure was being applied by the consumers in

these

countries,

w ho

were

dem anding

better

quality

and

more

diversified products.

(Koves 1978, P. 120)

European countries

m ight have encountered realization problems.

(Kovacs 1976, P.P. 54-5)

For the first time Eastern

Consequently, as a result of internal social

pressures, raising the population's standard of living and providing
them with more and better consumers' goods became a "major policy
task."

(Koves 1981, P. 19)

particip atio n

in

Brezhnev's words:
vastly

the

The policy which itself required intensive

international

division

of

labor,

in

Leonid

"the scientific-technical revolution progress . . .

increases people's needs

and dem and, and necessitates

a
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growing degree of international division of labor."

(cited in Koves

1978, P. 115)
A. Koves (1975, P. 312) argues that by 1971 it became quite
clear that increasing the intra CMEA21

trade and o f co-operation to

higher levels requires more outward looking to the world market.

It

became common know ledge that for the socialist countries, intra
CMEA trade, and trade with the developed capitalist countries could
be treated not as alternatives but as two complementary processes
which reinforce each other.

The growth in trade of machinery as

w ell as consum er goods and foodstuffs between CMEA countries
could

be

significantly

enhanced

by

im ports

of

m achinery

and

materials from the West.
In the late 1960s the culmination of all these difficulties was
manifested in the slow down in the growth of national income in the
Eastern European countries.

(Csaba 1983, P. 54)

In order to combat

these difficulties and to increase the rate of grow th, the Eastern
European economists advocated "intensive economic development."
The main task o f the present stage in the CMEA countries'
developm ent is not as much to accelerate the quantitative
growth of the production apparatus and the scientific and
te c h n ic a l p o te n tia l as
to im p ro v e
th e ir q u a lita tiv e
characteristics, the balance in th eir developm ent, and their
much more efficient use. (Bogmolov 1979b, P. 8)

Founded in 1949, the CMEA (formerly known as the COMECON) now has the
following active members: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Vietnam and
the Soviet Union.
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Such

a

developm ent

policy

is

only

achievable

through

international cooperation and participation in the internal division of
labor
In the past, when economic growth was m ostly based on
sources like the increase in employment and in the volume of
investments, the requirements [of] machinery imports . . . from
the W est—emerged less sharply.
However, when possibilities
o f ex ten siv e developm ent are exhausted and econom ic
developm ent depends more and m ore on the successful
im provem ent of quality, efficiency and productivity, it w ill
becom e m ore and m ore im p o rta n t th at te ch n o lo g ical
development and the raising of efficiency should be promoted
also through the import of up-to-date technology, . . . (Koves
1979, P. 324) See also (Dobazi and Inotai 1981).
Therefore, according to the Eastern European economists, the
requirem ent for increasing the standard of living of the population
and

m ore

im portantly

growth—under the

the

requirem ent

conditions where

the

for

the

sources

acceleration
for

of

the further

extensive growth had been exhausted—made the "greater and more
many

sided participation

imperative.

in the international division

of labor"

Only through such participation are the "technological

development, increase in efficiency, the modernization of economic
(and

com m odity)

growth”—achievable.

stru ctu re"—the

basic

foundation

of

intensive

(Koves 1975, pp. 311-312)

In the stage of intensive development when the limits to the
volum e of investm ent and to increasing em ploym ent are
closely discernable in every European CMEA country, the role
of technological process, of higher productivity, of moderizing
the econom ic structure and, along w ith these, of W estern
imports for the purpose of modernization, increase among the
sources of growth. It is less and less possible to rely on the
sources available at home or in the CMEA region for increasing
efficiency, in investment policies, in the supply of materials
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and parts to the ever-growing volume and ever more modern
and diversified production, in supplying the population with
industrial consum er goods. . .
In other words, increased
participation in the international division of labor, o p e n in g
towards the world-economv. was put on each CMEA country's
agenda bv the requirements of domestic social and economic
d ev elo p m en t. (Koves 1981, P. 117)
Such an argum ent is obviously different from that of the
dependency school.

One can recall Frank's b elief that economic

relations with the West can only bring harm to the Eastern European
countries.

According to Frank, the ill-effects of economic relations

with the W est are tremendous.

They range from importing inflation

to im porting capitalism itself.22

According to Eastern European

economists at the same period, some changes were happening in the
W estern powers' attitudes toward the Eastern European countries.
Western powers gradually came to the conclusion that the "Cold War
strategy

was

underm ining

the

very

basis

of

norm al

relations

between peoples and countries and was impeding the development
of their internal economy.”

(Bogdanov and Dustal 1975, P. 58)

The

end of the post war boom revealed the damages resulting from the
economic blockade of the Eastern European countries.

However, the

change in the W estern powers' stand toward the developm ent of
economic relations with the socialist countries was mainly influenced
by "the general change in forces in the world arena in favor of the
forces of peace and socialism ," which in turn is based on the
advantages o f the socialist economic system ;” and the ability of
Eastern
22

E uropean

countries

to

achieve

See the first chapter o f this dissertation.

great

successes

in

their
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economic progress in a historically short period of time.
and Dustal 1975, P. 59)

(Bogdanov

Consequently, remarkable progress toward

normalization o f political relations between East and West became
possible

at

th at

tim e.

A nother factor

responsible

for

such

normalization was the fact that the socialist countries became able to
maintain and increase their defense capacities.

A balance of military

force was achieved between East and West, a balance which is a pre
condition of peace.

(Bognar 1979, P. 5)

Such a development "served

to fulfill the primary conditions of changing the role of foreign
sector" in Eastern Europe.
long lasting

process of

(Samulewicz 1984 P. 257)

detente is indispensable in providing an

atmosphere for long term and interdepenent links."
P. 124)

Because "the

(Zagorski 1981,

The policy of detente is also desirable for the development

countries because the most important aim of these countries is a "fast
and smooth

developm ent

at home, and the establishm ent of such

in tern atio n al

econom ic

development,"

(Bognar 1979, P. 5)

conditions"

w hich

"w ill

prom ote

this

Besides the changes in the internal and external conditions,
th ere

were

m ore

gen eral

co n sid eratio n s

w hich

also

com pel

international cooperation:
The g ig an tic scale of m odern pro d u ctio n req u ires the
mobilization of m aterial, financial, and human resources that
are more and more beyond the potential of individual national
economies, even the most powerful.
At the same time, it is specifically the latest equipment and
technology that determine the level of the social productivity
of labor and the corresponding ability to withstand competition
on the world market. In this regard integrative processes are
developing in countries with the same socioeconomic system,
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on the one hand, and on the other extensive participation in the
universal division of labor is becoming an objective necessity
fo r all countries.
In other words, the rates o f economic
development of each of the two competing systems are greatly
influenced by the degree of their interaction. (Bogdanov and
Dostal 1975, P.P. 56-57)
Furtherm ore, the necessity
scientific

and

of resolving problem s caused by

technological

problem s

dem ands

the

the

cooperation

between the industrially developed countries and socialist countries.
Such problems include the development of hitherto unutilized energy
sources

and the

environment, etc.

resources

of the

ocean,

the

protection

of the

(Bogdanov and Dostal 1975, P. 57)

4.6. Eastern Europe and the International D iv isio n , ofLLabor:

4.6.1.

T he

E conom ic

R e latio n

w ith

the

A dvanced

C a p ita list

C o u n trie s :
In the late 1960s, it was mainly the smaller CMEA countries,
more dependent on foreign trade, which increased their trade with
the W est rapidly.

Their imports grew strongly, and under conditions

of prosperity in the West markets for sales of their export items also
expanded markedly.
exporting

Moreover, terms of trade for CMEA countries

foodstuffs

and

finished

products

developed

favorably.

With relatively stable (slow ly growing) prices and fixed rates of
exchange, Western sales could be planned as safely as sales to other
Eastern European countries.

(Koves 1981, P. 116)

Later, in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union also joined the ranks
of other Eastern

European

countries

and since then

"has been
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exploiting the inherent advantage of the division of labor more fully
than ever before in order to resolve the problems of raising the
efficiency of its production."

(Goldina 1984, P. 3)

By that time the

countries of Eastern Europe were covering up to 40% of their total
imports of food, 25% of their raw materials, machinery, and transport
equipment, and over 40% of their imports of chemical products from
developed capitalist countries.
58)

(Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P.

A t the same period, in individual years, the Soviet Union's

exports covered, for example, 70% of Finland's requirements for oil
and petroleum products and 60% of its requirem ent for timber;
almost 70% of Sweden's requirement for oil and petroleum products
and 70% of its requirement for chromium ore; 25% of Great Britain's
need for nickel; 44% of Austria's need for pig iron; 40% of France's
requirement for chromium ore and 35% of its need for fuel oil; 60%
of Greece's requirement for pig iron, 38% of its requirement for sawn
wood.

(Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 60)
Such an increase in the role of the DCs in the foreign trade of

Eastern European countries, according the A. Koves (1975), proves
that the "international division of labor is increasingly interpreted . . .
as a long-term lasting factor of economic growth, and no longer as
something marginal and complimentary, used to overcome particular,
though important, bottlenecks, or tensions that might occur here and
there, . .

(Koves 1975, P. 312)
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4 .6 .I .I . D ifferent Types

of Econom ic R elations with the PC s

and Their Advantages for East and West:
The economic relations between East and West have not been
lim ited

to

only

the

conventional

trade

agreem ents;

they

increasingly included a broad spectrum of economic ties.

have

In addition

to trade, new forms and methods of economic cooperation "that go
far beyond the framework of commodity and trade relations" have
becom e more and more widespread.

And their economic effects

have been manifested "not in the sphere of commodity exchange, not
in circulation, but in

particular

. . .

on

m aterial

production."

A ccording to Eastern European econom ists, these new
m ethods or Industrial

forms and

Cooperation A greem ents (henceforth

ICAs)

help not only to increase the socialist countries' national income, but
to influence their scientific and technical progress; they include such
activities as industrial cooperation on a compensatory basis, creation
of joint enterprises, agreements on reciprocal participation in various
projects in third countries, etc.

(Ivashkin and Pachenko 1980,P. 62)

ICAs represent "the highest degree of internationalization" allowed in
Eastern Europe.

(Cieslik 1983, P. 69)

In the words of two Soviet economists;
The 1970s are characterized by the strengthening of economic
relations between socialist and capitalist countries.
While in
the past socialist countries used only their available export
resources, at the present time they are expanding on a planned
basis the production of com m odities especially intended to
satisfy the needs o f the markets of W estern countries.
New
forms o f collaboration are placing economic relations between
socialist and capitalist countries on a stable, long-term footing.
The jo in t construction of enterprises, the conclusion of largescale com pensatory deals, specialization and integration of
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production, the adoption of a coordinated technical policy in the
production of certain technical items, and the amalgamation of
research effo rts in the elaboration of individual urgent
p ro b lem s—all these factors open the way to m utually
advantageous collaboration based on the enjoym ent of the
advantages offered by the international division of labor.
(Bogdanov and Dostal 1975, P. 60)
The Eastern European

econom ists unanim ously believe that

ICAs provide excellent opportunities for the transfer of technology to
the Eastern European countries.
im portance,

because

these

Such an element is of considerable

countries

are

in

need

of

im ported

technology at this stage of their development, when development is
based on intensive growth, and because of shortcomings inherited
from the previous strategy.23
A side from

the im port of technology,24 these

econom ists

believe that there are other advantages associated with industrial
cooperation agreements.

The ICAs guarantee higher volumes of

trade, raise the productivity of labor and decrease the production
costs

per

unit

o f product;

in

addition,

they

bring

about

the

modernization of production and higher standards of final products.
23

As the extensive growth factors (employment, investment) are depleted,
the socialist economy begins to encounter barriers, which can be
overcome only by activating inherent human creative forces and boosting
management efficiency, for example, by more extensive use o f the
achievements o f science and technology and by closer ties with the
international division o f labor.
This leads to the conclusion that entering
the intensive growth phase—creates in the socialist economy objective
preconditions for increasing the demand for imported technology and for
increasing the role o f foreign technology in the solution to problems of
national development." (Rapacki 1982, p. 62)

24 It is argued that the transfer of technology in the context o f ICAs is not
transfer o f "a product but an indispensable 'factor' intended to initiate
further effects, such as product quality, economies o f scale, and the
creation o f new markets growing out o f active and effective cooperation."
(Kozinski 1981, p. 142)
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Moreover, the ICAs by increasing the productivity and efficiency of
production,

solve

the

problem s

of

insufficient

materials in the Eastern European countries.

labor

and

raw

(J. Nykryn 1979, P.P.

246-7) ICAs according to J. Kozinski, (1981, P.P. 142-143) are the
most important vehicle in the introduction of up to date technology
in these countries.

Furthermore, ICAs can improve the balance-of-

payments of the Eastern European countries directly by providing
W estern help to produce the kinds of goods that are stable for hard
currency

and

to

m arket

these

products

in

the

"hard

currency

areas.”25
The establishment of joint enterprises in the Eastern European
countries with the participation of Western firms is another specific
aspect o f economic cooperation between East and West.

The legal

frameworks and economic terms of these organizations differ from
country to country.

What makes these organizations so significant is

that the W estern firms and in particular the MNCs are directly
involved

in

the process

of production in

the E astern

european

co u n trie s.26
25

E. Zagorski (1981, p. 127) believes that ICAs are more effective when they
give each partner a chance to start new lines o f production that may have
been too expensive for each without cooperation or when they are used in
lowering the costs o f production through application o f modem highly
efficient technologies and economies o f scale. Lower production costs can
strengthen the competitve position o f each partner in local as well as in
foreign markets.

26

A Gordos (1978) believes MNCs are usually chosen by the socialist countries,
because they "can satisfy expectations of" these countries "towards the
import o f technology." He argues that the MNCs subordinate their entire
activity to their market strategy which includes extensive control of
markets and may exclude profit maximization as their primary goal. It
follows that market expansion is the primary goal of the MNCs who get
involved in establishment o f joint ventures (henceforth J.V.s) in the
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The Eastern European economists believe J.V.s bring not only
foreign

cap ital

but

also

technology,

the

tw o

m ost

im portant

requirements o f intensive growth, into the socialist countries.

The

flow of capital through J.V.s is considered to be very important by Z.
Krasznai and M. Laki (1982, P. 150).

They argue the increased

participation of foreign capital mitigates the scarcity of capital in the
receiving countries.

Furthermore, the foreign banks are more willing

to lend money to countries where foreign investment is allowed.

The

establishment of J.V.s, therefore, indirectly also helps to increase the
stock

o f capital

of these

countries.

They

advantages to the establishm ent of J.V.s.

attribute

additional

They argue the J.V.s,

besides furthering the adaptions of modem technology in the Eastern
European

countries, will

help these

countries

to im prove

their

international balance of payments mainly because the J.V .s enable
domestic manufacturing of several products which were previously
imported.

This moderates, on the one hand, the lack of equilibrium

in the balance o f trade on the import side and, on the other hand,
socialist countries. (Ibid., p. 408) On the side o f the socialist countries, the
participation o f MNCs in the establishment o f J.V.s leads to the exchange of
"intellectual products" and the transfer o f technology. This line o f
argument is similar to Evrawicki's (1979) presented in the second chapter,
who argues that socialist countries favor MNCs over other Western firms.
It seems that the Eastern European economists suggest that the MNCs in
general are more suited for any kind o f ICAs, because these corporations
are "well provided with capital and modem technology” and are in a
position to satisfy most of the requirements of the ICAs. (Zagorski 1981, p.
128) and (Zurawicki 1975, p. 109) Also, these economists believe that the
MNCs do not give the Erst priority to gaining a majority-share in the joint
enterprises. This argument is in contrast to that o f some of the Neo
classical economists' discussed in Chapter (2). In fact, E. Zagorski believes
the "greatest obstacle to equity joint ventures" stems from the
inconvertibility o f the Eastern European countries' currently and
"subsequently, from exchange rate difficulties."
And "property
ownership" is not a decisive factor for doing business through J.V.s (Ibid.,
p. 123)
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furthers the realization of efficient import substitution, that mitigates
the pressure even for uneconomical exports."
151)

J.V.s also

help to strengthen

(Laki 1982, P.P. 150-

the general organizational and

technological discipline of Eastern European enterprises.
In

general, therefore,

Eastern

European econom ists

highly

value and praise any aspect of the socialist countries’ economics
relation with the advanced countries.
they

argue

that it

is

im portant

In regard to foreign trade,
because

it makes

significant

contributions in carrying out the main task o f raising the living
standard of E astern European people

through

equipment used in production of consumer goods.

im porting

food or

(Klochek 1979, P.

11)
Imports from the advanced capitalist countries are appreciable
factors in the modernizing of leading branches of industries and in
the implementation of large investment projects, to mention only a
few.

The exports to DCs, apart from ensuring the bulk o f foreign

exchange earnings to pay for the necessary imports, contribute to the
rise of technological levels of production and to improvement in the
quality of products of "not only enterprise working directly for
exports but also within a wide scope of related branches."

(Shmelev

1979, P.P. 315-316)
It is argued that taking advantage of economic integration with
the DCs is even more crucial for the sm aller Eastern European
countries, because
econom ic

these countries at the present stage o f their

developm ent are

constrained

more

than

other Eastern

European countries by their limited domestic resources and by their
domestic accumulation.

It is no wonder that these countries are
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strongly in favor o f acquiring and implementing a percentage of their
total investment with the aid of external sources, and increasing the
share o f foreign technology and machinery in their total investments.
(Simai 1977, P. 2)
E uropean

countries

It is further argued that the sm aller Eastern
in

th e

process

of th eir

developm ent

have

produced unnecessarily and inefficiently a broad range o f products,
and if instead o f importing the m ost modern technology from the
DCs, they decide to continue their production dom estically

and

’’widen the any w ay too broad range of domestic products," they will
face the unfavorable condition of "diminishing efficiency," and their
modernization of production pattern w ill be impeded.

(Koves 1979,

p. 332)
T he

Eastern

European

econom ists,

w hile

insisting

on

the

benefits of the socialist countries' participation in the international
division of labor, also m ention that such participation is "mutually
beneficial" and the DCs also benefit from their economic relations
with the

socialist countries; (Bogmolov

econom ic

cooperation betw een countries

system yields a mutual economic effect."

1979, P. 305) and "the
of

two opposite

social

(Bogmolov 1983, P. 24)

Such benefits can be attained at both Macro and enterprise (Micro).
It is argued that due to the Eastern European countries' "stable,
crisis free and smooth developing markets," the W estern countries
are able through the establishment o f trade relations w ith them to
prom ote

the

"technological

functioning

industrial production" in the West.

of

leading

branches

of

In addition, the imports of

Eastern European countries from the DCs provide new sources of
income for the W estern enterprises and more importantly guarantee
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a long period of employment for the workers of these countries.
Such economic relations can significantly attenuate the im pact of
economic crisis on the DCs.27
The
relations

W estern
w ith

channels.

the

(Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 61)

com panies
Eastern

can

benefit

European

from

countries

their

econom ic

through

different

Besides such factors as cheap labor and tariff reductions

which they can find in most of the capitalist developing countries,
these companies face smaller political and com mercial risks when
they deal with the Eastern European countries.

(Gordos 1978, P. 408)

After all, the foreign trade organizations of these countries are not
faced with the threat of bankruptcy and/or being swallowed up by
more powerful competitors.

The reliability of business relations with

these organizations is guaranteed by the socialist countries.
1975, P. 5)

(Voinov

In addition, the reliability of the socialist countries to a

certain degree may diminish the market problem that the Western
com panies encounter and create the possibility of expanding "the
scale of production and increase its effectiveness in the face of
merciless competitive struggle in the capitalist economy."

(Voinov

1975, P. 4)
The ICAs also provide an excellent source o f considerable
com m erical gain for the W estern com panies.

The compensation

agreem ents, for instance, guarantee a long range

supply of the

necessary raw materials, and other industrial products and result in

27 According to V. Ivashkin and V. Panchenko (1980, p. 61) the volume o f EastWest trade in 1980 provided employment for at least two million persons at
enterprises belonging to firms and companies in the DCs.
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long-range orders for machinery equipment and industrial products.
(Ivashkin and Panchenko 1980, P. 71)
w ithin

The delivery of the products

the context of com pensation deals

may be follow ed

by

delivery of products outside of these deals and further enhance the
benefit obtained by the W estern companies who seek markets for
their products28
Once

(Nykryn 1979, P. 247)

again

we

w itness

the

sharp

co n trast

betw een

the

argument of the dependency school and that of the Eastern European
economists.

While the dependency school maintains that as a result

of socialist countries' economic relations with the West, only the W est
will benefit, Eastern European economists insist that such economic
relations will produce mutual benefit.

4.6.1.2.

The

W o rld

M a rk e t

The
expansion

A d v erse

E astern

C o n seq u en ces

of

Q p e n in g -u n

European econom ists m aintain

that

to

th e

the rapid

of economic relations between East European countries

and the DCs in the first half of the 1970s confirms the fact that the
"two socially different world systems are developing not in isolation
from one another but in a clear interaction with one another . . ."
(Bogdonov and Dustal 1975, P. 61)
one

may

countries
28

expect

that

If such argument is true, then

these econom ists w ould

cannot escape

the

consequences

of

admit

that

their

adverse econom ic

The Eastern European economists' insistence on the benefits the West
derived from East-West economic cooperation is in a way an attempt to
combat the "reactionary circles" in the West who advertise the one-sided
advantage o f cooperations for Eastern Europe. (Bogdonov and Dustal 1975,
p. 64)
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conditions in DCs.

Indeed, they believe that to some degree such

adverse conditions have affected Eastern Europe and refer to the
period of the mid 1970s when the "objective conditions for the
cooperation
change,"

of countries

with

different social

system

began

to

and the new trends in the world economy proved to have

"far-reaching consequences and eventually affected the interests of
the

Eastern

European

countries."29

(Shmelev 1979, P. 316 and

Bogomolov 1979c, P. 305)
The m ost drastic

m anifestation

of these

changes

was

the

emergence of recession in the West and a general decline in economic
growth of the developed countries.

Such recession was accompanied

by high inflation; this meant not only increases in the cost of energy
and raw materials, but a steep rise in the interest rates.30

29

Besides

It is inconvenient that the appearance o f requirement rooted in the
intensive period o f Hungarian economic development coincided with the
stagnation o f world economy, with the troubles of its monetary and
institutional system and the sudden changes in price relations.
(197, p. 57)

One of the significant aspects of these developments was an increase in the
interest rate. In the first half of the 1970s international liquidity was high,
and consequently credit was relatively cheap and easily available.
Domestically, the period o f intensive growth requires increasing use of
efficient, modem technology.
Yet possibilities o f financing modernization
of production apparatus from internal savings were limited in Eastern
Europe due to the commitment o f raising the population's standard of
living. (Samulewicz 1984, p. 258) Therefore, in that period, both internal
and external factors were conducive to obtaining credit. Hence, one of the
cornerstones o f the compensation deals became reliance on Western credit.
However, the increase in the interest rates in the second half o f the 1970s
was among the factors which led to the slow down o f economic cooperation
o f East and West and to the deteriorating balance o f payments o f some of the
Eastern European countries.
Some Eastern European economists believe
that the application o f high rates o f interest on the credit issued to the
socialist countries is unjustified, because such rates are dictated by the
internal problems o f the capitalist countries.
The businesses conducting
relations with the socialist countries are advised to seek Western
governments' subsidies for development o f credit relations with the
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the inflation, the instability of the international m onetary system
was further enhanced by the introduction of floating exchange rates.
A ll

these

developm ents

had

im portant

effects

on

the

E astern

European countries' policy of intensive growth through introduction
of modem technology, improvement of efficiency, and quality mainly
through integration into the world market.

(Bogomolov 1979, P.P.

205-6; Shmelev 1979, P.P. 316-317; Koves 1981, P.P. 118-119)
In
protect

addition, the advanced capitalist countries,
their

protectionism.

recession-hit industries,

resorted

to

in

the

order to
policy

of

"The policy of trade liberalization" turned into "one of

'neomercantilism;' 'new protectionism' . . . "

(Golding, P. 12)

The

protectionism made it extremely difficult for any country to increase
its participation in the international division of labor.
P. 113)

(Kossut 1981,

M oreover, the DCs increasingly em ployed discrim inatory

measures against Eastern European products.

"[T]he capitalist states,

expressly violating the Helsinki accords, practice and even enhance
tariff and non-tariff discrim ination
exports."

(Bogomolov

against the CMEA

1983, P. 29)31

countries'

As a result, the Eastern

European countries were faced with serious obstacles in increasing
their exports.

The opposition of the "reactionary" elements in the

W est to any trade agreements between East and W est led to the

socialist countries because socialist countries can agree only with a
reasonable level o f interest. (Bogdonov and Dostal 1975, p. 69)
The Eastern European economists like to add that these restrictions do not
reflect solely the strained market situation.
They rather reflect the
protectionist tendencies o f Western countries in general. (Mujzel 1979, p.
419)
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imposition of special non-tariff restrictions on the socialist countries'
imports in various DCs.
Dostal 1975, P. 62)

(Bogdanov 1983, P. 30)

(Bogdanov and

Such restrictions, of course, adversely affected

the balance of payments of the East European countries.
Inflation in the West also contributed to foreign trade tensions
and indebtedness of the socialist countries.

Due to inflation, their

imports grew at a higher rate than expected, and the growth of their
exports

was

not

able

to keep

pace.

(K oves

1981, P.

119)

Consequently, the rapid growth of trade with the West took place
with the dynamic of imports considerably exceeding that of exports
causing
countries.

the

accum ulation

of

significant

trad e

deficits

by

the

(Koves 1979, P. 327)

The changes in relative international prices did not affect all
the socialist countries identically.

The Soviet Union, due to its huge

purchasing power and the strategic importance o f its exports, proved
to be less vulnerable to
and the policies adopted

the changes in Western economic conditions,
in reaction to them.

The smaller countries

of Eastern Europe, in contrast, proved to be more susceptible to the
W estern economic policy measures.

(Kador 1982, P. 324)

The

Eastern European economists are, however, quick to argue that such
susceptibility to the W estern economic conditions and their policy
measures must be sought in the internal conditions of the Eastern
European countries.

Therefore, many of the problems encountered

by these countries as a result of their economic relations with the
West stem from their internal economic structures and not from the
external conditions.

The Western economic situations, their political

pressures, etc. certainly affect the socialist countries, but by no
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means can determ ine or direct the economic conditions of these
c o u n trie s.32

To improve their international position and to reduce

and eventually wipe out the adverse consequences of the economic
relations with the West, the East European countries must implement
econom ic

refo rm s

and

in te n sify

th e ir

p a rtic ip a tio n

in

the

international division of labor.

4.6.1.3.

The

Internal

" S tru ctu ral”

Problem s

of

Eastern

Europe:
The Eastern European economists do not deny that as a result
of East-W est economic relations

the Eastern

European countries

become vulnerable to external conditions, but such a vulnerability,
according to them, is not as are important as the benefits derived
from these relations.

B. Kadar, (1982) for example, argues that

The increased dependence on the world market . . . has created
an objective material base for foreign trade relations to serve
power policy interests to a much greater extent than before,
since, in countries sensitive to foreign trade, an unexpected
closure of either markets or sources of supply may force the
affected trading partners to engage in costly substitution
programs. (Kadar 1982, P. 335)
Consequently,

he

believes

the

foreign

strategic instrum ent for influencing

trade

has

turned

into

a

international pow er relations.

He cites, for example, the Carter administration's imposition of the
grain

em bargo

on

the

Soviet Union

in

1980

and

the

Reagan

This is another argument which is in complete opposition to that of the
dependency school.
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adm inistration's restriction of exports of technology to the Soviet
Union in late 1981.33
The presence of
political pressure,
experience . . .
decisions do not
1982, P. 336)
He argues

Kadar, however, maintains that
the power policy intentions and the use of
is undeniable in East-W est relation. But the
call attention to the fact that government
automatically imply implementation."
(Kadar

that trends

in

actual

trade

often

outweigh

political

considerations of the traders; for instance, despite such restrictions,
exports to the Soviet Union increased faster than the total exports of
the OECD.34

The Western companies, interested in exploiting the

increased purchasing power in the Soviet Union which resulted from
the rise in the price of crude oil, were not willing to give up the
Soviet market.

Kadar admits the smaller countries of Eastern Europe

are more sensitive to the political pressures and the domestic policies
of the Western countries.35
Many other experts of East-W est economic relations, Kadar
argues, call attention to the strong cyclical fluctuation and to the
33

Following American pressures in January 1982, the NATO Commission,
coordinating exports o f strategic goods to the Socialist countries, ordered a
stricter control o f exports. The resolution was a compromise; Western
Europe and Japan resisted U.S. pressure, and only imposed restrictions on
the export o f most modem technology.
34
Kadar asserts that it is true that in the mid 1970s the growth rate o f Soviet
imports o f engineering products gradually diminished.
But such a decrease
"is not necessarily a consequence o f export restrictions, but reflects to a
considerable extent the structural changes in the Soviet import pattern,
the above average dynamics of the imports o f foodstuff and other
agricultural products." (Ibid., p. 336)
35

Z. Krasznai • M. Laki 1982 (p. 153) also argue that although the Western
endeavor to limit exports to socialist countries is never taken from the
agenda in the West, the more diversified the sources o f technology imports
are, the more Western firms are involved in this relationship, the less
sensitive this field will be to politics.
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sensitivity of such relations to the Western business cycles.

Kadar

believes that the growth rates of East-W est trade, however, show
such fluctuations which exceed those of either world trade or the
trade of OECD countries.

The fluctuations in East-W est trade,

therefore, cannot be explained simply by the phenomena of market
anarchy,

since they

are much stronger than

business cycles of the market economy.

the

swings

of the

(Kadar 1982, P. 338)

Nor

can they be explained by the foreign trade policy discrimination of
Western Europe, because the import policy dispreferences of these
countries against the four industrialized South East Asian countries
are stronger than those against Eastern European countries.

In spite

of such dispreferences, the exports of these four countries to Western
Europe

expanded

at a faster rate

than

the

exports

of Eastern

European countries to the West.36
Kadar, along with other Eastern European economists following
the

doctrine

of

openness,

believes

that

m ost o f

the

problem s

associated with East-W est trade relations m ust be sought inside of
the socialist countries and in their "structural features," not in the
external

conditions.37

At this point one can easily observe that the

dependency school, discussed in the second chapter, tends to ignore
36

J. Szita (1974) also argues that the argument that the impediment to the
development of East-West trade is discrimination imposed by the Western
countries is misleading. It is misleading because it diverts attention from
other problems whose solution requires efforts from socialist countries.

37

Emphasizing the external problems will, according to J. Szita (1974), "often
divert attention towards questions which are not in line with the most
important problems o f the development o f East-West trade, and then they
are likely to distract attention and efforts into the wrong direction." (Ibid.,
p. 283)
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these internal factors.
argue that studying

However, the Eastern European economists
these internal 'structural factors' is of vital

importance for understanding East-W est economic relations.
The Eastern European economists believe that the development
of economic relations with the W est requires reacting to the sudden
changes in the w orld economy.

However, it is argued that the

structure of East European econom ies, the weak points of their
production

structure,

including

unsatisfactory

q u ality

lev el

of

production, and the lack of flexibility and poor initiative of their
industrial and trade organizations do not allow them to m eet the
requirem ent of reacting to the fluctuations of the world economy.
(Kovals 1976, P. 57; Veress 1974, P. 336; Mujzel 1979, P. 420)

The

majority of these problem s is attributed to the policy of autarky
which was the dominant policy for decades in these countries, and
the system of central planning and m anagem ent's
38

W. Samulewicz (1984, p. 260), for instance, argues that the Eastern European
countries' "inability to produce enough goods o f sufficient quality" can be
traced back to the system o f central planning. The central economic
authorities, he maintains, translate the national goals, (at macro level) into
the plant targets (micro goals) for particular enterprises.
The managers
o f enterprises are then stimulated to fulfill these goals. According to him,
however, there is a great danger that managers neglect those aspects o f the
operation o f enterprises which do not find formal or full expression in
their plain targets. These neglected aspects are, in most instances,
activities like development of new products, which produce results only in
longer time periods, or those which have effects—like quality
improvement—that are not quantifiable.
According to W. Samulewicz, the Eastern European countries' inability to
market saleable goods in the West stems also from the domination o f central
planning in these countries.
Marketing goods on Western markets
requires the ability to adapt to changing conditions, but the Eastern
European enterprises operate according to plan, and the margin envisaged
by planners for flexible adjustment to changing market needs is very
narrow.
Consequently, many opportunities for exports are not utilized, and
exports grow slowly. (Ibid., pp. 260-261)
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M. Tardos (1981) attributes the problems associated with the
participation
division

of Eastern

European

countries

of labor to the lack of flexibility

managem ent system s in these countries.

in

the

international

o f institutional and

He argues "one of the

principle and still unsolved economic management problems is the
rather slow reaction of the whole system to new requirements and
cutbacks in demand.

For example, no ways have yet been found to

meet the demand for a new product by establishing a new company."
He furth er asserts

that "if there is

no effective dem and for a

company’s product, the system will not suspend production and wind
up the company.

Instead production will be m aintained by state

subsidies until some government decision is taken."

(Tardos 1981, P.

231)
Along with the inefficiency of Eastern Europeans' production
(Koves 1979, P. 328), and the lack o f adaptation to conditions of the
international division of labor, another internal situation is cited as
the reason behind the problem atic cooperation between E ast and
West:

that is the existence o f the seller's market in Eastern Europe.39

(Samulewicz 1984, P. 259)

39

According to Samulewicz (1984), the existence of the seller's market means
that the demand/supply ratio permanently is higher than unity for almost
all products. Z. Krasznai-M. Laki (1982, p. 156) discussing the Hungarian
situation, argue that the Hungarian market is characterized by lasting
disequilibrium and excess demand. Due to the shortage situation existing
for more than three decades, enterprises are defenseless as buyers while
they are in a relatively comfortable situation as sellers.
Hungarian
enterprises can obtain new labor, investment capacity, or credit only with
difficulties and they have serious problems even in purchasing parts, units
and auxiliary materials required for current production.
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On the seller's m arket sellers neglect buyers' requirem ents
concerning

qualities,

assortm ent,

etc.

Because

of

the

lasting

superiority of sellers characteristic of the Eastern Europe market, the
buyers have developed particular, defensive m ethods to increase
their security.

In the interest of easing their defenseless position

they often arrange for occasional or lasting self supply, are willing to
accumulate material stocks and in their em ergency situation they
themselves initiate concealed or open price increases.

Under these

conditions it is believed that
. . . if a new product or technology deviating from those well
known in the enterprise is introduced, then the aforementioned
fo rm s of e lim in a tin g
d efen sele ssn ess
are even less
efficient.((Krasznai and Laki 1982, P. 158)
Relating the existence of the sellers' markets in Eastern Europe
to these countries' participation in the international division of labor,
Z. Krasznai and M. Laki (1982) argue that certainly the possibility of
purchasing

from

abroad

im proves

enterprises against domestic suppliers.

the

position

of

purchasing

Subcontracting agreements

make it possible fo r the Eastern European enterprises to become
independent of domestic conditions of material supply.
In the case of Western cooperation deals and J.V., however, the
situation is by no means unambiguous, especially if the deal is aimed
at the manufacturing o f some products or group of products new for
Eastern European

enterprises.

Here—m ainly if

several dom estic

parts, units, auxiliary materials are used for the new product—the
aforementioned methods of eliminating defenselessness is inefficient.
(Krasznai and Laki 1982, P. 158)

As a result, the more an enterprise
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is forced to resort to domestic sources of purchasing and sales on the
world market, the more problems and inconvenience the cooperation
with W estern firm s will cause.

The Eastern European countries'

enterprises accustomed to circumstances of the domestic markets are
rarely capable of reliable quality, deliveries in time, etc.
Z. Krasznai and M. Laki (1982) therefore conclude that due to
the lasting excess-demand on the domestic market, there is a strong
pressure for imports and involvement in those types of cooperation
deals w hich lead to increases in imports; at the same time the
intention to export to Western markets is weak.
the reasons
enterprises

m entioned before, they
are

only

w illing

Furthermore, for

argue the Eastern European

to participate

in

those

cooperation

agreements that use world market input and produce output for the
Eastern Europe markets.
chronic
so cialist

balance

These conditions consequently lead to

of paym ents problem s,

countries

to

take

advantage

and do not perm it the
of

p articip atio n

in

the

international division of labor.
B esides the inability

of the socialist countries

to produce

sufficient goods for export, to produce goods of higher quality, and
[their inability] to market saleable goods in the West, some of the
Eastern European governments' policies are also blamed for these
countries' problems in dealing with the West.

A. Koves (1981), for

instance, argues that after Eastern Europe opened up to the world
market, although smaller Eastern European countries encouraged the
export to the West products of such inefficient sectors as agriculture,
food industries, and light industries.

The sectors which enjoyed

priorities in development policy, and whose development was mainly
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prom oted by im ports from the W est, m anufactured products not
primarily for export to the West, but for domestic use.
Other unfavorable conditions were at w ork which made the
participation

of E astern

European

countries

in

the

international

division of labor in the second half of the 1970s more problematic.
The insufficient developm ent of fuel, raw
producing

branches

along

with

repeatedly

and prim ary

m aterial

unfavorable

harvests

increased demands for imports from outside Eastern Europe, and
made the raising
difficult.

o f commodity

funds for exports

alm ost more

Under these circumstances, the individual countries made

increased efforts to shift some of their products traditionally sold
within Eastern Europe to be sold for convertible currency.

Such acts,

therefore, produced a chain effect which led to a general increase of
im ports
countries.

from

the

W est

throughout

all

the

E astern

European

(Koves 1979, P. 328)40

The pattern of trade of Eastern European countries is also cited
as an im portant contributer to the problem of trade deficits and
other difficulties

faced by these countries

as

a result of their

engagem ent in the international division of labor.

For example,

regarding pattern of trade of sm aller Eastern European countries,
Kozma (1982) argues that these countries generally appear as sellers
in those industries in the West in which competition is sharp and the
40

Other internal factors are also blamed for the failure o f Eastern European
countries to take advantage o f participation in the internal division o f
labor. B. Kadar (1983, p. 306), for instance, argues that insufficient
development o f infrastructure has a retarding effect on the foreign
economic relations o f these countries.
He believes infrastructural
development (transport, distribution, storage, sales, flow information)
reduces the cost o f foreign economic relations.
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dominating form of production is the small and medium-size plant,
whose protection is, to a certain extent, in the political interest of the
W estern
problem s

governm ents.
faced

by

T herefore,
the

E astern

one

im portant

E uropean

cause

countries

of
in

the
th eir

international economic relations m ust be sought in what types of
products these countries

export and what

type of products they

import, (Koves 1978, P. 109) which takes us to the discussion of the
Eastern European econom ists' arguments in regard to the place of
Eastern Europe in the hierarchy of the international division of labor.

4.6.I.4. _ The Position o f Eastern Europe in the Hierarchy of
the International Division o f Labor and Cost o f Openness:
T he

E astern

E uropean

tremendous developm ent

eco n o m ists

of the forces

of

argue

th a t

production

d esp ite

of Eastern

European countries, they are placed in the middle of the hierarchy of
the international division

of labor.

East-W est foreign

reflect those

betw een

the

trade

developed

developed" countries.

cap italist

The
of

structural characteristics of
foreign

countries

(Kadar 1977, P. 154)

and

trade relations
the

"m edium

The developed capitalist

countries, "mainly for the historical reasons," are at an advantage
over the socialist countries.

The DCs sell goods and products to

Eastern Europe which they usually export to the LDCs and in turn
purchase

goods

and

products

usually import from LDCs.

from

Eastern

Europe

(Chase Dunn 1982, P. 21)

which

they

Eastern Europe

exports, consisting mostly of raw materials, sources of energy, and
foodstuffs, pay for imports of industrial goods.

Eastern Europe
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exports mainly consumer goods, and imports m ainly capital goods.
(Kadar 1977, P. 158)
Such a pattern of trade put Eastern European countries in a
disadvantageous position, m ainly because most o f the exports of
these countries rely

on the

natural endow m ent

(foodstuffs, raw

materials, as products of timber, paper and sources of energy, etc.)
which consist of products "that are more capital intensive than the
average.
capital,

Yet, the Eastern European countries are relatively short of
and

by

exporting

aggravate their problem.

th e

capital

intensive

products

they

(Kadar 1977)41

Moreover, the fact that there are few up-to-date machines and
other industrial products of outstanding quality in the structure of
Eastern European exports makes these countries especially sensitive
to restrictions.

(Koves 1979, P. 336)

Among the manufactured

products exported to the Common Market, for example, is clothing,
which is produced by small and medium sized industries in the West
ind consequently prone to high tariff rates and other restrictions.
At any rate the Eastern European economists believed that the
zone in which the Eastern European countries are situated in the
international division of labor is one o f the 'danger zones' in the

41

The Eastern Europoean economists argue, it is true, that a similar situation
can be observed in the case o f underdeveloped or medium-developed
capitalist countries that export capital-intensive products o f the extractive
industries, as well as other raw materials, but in these countries the
extractive industries are usually the result o f foreign capital investment.
In the case of Eastern European industries there is not such foreign
investment; therefore the export structure engaged additional domestic
resources o f investment and influences the "efficiency o f investments" at
the national level. (Ibid., p. 159)
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world economy, mainly because of the following considerations:

a—

the industrializing developing countries can break into this zone in a
relatively short time and become Eastern Europe's competitors; b—
the majority of Eastern Europe's products exported to the W est are
vulnerable to the DCs' defensive measures in order to protect their
"non-leading" industries and agricultural sector.
10)

(Simai 1977, P.P. 9-

It follows, then, that "breaking-out" of this zone and moving

towards an advanced industrial level is of vital interest for the
Eastern European countries.
The Eastern European economists, however, like to emphasize
two important points:

first, the position of Eastern Europe in the

hierarchy of the international division of labor does not reflect the
level of developm ent of productive forces of this region and is
largely

of

historical

nature,

resulting

from

traditional

regional

specialization in production and in exports of fuels, raw materials,
other production

m aterials,

(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 98)

and

agricultural

and

food

products.

To support this point, they assert that for

instance, in the case of Hungary, its exports to the socialist countries,
am ounting
exports

of

to tw o-thirds of its foreign
the

m ost

industrial

trade, correspond

developed

countries,

to the

w hile

the

structure of its non-socialist exports is close to the trading structure
of the developing countries.

(M andel and M yller 1974, P. 38)

Clearly Hungary is capable of producing high-quality goods but is
unable to market them in DCs.
discrim inatory

procedures

of

Part of this problem, apart from

W estern

countries,

is

due

to

the

difficulties of establishing new, wide trade relations on the markets
of the DCs.

In these countries years of development of international
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trade fostered the formation of wide and stable trade and capital
relations* of which for a long time the socialist countries had been
left out.
close

The sophisticated system of business relations is based on a

and

netw ork

com plicated

system

of

relations

of traders* financial institutions*

governments agencies, etc.

em bracing

production

a w hole
com panies,

For the outsider and the newcomers it is

very difficult to break into this complicated network, therefore the
quality of their products and technology by itself is not sufficient for
their success.

(Szita 1974* P.P. 281-82)

In the case of Eastern

European countries, although the level of production and variety of
goods and services which are produced by them are far superior to
those of the developing countries and indeed in cases surpass those
of DCs, they are not successful in penetrating into the W estern
markets.

Notwithstanding, Eastern European economists do not deny

that the quality of most o f their goods may be below the DCs'
stan d ard s.
The second point that Eastern Economists like to stress is that
their participation in the international division of labor is a necessity
and an undeniable fact, but it does not imply that their economic
developm ent is
w orld

market.

shaped and directed by the requirem ents of the
For exam ple,

according

to

Kovas

(1976),

the

Hungarian econom y is an open economy, which means that it is
linked through many threads (by imports and exports) to the world
economy.

Such openness is no doubt necessary.

Because "of the actual and potential scarcity of production
resources the utilization of neither the operating nor the newly
entering capacities, nor the em ploym ent of labor can be
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realized by relying exclusively on the growth of the home
market.
In other words, the importing of raw materials, and
means of production necessary for extended reproduction in
the H ungarian econom y and of consum er goods as well
becomes possible only by exporting a considerable part o f the
output." (Koves 1976, P. 51)
K ovacs,

how ever,

m aintains

that

"openness"

m eans

som ething

different in the case of Hungary than when applied to small and
medium-sized W estern countries.
much

more direct assertion

processes.

In Hungary

In their case openness means a

of foreign

m arket effects

on home

the wide sphere of plan-controlled

and

influenced economic processes, the socialist character of price and
income policies, and the government control of investment decisions
allow —openness

n o tw ith stan d in g —a

less

d ire c t,

restric te d

and

delayed infiltration of foreign influences. (Koves 1976, P.P. 51-52)
Yet he admits that the open character of the Hungarian economy
makes this country to some extent vulnerable to the changes in the
world economy and has manifested itself in deterioration of its terms
of trade under the effects of world market changes in 1974 and
1975.
G. Stepanov (1981) states that the history of the Soviet state is
full of examples of "futile attempts to 'punish* or 'isolate* it."

For

example, during the first years of the Soviet Republic the imperialist
states wanted to strangle it by means of blockade.

But even in those

extremely difficult conditions the Soviet state managed to hold out.
Another im perialist attempt to prevent the Soviet Union's economic
development in the 1940s and early 1950s also ended in failure.

At

that time restrictive export lists included almost all products that the
Soviet Union needed for the rehabilitation and development of its
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economy.

Yet, the Soviet Union was able to organize its own

production including the most import branches of industries.
w ith

the

existence

of the

socialist com m unity

and

Today,

their close

collaboration, opportunities for im perialist states to influence the
econom ic

developm ent of the

countries are largely limited.

Soviet Union

and other

socialist

(Stepanov 1981, P. 46)42

G. Kohlmey (1975) also strongly denies

that the

socialist

countries as a consequence of their participation in the international
division of labor are com pelled to 'import' the capitalist countries'
inflation and crisis.
"Some disadvantages do arise for us (owing to difficult
marketing conditions due to recession, growing protectionism
and increasing com petition), but there em erge also certain
advantages (e.g. more favorable procurement conditions, better
c re d it term s).
A t o th er tim es the ad v an tag es and
disadvantages differed, and the disadvantages w ere often
great. Crisis and inflation do influence the socialist economies,
but their influence is not significant and not deforming at all."
(Kohlmey 1975, p. 305)42

42

One can also add the increase and rivalry among Western firms to export
pipeline to the Soviet Union.

43 Given the position o f Eastern European countries in the international
division o f labor, and the problems encountered by these countries as a
result o f such position, the Eastern European economists seek the solution
not in the curtailment but "in the expansion and rationalization o f
economic relations" with the non-socialist countries. (144, p. 317) They
believe that the most important element o f long-term strategy o f the CMEA
countries must be following the "export-oriented model o f development."
For a discussion o f this approach please see appendix (II).
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2.6.2.East European Countries and the LPCs:
The

dependency

school

m aintains

that

since the

socialist

countries occupy an interm ediate position in the hierarchy of the
international division of labor, their economic relations w ith LDCs
resemble those of DCs with LDCs.

I believe the explanation for East-

South economic relations given by the Eastern European economists
are im portant and worth further investigation.
One of the first points generally raised by the Eastern European
economists is that they do not consider their countries responsible
for the problems of LDCs.

For example, O. Bogomolov (Bogomolov

1979b, P. 15) maintains that it is the developed capitalist countries
which are responsible "for the colonial past and present condition of
developing countries" not the socialist countries.

Bognar (1979) also

argues the same points, "[f]or the p ast—for colonialization and its
consequences—socialist countries are in no way responsible," but he
maintains that "yet for the future they are, since they have immense
direct and indirect influence on its formation."

(Bognar 1979, P. 15)

According to him, the socialist countries should initiate and promote
establishment of such circumstances "which allow that countries with
different social system and state of development can help each other
in solving economic problems.

. . . Only in this way will it become

possible that the various economics—and especially the economics of
developing countries. . . . "

(Bognar 1979, P. 16)

Such economic

development in the Third W orld can be accelerated by the socialist

Ill

countries* establishment of trade, extensive cooperations, and aid.44
(Bognar 1979, P. 15)
One form of economic cooperation with LDCs is providing
technical assistance and "economic aid credits" to them.

According to

Bogomolov, the technical assistance of the socialist countries to the
LDCs is concentrated mainly in the state sector, especially, in the key
industries whose development is important for ensuring the "political
independence”

of these

countries

and

w hich

consolidation of their national economies."

contribute

to

the

(Bogomolov 1979d, P. 30)

It was only after socialist countries started to build engineering and
other heavy industries that the DCs became compelled to enlarge and
extend their scale of aid to the developing countries.

Therefore, the

Eastern European rendering of technical assistance to LDCs has been
doubly advantageous to the developing countries, on the one hand
providing these countries with the heavy industrial sector, on the
other hand forcing DCs to extend their economic assistance from the
extractive industries to other sectors.
According to the Eastern European economists, there exists a
distinct difference between the

types of

"economic

aid credits"

granted by CMEA countries to LDCs and those granted by DCs.
Socialist countries* credits as a rule are long term (10-15 years) and

Y. Shiryayev (1979) in fact argues that the establishment o f these
economic relations must be aimed at elevating the position o f LDCs in the
hierarchy of the international division o f labor.
"One important indicator
o f the CMEA countries' growing role in the system of international
economic relations is their vigorous efforts to solve one o f the most
imperative problems o f our day, i.e. to change radically the place and role
of the former colonial and semi-colonial countries in the world division o f
labour." (Ibid., p. 5)
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are granted at a 2.5 percent interest rate.
credits

allow

industrial

the

project,

recipient
to

m aster

country

"The long-term nature of

enough

production

credits with the receipt from its output."

tim e

and

start

to

build

the

repaying

the

(Bogomolov 1979d, P. 31)

Admittedly they assert that the total sum of credits extended by the
socialist countries' assistance to the LDC is "less than that provided in
the form of so-called 'aid' by the industrialized capitalist countries."
They continue that one should remember that "by diverting a part of
its free capital to developing countries as 'aid,' the W est derives even
greater benefits by extracting

interest, profits and

other receipts

from the developing countries."45
According to Bogomolov (1979a), the socialist countries, desire
to render all-round assistance to the developing countries is mainly
motivated from their interest to support LDCs in their "struggle for
national sovereignty and independent development."

In maintaining

these relations the socialist countries "are not m otivated by any
unilateral advantages:

they are pressing fo r neither concessions, nor

political domination, nor military bases.

On the contrary, they are

m otivated

ju stice,

by

a

sincere

striv in g

advantage and people's solidarity."

for

equality,

m utual

(Bogomolov 1979a, P. 24)

In

In 1977, for example, the LDCs (non-petroleum exporting developing
countries) paid $25b against loans and credits and the interest on them
amounted to 21% of their export earnings. In the same year the entire 'aid'
received by these countries from the West amounted to $14.86. (Ibid., p. 31)
(See also Kulev 1983, p. 26) It is argued that the socialist countries could
increase their volume of aid to LDCs and increase their contribution to
their development "if the progress is achieved in disarmament." The
socialist countries could channel to the LDCs a fixed share o f the resources
which would be released through the reduction o f the military budget.
(Bogomolov 1979b, p. 16)
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addition, he argues that the socialist countries' economic assistance to
LDCs indicates "a fundamental difference in the division of labor and
economic cooperation between these two groups of countries, on the
one hand, and the capitalist division of labor” on the other hand.
(Bogomolov 1979a, p. 24)46
T he economic-relations between the socialist countries and the
LDCs are not lim ited to technical assistance, and 'econom ic aid
credits.'

They entail a variety of economic relations including trade

and ICAs.
"The Soviet Union devotes great attention to the development
of relations with the developing countries. . . . and purses a
p o lic y
of
c o m p re h e n s iv e --in c lu d in g
tra d e --e c o n o m ic
cooperation with them.
In all phases of this cooperation the
S oviet Union adheres to the dem ocratic principles of total
equality and mutual advantage and the inadm issibility of any
m anner of encroachment on sovereignty." (Klochek 1979, P.P.
1 5 -1 6 )
T he
econom ic

Eastern
relations

European
not

only

econom ists
help

believe

LDCs

to

these
"achieve

types

of

genuine

independence but are also an im portant factor of countering the
im perialists' attempts to obstruct the positive processes taking place
in them in the political, economic and social spheres."

(Kulev 1983, P.

22)

46

On other points, however, Bogmolov suggests that the socialist countries'
economic assistance and aid should be directed at rationalizing "the
division o f labor between the socialist countries and LDCs." Such rational
division o f labor will "secure new sources o f stable imports o f raw
materials, fuel, and some goods by CMEA countries, while simultaneously
creating a stable prospect for exports to the developing countries o f the
goods they need." (Bogomolov 1979b, p. 16-17) This type o f division of
labor is not significantly different from that which exists between DCs and
LDCs.
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The socialist countries, some argue, follow certain principles
and criteria in their economic relations with LDCs; these principles
are outlined by T. Szentes:

(1976, P. 146):

-exclusion of exploitation from internal economic relations;
-equality o f p artn ers, avoidance o f one-sided econom ic
dependence, and exclusion of interference with the partner's
affairs;
-support to countries fighting for their economic independence
against imperialist economic powers;
-full respect for national sovereignty over the natural and
labour resources of the partner countries and support to
governments intending to realize it;
-combining the observation o, the principles of mutual
interests and advantages . . .
-cooperation with and assistance to the state and collective
sectors, wherever it is possible in the partner countries; . . . "
The Eastern European econom ists also

stress the economic

advantages which the socialist countries obtain from their economic
relations with LDCs.

The question is, however, raised about what

types of products CMEA countries should import from and export to
LDCs which would be mutually advantageous [to both parties].

O.

Bogomolov (1979c), for instance, suggests that in the interest of
raising the efficiency of investment and in "a fuller satisfaction of
demand for energy in the CMEA countries" it is reasonable that these
countries increase the imports of energy and other raw materials
from LDCs.

(Bogomolov 1979c, P. 310)

He furthermore argues that

under the conditions of pressing "scarcity of natural resources" it is
important for Eastern Europe to ensure access to mineral resources
on a long-term basis.

(Bogomolov 1979c, P. 311)

To ensure such

access, the Eastern European countries can pool their resources
together and help developing countries to increase their extraction

2 81

and processing of certain raw m aterials.

(Bogomolov

1979c, P.

3 1 0 )47
L. Csaba (1983) argues more or less the same points, but he is
more cautious and maintains that Eastern European countries could
increase their industrial exports to LDCs at the present time, but this
action

may

overstrain

"their

already

very

strained

balance

of

paym ents," especially if one considers that the Eastern European
countries are in need of imports of the most advanced technology
from

the W est in

development.'

order to continue

their policy

o f 'intensive

Consequently, E ast European countries, in order to

afford these imports should channel their exports toward the West,
(Csaba 1983, P. 69) and not LDCs.
There are economists like M. Simai (1977) who believe that
given the growing differentiation in the Third W orld, and uneven
economic development, it is wrong to prescribe a single and common
pattern of trade with these countries.

The developing countries,

these days, can produce and export a variety o f different industrial
products.

These products include:

traditional

and

new

labor-

intensive industrial finished products (such as clothing; textiles);
47

Consequently, Bogmolov suggests that LDCs in their relations with the
socialist countries should confine themselves to their traditional role in the
international division o f labor, i.e. the exporters o f raw materials. The only
impediment he foresees in the continuation o f such economic relations is
the inability o f socialist countries to provide enough investments in the
expansion o f their export-oriented production in order to pay for the
rising volume o f imported fuels and raw materials. (Ibid., p. 310) However,
he believes Eastern Europe, by redistributing the existing investment
funds from the extractive industries to the manufacturing industries and
consequently by specialization in the manufacturing sector, can raise
efficiency and produce enough goods o f high quality to be exported to the
LDCs. (Ibid., p. 311)
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m achines,
chem icals,

electrical
chem ical

engineering
products,

and

electronics

synthetic

fib ers,

products;

basic

fertilizers,

etc.

Therefore, the Eastern European countries can purchase increasing
amounts of semi-finished and finished products from these countries,
and do not have to limit themselves to purchases of raw material and
fuel.

(Bimai 1977, P.P 16-17)

I. Kulev (1983) similarly believes that

the socialist countries do and w ill continue to provide a stable
market for the developing countries' traditional export goods as well
as output of their new enterprises.

(Kulev 1983, P. 25)

In fact, he

asserts that a large portion of LDCs industrial output exported to the
Soviet Union is produced by industries established by the help of this
country.

A ccording

to

him,

the

conclusion

of

"com pensatory

agreements” under which deliveries of equipment and other services
by the Soviet side are paid for by deliveries of the output of new
enterprises

is

a

growing

practice

in

the

econom ic

cooperation

between the Soviet Union and LDCs.
O. Bogomolov (1979a) emphasizes the importance of ICAs in
the East-South economic cooperation.

He believes ICAs help the

developing countries "to speed up the introduction of new industries
and attain the necessary production efficiency and quality output.
also helps

them

to increase

their exports

o f m anufactured

It
and

sophisticated goods to the extensive and stable markets of CMEA
countries."

(Bogomolov 1979a, P. 31)

At the present time, therefore,

because of the existence of a variety of economic relations between
the Soviet Union and LDCs, the Soviet Union supplies these countries
with increasing numbers of various kinds of machinery, equipment
and materials.

In turn the USSR has increased its purchases of not
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only raw materials and traditional exports of foodstuffs but also of
the finished products of their young industry.48

(Klocheck 1979, P.

16)
It

seems

there

Soviet econom ists

exists

an

apparent difference

who recom m end the

export

betw een

of a variety

the
of

industrial goods from LDCs, and those of smaller Eastern European
countries whose countries lack a sufficient supply of raw materials
and consequently recommend exports of traditional products of LDCs.
One way of solving the apparent contradiction between these two
approaches is suggested by T. Szentes. (1976)49

Szentes suggests

that one can easily visualize a long-term agreement which would
start from exploration and exploitation of raw materials to be sold

48

ICAs between the socialist countries and LDCs through the years have taken
different forms. In the earlier time, the CMEA countries introduced mass
deliveries and installation o f complete plants. Under this form o f
cooperation the contractor undertook the delivery o f all the equipment
required for the project under construction.
Later another form was
developed, the 'turn-key* projects.
Apart from delivering the complete
plant, the socialist countries pledged to carry out building jobs, and hand
over a complete ready-to-operate industrial enterprise.
Recently, a more
complex form o f technical assistance has been developed. Under the type
o f agreement, the socialist countries undertake "to master the project's
capacity and train local manpower, as well as to ensure the profitable
operation o f the enterprize in the intiial stages." (Bogomolov 1979a, p. 29)
Another form o f cooperation is the establishment o f joint companies. The
host country holds the controlling interest and actively participates in its
mangement. All of these types o f economic cooperation are believed to
help "to strengthen the state sector o f these countries' economies and
become an effective instrument for expanding the economic ties between
the two groups o f states." (Ibid., p. 34)

49

According to him, there exists an apparent contradiction even between
"the deliberate policy of Hungary . . . o f assisting the developing countries
in the building up o f their own processing facilities and the dynamic key
industries, applying modem technology, and based upon local natural
resources, on the one hand, and her import demands for traditional raw
materials, on the other." (Szentas 1976)
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partly to the cooperating country; it would then be followed by local
processing of the raw materials, and the growing share of the related
m anufactured products in the export to the partner; and finally it
would proceed to

the developm ent o f some advanced industrial

centers based upon the local natural resources and entering into
intra-industrial exchange and cooperation with those in the assisting
country.

The drop, in a relative sense, of the raw material purchases

of the latter from the developing country, which follows from the
increasing volume of processing on the spot, can be purposefully, and
for m utual benefits, compensated by an appropriate increase in the
m anufactured im ports for the

related

final consum ption,

harmful consequences for the Eastern European country.

without

The greater

mutual benefits will arise in those fields in which sharing of the raw
material supply can be connected with the sharing of the final stages
of the production.

(Szentes 1976, P. 152)50

At any rate, the Eastern European economists believe that since
the nature of socialist countries' economic relations with LDCs is
different from that of DCs, the developing countries will obtain
considerable benefits from their economic relations with the socialist
countries.

It is therefore irrelevant w hether LDCs export raw

materials or machinery to Eastern Europe.

"Unlike the imperialist

powers w hich have preserved and often even increase customs and
other barriers blocking the export output o f the newly-free countries
50

Szentes' proposal is almost similar to that o f Csaba (187) discussed earlier.
Csaba suggests a conscious and deliberate policy to divest from declining
industries, and instead import the related products from the developing
countries, and concentrate and specialize on those manufacturing products
in the production o f which Eastern Europe enjoys comparative advantage.
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and especially the finished products of their industries, there are no
tariff barriers in the USSR, . . . the clearing system of accounts based
on cancelling out the mutual accounts of the sides is of considerable
im portance for a num ber of countries.

Many young states are

experiencing difficulties with freely convertible currency, and the
clearing system rids these states of such difficulties."

(Kulev 1983, P.

25)
Another im portant aspect of economic relations between the
East and developing countries is its long-term nature.

The long-term

agreement "creates a stable basis for commodity exchange and allows
the

developing

trad itio n al

states

goods,

to

but

(Bogomolov 1979a, P. 28)

count

also

of

on

stable

newly

exports

not

m anufactured

only

of

products."

They furthermore "enable the Soviet side

to recoup its outlay on the building of projects."

(Kulev 1983, P. 25)

A nother significant elem ent which makes Eastern

European

countries' relations with LDCs distinguishable from those of DCs and
LDCs is that the majority of East-South economic cooperation takes
place within the framework of the state sector.
"Because of the weakness of the national economy most AfroAsian and Latin American countries lack the capital and the
necessary experience to manage a m odern economy.
The
record has shown that in these conditions the state sector, if
used sensibly, can become an effective means of mobilizing
in te rn a l resources, accum ulating the necesary skills o f
developing and managing the economy. . . . " (Kulev 1983, P.25)
In addition it is argued that "the state sector makes it possible to
solve top-priority social problems, such as the introduction of regular
working

hours, free prim ary education, raising m inimum

wages,

introducing a system of social insurance, free medical services, etc."
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(Kulev 1983, P. 23)
only

raises

the

Therefore, strengthening the state sector not

level

of

econom ic

developm ent

of

developing

countries, but it also raises the standard of living of people of these
countries.

The Eastern European countries do not reject, however,

development of business cooperation with the private sector of LDCs
under the condition that it "facilitates the consolidation of the newlyfree countries' national economy."

(Kulev 1983, P. 23)

Furtherm ore, the Eastern European

countries

promote these

types o f economic relations which are contained in the economic
plans of various developing countries.
services

and

technological

prom ote

econom ic

developm ent

(Bognar 1976, P. 240)
econom ic relations

system s

"In this way commodities,
to

in

be

the

supplied

can directly

developing

countries."

The programmed, planned character of such

"can offer the required safety

in supply, in

revenues and for the employment situation on both sides.”
1976, P. 152)

(Szentes

Consequently, the socialist countries have been able to

develop and apply "totally new patterns of international relations,
differing
capitalism .
oppressed

fundam entally

from

those

These economic relations
peoples

to

(Shiryayev 1979, P. 5)

rid

them selves

obtaining"

in

LDCs

under

"make it possible for all
of

the

im perialist

yoke."

In fact the economic relations between the

socialist countries and the developing countries should not be viewed
only based on "purely economic indicators like the volume of credits,
foreign trade, . . . etc," because these economic relations produce two
very important benefits for LDCs.

First, they serve to strengthen the

economies of these countries and their economic independence, and
they consolidate the position of the state sector to build modem
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industrial and agricultural sectors.

Second, the developing countries

become involved in an advantageous, "steady and balanced division
of labor with the CMEA countries" which along with all sorts of
benefits, eliminates the DCs' monopoly as sole exporters of industrial
goods to them and im porters of their products and consequently
enhances the economic independence of the LDCs.
P. 6)

(Shiryayev 1979,

Such economic independence in turn will help the restructuring

of the world-wide economic relations and place these relations on
more equitable and democratic foundations.

(Bogomolov 1979a, P.

23)
Unfortunately, the economic relations between the LDCs and
Eastern

European

countries

have not reached the desired

level,

partly because of lack of historical contact between these two groups
of countries.

Historically, the majority of Eastern European countries,

unlike the former colonial powers in Europe, did not establish any
contact with the LDCs; as a result they did not acquire "accumulated
know ledge

and

field

experiences

in

the

developing

countries."

(Szentes 1976, P.145)

Consequently, many developing countries are

inclined

th eir

to

c o m p a n ie s .51

continue

trad itio n al

ties

w ith

the

W estern

The Eastern European countries, therefore, need to

endeavor harder and concentrate their efforts on
their economic relations with LDCs.

acceleration of

The importance of such economic

relations become even further enhanced, if one considers that the
developing countries and Eastern Europe have similar interests as far

51

Apart from the influences and pressures o f MNCs.
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as "actively countering the forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism
and the im perialist exploitation of nations are concerned."

Their

interests also coincide "on issues relating to restructuring world-wide
economic relations and placing them on new democratic and just
foundations."
again,

that

(Bogomolov 1979a, P. 23)
the

conclusion

reached

It has been shown, once

by

the

E astern

European

economists are considerably different from those of the dependency
school.

Even if the Eastern European economists agree with the

dependency school's argument that Eastern Europe's pattern of trade
with LDCs is similar to that of DCs with LDCs, they disagree with the
dependency school's idea that Eastern Europe expolits the LDCs.
Eastern European economists maintain that the nature of Eastern
Europe's economic relations with the LDCs is fundamentally different
from that of the DCs with LDCs.

Therefore, regardless of their pattern

of trade, the LDCs will gain from their economic relations with the
socialist countries.

4^7. S um m ary

and

T he C o n ten d in g Views:

The proponents of openness in Eastern Europe believe that
although

adoption

of autarky

and

its

concom itant policies

was

justified at one time, by the late 1960s it became clear that "the price
of autarky is too high and not worth paying."
They

argue

that,

by

the

late

developm ent, a characteristic
consequently, a shift from

1960s,

the

(Pasztor 1980, P. 90)
sources

of autarky policy,
an extensive

o f extensive

w ere exhausted;

growth to

an intensive
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growth became imperative.

An intensive growth in turn requires

participation in the international division of labor.
E astern European econom ists argue that as

a result of its

participation in the world market, Eastern Europe is placed in the
middle of the hierarcy of the international division of labor.

The

structural characteristics of East-W est foreign trade reflects those of
foreign trade relations between the DCs and the "medium developed"
countries.

They argue, however, that as a result of such a position,

Eastern Europe is neither exploited by nor dependent upon the DCs,
mainly

because

foreign

cap ital

cannot

directly

infiltrate

these

countries, and in m ost cases the ill-effects of such infiltration can be
m itigated
econom ists'

by

the

governm ent

conclusion

policies.

is, therefore,

The

E astern

different from

that

Europe
of

the

dependency school.
In regard to Eastern Europe's economic relations with the LDCs,
these economists argue that such relations are entirely favorable to
the LDCs.

They maintain that since the nature of Eastern Europe's

economic relations with the LDCs is fundam entally different from
that of the DCs with the LDCs, the LDCs will benefit from their
relations with the socialist countries.
The proponents of doctrine of openness, w ith their heavy
emphasis on the imports of W estern technology, have been criticized
in Eastern Europe on several grounds.
argues that in spite

of all

E. Kozma (1982), for instance,

the "deficiencies and

exaggerations"

associated with the policy of "autarky," this economic policy "had two
starting points" w hich are correct even

today, nam ely, that the

developm ent of the Eastern European economies

"should rely on
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developing

the

intellectual

capacity

and

technical

skills

of the

population and that the highly important specialization should be
implemented within the socialist community."

(Kozma 1982, P. 33)

These two important principles seem to be abandoned by the exportoriented model's proponents; and "their abandonment would amount
historically to abandoning the efforts at true development in Eastern
Europe."

(Kozma 1982, P. 33)

The critics argue that the policy of openness renders it possible
for

the

cap italist

countries

to

build

in

the

E astern

European

community "a base of raw-material supply, food supply and of cheap,
m oderately

qualified

'subsidiary'

labor,

w hich

depend on Western capital and technology."

would

one-sidedly

(Kozma 1982, P. 31)

Moreover, it is unrealistic to believe that Eastern Europe can increase
in a large magnitude its exports of manufactured articles to the West,
particularly in the short run.
"Massive exports of manufactured articles to the W est will not
be competitive for a long time to come, and this is because the
products are not so new that the 'extra profit' to be included in
their price could bear the relatively high social costs of labour.
On the other hand, the manufactured commodities that could
be otherw ise sold in the W est, are not
introduced to the
W estern markets. The costs of marketing which emerge in
convertible currencies are . . . much higher than what could be
borne by the particular socialist countries."
(Kozma 1982, P.
32)
As

a result, the Eastern European countries have

resort to export of raw

no choice but to

materials to the W est in order to import

Western technology, which would make Eastern Europe dependent
on the West, and as a result it would do immeasurable harm to the
cause of socialism.

The socialist countries should develop "their
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economic relations with the W est to the extent which does not
threaten their technological and economic independence and does not
make them strategically vulnerable.”

(Bogomolov 1983, P. 26)

Another point raised by the Eastern European critics is that
the promotion of business cooperation with the W est and the import
of technology from them tends to weaken the ability of Eastern
Europe to manufacture sophisticated products internally.

They argue

that as a consequence of the import of W estern technology and
know-how the development of domestic research and development
has

been

n eg lected .

consequences;

it

for

Such
instance

a

neg lig en ce

guarantees

the

pro d u ces
W estern

severe

countries'

superiority in introduction of new technology, and propels Eastern
Europe to seek even further the imports of Western technology until
they become completely dependent on it.

They then suggest that

Eastern European countries, instead of em phasizing the imports of
W estern technologies, should direct their efforts in supporting and
en co u rag in g

do m estic

research

and

d ev elo p m en t

and

ex ert

themselves in introduction and diffusion of home-grown technology,
(see Hanson 1983, P. 32)
Apart from all the adverse consequences of imports of Western
technology mentioned above, it is believed that there is no guarantee
that the W estern firms will sell most up-to-date technology to the
socialist countries; getting such technology is one of the major goals
of the "export-oriented" model of development.

(Koves 1981, P. 53)

In fact, Bogomolov (1983, P. 33) maintains that in most of the ICAs,
W estern firms attem pt to obtain unilateral advantages and supply
the socialist countries with those "production lines or technologies
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which seriously pollute the environment, require an insufficiently
skilled labour and are difficult to be mechanized."

In addition, he

asserts that the

"capitalist firms often sell licenses for obsolete

technology w hile

possessing a better one w hich is to oust the

former."

M oreover, he believes that the ICAs entail a substantial

additional import of components and materials from the West and
somewhat "tethered the CMEA countries to Western standards and
technology . . ."

(Bogomolov 1983, P. 33)

O. Bogomolov (1979b) also

points out the extension of imports of Western technology.

Under no

condition can these be considered as an alternative for the socialist
countries'

scientific

supplement it.

and

technical

progress.

They

can

m erely

(Bogomolov 1979b, P. 13)

Some critics argue that the doctrine o f openness makes the
econom ic

developm ent

of

East

Europe

susceptible

to

W estern

economic fluctuations, which will produce adverse consequences for
the socialist countries.

These

adverse

effects

w ill

be further

enhanced during the period of Western recession when the politically
motivated discrimination against socialist countries is aggravated by
the strengthening of protectionism.

(Koves 1981, P.P. 52-53)

The

socialist countries' economic, social and scientific and technological
progress

m ust

re s t

prim arily

on

the

developm ent

of

internal

resources and increasingly on expanded possibilities of cooperation,"
for it is only then that they will be able to protect themselves from
the influences from without.
policy

which

ignores

the

(Bogomolov 1983, P.P. 29-30)
im portance

of economic

Any

and political

independence of the socialist countries not only does not contribute
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to the

solution of problem s facing Eastern Europe,

but in fact

heightens these problems.
The critics

maintain

that the doctrine of openness model's

contention that the Eastern European countries are unable to develop
their economies without the import of foreign capital, technology,
and know how is groundless.
1981, P. 47)

(Goldina 1984, P. 13 and Stepanov

Eastern Europe and in particular the Soviet Union has

tremendous economic and scientific-technological potential, and the
external

econom ic

ties

w ith

the

cap italist

countries

are

only

"supplement to rather than the determinant of progress for the USSR
and the other members of the socialist community."
P. 13)

(Goldian 1984,

The Soviet Union's total imports from the capitalist countries

represented only 1.6% of the Soviet Union's gross social product in
1981.

(Goldian 1984, P. 13)

The share o f industrial equipment

imported from capitalist countries does not exceed 5-6 percent of the
Soviet Union's total capital investm ent in machinery.
1981, P. 48)

(Stepanov

In terms o f development of technology, the CMGA

countries account for at least 80 percent o f total research on the
European continent.

(Stepanov 1981, P. 48)

N evertheless, even the critics do not advocate a total isolation
from

the

world

market.

The

socialist countries

should

take

advantage of possibilities inherent in the international division of
labor.

However, at the same time they have to search

for a rational

means to link their economies to the world market, a

means which

intensifies the economic

growth

o f socialist countries, does not

endanger their economic and political independence, and does not
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make them vulnerable and/or dependent on the economic conditions
of the capitalist countries.
The doctrine of openness, some believe, strives in essence to
change the socialist economies and suggest a compromise.
approach is criticized as ignoring
reality:

Such an

"instead o f understanding

the

the socialist planned economy is an established system

whose continuous development is not determined by the aspects of
the trade with Western economies but by its inherent necessities and
requirements."

(Szita 1974, P. 283)

The solution should be sought

not in concessions to be made in the fields of the systems of
management and trade but in those practical measures which could
positively foster the development of the trade.

The experience of the

past years has shown that only such a pragmatic approach brought
success; only this could bring about a situation in which East-W est
trade is developing and, according to all indications, its further
expansion can be anticipated.

(Szita 1974, P. 284)

CHAPTER V

E M PIR IC A L INVESTIGATIONS
The table below summarizes the major issues raised in the
previous chapters.

It is • the purpose of this chapter to investigate

empirically the validity of the dependency, neo-classical and Eastern
European

schools'

arguments

in regards

to E ast-W est

economic

relations.

This investigation does not attempt to be a thorough test;

rather it will only give an indication of empirical relevance of the
theoretical analyses of these three schools.

Much of the emphasis

throughout the chapter will be on the dependency school, since this
is the only school among the three that has vigorously attempted to
theorize the economic relations between East and W est.1

In any

event, in order to empirically substantiate or repudiate these schools'
arguments I will take the following steps:

F irst:

I will systematically

collect necessary data in regards to the patterns of trade of Eastern
European countries with both DCs and LDCs for selected years.
S eco n d :

As the dependency school (as well as some Eastern European

economists) has categorized Eastern Europe along with Brazil and
Mexico and a few other countries as "intermediate" countries, I will
collect appropriate data in regards to patterns of trade of these
"intermediate" capitalist countries with DCs and LDCs.
There have been various attempts in testing the dependency "theories."
See for example Chase-Dunn, C. (1975); Kaufman, R., et al. (1975) and
Jackson, S. I. (1979).

I Dependency School

Conclusions and Relevant Points
Method of Analysis

nTum*
for "Enm
m T Verification

Extends his method of
analysis of the DCs' and
LDCs’ economic relations
to those of the capitalist and
socialist-economic systems.

International investment inten
sifies die dependency of the
socialist countries on the world's
market. Therefore, it can only
produce harmful effects for the
socialist countries.

a-Frank:

b-Wallerstein:
Since there exists only one
wold embracing mode of
production, the capitalist
mode, there is no need for
devising a theory of socialism.

Socialist countries occupy an
intermediate position in die inter
national division of labor, a
position similar to those of "semiperipheral" capitalist countries.

II Neo-dassical School
a-Non theoretical
approaches
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i -Case Studies
ii -General Description
iii -Informed Specialization
iv -Taxonomical Studies

Conclusions and Relevant Points
Method o f Analysis

for "Empirical" Verification

b-Theoretical Approach
Ignores the differences in die
socio-economic systems of
capitalist and socialist countries,
and/or believes such differ
ences are irrelevant and play an
insignificant role (as far as
assumptions of economic theory
are concerned) in the investi
gation of economic relations of
the East and the West

Socialist countries conduct
their trade according to the
principle of comparative
advantage.
Socialist countries in their
economic relations with the West,
in particular in their establishment
of joint ventures with Western
firms, are "profit maximizers."

in Eastern European Approach
Acknowledges the existence of
two different economic systems
in the world, but suggests that
some form of coexistence
between them is possible.

In general, their analyses are void
of any consideration for die
potential conflicts of interest
between Eastern Europe and the
Western firms.
Although the socialist countries
occupy an intermediate position in
the international division of labor,
they are not dependent on the
Western countries.
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T h ird : The comparison of these sets of data together can give
an indication of the

authenticity

European schools’ arguments.

of

the

dependency and Hast

If the patterns of trade of capitalist

intermediate and Eastern European countries with LDCs are similar to
these of DCs with LDCs, then these schools are correct in one aspect of
th eir

argum ents.

If

the

patterns

of

trade

of

the

capitalist

"intermediate" and Eastern European countries with DCs are similar
to those of LDCs with DCs, then these schools are correct in another
aspect of their arguments.
F o u rth :
countries'

The dependency school posits that Eastern European

econom ic

relations

with

the

W est place

them

in

interm ediate position in the international division of labor.

an

As a

result of such a position, the development of the former is in essence
determined by trends in the latter.
by the

developm ent

capitalist countries.

of the

These trends, in turn, are molded

capitalist

system

in

the

advanced

I believe one way of empirically verifying such

an argument is by establishing how dependent Eastern

European

countries are on the imports and exports from and to DCs.

By

calculating the ratio of net imports and net exports of different
categories

of

products

to

actual

dom estic

production

products, one can more or less measure such dependency.

of

these

I will look

at these ratios for the USSR, because it is the country most discussed
in the dependency literature.2

See, for example, Frank and Wallerstein's discussion about the Soviet
U nion.
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F ifth :

The calculation of such ratios can be a means to partially

verify the neo-classical school’s belief that the Eastern European
countries conduct their trade with the DCs based on the principle of
"comparative costs."

If these countries are taking advantage of the

gains from trade, stemming from the differences in com parative
costs, then one should witness a rise in im port-dom estic supply
ratios of those products for which DCs maintain a "comparative cost
advantage" in their production.
increasingly
demand.

on imports
(Dohan

In other words they should rely

to satisfy

a growing share of domestic

1979, P.345).3

At the same time, one should

observe an increase in the export-domestic ratios of those products
in

w hich

they

have

"com parative

cost"

advantages

in

their

production.
S ix th :

Finally, I will look at the international investments in

E astern Europe and try to establish any pattern of sim ilarity or
d is s im ila rity

b etw een

such

in v e stm e n ts

and

in te rn a tio n a l

investments in the "intermediate" countries.

5.1.

East-W est Econom ic Relations:
As was mentioned previously, in the late

1970s

the

com bination

of

both

external

and

1960s and early
internal

factors

compelled E ast European countries to participate in the international
division of labor.

In the East, rates of growth of national product,

industrial production and capital and labor productivity had begun to
Since DCs mainly export industrial goods, I assume they have a
comparative advantage in production o f those goods.
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fall from the significant levels which they achieved in the previous
decades.

The East European economists and policymakers perceived

these problems as a consequence of movement of these countries
from the extensive to the intensive phase of economic development.
According to Bomstein (1979, P.292), "this diagnosis led initially to
the prescription that 'reform' of the domestic economic system could
improve economic performance from available resources—through . .
. 'decentralization.'”

The decentralization was, however, rejected in

the most of these countries, with the exception of Hungary, where an
"economic decentralization" policy was implemented to a significant
e x te n t.4
th eir

Consequently, the East European countries, in order to solve

problem s,

paid

greater

attention

to

the

establishm ent

of

extensive economic relations with the Western countries.
In the West, by the mid 1950s a gradual thaw in the 'Cold War'
situation had started.

In the 1960s such a change coupled with the

conditions of prosperity in the W estern economies stimulated lively
competition among the Western firm s in regard to penetrating into
the Eastern markets.

As a result Eastern Europe imports from the

W est climbed from $6 billion in 1970 to over $26 billion, and their
exports to the West increased from $6 billion in 1970 to over $17
billion in 1975. 5 (See Table (1) all tables can be found at the end of
this chapter).
4

5

From 1970 to 1975, the Soviet Union's imports from

In Bomstein's account, 'economic decentralization' envisions ''a greater
role for domestic and foreign market forces in determining the
composition o f output, the allocation o f resources, and even the distribution
o f income." (Ibid., p. 293)
Including the Soviet Union.
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the West rose from $2.4 billion to $11.8 billion, and its exports to the
West from $2.4 to $8 billion.
The development of East-W est trade was, however, interrupted
by inflation and recession in the West.

Although in 1980 imports to

Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) from the West climbed to
$47 billion and exports to the West rose to $46.8 billion, much of
such increase must be attributed to price increases.

For example, as

Table (2) indicates between 1976 and 1980, the volume of East
European countries' exports to OECD was increasing but at a declining
rate every year, except for 1978 and 1979 which remained constant;
during the same period, East Europoean countries' volume of imports
from OECD showed a fluctuating trend.

From 1975 to 1976 the

volume of imports increased by 13%; in 1977 it however decreased
by 9%; in 1978 it showed a 9% increase and in 1979 it declined again.
As the same table indicates, at the same time interval the prices of
East European countries' imports and exports were increasing almost
every year at an increasing rate, and in alm ost every year the
increase in prices surpassed the increase in volumes of both imports
and exports.
N early

from

the

beginning,

am ong

the

m anifestations

of

increase in trade relations between East and W est were trade deficits
and balance of payment problems of East European countries.

The

"export-o rien ted "

on

the

from

the

m odel

assum ption

that

im portation

of foreign

increased

the

in order

of

developm ent

increased

pro d u ctiv ity

technology

to finance

w as

the

w ould

based

realized

enable exports

cost of W estern

to

be

technology.
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(Hanson 1982, P.P. 130-131)

Although it was only Poland that fully

embraced this model (Bomstein 1979), the rest of the East European
countries

w ere

under

the

im pression

th a t im ports

of

W estern

technology would generate enough exports earnings to maintain the
balance of payments.

Even though Soviet planners in the early

1970s did not project large term s-of-trade gains, they "may have
intended that these imports should be self-financing."
P. 140)

(Hanson 1982,

Nevertheless, the adverse conditions in the West, along with

the difficulties faced by East European countries in increasing their
exports at the same rate as imports, led to trade deficits and balance
of payment problems.6
Much of the trade deficit was financed through credits, and the
debt levels of CMEA nations grew rapidly, resulting in high debtservice ratios. (Doane, Jr. 1983, P. 12)

Not unexpectedly, the foreign

trade deficits of East European countries had a depressing effect
upon trade w ith the capitalist economies.

These countries had to

forgo planned 'import investm ent,' for they had experienced some
bottlenecks

due

to

reduced

im ports

availability of some consumer goods.

and

had

to

reduce

the

(Hanson 1982, P. 130)

Trade is, however, only one dimension of East-W est economic
re la tio n s;

an o th er

Agreements (ICAs).

dim ension

involves

In d u strial

C ooperation

One important feature of the foreign economic

relations of East European countries in the 1970s included not only

The Western and Eastern European economists cite different reasons for
Eastern European countries' inabilities to increase exports.
(See previous
ch ap ter)
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their deeper involvement in the international division of labor, but
also

th eir

relations

o rientation

w ith

the

Panchenko 1980)

tow ard

developed

long-term ,

larg e-scale

capitalist countries.

econom ic

(Ivashkin

and

The ICAs included a wide range of activities such

as licensing, com pensation agreements (Eastern imports o f capital
goods repaid

by

output

from

the

finished

plant),

countertrade

agreements (in return for a sale, the Western exporter agrees to
purchase East European goods), coproduction, and joint ventures.
This chapter is divided into two major parts.

The first part will

analyze the trade relations between East European countries and DCs,
and in the process I will take the five out of six steps mentioned
earlier.

In the second part I will study the ICAs between DCs and

East Europe and take the final step.

5.2.

Trade Relations:

Geographic Distribution o f East-W est

T rade:

In 1970, four European countries (Austria, Switzerland, Finland
and Sweden) had a 20% share in the Eastern European countries'
im ports from the OECD; however, as East-W est trade started to
expand, the share o f these countries as percentages of East Europe's
imports and exports from the West declined.7

The Federal Republic

of Germany, on the other hand, has traditionally been the dominant

B. Kadar (1982) believes that these four countries could not cope with the
economic requirements o f the imports demand of the CMEA countries, for
example with the buy back arrangements.
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exporter to Eastern Europe and the extent of its dominance has been
even further enhanced by the increase in the East-W est trade.

As

Table

of

(3) discloses, in

1980 about 31%

o f B ulgaria's, 37%

Czechoslovakia's, 38% o f Hungary's, 23% of Poland's and 31% of
Romania's imports from the West came from the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Republic

The East European countries' interests in the Federal
of Germ any's

products

stem from

not only

the close

historical and cultural ties but also from East Europe's high regards
for W est German engineering products.

The fact that in the 1970s

the Federal Republic of Germany surpassed the United States as the
world's largest exporter of manufactured products should also be
recognized as an important factor in the expansion of this country's
export m arket-share in the East Europe.

(W olf 1977, P. 1052)

France, United States and Italy are other important exporters for East
Europe (See Table (3».
T he m ajor im porter of E ast European products is also the
Federal Republic of Germany.

As Table (4) indicates, in 1980, 23.5%

of Bulgaria's, 34.4% of Czechoslovakia's, 37.2% of Hungary’s, 26% of
Poland’s and 27.7% of Romania's exports to the West w ent to W est
Germany.

The second m ajor im porter is

Italy, w hich in

1980

attracted 33.4% o f Bulgaria's, 8.6% of Czechoslovakia's, 9.3% of GDR's,
14% o f Hungary's, 10.8% of Poland's and 18.9% of Romania's exports
to the W est (See Table (4)).

The United States, which is among the

dominant exporters to Eastern Europe, does not purchase much of
their products.

In 1980, for example, only 3.6% of Bulgaria's, 1.4% of

Czechoslovakia, 2.2% of GDR's, 9% of Hungary's, 1.9% of Poland's and
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2.4% of Romania's exports to the W est went to the U.S.A.

(See Table

(4))
The

F ed eral

R epublic

o f G erm any

also

is the

industrialized Western trading partner of the Soviet Union.

m ajor
As Table

(5) shows, in terms of total trade turnover, Japan and Finland follow
the Federal Republic of Germany as second and third trade partners
of the Soviet Union.

The shares

much higher as a percentage
exports to the West.

of these countries, however, are

o f the Soviet U nion's

im ports and

(See Table (6))

On the Eastern side, the Soviet Union, due to its vast market
and its

significant purchasing power, has attracted

Western countries' trade flow.

most of the

As Table (7) denotes, in 1970, about

40% and in 1980, 50% of OECD's exports to East Europe went to the
Soviet Union.

Poland was only a distant second which received in

1970, 12.4% and in 1980, 14.7% of OECD's exports to East Europe.

In

summary, the major Western trading partner of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe is West Germany.

5.3.

E astern

C a p ita lis t

5.3.1.

E u rop e’s

T rade

R elation s

w ith

D eveloped

C o u n trie s

Data and Method:
In order to explore whether the E ast European countries in

their trade relations with the non-socialist world play the same role
as

the

"interm ediate cap italist” countries

following steps:

do, I have taken

the
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1.

I have categorized commodities into two broad groups:

primary goods and manufactured goods.

The primary goods include

the UN’s categories of SITC (0) and (1) food, beverages and tobaccos,
SITC (2) and (4) crude materials, SITC (3) mineral fuels and related
materials.

The manufactured goods include the UN categories of SITC

(5) chemicals, SITC (7) machinery and transport equipment, and SITC
(6) and (8) other manufactured goods.
2.

I have taken the U.N. (1982) category of the Latin America

Free Trade A ssociation to be synonymous with the "intermediate
capitalist" countries.
includes

A rgentina,

The Latin America Free Trade A ssociation
B olivia,

Chile,

Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Colum bia,

Ecuador,

M exico,

(Steiber 1979, P. 36)

generalization, at first instance, may not seem to be justified.

Such
If,

howeve,r one pays attention to the fact that in 1970 almost 73% of
imports and 69% of exports, in 1975, 81% of imports and 78% of
exports, and in 1980, 79% of imports and 82% of exports of the Latin
American Free Trade A ssociation belonged to only four countries
(Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuaea)8

then such generalization

will gain some ground. (See Table (8))9
8

These four countries have elsewhere been considered as "intermediate
capitalist countries."
Frank, for instance, refers explicitly to Brazil and
Mexico as semi-peripheral countries. According to Kaufman, et al. (1975),
Venezuela's extraordinary oil wealth represents "a degree of bargaining
power and an advantage in the international system not normally implied
by concept o f dependency." Consequently, I believe there will be no
objection in considering it a "semi-peripheral" capitalist country.
The
same authors rind Argentina ranking among the 'least dependent'
countries in Latin America, which I believe gives a certain creditabilily to
treating it as a "semi-peripheral" capitalist country.

9

I realize that to consider only these four countries as "intermediate
capitalist" countries is somehow limited in scope.
Such consideration,
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3.

In order to discover whether the East European countries,

along with the Latin American

"intermediate capitalist countries",

exhibit the same pattern of trade that the less developed countries
maintain in their trade with the DCs, I have taken the following
steps:
i.
three

For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), and for
d iffe re n t

groups

of

co u n tries

(LD C s,

L atin

A m erica

'intermediate capitalist countries', and the East European countries), I
have calculated the percentages of primary goods and manufactured
goods in their total exports to
ii.

DCs.

For three different periods

(1970, 1975, and

1980), and for

the same three groups of countries, I have calculated the percentages
of primary goods and manufactured goods in their total imports from
DCs.
iii.

In both steps (i) and (ii) I have made the calculations for

five major groups of DCs, including Western Europe, U.S.A., Japan,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
4.
along

In order to find out whether the East European countries,

with the Latin

Am erica 'interm ediate

capitalist' countries,

exhibit the same pattern of trade that DCs maintain in their trade
relations with LDCs, I have taken the following steps:
i.

For

three different periods

calculated the percentages of

(1970, 1975, and

primary goods and

1980), I have
manufactured goods

however, allows me to rely on one consistent source of data (U.N. 1982, 229)
which has the advantage o f preventing any confusion resulting from
conversion o f different currencies into one major currency such as U.S.
dollars.
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in the total exports of LDCs to Eastern Europe and the Latin America
'interm ediate capitalist' countries.
ii.

For three different periods (1970, 1975, and 1980), I have

calculated the percentages of primary goods and manufactured goods
in the total imports of LDCs from East Europe and the Latin America
'interm ediate capitalist' countries.
iii.

I believe my findings will support to some degree the

dependency

school's

argum ent.

However,

there

exceptions to "the dependency school's 'rules."'

w ill

be

some

I will argue that

these exceptions are sufficient to enable one to reject the existence of
any general and comprehensive rules which govern the pattern of
East-W est trade.

5.3.2.

The

E astern

European

In te rn a tio n a l

D ivision

o f L ab o r:

C oun tries’

P osition

It is the purpose of this section to em pirically
d epend en cy

sc h o o l’s

argum ent

th a t

'in te rm e d ia te

in Jthe

study the
c a p ita list'

countries, LDCs and the socialist countries exhibit an identical pattern
of trade with DCs.

They ostensibly import finished products from

and export primary goods to DCs; consequently, part of their 'surplus’
is expropriated by developed capitalist countries which makes them
underdeveloped and dependent to DCs.

This is a situation which is

not reversible and almost impossible to change.10

East European

economists, although maintaining more or less the same arguments

Due to the persistently unfavorable terms o f trade for LDCs' products.
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in regard to pattern of trade of socialist countries with DCs, do not,
however, believe such

a condition is a permanent state of affairs.

They argue that by importing finished goods from DCs, the socialist
countries will be able to change their position and to move to a
higher rung in the international division of labor.

5.3.2.I. Imports from DCs
If

E astern

E urope

and

the

L atin

A m erica

’interm ediate

capitalist' countries maintain the same pattern of trade that LDCs do
in their trade with DCs, then, according to both the dependency and
the

East E uropean

schools,

these

im porters o f manufactured goods.

countries

m ust

be

the

main

In this section I w ill try to

investigate this subject.11
The calculations for 1970 (Table (9 »

show that the major

portion of LDCs', Latin America 'interm ediate capitalist' countries'
[hence forth Latin America] and Eastern Europe's imports from DCs
consisted of m anufactured goods.

Seventy-eight percent of LDCs'

im ports, 84.9% of Latin Am erica's imports, and 75% of Eastern
E u ro p e's

im p o rts

m anufactured goods.

fro m

d ev elo p ed

c a p ita lis t

Eighty-four percent of the

co u n trie s

w ere

Soviet Union's

im ports from DCs comprised o f m anufactured goods.

However,

looking at the imports of these groups o f countries from different
11

I would like to remind the readers
and the Eastern European economists
methodology is different.
While the
emphasize the qualitative differences
DCs and those of LDCs with DCs, the
d ifferen ces.

that although the dependency school
reach the same conclusions, their
Eastern European economists
between their trade relations with
dependency school ignores such
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parts of DCs changes the picture somewhat.

For instance, while the

main share of LDCs' and Latin America's imports from all sub-groups
of DCs, except those from Australia and New Zealand, was composed
of manufactured goods, the East European countries' main share of
imports from only two out of five sub-groups of DCs consisted of
manufactured goods.

In the case of the Soviet Union, its main share

of imports from two out of three sub-groups of DCs was made of
manufactured goods.
The calculations for 1975 more or less reveal the same pattern
[See Table (10).]

Eighty-one percent of LDCs' imports, 84% of Latin

America’s and 81% of Eastern Europe's imports from DCs consisted of
manufactured goods.

The picture changes again when one focuses

upon the imports o f these countries from different sub-groups of DCs.
While the main share of LDCs' imports from all sub-groups of DCs,
except that from

A ustralia and New Zealand, was m anufactured

goods, East Europe's and the Soviet Union's imports from only two
out of five sub-groups of DCs were mainly of manufactured goods.
They essentially im port manufactured goods from Europe and Japan.
In the case of Latin America; the imports from all sub-groups of DCs
were prim arily

com posed of m anufactured goods, a perform ance

which in the dependency school's context should be considered worse
than that of LDCs.
In 1980, one observes the same pattern.

The major portion of

LDCs', Latin America's, Eastern Europe's and Soviet Union's imports
from DCs was composed of manufactured goods.

Eighty percent of

LDCs’, 82% of Latin America's, 71% of Eastern Europe's and 72% of
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S oviet U nion's

imports

from developed cap italist countries were

made of manufactured goods.

(See Table (11))

Although in 1980 the

shares of manufactured goods' imports in Eastern Europe's and Soviet
U nion's total imports from DCs declined, compared with 1975, they
still represent significant portions o f their imports.

In 1980, again,

while the major shares o f LDCs' and Latin America's imports from all
sub-groups of DCs, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand,
were manufactured goods, for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
im ports from tw o out of five sub-groups of DCs, Japan and West
Europe, were in principle manufactured goods.12

5.3.2.2.

Exports to DCs:

Another issue raised by the dependency school, and in another
context confirm ed by the Eastern European econom ists, is that the
Eastern European countries' exports to DCs consist mainly of primary
goods,

a p attern

that

according

to

the

dependency

maintained by LDCs and 'intermediate capitalist' countries.

school

is

It is the

purpose of this section to investigate this point empirically.
The calculations for 1970 (Table (12)) disclose that although
74% of LDCs* and 78% of Latin America's exports to DCs were
composed of primary goods, only 45% of the E ast European countries'
exports to DCs were primary goods.

The situation remains the same

when different sub-groups o f DCs are considered.

W ithout exception,

LDCs' and Latin America's exports to all of these sub-groups, were
Steven R. Steiber's (1979) calculation for 1973 more or less reveals the
same results.
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essentially primary goods; Eastern Europe's exports, on the other
hand, to all of the DCs' sub-groups consisted mainly of manufactured
goods.
In 1975, the picture changed somewhat (See Table (13)).

It is

true that while LDCs and Latin America continued to export mainly
primary goods to DCs, Eastern Europe continued to concentrate on
exports

of m anufactured

goods.

(Fifty-four percent of Eastern

Europe's export to DCs were manufactured products.)

In 1975 the

Soviet Union's pattern of exports, however, was similar to LDCs and
Latin America's (Seventy-seven percent of its exports to DCs were
prim ary goods).
When one breaks down DCs into different groups, the situation
changes slightly for the Eastern European countries.

W hile they were

in essence exporters of manufactured goods to three out of five of
these sub-groups, they mainly exported primary goods to the U.S.A.
and Japan (55% of their exports to the U.S.A., and 63% of their
exports to Japan were primary goods).
situation changes for the Soviet Union.

By such a breakdown, the
Its share of exports of

prim ary goods outweighted its share of exports o f manufactured
goods in only two cases:

Japan and W est Europe.

W hile LDCs

exported mainly prim ary goods to all sub-groups of DCs, Latin
America exported mainly primary goods to four out o f five of these
sub-groups.
The calculations for 1980 indicate that LDCs and Latin America
were essentially exporters of primary goods to DCs:

82% of LDCs'

exports and 81% of Latin America's exports to DCs consisted of
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primary goods.

They maintained the same pattern of exports to all

sub-groups of DCs, with the exception of Latin America's exports to
A ustralia and New Zealand.

Eastern Europe, however, exported

primarily manufactured goods to DCs and to all of DCs' sub-groups.
Fifty-six percent of Eastern European countries' exports to DCs, 55%
of their exports to West Europe, 89% of their exports to Canada,

67%

of their exports to U.S.A., and 61% o f their exports to Japan were
manufactured goods.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, at the

first glance, exhibits an export pattern similar to those of LDCs:
of its exports to DCs were primary goods.

83%

It exported, however,

mainly manufactured goods to Canada, U.S.A. and Australia and New
Zealand, three out of five sub-groups of DCs.

(See Table (14) *3

Summary:
Clearly, as the calculations in this section reveal, in some cases
dependency school adherents are justified in their argument that
East-European countries' and the Soviet U nion's patterns of trade

The conclusion o f this section seems to be in part consistent with Donges'
empirical study, (cited in Portes 1981, p. 345) Donges categorizes exports
into: 1. Ricardo goods (some primary products), for which production
functions differ between countries because o f differencs in their resource
endowments; 2.
Heckscher-Ohlin goods, for which production functions
are identical but capital-labor ratios differ among various countries.
3.
Product cycle goods: new commodities produced with new techniques
"which are not equally available to all countries."
Donges* findings suggest
that Eastern Europe seems to have comparative advantages in some labor
and some capital-intensive products but is shifting more and more to the
production o f the latter such as non-ferrous metal processings, pulp and
paper. The "industrially advanced LDCs" appear to have comparative
advantages in Ricardo goods and some labor intensive Heckscher-Ohlin
goods as well as some mature product cycle goods (electronic assembly, for
exam ple).
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with DCs display similarity with those of LDCs and DCs (an argument
w hich

is confirm ed

by the

East European

econom ists).

More

importantly, however, these calculations exhibit that there exists not
a certain

set o f rules,

w hich

are

etern al,

unchangeable

and

inescapable, which govern the pattern of trade of LDCs, 'intermediate
capitalist* countries, and Eastern European countries with DCs.

One

may be able to conclude from the data presented in this section that
Latin American 'intermediate capitalist' countries and to some extent
the Soviet Union

manifest a pattern of trade similar to LDCs;

but

undoubtedly

E ast

the

the

category of DCs

E uropean countries,

especially

when

is broken down into major sub-groups, break

the

"rule" and damage the dependency school's arguments.
The data presented here casts some doubt on the "theory" of
dependency of East European countries on DCs, a theory which partly
states that DCs dump finished goods into their economies and import
prim ary goods from them
surplus.

and thereby expropriate p art of their

This is an interesting conclusion and contrasts with the

general belief that in the early 1970s the E ast European countries
were following the model of "export-led" growth
had concentrated

and deliberately

on the imports of m achinery from the W est.14

Such a conclusion, however, confirms the contention that, although in
that period most East European countries assigned to the East-W est
economic relations and in particular import of Western technology an
important, though modest role, it was mainly Poland that went so far
as to actually adopt the model of "export-led" growth as an economic
See (appendix 3) for explanation.
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strategy.

(Bomstein 1979, P. 293, and Hanson 1982, P.P.

130-131)

Poland’s hard currency debt of $13 billion in 1977 out o f total $31.7
billion hard currency debt of all E ast European countries
this contention.

5.3.2.3.

confirms

(Bornstein 1979, P. 297)

Eastern European Countries' Trade with their M aior

EaLUiera
As was mentioned before, the Western European countries, in
particular the Federal Republic of Germany, are the major W estern
trading partners of Eastern Europe.
separately

investigate

the

It seems, therefore, necessary to

patterns

countries with the W estern Europe.

of

trad e

of E a st

European

Such necessity in part stems

from the concern that it is justified to ask:

it is true that E ast

Europe's trade relations w ith Australia, for example, do not resemble
those o f LDCs and DCs, but E ast Europe's trade w ith Australia
accounts for only one percent of its trade with the West?

How about

its trade with its major partners?
A bout 40%
E u ro p e 13

of East-W est

trade

takes

place

between

E ast

and twelve W est European countries of Austria, Belgium,

Denmark, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K.

(Wolf 1977, P. 1042)

It is my

intention in this section to show the com modity com position

of

individual East European countries' exports to and im ports from the

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
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above mentioned W estern European countries.

For the purpose of

my study I have chosen three periods, 1975, 1977, and 1980.
In

all

three

p erio ds,

m anufactured products

T ab les

(15-17),

the

proportion

of

(SITC 5-8) in the total im ports of E ast

European countries from the W est was high.

In 1975 (See Table

(15)) the highest proportion of imports belonged to Bulgaria (93.1%)
and the lowest to the GDR (83.6%).

In 1980, (table 17) although the

proportion o f manufactured products in the imports of East Europe
was uniform ly high (ranging from 72.2 to 87.3), the proportion
declined compared with 1975.

In Romania, for instance, while the

share of manufactured goods in total imports from West in 1975 was
86.1%, it dropped to 72.8% in 1980.

For GDR, the same proportion

declined from 83.6% in 1975 to 74.6% in 1980.
In

all

three periods

and

fo r all E ast European

countries,

machinery imports (STIC 7) accounted for the highest proportion of
manufactured products imports from the W est.

On the other hand,

miscellaneous manufactured products (which include m ost consumer
goods) (SITC 8) accounted for the lowest proportion of manufactured
products

im ported.

m anufactured products

In

1975,

fo r

instance,

the

m iscellaneous

made up 4% of E ast European countries’

im ports from the W est, at the sam e time the m achinery im ports
made up 38% o f these countries' imports.
m iscellaneous

m anufactured

products

In 1980, while the share of
increased

to

7%

of E ast

European im ports, from the West, the share of machinery imports
remained almost the same (39%).

A t this point it is worth noting that
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th e

share

of

'h ig h -tech n o lo g y '

im p o rts,16

in total imports of

manufactured goods from the W est,17 fell from 15% in 1970 to 12.7%
in 1980.

(See Martens 1984, P. 40).

For the Soviet Union the same

ratio fell from 18.2% in 1970 to 15.4% in 1980.
70).

(Martens 1984, P.

According to Richard Portes (1981, P. 33), one reason that such

deals get publicity in the W est is that such attention seems to
"confirm our prejudices that the centrally planned systems cannot
cope without Western help.18
The structure of East European countries' exports to W est
E urope

has

undergone

a

strik in g

transform ation

since

1965.

Agricultural exports (SITC 0-1), for instance, dropped from 35% of
total exports to 19% in 1975 (W olf 1977, P. 1047) and to 12% in
1980.

At this time interval, however, the share o f manufactured

goods increased from 36% to 51% in 1975 (W olf 1977,.P 1047) and to
55% of East Europe's total exports to the W est Europe in 1980 (See
Tables (19) and (21)).
As T ables (19-21) indicate, the m ajority of E ast European
countries' exports to the West consist of manufactured goods.

In

1975,

of

how ever,

B ulgaria's

and

Poland's

share

of

exports

manufactured products were less than 50% of their total exports to
the W est (44.9% and 38% respectively).

In 1977, only Poland's

proportion of manufactured exports to the W est was less than 50% of
16
17
18

For a list o f what items are considered high technology see Table (18).
West, here, refers to all industrialized West.
Cooper (1986) also makes a similar point. He states that in recent years,
"certain Western perceptions o f the Soviet Union have gained broad
currency (due to) sustaining deeply held beliefs in the superiority of free
enterprise and liberal democracy." (Ibid., p. 317)
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its total exports to the West (48.5%).

In 1980, while Bulgaria's share

fell to 48.2%, Poland increased its exports of manufactured goods and
they reached 51.8% o f its total exports to the West.

At the same

tim e, however, the proportion of Romania’s exports of manufactured
goods dropped to 46% of its total exports.

Despite such fluctuations,

because the exports of manufactured products account for a high
proportion of East European total exports to W est Europe, one can
consider these countries in general as exporters of manufactured
goods and not as exporters of primary goods.

There exists, however,

a distinct difference between the type of manufactured goods that
they

im port

and

export.

W hile

they

are

m ajor

im porters

of

machinery from W est Europe (SITC 7), they export predominantly
m iscellaneous m anufactured products

(SITC

8) and m anufactured

goods classified by materials (SITC 6).19

5.3.3.

Dependency on the West and Export Specialization:

As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in order to
em pirically investigate the validity of the dependency, neo-classical
and Eastern European schools' arguments, six steps must be taken.
In the previous section I dealt with steps 1-3; in this section I will
deal with the remaining steps.

SITC 6 includes such items as basic manufactures, rubber, paper, textiles,
yam, fabric, non-metal minerals, iron, non-ferrous metals, metal
manufactures, etc. SITC 8 includes such items as furniture, clothing,
precision instruments, photo equipment, plumbing, heating, lighting,
footwear.
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The dependency school posits the pattern of trade of a country
w ith

the

D(^s

is

an

indicator

of

the

level

(underdevelopm ent) of its productive forces.

of

developm ent

If one accepts this

postulate then she/he has to admit that the Soviet Union is among
the least developed, if not the least developed, countries of the
Eastern Europe.
im ports

As Table (22) shows, the Soviet Union primarily

m achinery

and

m anufactured

materials and mineral fuels.

goods,

and

exports

raw

In 1980, for example, while 71% of its

total exports to the W est was composed of mineral fuels, exports of
m anufactured
e x p o r t s . 20

products

were

counted

as

only

12%

of its

total

On the import side, the Soviet U nion’s imports of

manufactured products were about 72% of its total imports from the
West, and primary products, mainly food and beverages, made about
25% of its total imports.

These numbers suggest that the Soviet

Union's pattern of trade with the West is similar to that of LDCs:
exports primary goods and imports manufactured goods.
to the dependency

it

According

school as a result of such position

in

the

international division of labor, the 'development' of the Soviet Union
is determined by the trends in the developed capitalist countries.21
20

As Table (21) shows, in 1980 in the case of Romania, one o f the least
industrialized countries o f East Europe, the share o f primary goods exports
in the total exports o f this country to West was about 52%; the same ratio for
the Soviet Union is about 81%.

21

One can easily remember Frank’s argument, which states the "socialist
countries are becoming increasingly dependent on the West and on the
economic and political stability in the West." (Frank 1977, p. 124) Or his
argument that "the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will
be importing not only western factories . . . but the capitalist relations
embedded in them. . . .
In short . . . will be and are already importing
capitalism.” (Ibid., p. 127)

320

One can verify this argument by establishing how dependent the
Soviet Union economy is on the imports from and exports to DCs.

One

way of measuring this 'dependency* is by calculating the ratios of net
im ports and net exports of different categories of products to the
actual domestic production of these products.22

The measurement

of these ratios might also prove helpful in verifying the neo-classical
economists' claim that the Soviet Union's foreign trade, like that of
any

other

country,

'com parative costs.'23

is

conducted

based

on

the

p rin cip le

of

If the Soviet Union is taking advantage of the

gains from trade, stemming from

the differences in

com parative

costs, then one should witness a rise in im port-dom estic supply
ratios of those products that the Soviet Union does not maintain
comparative costs 'advantages' in their production.

In other words it

should rely increasingly on im ports to satisfy a growing share of
dom estic
resources.

dem and

for

those

products

rath er

than

use

dom estic

(Dohan 1979, P. 345)

A t the same tim e, one should observe an increase in the
export-d o m estic

p ro d u ctio n

ra tio s

of

those

p ro d u cts

in

the

production of which the Soviet U nion m aintains com parative costs
"advantages;" in other words, a growing share of domestic production
should be devoted to their export.
22

Such ratios have been calculated by Michael R. Dohan in two superb
studies (Dohan 1979 and Dohan 1976). The main part of this section will
rely on his studies.

23

The "comparative costs" in turn arise from "economies o f scale, differences
in natural resource endowment, differences in factor proportions,
locational advantage, and noncompeting imports (coffee, citrus, et cetra)."
(Dohan 1979, p. 345)
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It is important from the outset to establish to what extent the
Soviet Union is involved in the international

division of labor.

An

analysis of the trade data (Table (23)) underscores the increasing
importance of DCs’ trade to the Soviet Union.

In 1965, while DCs

accounted for 18% of Soviet Union exports, their share increased to
32% in 1980.

The major trading partner of the Soviet Union is

Eastern Europe.

In 1980, the Soviet Union conducted 42% of its

exports and 43% of its imports with Eastern Europe.

Despite the

growing share of DCs in Soviet Union foreign trade, such trade
accounts in general for a small portion of Soviet economic activity.
In 1980, for instance, Soviet exports to the West made up 1.8 percent
of Soviet GNP, and its imports from the West accounted for only 1.7%
of its GNP.24

(Cooper 1982, P. 461)

Indeed, as the following table

suggests, the Soviet Union

is less dependent on trade with the West

than W estern countries are

with each other.

Imports to and Exports from DCs as Percent of GNP 1977-79
Exports

Im p o rts
U.S.S.R.

I.3% NMP*

West Germany

14.5%

17.1%

France

12.7%

I I .8 %

UJC

19.8%

16.4%

5.0%

4.1%

U.S.A.
Source:
24

1.4% NMP*

from (Szymanski 1982)

NMP = Net Material Product

In 1980, total Soviet exports accounted for 5.5% o f its GNP and its total
imports made up 5% of GNP. (Cooper 1982, p. 461)
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5.3.3.1.

E x p o rt

S p ecializatio n :

The m ajor share of Soviet exports to the W est comprises
mineral fuels and raw materials.

It is, therefore, important to find

out w hat portion of domestic production is devoted to the exports of
mineral fuels.

As Table (24) shows, the net export-output ratio for

coal was 4% in 1960; it increased to 9% in 1970 and declined again to
6.6% in 1976.

The same ratio for crude oil was 20% in 1960; it grew

to 28% in 1970 and remained about the same in 1976.

One can

conclude, then, that the dramatic increase in importance of oil in the
Soviet Union's export structure can be largely attributed to the rise
in prices.

In the case of natural gas, the Soviet Union’s exports were

only about 4% of domestic production in 1960 and reached 4.4% in
197 6 .25

Obviously, these numbers suggest that the intensification of

the Soviet Union's pariticipation in the internal division of labor in
the 1970s has not been accompanied by a significant attempt on its
part to specialize in production and export of any particular item.
Ferrous m etals also show a trend sim ilar to that of 'energy
products.'

Net exports of iron ore, for instance, were equal to 20% of

domestic output in the 1960s; it only increased to 22% of domestic
output in 1976.

The export-output ratio for chromite ore, on the

other hand, showed a decline between 1960 and 1976.

In the case of

This ratio increased later on due to many gas for pipe deals negotiated
between Soviet Union and Western countries in particular West Germany,
France, Italy and Austria.
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manganese, in 1960 18% of output was exported and in 1976 about
20% of domestic output was devoted to export.

(See Table (24))

Sim ilarly, in the case of non-ferrous m etals, one does not
observe a m ajor increase in export-domestic production ratios as a
result of expansion of Soviet Union trade relations with the West.
For example, this ratio for copper between 1965 and 1975 increased
by only 3% (See Table (25)); in the case of lead the ratio in fact
showed a declining trend:

while exports of lead in 1960 stood at

about 12% of production, it was only about 9% of production in 1975.
The export-domestic production ratio for zinc remained constant in
the period o f study.

It was only aluminum that showed a growing

export-dom estic production ratio.
In sum, the above inform ation reveals that, in general, net
export-dom estic

output ratios for many energy products and raw

m aterials, despite increases in their exports, increased only slightly
as a result of Soviet participation in the international division of
labor, and in fact in some cases, such as chromite ore and lead, these
ratios declined.26

S.3.3.2.

S oviet D ependency

on

Im p o rts

Once a major exporter of agricultural products, the Soviet Union
has become an importer of these products in recent years. Such a
transform ation
agriculture,

has

been

several crop

attributed
failures,

to

"lagging

productivity

and a com m itm ent

by

in

Soviet

For more information about commodity portfolio o f Soviet exports to DCs
see (Kravalis 1979).

leadership to improve the diet of its citizens."

(Dohan 1979, P. 355)

As the following table exhibits, between 1950 and 1980, the Soviet
Union, for instance, significantly increased its imports of coffee, tea,
sugar, rice and eggs.

The Soviet Union, however, imports most of its

agricultural products from Eastern Europe, Cuba and developing
countries prim arily in bilateral exchange for Soviet exports, and
thereby

does

not risk

countries' economies.

'dependency1 on

the

developed

An exception to this trend:

cap italist

the Soviet Union,

for instance, is a major importer of grain from the West.

Every year

it spends large sums of hard currency on grain im ports.—largely to
feed livestock to provide more meat and animal products in the
population's

d iet.27

These imports would seem to increase Soviet

vulnerability to the Western powers' trade policies, such as the U.S.
grain embargo of 1980.

The Soviet Union, however, as M arshall

Goldman (1976) mentions, has proved able and willing to hold down
it grain purchases whenever it feels it is important to maintain its
independence, or when it has no choice.

In 1972, for example, the

Soviet Union imported 27 million tons of grain with a harvest of 168
m illion tons; in 1975 it imported about the same amount with a
harvest of only 140 million tons, a serious shortfall from an expected
yield of 215 m illion tons.28

As a result of such cutbacks, the pig

Between 1950 and 1977 Soviet per capita consumption o f meat and fat
increased by 2.19 times; consumption o f milk and milk products by 1.87
times; consumption of eggs by 3.73 times. (Golrich 1979 and Szymanski
1982)
Due to a combination of serious hard currency shortages and U.S. exports
em bargo.
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herd in 1975 fell from 72 million head to 58 million.

"Thus, despite

its prom ises o f more meat in the diet, the Soviet Union seems
prepared to impose at least limited hardship on its population when
it wants or is forced to.” (Goldman 1976, P. 86)
The increase in Soviet grain imports did not mean a reduction
in domestic production.

As Table (27) denotes, between 1956-61

and 1975-79, the Soviet Union increased its grain production by a
factor of 1.63 times.
The same table also shows that while in the period of 19751979, 111 million tons of grain was used to feed animals, only 46
million tons was used as human food; in 1956-1961 human food

Table (27)
Soviet Grain Production and Utilization
in Millions of Metric Tons

Piodactioa

Utilizatmn

Annual Averages

Feed

Food

1956 - 1961

122

37

43

1975 - 1979

199

111

46

Source:

extracted from Goldrich (1979) cited in Szymanski (1982).

obtained the larger share of grain production.

Such a change, as was

mentioned earlier, reflects the Soviet Union's desire to increase meat,
eggs and other animal products in the Soviet Union population diets
by increasing the animal stocks of the country.

(Szymanski 1982)

It

is therefore doubtful that Soviet Union imports of grain from DCs
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make it dependent on the West.

The existence of quite a number of

major grain producers and exporters in the W est, along with their
tendency to overproduce grain, almost ensures a permanent source
of grain supply for the Soviet Union, even in the case of total cut off
of W estern grain the Soviet Union would only be faced with a
tem porary

hardship, because such cutoff w ould imply

slaughter of livestock.

an initial

After that the Soviet Union would have to

stabilize the availability of grain by storing more grain in the years
with good harvest in order to use them in the years
harvest.
Soviet

with bad

Such action, no doubt, would reduce the chance of the
governm ent

to

increase

the

meat

consum ption

of

its

population quickly, but it would not render it impossible.
The Soviet Union is also a major importer of machinery from
the West.

Its postwar import structure has been characterized by a

large share of machinery imports, 30-37 percent of total imports.
(See Table (28))
machinery.

The Soviet Union, at the same time, is an exporter of

For instance, in 1970, gross machinery imports supplied

about 15% of investment in equipment and inventory, but allowing
for machinery exports, net imports were accounted as only about 5%
of total machinery available for domestic use.29
356)

(Dohan 1979, P.

In some branches of industry, the Soviet Union imports a large

proportion of domestic supply.

In 1970, for example, products with

relatively high import-gross domestic supply included metal-forming

In 1976, the net import-investment in equipment and machinery was
about 13% much greater than 1970. Evidence suggests, however, this ratio
has been falling since then.
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(23%), paper and pulp industries (52%), the chemical industry (41%),
food processing industry (27%) buses (10%) trolleys (39%), combines
(16%), grain cleaners (13%), mowers (18%).

(Dohan 1976, p. 122)

According to Dohan, however, compared with 1913 or the NEP, the
degree of import dependence rem ains relatively low.
P. 122.)

(Dohan 1976,

Furthermore, a major portion of these imports comes from

the countries of Eastern Europe, primarily from Czechoslovakia, East
Germany

and Poland.

According

to D ohan, Soviet im ports

machinery can be divided into two distinct categories:
for factories and mass produced items."

of

"equipment

Equipment for factories such

as chemical, automotive, machine building, etc. come from DCs and to
a lesser extent from GDR and Czechoslovakia (See Table (29)).

Mass

produced item s, on the other hand, come from Eastern Europe and
inclu d e

such

item s

as

v eh icles

and

p arts,

e le c tric

m otors,

transform ers, lifting and transporting equipment, etc. (Dohan 1979,
P. 357)
Imports of machinery from DCs in general represent a small
share of Soviet equipment investment.

As Table (30) indicates, this

proportion has increased since the early 1960s, "but the rise has
been neither strong nor continuous."
highest grow th happened in the

(Hanson 1978, P. 25)

The

m id-1975, when the machinery

im ports from the W est accounted for 5.6% of domestic machinery
in v estm en t.
The fluctuations in the value of machinery im ports from the
W est have been considerable.

Between 1974 and 1975, for instance,

the amount o f machinery imported doubled from $2,094 million to
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$4,184

m illion.

imports increased

Between

1975

and

1976, however,

m achinery

by about $75 million. Such fluctuations, according

to Hanson, appear to be "the result of the exigencies of the Soviet
hard-currency balance of payments."

(Hanson 1978, P. 25)

One may

add to this element the Soviet Union’s ability and willingness to cut
such imports when other priorities arise.

For instance, in 1977 when

the Soviet Union's hard currency indebtedness reached a point which
was deemed to be undesirable by the Soviet government, it sharply
reduced its new orders for W estern machinery.30
25)

(Hanson 1978, P.

In general the Soviet Union's imports of machinery in recent

years, as a percentage of total imports, are lower than their share of
total im ports at its peak of industrialization in
about 55.7%).

1932 (which was

(Azov 1982)

Imports from the W est in some cases, however, are responsible
for a large portion of domestic production.

The chemical industry is

a prime example; the Soviet Union over the past quarter of a century
has devoted about a quarter of all the Western machinery imports to
the chemical industry (Goldman 1976, P. 138).

In the 1970s alone

imported chemical equipment accounted for about one-third of all
Western machinery purchased by the Soviet Union.

Consequently, in

the late 1970s, about half o f the Soviet ammonia output was from
Western plants.
30

(Parpartzoeter 1982, P. 484)

Imports from DCs also

According to Hanson it is not correct to believe that the Western
governments and bankers imposed a limit on the Soviet Union borrowing.
To the contrary, "western governments continued to extend official credit
support for exports to Soviet Union and medium-term Eurocurrency loans
continued to be obtainable by the USSR on good, though marginally
hardened, terms."
(Hanson 1978, p. 25)
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have played an im portant role in supporting the energy sectors;
virtually

all

c o n stru c tio n

the

large

has

diam eter

com e

from

(Parpartzoeter 1982, P. 485)
the W estern

m achinery

producing industries.

pipe

needed

W est

for

G erm any

gas

pipeline

and

Jap an .

Less well known cases are the role that

im ports

play

in

some

consum er goods

For example, in textile machinery, imports

contributed 40% o f the domestic supply in 1976; in shoemaking
equipment industry, the machinery im ports accounted for 64% of
dom estic

production

industry,

im ported

in

1976;

m achinery

in

the

paper

m aking

provided

about

61%

production. (Dohan 1979, P. 358)

of

equipm ent
dom estic

In some other industries, such as

the machine tool industry, although the imports of machinery from
the W est is relatively

high, their contribution

to

the

dom estic

production is not significant; their contribution is estim ated to be
from 1% to 10% of domestic consumption in 1975.

(See Hanson and

Hill 1979, P.P. 586-88)31
In general the Soviet Union uses W estern machinery in order
to modernize its industries.

The sectors which receive most of the

Western machinery include first, the 'high priority' sectors, such as
the chemical industry.

The emphasis on this industry started with

the 'chemicalization* drive begun in 1958, with the idea that the
W estern technology

should be injected into previously neglected

branches in the Soviet economy, in particular the chemical industry.
(Hanson 1978, P. 76)

The imports of Western technology in these

See Hanson and Hill 1979 for the reasons behind such a wide difference in
such contribution.
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cases

enable planners to implement new priorities more rapidly.

(Dohan 1979, P. 366)32
p ap er

and

Second, sectors such as shoes, clothing,

fu rn itu re equipm ent

in d u stries

in

w hich

design,

assortment, and finishing are essential aspects of the final products.
(Dohan 1976, P. 127)

One reason for reliance on Western machinery

in these sectors is that they "received less support in research and
development over the past years compared with energy branches or
metallurgy.
seem

to

(Koves 1978, p. 358)
have

led

to

a

drastic

production. (Koves 1978, P.367)
cases

Growing imports, however, do not
reduction

in

dom estic

output

As Table (31) indicates, in all four

domestic output grew between 1960 -

1975, notwithstanding

in the cases, of equipment for the chemical industry and shoemaking
equipment such growth was not smooth.

S um m ary :
In

this

section

I

have

attem pted to

address

two

major

argum ents:
1.

Some

n eo -classical

eco n o m ists’

argum ent

th at

determinant of Soviet Union import and export structure, similar to a
market economy, is com parative costs which in turn depends on
com parative factor endowment.33
32

(Dohan 1976, P. 126)

Cooper (1986) argues the same point. According to him, the Soviet industry
has a "multilevel pyramidlike structure." At the upper levels o f this
pyramid are those sectors which are capable o f production o f high-quality
goods. However, the "quality o f goods diminishes as one descends to lower
level o f pyramid." (Ibid., p. 318) In recent years, Cooper believes that the
Soviet Union has acquired Western technology in order to raise such
industries as oil, chemical, automotive and gas, to the higher level o f the
economic pyramid.
33 See for example Rosefield (1973).

the
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2.

The dependency school argument that due to the Soviet

Union's position in the international division of labor, this country
has

becom e

"dependent"

consequently

its

"development" is largely determ ined by the developm ent in

the

in d ustrialized

are

W estern

on

the

countries.

DCs

"The

and

socialist

countries

becoming increasingly dependent on the W est and on the economic
and political stability in the West."

(Frank 1977, P. 124).

The neo-classical economists' argument is not inconsistent with
the changes in the Soviet Union foreign trade structure:

a shift away

from agricultural, light industry to more capital intensive heavy and
extractive industries.

Dohan (1976, P. 126) argues that the change in

factor proportions may not be responsible for such a shift.

The

Soviet U nion’s "development" of export capacity, import needs, and
comparative costs can be explained in part by reference to its natural
resource endowment but also by a set of "qualitative" institutional
and historical factors peculiar to Soviet economy.
factors as historical priority

Such qualitative

of sector, com parative

technological

levels, the complexity of the products in terms of assortment, . . .
probability of plan fu lfillm en t. . . . "

the

These factors, however, are

difficult to quantify, but such difficulties should not prevent one
from

"outlining tentatively

instance,

the

Soviet Union

their im pact on Soviet trade."
transform ation

from

an

exporter

For
of

agricultural products to an importer of agricultural products has its
origin

in

the

S oviet

U nion's

"dom estic

policy

p riorities

and

institutions of the prew ar five-year plans" with their emphasis on
heavy industry at the expense of light industry and the agricultural
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sector.

(Dohan 1976, P. 104)

intensification

Moreover, as argued in this section the

of Soviet Union participation

in the

international

division of labor has not been responsible for the Soviet Union's
specialization in any particular branch of industry.

The Soviet Union

largely exports products of priority branches of heavy industry, in
p a rtic u la r

th o se

Consequently,

w hich

one

rely

h eav ily

cannot observe

on

n atu ral

reso u rces.

a significant increase

in

the

export-domestic output ratios of the exported products as a result of
the

S o v iet

international

U nion

in ten sificatio n

of

its

p articip atio n

in

the

division of labor.

On the im port side, the data presented

in this section

reveal

that w hile imports from the West play an increasingly large role in
the

S oviet econom y,

they

have

not significantly

dependence of this economy on the West.

increased

(Dohan 1979, P. 366)

the
In

other w ords, neither have im port-dom estic supply ratios increased
significantly in recent years, nor has the growth of imports led to a
decline in domestic production.

The Soviet Union has gained from

imports of Western technology by enabling its planners to implement
new priorities more rapidly, and to im prove product quality and
productivity of some historically neglected branches.
argues, the
Union

are

capabilities:
crucial."

"economic strength and m ilitary might
based

overw helm ingly

on

(Cooper 1986, P. 342)

shortfalls in dom estic production.

of

dom estic

W estern technology is im portant,

As Cooper
the Soviet

resources

but by

and

no means

Imports are also used to cover
Soviet im ports of grain have

enabled this country to quickly improve the living standards of its
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population beyond its present economic capability; such imports also
reflect the institutional and historical factors peculiar to the Soviet
Union, i.e. its neglect of the agricultural sector, and its inability to
produce all types o f commodities for which the assortm ent, design
and "finishing" are important elements for the end product.
5 .4 .

E a s te r n

PeYfilftped
This

E u r o p e ’s

T ra d e

R e la tio n s

w ith

th e

Less

Countries:
section

is

devoted

to em pirical investigation

of the

dependency school's contention that the socialist countries as well as
'interm ediate capitalist' countries in their trade relations with LDCs
follow the same pattern of trade as DCs do in their trade with LDCs.
In other words, they import essentially primary goods from these
countries and export manufactured goods to LDCs.

The methods of

analysis is identical to that described in Section A of this chapter.
Both Tables (32) and (33) support the dependency

school

argument in regard to the pattern of trade of East European countries
and the Soviet Union with LDCs.

In all three periods of study more

than 80% of these countries imports from LDCs w ere composed of
prim ary goods; and in all those periods more than 75% of East
European exports to LDCs consisted of manufactured goods.

In the

case of Latin America intermediate capitalist countries, however, the
data suggest a different kind of pattern of trade.

The major portion

of these countries' exports and imports to and from LDCs is made of
prim ary goods, a pattern which undeniably rejects the dependency
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school prediction in regard to the trade relations between LDCs and
sem i-peripheral capitalist countries.
Although East Europe's and DCs patterns of trade with LDCs are
similar, the breakdown of their imports from and exports to LDCs
into different commodity groups displays some dissim ilarity.

As

Table (34) shows, DCs* imports from LDCs are mainly concentrated
around one category of SITC (3).34

In 1975, for example, 68% of DCs

imports from LDCs and in 1980 about 71% of their imports were
made up of fuel.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union's imports from

LDCs in large part are composed of food.

In 1975, 56% of its imports

and in 1980, 61% of its imports from LDCs were made up of food.
East Europe's imports from LDCs in 1975 were largely concentrated
around fuel and crude materials.

In 1980, however, a major portion

of Eastern European imports from LDCs were composed of fuel.
Table (35) represents the commodity breakdown o f Eastern
Europe's, the Soviet Union's, and DCs' exports to LDCs.

Machinery and

transport equipment (SITC 7) occupy the prominent position in the
export structures of all three.

While a large portion of DCs' and

Eastern European exports to LDCs are also made up of SITC (6 and 8)
and other manufactured goods, for the Soviet Union it is the exports
of fuel that play an important part in its export structure to LDCs.
W hile there exists some obvious similarity in patterns of trade
of East European countries with LDCs and DCs with LDCs, there also
exist significant differences in

these

groups

of countries' trade

SITC 3 includes such items as coal, coke, petroleum and gas.
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relations with LDCs which must be noted.

Although since 1955 the

share of LDCs' trade in the total trade of East Europe has increased
considerably, it still remains at a relatively low level, and the part
LDCs play in the East European countries trade is less significant than
their position in the trade of DCs.

For example, in 1978, LDCs

supplied 25% of DCs' imports and took 23.8% o f their exports.
(Paszynski 1981, P. 34)

In the same period, however, LDCs received

only about 14.7% of East European exports and provided 10% of their
imports.

(Dobozi and Inotai 1981, P. P. 51)

As Table (36) shows,

these ratios are not identical for different countries of Eastern
Europe; Romania occupies, for instance, the prominent place in the
East European trade with LDCs,35

and GDR receives the smallest

share of LDCs trade with the CMEA.
Table (36)
Percentage Share of Developing Countries
in the Trade of the East European Countries (1977)
Exports
Bulgaria

12.6

6.7

11.9

9.5

7.4

8.1

H ungary

14.4

11.7

Poland

10.5

7.5

Czechoslavakia
GDR

Source:

Im p o rts

Rom ania
18.9
from (Paszynski 1981, P. 37).

Not including the Soviet Union.

17.1

336

Probably the differing importance of LDCs* trade with individual
Eastern European countries depends to some extent on the various
degrees

of these

countries' openness

to

international

trade;

the

smaller ones tend to be more open to international trade.36
There are several factors that explain the relatively small share of
LDCs in the total trade of East European countries.

Eastern Europe

initiated its trade relations with a m ajority of LDCs only after
decolonialization.

The most important factor is, however, connected

with the function that foreign trade performs in Eastern European
e c o n o m ie s .37

Historically, foreign trade has acquired a residual

nature in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

These nations

imported in order to cover domestic shortfalls and exported enough
to pay for imports.

Consequently, they did not feel an urgent need to

expand their foreign trade with the LDCs.

Coker (1984) argues the

same point when he discusses Soviet Union foreign trade policy:
"Soviet Union’s trade with the outside world, and the third
world in particular, is a marginal element in its own economic
planning. M ost of the goods imported from LDCs are rather
peripheral to the Soviet economy and therefore of no great
importance to the overall planning process. Imports from the
Middle East are generally exported immediately.
Imports of
grain from Latin America are "balancing items," for use when
the plan goes awry. There is really no significant volume of
Such an explanation is, of course, only a partial one, because in the case of
Romania the relatively large share of LDCs' trade in its total imports and
exports is mainly due to its deliberate policy o f extending trade relations
with and preferential treatment to LDCs. (Paszynski 1981, p. 38)
This explanation is also valid in regard to the small share o f DCs' trade in
the total trade of Eastern Europe.
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im ports that is integrated into the planning system.
policy could be characterized as a "barter of residuals."

Trade

Another feature of trade between Eastern Europe and LDCs is
the fact that Eastern Europe runs persistence trade surpluses with
LD C s.38

Dobozi and Inotai( 1981, P. 50)

and R. Portes (1981, P. 327)

argues that such surpluses are little help in "redressing their large
deficit with the West."

Much of their surpluses with LDCs is in

inconvertible currencies or is covered by economic aid which will
only be redeemable in the long run.

For example, in the mid 1970s,

almost one-half of the Soviet Union's imports from the LDCs were in
the repaym ent for development aid credits; and its involvement in
bauxite production in Guinea and in the extraction of phosphates in
Morocco will not be recovered for another twenty years.

In fact, the

provision o f credit to Morocco in 1978 was so extensive that it
brought the Soviet Union’s foreign aid figures in parity with those of
the U.S. for the first time.

(Coker 1984, P. 13)

There is, therefore, no ground for the dependency school's
argum ent that Eastern Europe, by running surpluses with LDCs,
exploits these countries in order to cover its own deficit with West.
(Dobrovolny 1983, P. 98)

Indeed, the existence of a trade surplus

should not be taken as synonymous with the existence of a hard
currency surplus.

Szymanski (1982) argues that between 1975 and

1978, the Soviet Union exported, on the average, about 4.5 billion
rubles annually to LDCs, at the same period importing an annual
average of 2.9 billion rubles from them.

According to him, a large

This feature is also a common characteristic o f DCs' trade with LDCs.
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portion of Soviet Union exports were financed through "exchange
agreements,” or the barter without any hard currency purchases by
LDCs.

At the same tim e, the Soviet U nion purchased a high

proportion of its imports with hard currency.

In the 1975-1978

period, the Soviet Union earned $1.4 billion a year in hard currency
because of its transactions with LDCs; at the same time period on the
average it spent $2 billion annually in hard currency in order to
purchase goods from them.

In other words, the Soviet Union ran a

hard currency deficit with LDCs averaging about $600 million a year,
(see also Bozek 1979)
In fact, some economists believe running trade deficits is more
advantageous to the socialist countries than running trade surpluses.
T heir

argum ents

run

as

follow :

the

socialist

countries

face

productive capacities w hich are not capable of producing enough
goods to satisfy the demand.
expanding

dom estic

Domestic supply, therefore, lags behind,

dem and:

such

countries

Kalecki as "supply-constrained” economies,
P. 38)

are

described

by

(cited in Paszynski 1981,

Under these conditions, the functions of foreign trade differ

from those in DCs.

In the latter, exports supplement insufficient

domestic demand and therefore play the prominent role.
countries, the situation is opposite:

In socialist

it is the imports that perform the

most im portant function and supplem ent the insufficient domestic
supply.

Exports, on the other hand, are deemed undesirable because

they compete with domestic demand; therefore, the most important
function of exports is "to cover indispensable import requirements."
(Paszynski 1981, P. 39)

The same arguments are applicable to
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export surplus over imports.

In DCs "a positive trade balance a c ts -

like investm ent—as a stimulus to growth of demand, through the
m ultiplier effect, and to fuller capacity utilisation."

In socialist

countries it is the trade deficit that can assist the country to ease up
its "supply-constrained" situation.

(Paszynski 1981, P. 39)

Kalecki and Sachs express the same ideas about the economic
aid:
Turning now to the definition of aid from the point of
view of the donor country, we should make a clear
distinction between two positions: a) the donor country
has no free productive capacities (as e.g. usually happens
in socialist countries); b) the donor country does not fully
use its productive capacities, because of lack of effective
dem and (a frequent situation in developed cap italist
countries).
In the former case giving foreign aid, embodied in export
surplus, means a sacrifice because the aggregate internal
expenditure (i.e. national incom e less exports plus
imports) will be less than the income generated, which
can n o t be stepped up above the m axim um level
w arranted by the productive capacities.
W ould there
have been no export surplus, the aggregate internal
expenditure would be equal to the income generated at a
maximum level.
In the latter case the picture changes entirely: the export
surplus, similarly to investment, has a "multiplier” effect,
so that the aggregate do m estic ex p en d itu re after
deduction of the export surplus from the incom e thus
generated is higher than the income which would be
generated w ithout the export surlus.
W e may say
therefore, that by giving economic aid to other countries
a developed country with free productive capacities
assists its own economy in obtaining a higher level of
economic activity, (cited in Paszynski 1981, P 39-40)
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It is therefore not universally

true that running a trade surplus is

advantageous for any given economy and under any condition.39
There is no doubt that the Eastern European countries and the Soviet
Union benefit from their trade relations with the LDCs.

There is,

however, some doubt about the dependency school's argument that
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are the beneficiaries of such
re la tio n s.40 The long-term nature of their trade contracts with LDCs,
for instance, is certainly useful for planning purposes in Eastern
Europe; but such long term contracts are also important for LDCs
because

they create

a reliable and perm anent m arket for these

countries' products and consequently assist the stable functioning of
their economy.
clearing

Another feature of these trade relations, i.e. the

system of accounts

based on cancelling out the

mutual

account of each side, is of considerable importance for both

parties.

Such a system not only perfectly matches with the foreign trade
system

of E astern European

countries, but at the same

time it

enables LDCs as well as Eastern Europe to conduct their trade without

39

The "supply constrained" feature of Eastern European economies is
another important reason behind their trade aversions.
It is, therefore,
not surprising that Eastern Europe's trade with LDCs is comparatively low.
"If we compare the CMEA share in world exports to its share o f world
product, we find it is in the proportion o f 1:2. Taken together, its share in
world exports is twice as low as its share in world production." (Coker 1984,
p. 10-11)
40
It appears that most East-South economic relations tend to reinforce the
existing place o f the underdeveloped countries in the international
division of labor. The economic and political advantages that East-South
economic relations confer on the underdeveloped countries are not
significantly different from "advantages" o f imperialist economic relations
between the capitalist underdeveloped and the capitalist developed
countries of the West." (Frank 1977, p. 118)
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facing difficulties of providing sufficient 'valuable' hard currency in
order to import the needed products.

Running trade surpluses with

LDCs, as was discussed earlier, is considered by some economists to
be more harmful than helpful to Eastern Europe.

Many of these

surpluses stem from Eastern European countries' extending economic
assistance to LDCs.

It is, of course, not true that Eastern European

countries are the complete losers in such deals.

They are "inclined to

accept deferred paym ent conditions for that part of their exports
which consist of goods that are usually traded internationally on
credit terms."

An export surplus in these cases is used to finance

imports, but at a later stage.

(Paszynski 1981, P. 40)

In view of the controversy, it is not easy to make a definite
judgm ent on the dependency
economic relations

school's

argum ent that "East-South

are not significantly different from economic

relations between DCs and LDCs.

However, it seems to me there

exists enough evidence to raise serious questions about the validity
of the dependency school's argument.

5.5«_ Industrial- Cooperation

Agreements

and

Eastern

Europe:

The dependency school posits that besides East-W est trade,
another aspect of East-W est economic relations which has led to the
integration

of East European

countries

into the

world capitalist

system is defacto investm ent of MNCs in these countries.

Such

investments allegedly

amount to nothing less than the utilization

cheap East European

labor for the export of

of

goods manufactured in
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these countries back to the West.

The dependency school believes

that the MNCs' activities in Eastern Europe are parallel to the
"transfer of certain kinds of industrial production from
the
W est to certain parts of the underdeveloped countries:
the
transfer of labor intensive industries, such as textiles, clothing,
and footwear, or manufacturing process such as the fabrication
of electronic components, from economies where the cost of
labor has become too high to keep them profitable to areas
with cheap labor; the transfer of some heavy industry, part of
automotive and related equipment manufacturing, and of steel
production, to more advanced parts of South and East . . . what
better strategy than to shift some of the production in these
industries to Brazil, the Soviet Union and Poland where labor is
not only cheap but more diciplined?" (Frank 1977, P. 112)
In this part of my dissertation, I will try to verify empirically
to what extent the dependency school’s argument is valid, and find
out whether MNCs' investments

in Brazil and Mexico are similar to

those in Eastern European countries.

Since the direct investments by

MNCs in Eastern Europe are minimal, and in fact nonexistent in some
of the Eastern European countries such as the Soviet Union, from the
beginning

one

has

to

accept

a

broader

definition

for

MNCs'

investments in Eastern Europe, a definition which covers all types of
econom ic
Europe.

activities

conducted

by

these

corporations

in

Eastern

Consequently, in this part I will take ICAs between Eastern

Europe and the West to be synonymous with MNCs* investments in
Eastern Europe.

A specific feature o f investment, according to this

definition, is that while “equity may be title to a specified share of
output or profits, rather than physical assets which generate them,"
the debt or return on investments may frequently be repayable in
kind.

(Portes 1978, P. 163)

Such definition makes a distinction
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between MNCs' activities in East Europe and those in the capitalist
countries.

In the capitalist countries MNCs' investments entail actual

ownership of physical assets, and return on investments are almost
never, in kind.

Such a definition seems to be accepted by McMillan

when he argues that ICAs are
"the framework for a form o f real capital investment, since
through production and m arketing sharing provisions, quality
co n tro l arrangem ents and o th er agreed p rocedures, the
Western firm is able to play a continuing, if indirect, role in the
use of productive assets within the Eastern economies" . ..
In sum he believes ICAs
"can be viewed as means by which, in principle a Western firm
can exercise some of the- property rights which normally
accompany equity investment. In the absence of formal title to
assets in the East, the W estern partner may nevertheless
exercise some control over the uses allocation of income from,
and disposal o f transferred assets during the life of the
agreem ent."
In this sense he argues, ICAs "can perform some of the functions of
more direct forms of capital investment and can substitute for the
latter in the face of East-W est legal and systematic constraints."
(McMillan 1977, P. 1192)
The ICAs differ from international trade in two important
aspects:
by

a

time and interdependence.
series

of

"once-and-for-all

Ordinary trade is characterized
tran sactio n s;"

a

cooperation

agreement, in contrast, is represented by a contract "extending over
a number o f years."

(Hanson 1978, P.P. 127-128)

Although ICAs

take different forms, almost all of these forms entail at least one of
the following activities:

sales of know how, transfer of technology,
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training of labor and management, engineering consultancy, etc.

It is

therefore not difficult to see why these activities tend to have a
duration

and

a character of continuing

interdependence between

contractual partners; (Hanson 1978, P. 128) a characteristic which is
absent from an ordinary trade transaction of selling or purchasing of
a given product.

D ifferent F orm s of ICA s:

LLL

ICAs bring Eastern European countries
together in a broad range of activities.

and W estern

firms

Table (37) presents the

different forms of ICAs from least to m ost integrated.

In practice,

however, "quantitative research has been hampered by the absence
of a standard definition" for different form s of ICAs.
1977, P. 1181)

(McMillan

Furthermore, accurate classification requires a fairly

detailed knowledge of a given contract and such information is not
generally easily or system atically available.
authorities
W estern

are

relu c tan t

governm ents

C onsequently,

do

individual

to

publish
not

d etailed

require

researchers

The East European

are

inform ation,

reg istra tio n
lim ited

to

of

and
ICAs.

collecting

inform ation based on scattered data as reported in dom estic and
foreign business publications, an endeavor which is extremely time
consum ing.

The m ajor problem , however, is that there

guarantee about the accuracy of data or their classifications.41

Because one has to rely on the secondary sources.

is

no

(Cory
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1982, P. 141 and McMillan 1977, P. 1181)
very difficult,

sometim es even im possible,

As a result, it is often
to

decide

particular deal falls within a given definition of ICAs.

w hether a

It is based on

the realization of such difficulties that, in the empirical section of this
part, I will mainly rely on the United Nations survey and McMillan's
studies which are generally accepted and are referred to as accurate
sources

of inform ation

about the num bers, different form s

and

characteristics of East-W est ICAs.

Consequently, I do not feel it

necessary

investigation

p a rtic u la r

to

conduct

b ecause

a

separate

M cM illan's

and

the

on

U .N .’s

my

own,

stu d ies

in
are

com prehensive and cover ICAs at different periods of tim e and
therefore

allow

one

to draw

legitim ate conclusions

about

their

ch aracteristics.
Regardless of difficulties in classification o f East-W est ICAs,
there are some well known examples of different forms of ICAs
which can be useful in explaining Table (37).

Among the examples of

turnkey projects is the $20 billion Occidental Petroleum contract with
the Soviet Union, part of which calls for O ccidental to provide
manufacturing facilities, pipelines and shipping in exchange for 1.5
million tons of ammonia per year.

(Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 65)

Licensing agreements can also operate without paym ents of
royalties in hard currency to Western firms.

For instance, there is an

agreem ent between a Polish state enterprise and the Swedish firm
Ericsson in which the former is licensed to produce heavy devices for
railway signal boxes in return for payment of half of the license fees
in the form of delivery of these devices to the Swedish company.

346

(Schnitzer 1980, P. 48)

Subcontracting is another form of ICA which

can be used by E ast European countries to earn hard currency.
H ungarian

subcontracting,

for instance,

finishing clothes for Western markets.
of

is

used in

cutting

and

In 1975, Hungary earned an

estim ated

rev en u e

$175 m illio n from

its

subcontracting

agreements

with Western firms. (Schnitzer 1980, P. 51)

Among the

examples o f production cooperation agreements is the one which
involves the French subsidiary of Regie-Renault in Poland.

Based on

this agreement, the French company built a factory in W arsaw to
m anufacture Jelez-B erliet buses,
Western markets as well as Africa.

which

are

sold in

Eastern

and

Machine tools and equipment for

the buses are made in Poland with the help of French specialists.
(Schnitzer 1980, P. 45)
Examples of joint ventures in Eastern Europe include:

the one

between Volvo, the Swedish car m anufacturer, and the Hungarian
enterprise for production of two standard models for sale in both
Eastern and Western markets; another one is between the U.S. firm
Coming

and the Hungarian foreign trade organization for production

of blood gas analyzers.

In this venture Coming is responsible for

providing technology and certain components as well as distribution
and sales of blood gas analyzers in Western Europe.

(Schnitzer 1980,

P.P. 97-98)
There are other types of ICAs which are not mentioned in
Table (37), such as Pepsi-Cola Corporation's agreem ent with the
S oviet

U nion

w hich

illu strates

production and joint-m arketing.

a
In

cooperation

betw een

joint-

1976 Pepsi Cola provided a
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bottling plant to the Soviet Union with capacity of 50 million bottles
of Pepsi.

Pepsi-Cola Company furnishes the Soviet Union with cola

concentrate, under a barter agreement in which Pepsi sells Soviet
vodka and wine in the U.S.A.

The more vodka and wine Pepsi can

sell in the U.S., the more cola concentrate the Soviet Union gets in
return.

(Schnitzer 1980, p. 48)
The

European

in itial

contact

countries

between

usually

takes

provision of turnkey projects.
integrated

forms

of cooperation

W estern
the

form

com panies

and

o f licensing

East
and/or

They then are followed by more
(such

as co-production

or jo in t

ventures in third countries and probably later establishment of joint
ventures in East Europe).

(Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 29)

The

reasons that licensing usually evolves into co-production deals are
not difficult to comprehend.

The royalties are often too expensive in

hard currency, and there exist numerous com plains about lack of
sufficient servicing and/or advice. 42 (Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 29)
The evolution from one form to another, how ever, is not
automatic and depends on "the development of partners capability
and the growth o f mutual knowledge and confidence."
1977, P. 1195)

(McMillan

Furthermore, a careful study of East-W est ICAs

reveals the importance of historical ties in establishm ent of more
integrated forms of ICAs.

The Control Data establishment of joint

venture in Romania took place only after this corporation was selling
its products in Romania for a couple of years.

42

Fujitsu Fanuc of Japan

For more difficulties in measurement o f ICAs see (McMillan 1977, p. 1183).
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had had an ICA since 1974 for numerical process control equipment
in Bulgaria before establishing the first joint venture there.

And the

m anufacturing of "the V utronik system for controlling

industrial

processes" by Honeywell in Poland was made possible only after long
years of Honeywell transactions with Poland.

(McMillan 1977, P.

3132)
The U.N. breakdown of ICAs into different forms, using a
broader definition of ICAs, as of the end of 1978 reveals that the
majority (about 45.2%) of these agreements were concentrated on co
production and specialization.

U.N.'s study, however, exaggerates the

role of specialization and co-production in Eastern Europe.
exam ple,

20.4%

of

co-production

and

concerned with research and development.

specialization

are

For
only

Therefore, only 24.8% of

ICAs can be really categorized as co-production and specialization;
and out of them 21% are related to co-production in which each
party manufactures parts of components of a final product.43 N early
4 percent are

the

type

of co-production

in

which

each

party

specializes in part of the manufacturing product and then exchanges
units in order to complete each other's range of product (U.N. 1979,
P. 22)
One of the oldest forms of cooperation, which is closely linked
with the transfer of technology, comes next:
43

supply of plants and

Co-production may be distinguished from sub-contracting by the more
egalitarian nature o f the relation established between the partners.
"It
includes determining the components o f a final product, drawing up
specifications for these components and distribution o f this production
among the co-operating enterprises, each partner periodically specifying
the volume and nature o f its needs in components." (U.N. 1979), p. 9)
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equipment (17.4%) mainly in return for the resultant products.
form is then closely followed by jo in t ventures
ventures in

any of

the

follow ing countries:

countries, DCs and LDCs (16.9%).

This

and contractual

Eastern

European

The other forms of agreements play

a m ore m odest role, (See Table

(38)), especially

licensing

and

subcontracting which are among the original forms of cooperations.
Such a breakdown, however, does not reflect the sm all number of
joint ventures which exist in Eastern European countries (in 1981
about 99 J/Vs existed in all Eastern Europe).44

5.5.2.

A ttractiv e F eatu re s of IC A s:

For the Eastern European countries the most important feature
of ICAs is

the import of W estern technology.

technology

function is

the

m ajor

E astern em phasis on cooperative
stressed in
subject."

consideration
relationships

official statem ents and legislative

(McMillan 1977, P. 1193)

"This transfer
underlying
and

of
the

is repeatedly

enactm ents on the

In Bulgaria, for instance, the

M inister of Foreign Trade said that by increasing contact with the
West, Bulgaria hopes ”to raise the scientific and technological level of
its production, improve the quality of its goods. . . . "
Kazlov

1983, P. 34)

(Herold and

In regards to the establishm ent of mixed

A number o f reasons have been cited by Western and Eastern economists
for the lack o f Western firms' interest in participation in joint ventures.
(McMillan 1981, p. 61) ascribes such lack of interest to "difficulties o f
integrating jointly owned, and necessarily more autonomous enterprises
into centrally administrated economies."
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companies in Hungary, an Eastern source reported that "the principal
task

of 'these com panies' is to prom ote scientific

progress."

and technical

(cited Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 34)

ICAs are not perceived by East European countries as a simple
vehicle for acquisition of technology, because technology may in
many cases be purchased or leased through a trade

transaction.

Indeed, it is possible to acquire the whole production system, from
feasibility studies to construction of plants through the market.
"A cooperation agreement may also include these elements, but
it extends possible 'packages' beyond the acquisition of a
complete engineering system to the creation of a reinforcing
system of technical and commercial linkages, extending into the
future and creating the possibility o f continuing access to
partner technology" (McMillan 1977, p 1195)
It is

this aspect of "continuity"

European countries.

w hich

m ost interests

the East

Furthermore, these countries hope, by involving

the W estern partner in the operation and commercial application of
transferred technology, to acquire those technologies which are not
usually available through trade transactions.
else,

how ever,

E astern

European

countries

More than anything
w ish

possibility of assim ilation of the W estern partner's
capability through ICAs.

to

create

the

technological

(Ibid, p 1193)

The self-financing character of the majority of East-W est ICAs
is another important aspect of these deals which appeals to Eastern
European countries.

According to Carl McMillan (1977), there exists

an implicit and an explicit aspect of self-financing in such deals.

For

example, he argues the production specialization automatically leads
to self-financing, because it generate some hard currency earnings

351

which usually offset the hard currency expenditures associated with
the contract.

The explicit aspect of self-financing of ICAs, on the

other hand, is the one which is stated in the term of the contract.
C onsequently

"the

com pensatory

provisions

of

a

cooperation

agreement shift the burden of financing to the Western firm."

The

East European countries' pressure to enter into such arrangements
stems from their belief that the Western partner could arrange hardcurrency financing more easily than the Eastern European country
could.

These countries' interest in the explicit aspect of self-

financing of ICAs is reinforced by their hard-currency indebtedness.
According to P. Hanson (1978, P. 138), for this reason East European
planners favor ICAs which guarantee hard-currency export sales and
"usually veto schemes that do not."
Table (39) is extracted from Carleton Sample, and represents
the component elements of 218 East-W est ICAs (Each agreement is
composed of a number of elements).

This sample clearly indicates

the East European countries' attem pt to use ICAs as a vehicle of
transfer of technology.

The elements directly related with transfer

of technology include elem ents

two through

seven,

element number sixteen-joint research and development.

as well as
28.4% of

agreements surveyed included sale of capital equipment, 20.2% of
them included sale of complete plant; about 22% of these agreements
embodied custom design of plant and equipment, and about twothirds

of

them

contained

technical

assistance

(know -how ).

A

separate calculation of the Carleton survey shows 75% of agreements
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surveyed contained

at least one elem ent closely

transfer of technology.

related

to

the

(McMillan 1977, P. 1189)45

It is important to note that the Carleton survey indicates that a
significan t

share

arrangem ent
transferred

for
in

P .1 1 8 8 ) 46

(40-50% )
the

of

paym ent

resultant

the
of

or related

agreem ents
the

capital

products.

constituted
and

the

technology

(M cM illan

1977,

Although the Carleton survey is rather old, it does not

lose its relevance, because it was conducted in a period of explosive
growth of East-W est ICAs.

In any event, the survey shows the

Eastern European attem pt to use ICAs as a means of acquiring
W estern technology without heavy burden on their reserves of hard
currency.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that the Soviet Union and
E astern European countries use ICAs m ainly
technology.

to im port W estern

Despite ICAs’ attractive features and Eastern European

countries’ interests in the im portation of W estern technology, they
are still far behind the 'sem i-peripheral' countries of B razil and
Mexico.

These two countries outpace Eastern Europe in almost all

channels of technological imports.

For instance, in terms of the

purchase of disembodied technology-payments for patent and licence
between 1972-79, Brazil and M exico spent $3.1 billion and $2.1
45

The data on the Carleton survey is based on questionnaires completed by
the Western firms located in fourteen different West European countries
(including Japan). The survey was based on a sample o f 218 agreements
reported in McMillan (June 1976).

46

The survey by the secretariat of ECE reported in UNECE (1975) reached the
same conclusion. The ECE study of 1975 was based on a sample of 207
agreem ents.
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billion, respectively.

In the same period of tim e, the combined

expenditure of Czechoslovakia and Poland, "the largest spenders in
Eastern Europe," was $84 million, only 9.9% of those of Brazil and
Mexico.
E astern

In terms of the transfer of embodied technology, by 1983
Europe

investment.

attracted

about

$64

m illion

in

foreign

equity

By 1983, the amount of foreign direct investment in

Brazil. Mexico and Argentina was well above $45 billion, more than
700 times that of Eastern Europe.

5i5.3.

(Pozanski, 1986)

Geographic Distribution of ICAs:

The propitious economic and political clim ate in the early
1970s which contributed to the expansion of East-W est trade was
also equally helpful in the tremendous growth of East-W est ICAs.
According to M cMillan's study (McMillan 1981, P. 56), every year
between

1970-74, ICAs grew

by 30%.

The m ost active early

participant in East-W est ICAs from the W estern side was West
Germany, followed by France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
countries are also the major partners in the East-West trade.
and Kazlov 1983, P. 9)

These
(Herold

As of 1977, the position seemed to be

unchanged (see table 40), and W est Germany continued to be the
most active Western country involved in the ICAs.

Marer and Miller,

discussing the U.S. firms' participation in ICAs, believe that as of
1976 U.S. firm s and their subsidiaries became heavily involved in
East-W est ICAs and no longer lagged significantly behind their WestEuropean competitors.

(Marer and Miller 1977, P. 24)
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Table (41) presents the relative position of different W estern
countries in the East-W est ICAs at the end of the 1970s.

The FRG

continued to be the leading W estern participant in the East-W est
ICAs, followed by France and the U.S.A.

Obviously, between 1977

and the end of the decade, while the relative share of France and
A ustria declined, that of Italy increased.
ICAs

The U.S. involvement in

is underestim ated because U.S. firm s participate indirectly

through their subsidiaries in Western Europe.

M arer-Miller estimate

the share of U.S. firms and their affiliates in ICAs to be somewhere
around 25% of all ICAs in force, which bring U.S. firms in parity with
that o f their W est German counterparts.

(M arer and Miller 1977, p.

24)
On the E ast European side, the most active participants in EastWest ICAs are the more reform-minded among them:
Poland,

follow ed

at

som e

distance

by

Rom ania;

Hungary and
the

U .S.S.R .,

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the GDR tail behind. 47 (McMillan 1977,
and McMillan 1981)
denotes,

at

the

end

According to McMillan's estimate, as Table (42)
of

the

1970s

the

num ber

of

non-equity

agreements between Eastern Europe and W est was 1367; about 33%
of these agreements were signed by Hungary, 24% by Poland and
21% by the Soviet Union.

At the same period, 257 agreements with

W estern firms were in force in regard to joint projects in a third
47

If one, however, considers the general agreements or protocols with
Western firms (i.e. establishing the intent to cooperate in broad areas o f
cooperation, but not the specific aspects of progress), the Soviet Union
steals the show from other Eastern European countries. Out o f 625 general
agreements as o f end o f 1970, the Soviet Union received 406 o f them, about
64%.
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country; 30% of these agreements were signed by Hungary, 28% by
Poland and 11% by Romania.
Table (43)

shows the number o f jo in t venture agreements

between Eastern Europe and Western firms.

Hungary, as of the end

of 1981, had the largest number of joint ventures, follow ed by
Romania and then Poland and Bulgaria.
ventures in the
supports

m ost reform

M cM illan 's

establishm ent

of

oriented countries

co n ten tio n

J/V s

in

The existence of more joint

these

th a t

the

countries

of E ast Europe

m ain

o b stacle

in

the

d ifficulty

of

is

integrating a m ore autonomous entity into the economic systems
dominated by central planning.

(McMillan 1981, P. 61)

As these tables indicate, the Soviet U nion, relative to the
magnitude of its economy and foreign trade, has lagged behind other
E astern

European

countries

agreements concluded.

as

m easured

(McMillan 1981)

by

the

num ber

of

The Soviet Union is also far

behind the other Eastern European countries when one considers the
East-W est joint ventures in developing countries (See Table (42)).
However,

in term s

of the

number o f E ast-W est jo in t

ventures

established in DCs, the Soviet Union occupied only the second place
after Poland (See Table (44)), followed by Hungary and Romania.
According to McM illan, the Soviet Union's participation concentrates
m ainly

on

"protocol

cooperation.

agreem ents

C om pensation

fo r

technical

agreem ents

in

sem iprocessed goods, and jo in t com panies in
m arketing

of

S o v iet

exports."

raw

scien tific

m aterials

and

the W est for the

(M cM illan 1981,

com pensation agreem ents certainly play

and

p.

62)

The

an im portant role in the
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Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union uses compensation agreements in

order to acquire equipm ent and technology necessary to develop
Siberia as well as to expand production of

certain high priority

industries.

The Soviet Union counts on Siberia's untapped deposits of

oil, coal,

natural gas and metals to support

econom ic

growth.

The

Soviet

U nion

the country's future

also

uses

com pensation

agreem ents to expand production of such industries as chemical
fertilizers, petrochem icals, and ferrous and nonferrous m etals—"in
which Soviet technology lags the West or in which expanded capacity
is needed

quickly."

(Barclay

1979, p. 464)

The compensation

agreements provide several advantages for the Soviet Union.
enable

it

to

finance the

purchase

o f W estern

m achinery

They
and

equipment by long-term government backed credits with "very low
real interest rates."48

Furthermore, compensation agreements reduce

the Soviet U nion's risk, because they guarantee long-term export
markets, "providing protection from development in the W est that
would otherwise reduce Soviet export earnings and hard currency
reserves."

(Barclay 1979, P. 465)

The compensation agreements are

therefore used by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology,
and

guarantee

the

future

availability

materials as well as oil and natural gas.

of

som e

im portant

raw

Furthermore, in instances,

they are used to earn hard currency, such as export of natural gas for

According to Barclay (1979), the average interest rate on these loans in the
1970s was about 7%, roughly equal to inflation in world prices o f the
products to be delivered by the Soviet Union as repayment.
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equipment and pipe in which the export earnings exceed the cost of
im ported equipment and pipes.49
S u m m ary :

The most active participant in East-W est ICAs

from the Western side is W est Germany, and from the Eastern side:
Hungary and Poland.

The Soviet Union is m ainly interested in

compensation agreements, since they enable it to acquire equipment
necessary to develop Siberia as well as to expand production of
certain high priority industries.

5*5,4,

ICAs in D ifferent B ranches o f In d u stry ;

Since 1973 several surveys have been undertaken by 'different
researchers to outline the distribution
different industrial branches.

of East-W est ICAs among

Among the first of such studies are

those of UNECE (1975) and McMillan (1975).

Both of these studies

showed a high degree of concentration of these agreements in the
m ech an ical
industries.

en g in eerin g ,

tra n sp o rt

(Hanson 1978, P. 131)

eq u ip m en t,

and

ch em ical

Indeed, the studies found that

between 36-42% of agreem ents in the samples studied fell into

The emphasis in this section is on the West-East flow o f know how and
technology. Point needs to be added here that the research and
development networks in East European countries do generate their own
applied research results and they often include potentially worthwhile
invention.
According to Hanson, however, indigenous inventions "seem
frequently to get stuck at that stage in the product cycle," mainly because
in these countries there exists a "systematic weakness at the development
and innovation stages.” Therefore, the Western partner to take the
unutilized Eastern research results, "does the development, initial
production and de-bugging and hands back an improved and commercially
viable product." (Hanson 1978, p. 138-139)
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m achine

building

industries,

follow ed

by

transport

equipm ent,

chemical and the electrical and electronics industries, each ranging
between 9-15% of the agreements in the two samples.
1977, P. 1188)

(McMillan

The studies, therefore, showed a high degree of

em phasis on heavy industry and those branches of industries in
which technological progress is of primary importance.
18)

(U.N. 1979, P.

In fact, McMillan's study showed that over 70% of agreements

surveyed involved producer goods industries, and the ECE study
revealed that only 17% of agreements were identifiable as consumer
oriented goods industries.

(McMillan 1977, P. 1188)

As was mentioned earlier, McMillan did not include U.S. firms
in his survey; Miller-M arer (1977),50

on the other hand, conducted a

study of concentrating - only on the U.S. firms.
summarized in Table (45).
degree

Their findings are

Their study also dem onstrates a high

of em phasis on heavy industry, w ith chem ical industries

receiving the highest share of agreements (20.5%), followed by the
machine building industry (18.7%).

The electrical machinery, by

receiving 14.1% of agreements, was third.

Their findings reveal that

all countries of Eastern Europe tend to use ICAs m ainly in heavy
industry.

For example, in the Soviet Union only 12% of ICAs were

related to consumer goods.

In combined Eastern Europe, a slightly

larger share (18%) of ICAs with the U.S. were in the consumer goods
sector.

(Marer and Miller 1977, P. 24)

They mailed questionnaires to 1068 U.S. corporations, and received a
responce from 70% o f these firms.
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Another study by the U.N. (1979)51

in 1978 shows the same

degree of priority in regard to the distribution of East-W est ICAs
among different branches of industries, as was shown in M illerM arer's study.
(26.1% ),

They include respectively

m echanical

and

machine

tools

the chem ical industry
(22.3% ),

equipment and electronics (17.5%) (See Table (46)).

and electrical
In general, these

industries for which technological progress is of primary importance
together accounted for about 84%
industry,

agricultural

and

food

of the cases studied.

industries

and

o th e r

L ight

industries

occupy a much less important place, approximately 16% o f the total.
A
although
num ber

more
the

recent
high

of IC A s,

study

p rio rity
there

by

M cM illan

industries

had

been

(1981)

still

some

indicates

received
changes

distribution of ICAs among them, (See Table (47)).

that

the larg est
in

term s

of

Compared with

the U .N . study of Table (46), electrical equipment and electronics
receive the larger share o f ICAs than mechanical engineering and
m achine

to o ls.52

Transport equipment ranked 4 in both studies.

W hile in McMillan's study light industry plays a more important role
than metallurgy, in the U .N .’s study it is metallurgy that ranks higher
than light industry.
So far, the studies cited in this section have concentrated their
samples on Eastern Europe in general, but it is important to find out
how
51

52

individual

E ast European

countries

distribute

ICAs

am ong

The study is based on press infonnation, supplemented in some cases by
data obtained through direct interviews with firms.
Probably due to the altered plan priorities.
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d ifferen t

branches

of

industry.

As

T able

(48)

denotes,

the

mechanical industries and machine tools occupies first place in four
countries:

B ulgaria,

Czechoslovakia.

Poland,

German

D em ocratic

Republic

and

In the Soviet Union and Romania the chemical

industry is in the

first place with a share of 36.4%

and 39.3%

respectively; in Hungary it is the electrical equipment and electronic
industries which lead among other industries.

The chemical industry

occupies the second place in Czechoslovakia (33.3% ), and in the
German Dem ocratic Republic (14.3), the same percentage as for
transport equipm ent and for agriculture.
and machine tools

M echanical engineering

takes second place in the

transport equipment comes second in Romania.

Soviet

Union, and

It is only in Bulgaria

that agriculture and food industry occupies an im portant place and
comes second (27.3%).

It is clear, then, that this study confirms the

previous studies' findings that Eastern European countries use ICAs
primarily in heavy

industry and in the high priority

branches of

heavy industry in which technological progress is important.

(U.N.

1979, P.P.18-19)

Summary:
As was shown in the previous sections, East European countries
view East-W est ICAs as a means of acquiring Western technology on
a continuous

basis,

and

of easing

hard

currency

problem s

by

providing repaym ent to the W estern partner in resultant products.
Consequently, most of their emphasis on concluding such agreements
is on these two aspects.

It was also shown that the different studies
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conducted on the different periods of time all confirm that almost
three-fourths
goods

of

industries

industries.

these
in

agreem ents

particular

are

concerned

with

producer

building

and

chem ical

m achine,

These are all priority sectors, i.e.

"it is neither an accident nor the result of the workings of the
'law' of comparative advantage [as the neo-classical economists
argue] that the Soviet Union has negotiated a large number of
ICAs in petrochemicals and fertilizers since 1970.
Since the
1960s, the economic plans have called for an emphasis on
chemical production. If plan fulfillment requires an expansion
w hich is im possible to attain (or if attainm ent would
unacceptably strain domestic resources), buy back ICAs can
provide technology and equipm ent of high quality and in
requiste quantity, (emphasis added Herold and Kazlov 1982, P.
66) Furthermore, there is no indication that Eastern European
concludes ICAs, in particular joint ventures, are for the sake of
maximizing profit."
This is a claim made by some
in the third

neo-classical economists and discussed

chapter of this dissertation.

A m ajority

of these

agreements are used to modernize the industrial structure of East
European countries.

There are, of course, some ICAs which are

primarily used in the development of exports such as gas for pipes in
the case of the Soviet Union.

5.5JL

ICA s as A rena of E ast-W est C onflict:

Despite the advantages associated with ICAs, the goods shipped
under these agreements only account for a small percentage of EastWest trade turnover.

(In 1975, for instance, such goods amounted to

only 4-5 percent of total East-W est trade turnover.)

(Bornstein
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1979, P. 295)

The reason for such a small percentage can be mainly

attributed to the fact that virtually all aspects of ICAs from their
initiation to their subsequent implementation are potential areas of
c o n f lic t.53

It is this aspect of East-W est ICAs which is largely

missing in the discussion of East European economists, especially the
advocates

of

an

export-oriented

model

of developm ent54 These

economists tend to emphasize, and at times exaggerate, the potential
benefits of ICAs, and are inclined to ignore the problems associated
with

these agreem ents.

For instance, w hile the E ast European

countries seek to obtain the latest technology, W estern companies
prefer to transfer standard or even aging technology.
1977)

(Wilczynski

Moreover, while East Europeans are interested in acquiring

capital intensive technology due to the shortage o f labor in these
countries, the W est likes to sell labor intensive technology. (Bomstein
1979, P. 295)

In most cases, also the motivation of Western firms in

entering ICAs is to increase their sales of goods and services, rather
than to deepen the participation of the socialist partner in the actual
operation.

The evidence supporting this claim is the large number of

licensing and turnkey contracts, "precisely those form s where the
level of development of the participants diverges m ost,” concluded
by both sides. (Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 52)

The two sides also

often disagree on the specific varieties of models to be made and the
standard of quality control.

53

54

There are other problems, such as the

John B, Holt (1976, p. 77-78) provides a more or less comprehensive list of
the areas of conflicts in East-West ICAs.
See appendix III
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insulation of East European countries and domestic prices from the
world m arket which make it difficult to reach agreement on pricing
of inputs and outputs. (Bomstein 1979, P. 295)

It is therefore more

rational to view ICAs not only as an arena of cooperation between
East and W est but at the same time as an arena of conflict between
them.

Existence of such conflict does not mean (as probably the

dependency school would argue) that Eastern Europe will be always
the loser by virtue of being interm ediate countries.

For example,

concluding an East-W est industrial cooperation takes an unusually
long period of tim e, sometimes even more than two years, almost
three tim es longer than the normal time w ith a W est European
custom er.

55 (Hanson and Hill 1979, P. 59)

negotation

the

opportunity

to

E ast

European

becom e

extrem ely

production

During the period of
engineers

w ell-inform ed

details of technology involved in the agreement.

about

find

the

technical

M oreover, they

have sufficient tim e to examine the details of similar technologies
offered by other W estern companies and eventually to "make the
most rational purchasing decision in terms
output requirements."

of their quality

(Hanson and Hill 1979, P. 591)

and

Furthermore,

in the usual E ast European conditions of scarce hard currency,
"extended proposal and negotiation times frequently "allow" them "to

This number is based on a survey o f British companies selling machine
tools to the Soviet Union. The time sometimes can be reduced when the
smaller projects are under negotiation.
A similar survey about operation of
British chemical firms in the Soviet Union indicates 9-10 months' longer
negotiating time compared with a typical Western client. (Ibid., p. 594)
The study, however, indicates that this length o f time could be somewhat
reduced by development o f mutual trust and understanding.
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receive extrem ely favorable com mercial conditions, particularly if
other capital goods markets were generally depressed."
Hill 1979, P.591)

(Hanson and

The East Europeans' manner of negotiation, their

em phasis on detailed specification of projects, and the unusual (on
W estern standards) negotiation
Western firms as drawbacks.

time, however, are considered by

(Herold and Kazlov 1983, P. 62)

The recognition of these potential conflicts and the attempt to
resolve them a priori will assist in a more smooth operation of ICAs
and consequently will aid in averting future, more serious losses.

In

contrast to the advocates of "export model of development" in East
Europe, some of the W estern authors have fully recognized these
potential conflicts.
agricultural

and

techniques in

J. Holt (1977), for instance, speaks of how U.S.
construction

equipm ent

their bargaining

with the

industries
East,

use

different

and consider the

relative uniqueness of their technology as their strongest bargaining
chips; or as Philip Hanson aptly puts it, the benefits to the East
European countries and deriving from ICAs, of course cannot
"be expected to be available gratis.
Insofar as some of the
burden of risk associated with an investment project to Eastern
Europe is shifted to a Western partner, e.g. by his entering into
a forward commitment to purchase output from the project at
an agreed price or according to an agreed price formula, it
should be expected that something will be charged (in the
terms o f the cooperation agreement) for his risk bearing. The
Eastern partner may be thought, then, as paying for his riskaversion as well as for W estern m anagem ent or marketing
expertise." (Hanson 1978, P. 138)
The

E astern

E uropean

econom ists'

stress

on

the

benefits

derived from East-W est economic relations resem bles one of the
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'm o d ern iz atio n '

school

argum ents

p resen ted

e a rlie r

in

this

dissertation.

Similar to the modernization school, the East European

econom ists

seem

to

m ain tain

th at

b ecause

the

natu re

of

modernization is identical for all societies, then the economic growth
and consequently development of socialist countries can largely be
sped up by an inflow of W estern technology.

This perspective

largely

are

ignores

that technology

and

innovation

not neutral

elements that can be simply acquired from one economic system and
then be installed and used
system.
energy

in

a com pletely

different econom ic

For example, development of capital intensive and highly
consum ing

technology,

even

w ith

W estern

E uropean

standards, in the United States early in the turn of the century was
due to

the requirem ents of a growing economy rich

in natural

resources and capital but impoverished in terms of human resources.
Adoption of such technology by a country with a large source of
labor and insufficient capital would not be w ithout any adverse
consequences.

Furthermore, the East European economists' optimistic

perception of ICAs not only may lead to future losses, it also does not
reflect

the

actual

practice

of

ICAs.

governments frequently complain regarding
joint ventures.

For

exam ple,

socialist

their experiences with

They for example argue that J/Vs actually aggravate

a country's balance of paym ents problem , mainly

because

some

W estern firms sign J/V contracts to create "a captive client that
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w ould

subsequently"

im port

the

W estern

com pany's

products.56

The Western firms also usually want to establish a production facility
that dominates the East European market, and have no interest in the
export of joint venture's products to capitalist countries.
Kazlov 1983, P.P. 48-49)

(Herold and

Dow Chemical apparently withdrew from a

$1.2 billion basic petrochemicals complex in Eastern Europe because
it

feared

feedstock.

poor results

due

to

w orldwide

overcapacity

of basic

(Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 49)

M oreover, the

function

of ICAs

as a means

of acquiring

appropriate technology has come under question recently by some
critics of the ICAs critics.

For instance, under ICAs with Massey

Ferguson Ltd. and International Harvester, two tractor factories were
built in Poland.

These plants, representing an investm ent of $2.5

billion, produce large tractors, when the Polish private farms are in
need of smaller models.
other cases relating
developed
substitutues

a

(Herold and Kozlov 1983, P. 50)

to the

superior

item

In two

steel industry, Soviet engineers
of

equipm ent,

but

instead

had

foreign

were acquired w hich were either more expensive or

technically inferior.

(Hanson 1983, P. 31)

Similarly, in some cases

related to the Soviet chemical industry, the domestically developed
technology was unjustifiably neglected in favor of import of Western
technology.

(IHansonl983, P. 31)

Such a problem has apparently been at the origin o f the Citroen-Oltuit
joint venture dispute in Romania.
Because Oltuit lacked the hard currency
to purchase Citroen parts, the project came to a stand still by early 1983.
(Herold and Kazlov 1983, p. 48)
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A Soviet author in criticizing the above problems wrote in
Pravda "it is time to abandon the idea that 'there are no prophets in
one's own fatherland.'
carefully."

It is also time to treat the state gold reserves

(Hanson 1983, P. 32)

To staunchly advocate ICAs without

considering the possible adverse consequences would result in at
minimum a loss in state treasury.
Furthermore, some doubt has been raised by the ICAs’ critics
about

th e

contribution

of

these

agreem ents

productivity of these countries' industrial sector.

to

increasing

the

For instance, case

studies for the chemical, motor and gas transport industries reveal "a
highly uncertain and possibly negligible role of imported Western
technology in Soviet development since about 1960."
P. 43)

( Hanson 1983,

And the case study of the Soviet chem ical industry, an

industry with heavy imports of W estern technology, suggests that
"labor productivity in imported plants" is typically two-thirds of that
of West European labor productivity in similar plants.

(Hanson 1983,

P.42)

Another set of case studies, which had attempted to find the

extent

to

which

the

transfer

of technology

had

narrow ed

the

technological gap and by inference the productivity gap between the
Soviet U nion and the West, indicated that there had been no clear,
general reduction in observed Soviet lags behind the West in a broad
selection of key technologies between the mid-1950s and the early
1970s.

(Hanson 1978, P. 29)

Nevertheless, there have been case

studies and econometric models which suggest the contribution of
im ported

W estern

technology

to

the

Soviet

U nion's

industrial

development and its productivity has been great, but most of these
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studies have been criticized on different grounds.57

In general,

Brainard (1979) makes a fairly correct statement in regard to the
import of Western technology and its effects on the Soviet Union
economy and by implication the rest of East European countries:
. . Western capital goods are typically allocated to priority
sectors where their economic return may be very high due to
their help in relieving critical bottlenecks.
Such a role for
W estern capital may help significantly in the settling of
economic priorities and the timing of interrelated projects.
Western capital may also help to raise the technological lead of
specific industrial branches; the mineral fertilizer industry is a
case in point.
Apart from a limited number of such cases
where the contribution may be very significant, the size of
Western capital imports points to only a modest impact on the
technological level of the overall economy. The same is true of
the econom y's aggregate grow th ra te —a p o sitiv e though
modest contribution.” (Brainard 1979, P. 100)
One exercise among a series of exercises conducted by Levine and
Green

indicates

that

a

10% projected

total W estern

m achinery

imports in 1975-1980 would generate a slight change in Soviet total
industrial output in 1980, from an index of 126.6 to 126.2 in the case
of reduction in such imports, and to 127 in the case of an increase
(1975=100).

(108, 1. 28)

Doubt has also been raised about the

contribution of Western technology to the expansion of exports to the
West.

P. Hanson (1982), for instance, presents an assessment of the

performance of Polish, Hungarian, and Soviet economies during the
1970s in utilizing Western capital goods to raise exports to the West.
He relates the W estern-imports intensity of investm ent in different

For some examples of these studies and their criticism see (Ibid. and
Hanson 1978).
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branches of the economy and then relates them to the subsequent
grow th

of

exports

to

the

W est

from

these

branches.

Using

Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, he finds that all o f these
countries performed poorly in terms of increase in exports, though
the Polish performance measures were worse than the other two.
N ot all
attributed

to

countries are

the problem s associated w ith
the W estern

firm s'

the

attitudes.

ICAs could

be

E astern European

also at fault in term s of im plem entation

of some

unsuccessful ICAs. The "indigestion" problem is cited as one reason
for delay or complete standstill of some ICAs in Eastern Europe.

The

indigestion is caused by an acute shortage of labor and domestic
m achinery

and equipm ent to supplem ent the im ported machinery

and by inadequacies of planning and management.
P.

103)

These

countries

also

in

cases

(Brainared 1979,

rejected

technology unjustifiably in favor of imported one.58

the domestic
In some Soviet

press articles the decision for technology imports are argued to be
w ell

founded

implemented.

but

they

are

criticized

because

they

are

badly

For instance, one of these articles reported that the

import of equipment and chemical reagents for the oil industry were
abandoned as a result of negligence and corruption.

(Hanson 1983,

P.P. 32-33)
As John Holt aptly puts it
"to view ICAs as arena of conflict implies each potential conflict
constitutes a potential cost, a sacrifice by one or both parties if
agreement is to be achieved, a cost to be measured against
Examples were cited earlier in this chapter.
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perceivable benefits in order to assess the net benefit of the
cooperation as a whole." (Holt 1976, P. 78)
The recognition of this sacrifice associated with ICAs which is largely
missing in the discussion of East European economists, the advocates
of export-led growth, the East European governments on the other
hand seems to be more aware of the problems associated with ICAs,
and it is reflected in the period of time that they spend in negotiation
of different industrial cooperation agreements.

Some

C o n clu d in g

R em ark s:

My investigation reveals that East European countries use ICAs
as a means of acquiring Western technology.

They do not conclude

that ICAs are used for the purpose of maximizing their profit, as
some orthodox economists argue; rather, they engage in ICAs because
of their belief that
the country’s historic destiny and the position of
socialism in the present day would depend, in large
measure, on how we act further. By making widescale use of the achievements of the scientific and
technological revolution.” (Mikhail Gorbachev
quoted in Cooper 1986, P. 317)
These countries m ainly im port W estern technology
priority sectors.

In

the case of the Soviet Union, the

in highimported

technology is used in such sectors as oil, chemical, and gas where the
government wants to
economic pyramid.

raise an enterprise to a higher level on the

(Cooper 1986, P. 320)

I believe it is wrong to view ICAs as only an

arena of

cooperation between East and West, as a large number of Eastern
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European economists see them.

It is more accurate to consider ICAs

not only as an arena of cooperation but also as an arena of conflict
betw een

East

and

W est.

The

existence

of conflict

does

not

immediately translate to Eastern European's countries' loss, or their
dependency

on

proponents argue.

the

DCs,

as

probably

the

dependency

school's

Even the magnitude of ICAs and in particular the

amount of direct foreign investm ent in Eastern Europe, especially
when it is compared with those in Brazil and Mexico, cast some doubt
about the dependency of Eastern Europe on the West.

LLL

M ELCs-anti E aste rn E w w g :
The ICAs directly link MNCs to the countries of Eastern Europe.

Although not all W estern partners in these agreements are MNCs,
"their motivation are those characteristic of MNCs expanding their
overseas operation within capitalist world economy, i.e., a search for
markets for goods and technology, and/or lower costs of production."
(Radice 1979, P. 45)

The involvement of MNCs in Eastern Europe is

considered by the dependency school to be an instrumental factor in
integration and consequently dependency of these countries on the
world market economy.

It is

im portant, therefore, to investigate,

even if briefly, the degree of control that MNCs can exert in Eastern
European economies and then
corporations'

operations

in

attem pt to construe w hether these

Eastern

Europe

are

operations in "semi-peripheral" capitalist countries.

sim ilar

to

their
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In addition to the fact that East-West ICAs account for only 5%
of East-W est trade turnover, itself not a significant amount, MNCs'
direct investments in the majority of Eastern European countries are
limited or not permitted at all, and at the end of 1981 the number of
jointly owned and operated enterprises in all East European countries
was 99 (See Table (43)).

Except for these few joint ventures all other

enterprises set up in collaboration with MNCs are totally owned and
controlled

by

East

European

states.

T he

operation

of

these

enterprises, including J/V s, is as much a part of the overall plan of
each country as any other domestic enterprise.
P.

59)

The

MNCs’ economic

im pact is,

(Szymanski (1982),

therefore, lim ited,

as

Szymanski argues, "to their ability to participate or not participate,
and to scope and extent of their participation."
rate

of econom ic

providing

h igh

withdrawing."

grow th
tech n o lo g y

of

th ese
or

They can affect the

countries

slig h tly

"slightly

d eacceleratin g

through
it

by

(Szymanski 1982, P. 59 and Szymanski 1981, P. 522)

The lim ited extent of MNCs* operations in East Europe is a
co n trast

to

th eir

capitalist countries.

extensive

activ ities

in

the

"sem i-peripheral"

In Mexico, for instance, according to a study

completed in 1970, of the 2040 companies with the largest incomes,
foreign capital controlled 36% of the incom e of the largest 400
companies.
foreigners.

O f the largest 100 industrial firms, 47% belonged to
(Cockcroft 1983, P. 157)

According to Cockcroft by 1970,

U.S. based MNCs alone obtained the control of key sectors o f the
economy:

they owned 57% of automotive manufacturing, 49% of

petroleum products and coke; 33% of paper and cellulouse; 76% of

373

rubber; 53.6%

of mining and m etallugry; 72.2%

of copper and

aluminum; 100% of tobacco; 50% o f industrial chemicals; 46.8% of
food and beverages; 86.4% of chemicals and pharmaceuticals; 50% of
electrical

m achinery;

52%

of

nonelectrical

m achinery;

64%

of

transportation equipment; 88% of computers and office equipment;
53.4% of commerce; 38.9% of construction materials.
P. 158)

(Cockcroft 1983,

These corporations, Cockcroft argues, are concentrated in

more dynamic sectors of the economy and the "major contributiors to
Mexico's high GNP growth rates in 1950s and 1960s."
Gereffi (1982) observes a similar situation in Brazil.

Evans and
In 1972, for

instance, 32% of food, 44% of textiles, 25% of metal fabrication, 22%
of nonm etalic ores, 69% of chem icals, 100% of rubber, 74% of
nonelectrical machinery, 84%

of transporation

and 50%

of total

manufacturing of the 300 largest manufacturing firms in Brazil were
owned and controlled by foreigners.

(Evans and Gereffi 1982, P.

138)

In sum, they argue in both Brazil and Mexico MNCs are not

only

concentrated

in

the

leading

industries,

but

w ithin

industries they are also predominant among the leading firms.
same point is raised by Baer (1983, P. 175) about Brazil.

these
The

He points

out that within the manufacturing sector, foreign investments were
concentrated in those sectors which experienced the highest growth
rates within the Brazilian economy.

(See Table (49))

MNCs' control over key sectors o f industries in Brazil and
M exico

m akes

these

countries

extrem ely

vulnerable

to

these

corporations' behavior, which in turn is determined by the changes
in the world capitalist market.

Especially if one considers that any
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major decision by a subsidiary of a MNC, in particular in regard to
expansion or reduction of output, is not influenced only by the
conditions of local markets, but also by the general conditions under
which its parent company operates.
The effect of MNCs on the growth rate of the GNP in the semi
peripheral capitalist countries is not limited to their control of the
manufacturing sector.

Their effect is enhanced through their control

over these countries' exports and imports.

According to Evans and

Gereffi, in 1972, in both Brazil and Mexico, 85% of all manufactured
exports were concentrated in ju st four industries:
equipm ent,
chemicals.

electrical

m achinery,

n o n -electrical

transportation
m achinery

and

These are, of course, among the most dynamic sectors of

the manufacturing sector, and are largely owned by foreign interests.
In

all

these

industries,

except chem icals,

accounted for by MNCs' intercompany sales.

80%

of exports

are

In the case of chemicals,

55 to 65 percent of total exports are considered as intercompany
sales.

In other words, most of a M NCs exports are accounted for by

sales to affiliates, and the percentage of these sales as a share of total
exports has been generally increasing over time.

(See Table (50))

Hence, one can easily confirm Evan and Gereffi's conclusion that
MNCs’ exports in key industries are
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Table (50)
M anufacturing Sector
Percentage of Exports that are Intercompany Sales
Brazil
Mexico
Source:

1960
69

1966
62

1972
73

56

75

82

Evans and Gereffi (1982, P. 14)

"largely dependent on the willingness of the" parent company "to
buy or allocate production from its Brazilian or Mexican subsidiary.
This source of revenues becomes quite vulnerable in the event of a
general slowdown in demand or oversupply."
1982, P.

147)

Furtherm ore, they

(Evans and Gereffi

argue that the Brazilian

and

M exican involvem ent in building substantial manufacturing capacity,
highly geared to exports, intensifies their vulnerability, in particular
because many of these products are not "homogeneous commodities"
that can be sold in many markets and specific marketing channels
are required for their exports.

"Since there is really only one

customer for Pinto engines, the country that exports Pinto engines is
in at least this sense more vulnerable than the one that exports
coffee or silver."

(Evans and Gereffi 1982, P. 149)

Specialization and

co-production also take place between Eastern European countries
and Western firms'.

However, the nature of such specializations is

different in as much as they are based on agreements and generally
all details of a deal including volume and price are specified in the
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agreement.

This procedure is quite different from the one followed

by an affiliate of MNCs in Brazil and/or Mexico, where, for example,
it produces Pinto engines for which volume and price are determined
by the parent company.
On the im port side, the foreign owned corporations tend to
"voraciously" gobble up imports and export much less than they
import.

According to the foreign trade department of the Bank of

Brazil, the combination of 19 MNCs1 subsidiaries' deficits in 1977 was
sufficient enough to create a trade gap of $661 million.

(Evans and

Gereffi 1982, P. 150)
MNCs are also important factors in the large indebtedness of
'sem i-peripheral' capitalist countries.

A survey of the 50 largest

firm s in each ownership category in Brazil, state-owned, domestic
firms and m ultinational reveals that MNCs are more in debt than
either private Brazilian firms or state firms.

Although a large part of

B razil's foreign debt in the 1970s is believed to be due to the
borrowing by state enterprises, Table (51) at least can show that
MNCs are also to be blamed because they borrowed substantial
amounts.

Such borrowing, according to Baer (Baer 1983, P. 189) is

"another way of getting around profit restrictions . . .

as there are no

restrictions on the payments of interest on foreign loans."
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Table (51)
Indebtedness of Domestic, Multinational, and State Firms
(Brazil)
50 Largest in Each Category
General Indebtedness as % of net assets
1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

Domestic firms

57.0

56.0

56.8

57.0

55.9

MNCs

60.9

57.8

63.7

62.4

52.5

State Firms

47.7

51.9

58.4

59.9

55.1

Source:

From (Baer 1983, P. 191).

C ertainly

E ast European

countries’ expansion

o f econom ic

relations with W estern countries, including MNCs, was instrumental
in

their

increasing

indebtedness

to

the

W est.

However,

their

combined debt at its peak in 1980 was about $46 billion and they
managed to bring it down to $33 billion in 1984.
22)

(Fulton, Jr. 1985, P.

In 1978, Brazil alone owed $31 billion (Frieden 1981) which

reached to $84 billion in December 1982 (Baer 1983, P. 164) and in
1979 M exico’s external debt was nearly $30 billion, (Frieden 1981)
and (at the time of writing this dissertation) it appears neither one of
these countries is likely to be successful in solving the problem of
their external debt in the near future.

In brief, then, while MNCs can

only slightly influence the economic growth of Eastern European
countries, their realm of influence in the "semi-peripheral" capitalist
countries is much more extensive:
growth

they can directly affect the rate of

o f the GNP in particular through

their

control on

the
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manufacturing sectors as well as on imports and exports of these
countries.

Furthermore, by their contribution to the foreign-debt of

'sem i-peripheral'

cap italist countries,

governm ent policies, especially

MNCs

can

influence

major

those related to consum ption and

in v estm en t.
It is generally perceived that the m ost im portant feature of
East-W est ICAs for the

East European

countries

is transfer

of

technology, although at the same time it is argued that such a feature
raises the danger of "dependence" on the West.

There is, however, a

substantial difference between the possibility of "dependency"

of

Eastern European countries on the Western technology and that of
'semi-peripheral' capitalist countries.

The CMEA countries accounted

for at least 80 percent of all researchers on the European continent
and also for 53 percent of all spending by European countries on
research and development. (Stepanov 1981, P. 48)

These countries,

therefore, prim arily rely on their own scientific, engineering and
research

development, and the im ported technology can only

considered as a marginal factor in their development.

be

This situation

is in a sharp contrast to what exists, for instance, in Brazil, where the
rate

of

grow th

agreem ents

w ith

is

prim arily

a

transnationals."

"product

of jo in t

(Szym anski

technological

1981,

P.

522)

According to Baer, the MNCs’ affiliates' expenditures on research and
development in Brazil are relatively insignificant.

They

"allocate about one-fifth the expenditures to research and
developm ent that their parents do . . .
if m ultinationals
allocated to research and developm ent in B razil the same
proportion of local sales as they do in the U nited States,
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Brazilian expenditures would have been almost $150 million in
1972 instead of $30 million" (cited in Baer 1983, P. 192)
One should add that out of this amount a larger part probably is
devoted to quality control than to development of new technology,
because, although many MNCs maintain some kind of laboratories in
the host countries, these labs are usually part of their quality control
activities rather than part of their effort to engage in genuine
technology development.

(Baer 1983, P. 184)

According to Radice (1979), the following conclusions could be
drawn from the expanding literature on the transfer of technology
from DCs to LDCs.

The application of technology involves a package

of hardware and software, and decomposed elements of this package
can only be transferred separately if the recipient of technology has
the capacity to repackage these elements.

M oreover, the recipient

countries in order to avoid dependence on imported technology, must
not only develop their technological capabilities, but also must avoid
the packaged transfer of technology.

Furtherm ore, a technology

differs from a produced commodity in the sense that informational
requirem ents

of

its

m arket

are

in trin sically

unattainable

and

consequently its price can only be determ ined through bargaining
between buyers and sellers.
"E astern

b arg ain in g

Given the above, Radice argues that:

pow er

v is-a-v is

M NCs

is

undo u b ted ly

qualitatively greater than that of the typical southern technology
recipient in terms of m arket possibilities,
cap ab ilities,
resources."
E uropean

and

the

in stitu tio n al

technology

concentration

of

assessment
bargaining

Moreover, given the level of development of Eastern
countries,

they

are

able

to

purchase

"unpackaged"
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technology and
(Radice

to

operate

1979, P. 46)

and reproduce specific

technologies.

Consequently, although Eastern European

countries have chosen to purchase technology from the West, it is
unlikely

that

they

w ill

become

dependent

on

such

technology

tran sfer.
Radice also raises some more interesting points in regard to
transfer of technology. He argues that
"technology cannot be isolated from the social relations of
production, it does not in the last analysis determine those
relations except at a very abstract level, and at the same time
it is not something external to economic processes which can be
chosen 'off the s e lf as production-function theory suggests.
Thus . . . no assumption can be made about the universal
applicability of any given innovation system, such as that
characteristic of market economies.” (Radice 1979, P. 47)
However, given the present world conditions and the decisions of
socialist countries to acquire Western technology, one can add that
they have more possibility and potentiality to assimilate technology
successfully and to articulate it into related industries and direct it
toward the requirements of their economies.
MNCs are also
their weaker

usually blamed for some other difficulties facing

partners.For instance, MNCs are

believed to inhibit the

development of local firms which do not have technological and
financial means to compete with these corporations.
185)

(Baer 1983, P.

This condition cannot be said to apply to the East European

countries' relations with MNCs, since these corporations’ activities are
lim ited

by

the

contracts

set forw ard

countries and agreed to by MNCs.

by

the

E astern

European

These corporations' method of
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entry into the

host countries is also believed to contribute to the

displacement of local firms.
over 60%

of

In Brazil, for instance, in the early

new m anufacturing

established by acquisition
form ation
U.S.

formed.

of

U.S.

MNCs were

of local existing firm s as opposed to

or reorganization.59

MNCs entering

affiliates

1970s

In Mexico, about three-quarters of

affiliates w ere

acquired

(Evans and Gereffi 1982, P. 140)

rather

than

newly

Some economists argue

that such acquisitions are advantageous to Brazilian economy, since
MNCs possess superior technology, permitting greater efficiency.

A

study of sixteen takeovers in Central America, however, shows that
only in about one-half of the acquired firms some post-acquisition
changes in production were made by MNCs.
1979)

N ew farm er's

study

indicates the same trend.
acquired were

of the

In fact, he argues

technologically

(NewfarmeT 1979,P. 27)

B razilian

(Cited in Newfarmer
electrical

industry

that "many

sophisticated p rio r to

firm s

acquisition."

The displacement of the local firms, along

with MNCs' concentration on the key sectors of industries ,tend "to
transfer the decision-m aking focus concerning level of investment
and production abroad."

(Baer 1983, P. 185)

One may not agree

with this argument, but the point is that such a condition, which may
be applicable to the "sem i-peripheral" capitalist countries, is not
relevant to the Eatem European countries.60
59

According to Newfarmer (1979), more than one-third o f U.S. based MNCs
established in Brazil to 1975 were acquisition.

60

For a brilliant study of the effects of stagflation on Eastern Europe see
Portes 1980.
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In brief, although East European countries are to some degree
amenable to the policies of the MNCs, the manners in which their
econom ies are organized, i.e. centralized economic planning
monopoly

and

of foreign trade, m itigate or/and totally elim inate the

adverse effects of establishing close links with these corporations;
these are the adverse effects which seems to be the inevitable
outcome of constituting such links for the "semi-peripheral" capitalist
countries.
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Tibi* ( l)
lastera loropoaa Trad* with tfea Industrialized Wwt
(in M illion of US. Dollars)
1331

ism

iaaa

2.401
027
672
1,061
737
584
301

11,667
5,266
1.697
3.022
1,789
1,754
1,046

24,265*
6,137
3.625
5,662
2.728
3.120
1.491

T 673

26,671

47,075

U^SJL
Poland
Romania
GJJJt
Czadmiavakis
Hungary
Bulgaria

2.453
996
514
927
674
507
215

5,063
2.956
1,450
2,309
1,530
1,203
325

26,961*
5,344
3.055
5.153
2.972
2.645
725

Total

6,286

17.836

46,878

laporta ftgaJtot
USSS.
Poland
Romania
GDJt.
Csacboaiafvakia
Hungary
Bulgaria
Total

ttporta to Wrrt

•Sourco: inf. (1962).
Source Extract*! from Harold and Kazlov <1963), p. 10.
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Table (2)
Trends in East-West Trade

Period
1975
1976
1977
1976
1979
1960

Eastern Europe im ports from OECD Eastern Europe exports to OECD
Percent Change
Percent Change Percent Change
Percent Change
in Volume
in Prices
in Volume
in Prices
20

13
-9

9
1

3

32
5
1
17
16
12

Source: extracted from Kadar (1962), p. 335.

4
4

6
17
12

1
1

14
35

-3

19

15
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TABU (3)
Geographic Distribution East European* Conntrles'lmports
from the West (1940)
(Percent)
Bulgaria
Canada
U.SA.
Japan

Czechoslovakia OCR

4
10.5
4.2

Belgium/Luxembourg 3.9
Denmark
.6
France
11.1
West Germany
31.3
Italy
10.7
Netherlands
2-5
United Kingdom
5-1
Austria
7.7
Finland
1.0
Norway
.2
Sweden
2.6
Switzerland
4.6
Spain
2.5
Australia
.1
100**

Hungary Poland Romania

36
6.5
2.2

.35
19.6
57

.2
2.4
33

4.6
H-3
36

.4
10.5
4.2

2.6
1.4
57
37.3
6.2
4.7
6.6
6.3
1.4
.9
39
4.9
1.6
1.0
100

53
4.0
U2

2.3
1.4
73
360
64
4.6
5.0
12.0
2.9
.6
3.4
53
1.0
.6
100

2.4
1.0
13.2
232
6.0
4.0
10.9
7.4
1.0
1.0
4.2
2.7
1.0
1.4
100

39
.6
11.1
31.3
10.7
25
51
7.7
1.0
.2
2.6
4.6
25
.1
100

56
6.4
6.9
95
3-6
.9
6.5
54
1.0
.7
100

•Excluding the Soviet Union.
♦•Rows may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source> Calcnlalprf frm (JO

1974

TABLB (4)
G«ognpblc Distribution Best Huropean* Countries'Hxports
to Ik* W**t ( I 960)
(Percent)
Bulgaria

Czecboslavokia GDR

Canada
5
Japan
2.9
Belgium/Luxembourg 3.0
Denmark
.7
Franc*
6.1
Weet Germany
235
Italy
334
Motherland*
39
United Kingdom
4.4
Austria
6.0
Finland
2.3
Norway
.2
Sweden
1.0
Switzerland
3.2
Spain
34
U.SA.
36
Australia
3
100**

1.7
1.6
25
1.7
50
34.4
0.6
6.0
6.7
14.9
2.6
1.3
32
30
1.4
23
.7
100

•Excluding th* Soviet Union.
**Rows may not add up to 100 percent
Sourc*: Calculated from UH. (1004).

.4
2.0
7.2
7.4
13.0
II
9.9
10.3
03
4.4
2.0
16.4
2.0
2.2
2.4
•5
100

Hungary Poland Romania
.0
.6
1.3
1.7
7.2
37.2
14.0
4.5
3-7
12.5
2.1
.9
35
3.7
.9
43
3
100

1.1
1.1
3-6
3-0
11.0
26.0
10.0
31
05
4.5
50
2.7
52
2.7
1.9
0.6
3
100

1.0
2.0
1.2
.4
12.0
27.7
10.9
10.0
4.7
33
•5
.2
1.9
1.1
2.4
10.7
3
100

Table (3)
Soviet’s Major Western Trading
Partners (1976)
(X) of Total Soviet Trade Turnover
Federal Republic of Germany

4.7

Japan

3.3

Finland

3.1

Italy

2.$

France

2.6

USA.

2.6

United Kingdom

2.1

Austria

.9

Belgium

.9

Netherlands

7

Source: Bozek (1979), p. 511-
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T«M* (6)
ScocrapfeJc Dbtrltmttoa of tft* Strtrt Unioa's
bporta aad Imports to tad from Um Wort
(1940)

P K C H t« (ia p « itB in a Porcoa t of oxports to
tb» Woafc
a * Woat
Fodoral Ropublic of Germany

19.0

16.8

J«P*n

11.3

6.0

Franc*

9.6

95

Italy

6.0

13-2

United Kingdom

6.1

5.4

Souk*: Competed from Coopor (1962).
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T«M* (7)
Cast larop* Trad* witbOICD

<»

Era**

SovtotOnfen
Poland
Gorman Dwaocratic Kopubtic*
Czodjoaiavalcia
Hungary
Bwiwnto
Bulgaria
NxtwUog FJLG.
Socre*: (romEadar (1902), p. 333.

1970

1900

42.1
17.1
6.6
11.7
0.0
9.1
3.0

30-0
12.5
6.4
0.0
6.4
7.7
2-3

—

latwrtt

1970

1900

40.7"
12.4
6.0
12.2
9.9
11.1
2.3

50.1
14.0
6.2
7.4
7.7
9.0
3-9

390

Tabl* (9)
Brazil, M*xlco, V*n*zueJa and Argentina 9
Trad* aa (X) *1 Total Trad* of
Latlii America*
ImportB (la MtWQgOt V,S. DgUarai

Exporta (in MilUogof U.S. Dollars)

1922
Th* Pour Countrios
Latin Amorica

5,634

9,529

11,710

12,632

01)

69.6*

73.7*

is n
Tbo Four CountrlM

29,902

23,633

Latin America

36,734

30,102

(X)

91.4*

75.5*

ISM
IB* Pour CountrlM

65,590

65,752

Latin Amtrlca

92,610

79,000

(*>

793*

♦Latin America as is usod in UK. (1992).
Sourer Calculated from UK. (1992), UK. (1979) and UK. (1973).

92.6*

I i l i r b ( f Selected Good* by LDCs i i i Senri-Perlpberg tr m Cere la Mtlllaa a# U.S. M lir
i H Their h r n i t i i n It llx Total Imports of Those C it ilr lu (ran Cere
1970

DO

Eifom

Canada

JfflL

IDC # Imports of primary floods
5 6 1 1 (1 7 8 * )
I DC# Imports of manufacturedgoods 24815(70,7*)
IDC# lolll Imports
31514

1817(12.111)
12801 (85.7*)
14931

352(46 5 * )
398(S2.6*)
756

2119(20.5*)
4498(60.6*)
7417

5 2 4 (7 .5 * )
6334(91.7*)
6903

554(57.1*)
351(36.1*)
970

Latin's Imports of prlmerpflcods
1284(15 3 * )
Latin’s Import*of manufactured rods 8357(84.9*)
Latin s total Imports
9042

21 5 (5 .6 * )
3515(97.7*)
3809

96 (2 2 * )
330(75.6*)
436

856(17.6*)
3823(78.9*)
4841

1 7 (2 .5 * )
657(96.9*)
678

36(61.8*)
8 ( 18*)
44

E.E.’s Import*of primary goods971 (3 1 * )
E.E.'o Imports af manufactured goods 3065 (7 5 * )
E.E.'a Mol Imports
4066

557 (1 5 * )
2807(79.9*)
3612

33 (8 4 * )
5 0 2 .8 * )
39

175 (7 5 * )
57 (2 4 * )
233

14 (1 3 * )
96(69.7*)
107

36(70.5*)
6(11.7*)
51

USSR’s Imports Of prlmarygsods
431 (1 5 * )
USSR’s Imports of mamrfaetorsdfoods 2422 (8 4 * )
USSR’s total imports
2872

149(6.6*)
2004 (9 0 * )
2226

92 (9 3 * )
6 (6 .1 * )
98

35 (2 9 * )
04(70.5*)
119

5 (1 .4 * )
320 (9 6 * )
341

89(100*)
0
(0)
89

Source; eelesietsd from U.N. ( 1982)
•Samt-partpharp bars ts used la ths dapandanop school's context and Inelsdss Eastern Enropa and Latin America Intermediate capitalist countries.

CN

cr\

m

tikU (IO )
InptHa ir S tlK ld Gee* fry LDCt iM 5 ia ^ P ir lp l« r |* free* K i in MlVllea «f 11.3. Dellart
iN Their Pereenteft* i t the Tntal Imperlt #f Tint* Caantriaa fr«n DCe
19-7.5

J tL

ClESfifi

IOC dlroports of primary goods
17703 (1 6 * )
6607 (1 2 * )
LDCdlmports of menufectured goods 09232 (8 1 * ) 47335 (8 6 * )
LDCdtotal Imports
110085
54790

C*Md»
924 (4 7 * )
1019 (5 2 * )
1953

_ UM

Juso

Austrtll* ind (lev Zestind

915(3.6*)
7157(29.6*)
15388(63.8*) 23628(95.3*)
24122
24773

litln s Imports of primary goods
3772 (1 6 * )
Latin * imports of manofetored good*23432 (84X)
Utln'ototil Imports
27893

600 (5.8*)
9460 (9 2 * )
10269

196 (2 0 * )
2380(17.4*)
744(78.9*) 10400(76.2*)
942
13636

E.E.t Import* of prlmorygoods
2407 (1 7 * )
E.E. * Import* of manufactured goods 11785(81.9*)
E C. * total Imports
14378

1510(12.1*)
10869 (8 7 * )
12466

186 (8 9 * )
21 (1 0 * )
208

USSR'* Import* Bfprtmorffiod*
2628(19.5*)
USSR’*Import*ofm*nuf*etur*dgood»107B6(79.95l)
US9R * total Import*
I34B3

697 (7.5*)
8506 (9 2 * )
9232

359 (8 9 * )
4 4 0 0 .9 * )
402

2165 (67X)
969 (3 0 * )
3231

79(2.9*)
2600(96.8*)
2685

102 (4 1 * )
137 (5 5 * )
247

637 (6 7 * )
305 (3 2 * )
946

2 5 (4 .3 * )
541 (9 4 * )
574

107(75.8*)
2 5 0 7.7*)
141

1160 (6 3 * )
670(36.5*)
1034

2 5 0 .5 * )
1559(95.9*)
1625

386 (9 9 * )
2 (.51*)
389

Store*: calculated from U.N. ( 1982)
"Semi-periphery hereto used In thodepindency echo*!'* context end Include* Esstorn Eurap* and Latin America Intsrmtdlatt eopltollst countries.

I

CO
CTv

CO

T ails ( I I )
Impart* *1Select*! Cwti Ij LDC* n t S am i-P erip h ery * fram DC's la U tlllaa af U.S. D allars
<H Tkelr Perceataya* ta the Tatal Im parts a f Thaaa C asatrtas fram DCs

Cuttu

abu

AwtrcimmwivZMUffli

LDCs'Importsef pHmtryyood*
41775 (17.9) 19535 (1 6 * )
IKs'Importeaf mtnuftc1uredyioditB84l5 (80.7) 99721 182*)
Tatal ImportI of t,oc»
233466
121380

2094 (4 7 * ) 12485
2372 154*) 31926
4381
44930

(2 7 * )
171*)

2047(3.8*)
50293 (9 5 * )
52933

4605 (6 6 * )
2099 (3 0 * )
6950

Litln * Importi if primary yood*
manufactured food*:
Tatal Impart* of im In

J fi-

12BJ2

Canada

-ISA.

9505 ( 1595)
49415 (8 2 * )
59920

1515 (7.8*)
17453 (8 9 * )
19411

805 (3 3 * ) 6832
1582 ( 6 6 * ) 24097
2392
31394

( 21 * )
(7 6 * )

130 (2 * )
5767 (9 7 * )
5923

161 (6 0 * )
45(16.8*)
267

C.E.'*Import**fprimaryyoed*
6170 {21%)
E C.'* Import* of manufactured flood* 15986 (7 1 * )
Total inporlit of *..E.
18440

3550 (1 9 * )
14716 (7 9 * )
456

296 (6 4 * )
162 (3 5 * )
2340

2074
361
807

( 66*)
(1 5 * )

97 (1 2 * )
704 (6 7 * )
237

214 (9 0 * )
17 (7 * )

USSR'* Impart* of primary flood*
manuf*cter*d pood*
Tatal Impart* pf past

2842 (I6 R )
14479 (6 3 * )
17383

1085 (7 1 * )
424 [2 6 * )
1510

101(3.6*)
2607 (9 3 * )
2776

1273 (9 9 * )

6393
17680
24265

(2 6 * )
(7 2 * )

1145 (6 7 * )
169 (1 2 * )
1315

0

(0)

1279

#S*m1-periphery hire 1* mad 1* the dependency school'* context ind Include* [**t*rn Eurep* end Latin America 1nt*rm*dlat* capitalist' countries.
Source: calculated fn m U .M 1982)

l
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T all* ( 1 2 )
Export* af S i Im M Ooads I* I DCs end S sm l-P erlp h ery * la Cara la H flllaa af U.S. Dallara
a id Tkalr Percentages la t l a Talal Experts a f Tbtaa Caaatrla* la Cara

15211

DCs

Euroaa

Canada

JS&

ifKID

Austrill* and Nev Zetland

LDCdexports of primary goods
22276 (7411)13761 (6 1 5 )
LDC4exports of manufactured goods 6937 (2 3 5 ) 3147(18.75)
LDCd total exports
30090
16959

364(65.55) 3737(595) 4444(545) 517(69.95)
189 (3 4 5 ) 2546(405) 779(14.85) 204(27.65)
555
6320
5235
739

Latin'* exports ef primary goods
7596(76.55) 3516(75.55)
Latin's exports af manufactured goods2056( 2 15 5 ) 1128(24.25)
Latin'* total exports
9668
4655

416(96.75) 3023(79.75) 562(815)
13 (3 5 )
762(205) 135(18.85)
432
3792
718

I.E.'* export* of primary goods
1972(45.65) 1657(46.65)
EE 's exports of manufactured goods 2306(53.45) 2073(52.25)
E.E.'a total exports
4316
3966
USSR's export* of primary goods
1576
USSR's exports of manufacturad goods 730
USSR'* total exparta**
2716

1276
578
2261

4 (7 5 )
54(94.75)
57
3
4
6

71(46.75)
80(52.65)
152

31
66

22(34.35) 274
43(675) 106
64
379

10(71.45)
4(28.55)
14
3 0 3 .6 5 )
18(61.65)
22
1
12

Source: calculated fram U.K. (1982)
•Seml-perlphary her* I* used In the context of depandancg school and Inetude* last Eurap* as vail as 'capltallat Intermediate’
countries.
••The Soviet (Men's laminations af export* of primary and manufactured goods do not add up to their tetri, probably because the
exports of those commodities net reported by klad (SITE 9) were large In 1970.

E >r<rti af M k M E n A I f L K i 1 1 E Sem t-Psrlpfeerg* I* DC'* fa Million af U.S. Dollar*
aa4 Thalr Percentages aa Tatal Exp arts a f Tlaaa Caaatrlaa ta DC*
1975

PC?

L K s export* of prlmaru goods
109768(85*)
LK * exports of inanufectvred goods 18609 (1 4 * )
LK a total exports
128767

Europe
57365 (87.5*)
7969 (1 2 * )
65486

USA

Canada

1211 (9 0 * )
134 (9.9*)
1345

7078 (8 3 * )
1402 (1 6 * )
8510

E E 's axport* of prtmarg goods
4909 (4 6 * )
E.E.'* axporta of manafactarsd goods 5775 (5 4 * )
E.E.'s total exports
10618

17
110
128

(1 3 * )
(8 6 * )

242
IB9
436

18
22
44

(40.9*) 06
104
(5 0 * )
191

USSR'* experts ef prtmarg good*
7445 (77.7*) 6500 (7 7 * )
USSR's exports of manafactarsd goods 1793 (18.7*) 1576 (1 8 * )
USSR'* total axport*
9582
8414

Australia and New Zealand

2280 (77.5*) 22539 (7 6 * )
24532(91*)
650 (2 2 * )
6759 (22.9*) 2285 (8.5*)
29464
2940
26862

Latin's export* of prlfnarg goods
15585 (80.7*) 6035 (76.9)
Latin's exports of manufactured goad* 3851 (19.9*) 1776 (22.6*)
Latin'* total exports
19300
7840
4417 (4 5 * )
5341 (54.5*)
9790

Janan

1684(67.4*)
787 (31.5*)
2497

1105 (79.9*) 15
276 (19.9*) 25
1382
39

(3 8 * )
(6 4 * )

(55.5*) 118
(4 3 * )
70
187

(6 3 * )
(3 7 * )

5
37
42

(11.9*)
(B8*)

(4 5 * )
(5 4 * )

(9 0 * )
(9.4*)

3
3
6

(5 0 * )
(5 0 * )

838
88
927

*Saml>p*rlpti*rg hara la aaad In tha h im cantext aa tha depandsncg aehsal and Ineluda* Eastern European cauntrlaa and Latin Amarie* intermediate
capltaltat'caantrle*.
Satire*: ealcalated fram U.N. ( 1982)
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TaMa (14)
[ i f t r l i i f M n M Si H s k« L N i iM S an f-P arlp h a rp * to DC'a to H llllaa i f U.S. Dallars
and T h l r Parcaatapaa to tha T tlal Exparta af Thaaa C aaatrlaa to DCa
1980

JSS_

Csnada

LIC ^exports of primary goods
291199(8251)
135824(9451)
LKloxports of manufactured pods 57559 (16.855) 24231 (1551)
LK i total exports
341274
161336
Ltttn's exports of primarp poods
41800
Litin's exports of manufactured pods 8453
litln'a total axporit
51302

70452(7515)
22546(24)5)
93757

A n a Awtralla and Hsv Zaaland
67375(9115)
6860 (9)5)
73738

4512 (67.615)
2056 (30.815)
6672

(8115) 16515 ( 79.815) 2249(90.715) 19432(84.555) 2544 ( 6415)
(16.455) 4400 ( 20.915) 229 (9.215)
3547 (15.455) 1076 (2755)
20953
2479
23005
3971

39 (26.715)
113 (79.515)
142

EE.'o exports of primarp poods
8848 ( 4215) 8308
EE 'S sxporls of manofsctarsd poods 11687 (56.555) 10460
EE.'a totol axporto
20660
18896

3297 (6955)
1390(2915)
4716

JBL.

( 43955) 17 (8.815) 367 (3215)
(55.315) 172 (09.615) 775 (67.755)
192
1144

(BSR’s axpsrts af primarp poods
22423 (8355) 21155 (8315)
IBSR’s axporto af manafactarsd poods 3673 (13.655) 3185 (12.655)
USSR's total oxports
26995
25225

3
34
46

107
179
289

(3715)
7
(61.915) 81
89

50 (2115) 1161 (7955) 4
183 (78.555) 263 (17.955) 9
233
1464
14

(7.855)
(9115)
(28.511)
(6455)

*5om1-por1phorp hors is usad la tha dspondsncp school's context and laeludsa Eastora Corapa and Latin America intormedtita capitalist'
ceuntrtes.
Siurta: eatoalatod fram U.N. ( 1982)
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Table (15)
Commodity Composition of Individual East
laropoan Conntries' imports from Woatorn Inrope*
1975
(Percentage)

Bulgaria

German
Democratic
Czechoslovakia Republic
Hungary

o-----------— -----1--------------- -----2--------------- -----3--------------- -----4--------------- -----5--------------- -----8--------------- -----7--------------- -----8--------------- -----9--------------- ------

2.6
A
2.1
1.0
.1
12.0
29.7
48.4
3.0
.7

37
5
6.1
1.6
.7
21.7
18.7
394
6.8
1.1

59
1.4
8.0
.1
5
20.7
27.1
32.3
35
.5

4.9
.4
4.7
.4
.4
253
32.0
26.4
4.6

Total**-------- ------

100.0

100.0

5 to 8 ----------------

931

86.6

Poland

Romania

.6

54
I
4.9
.1
.4
10.9
32.2
41.2
30
1.7

4.5
.1
2.7
34
.6
11.7
353
36.0
31
5

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

836

685

87.3

66.1

’ Include exports of Canada and Japan to CMEA (6), resulting In probable biasing of tbe percentages
by less than one percentage point Excludes Federal Republic of Germany-German Democratic Republic
trade.
**Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: from (Wolf 1977, p. 1048).

Table (16)

Commodity Composition of Individual la st
European Countries" 1977 Inports from Western Europe
(in Percent)

Bulgaria

German
Democratic
Czechoslovakia Republic
Hungary

Poland

Romania

o--------------------l „ „ -------- -------2------------- -------3------------- -------4------------- -------5------------- — . . . .
6------------- -------7------------- -------6------------- -------9------------- --------

2.6
5
2.4
10
.2
no
30.4
40.0
4.9
1.1

43
3
6.2
13
.4
19.9
163
41.1
6.6
1.3

7.5
1.6
9.2
3
.6
167
29.3
260
3.0
1.7

4.4
3
50
.4
3
23.0
27.5
325
55
1.2

57
.2
52
1.0
.7
14.4
27.2
40.6
37
1.1

31
.1
2.7
1.7
5
12.3
31.2
43.6
4.2
.7

Total*------- --------

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

5 to »------- --------

923

659

79.0

07.5

66.1

913

♦Columns map not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: from Bureau of East-West Trade (1979).

Commodity Composition of Individual East
European Conntrlos'ImporU from Western Enropo (I960)
(Percentage)

Bulgaria

German
Democratic
Czechoslovakia Republic
Hungary

Poland

Romania

SITC:
o------------- -------1------------- -------2------------- -------3------------- ..........
4------------- -------5------------- -------6------------- -------7------------- -------6------------- -------9------------- --------

.4
2.6
5.7
13
.1
7.7
16.3
537
9.1
2.0

65
3
7.1
13
05
10.6
29.4
36.0
7.0
1.2

113
2.1
9.4
1.2
.01
16.9
232
30.0
45
.9

4.0
3
7.0
1.6
03
11.9
22.2
40.5
10.2
1.6

16.6
.4
5.7
1.1
.04
4.4
245
39.0
43
1.4

94
3
56
10.4
.03
33
21.4
40.4
7.7
.9

Total**------ --------

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

5 t o 6 -------- -------

67.3

632

74.6

64.6

72.2

72.6

•Not Including trade with FRG.
♦•columns may not add to 100 percentdue to rounding.
Source: Calculated from UJ1.( 1964).

T able (IS )

400

List of High Technology Items
7151
7192
7266
72952
71992
6619
7249
7143
71954
73592
7293
7197
71492
6624
7262
71652
73492
691U
6613
71142
7341
7142
6611
72911
7297
66161
7117
-

Machine tools for metal
Pumps and centrifuges
Electrical machinery, n.e.s.
Electrical measuring and control instruments
Cock, valves, etc.
Measuring and control instruments, n.e.s.
Telecommunications equipment
(end. TV &radio receivers)
Statistical machines (punch card
or tape)
Parts and accessories for machine
tools
Special purpose vessels
(incl. submersible vessels)
Tubes, transistors, photocells, etc.
Ball, roller or needleroller bearings
Parts of office machinery
(incl. computer parts)
Photographic film
1-ray apparatus
Glass-working machinery
Aircraft parts
Gramophones, tape recorders, etc.
(Ind. videorecorders)
Optical instruments
Jet and gas turbines for aircraft
Aircraft, heavier than air
Calculating machines (incl.
computer parts)
Optical elements
Primary batteries and cells
Electron and proton accelerators
Image reactors
Nuclear reactors
High Technology Esports
Total Exports

Source: Martenez (1984)

Table (19)
Commodity Composition of Individual Bast
European Countries' Exports to Western Europe*
1975
(Percentage)

Bulgaria

German
Democratic
Czechoslovakia Republic
Hungary

SITC:
o ------ --------- ----1---------------- ----2---------------- ----3---------------4---------------- ----5---------------6---------------- ----7---------------6---------------- ----9----------------

29.1
11.6
6.4
1.9
1.0
52
162
9.1
12.4
50

62
.4
11.4
14.3
3
6.6
26.9
15-5
14.6
1.6

Total**--------- -----

100.0

5 to 8----------------

44.9

Poland

Romania

75
6.6
.6
16.6
17.1
165
17.3
•3

32.5
1.4
9.1
2.1
I
7.0
16.2
62
20.6
2.6

137
.6
10.4
37.0
3
36
136
113
93

16.6
.6
7.6
20.6
33
4.6
16.5
6.3
22.6
.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

636

697

52.2

36.0

50.4

15-1

♦include exports of Council of Mututal Economic Assistance (6) to Canada and Japan, resulting In probable biasing of the
percentages by less than 1 percent point Excludes Federal Republic of Germany—German Democratic Republic trade.
♦♦Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: from (Wolf 1977, p. 1046).

Commodity Composition of Individual Bast
Buropean CountrlM'1977 Export* to Western Korops
(in Percent)
German
Democratic*
Republic
Hungary

Bulgaria

Poland

Romania

S1TC
0-................ -------1------------- -------2------------- -------3------------- -------4------------- -------5------------ --------6------------- -------7------------- -------0------------- -------9------------- --------

24.4
9.9
7.3
4.0
.0
51
27.0
0.1
12.0
1,2

6.8
.4
13.9
11.0
.2
75
299
137
151
1.7

5.4
0
8.7
7.4
5
135
22.9
20.0
20.7
.8

26.8
1.2
9.1
4.9
15
7.8
18.2
9.8
20.6
1.0

14.7
.7
10.6
250
.4
39
156
17.0
10.4
1.4

10.6
.8
50
21.4
33
52
21.3
6.9
25,0
.4

Total**---------------

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

5 to 0----------------

53.4

67.8

77.9

56.4

485

58.1

•Not including trade with FUG.
••Columns may not add to 100 percent due to roi
Source: from Bureau of Bast*West Trade (1979).

Commodity Composition of Individual Bast
European Countries' Exports to Western Borope (1900)
(Percentage)
German
Democratic
Republic* Hungary

Bulgaria

Czechoslovakia

SITC:
o---------------- .......
1---------------- — 2---------------- ----3---------------- ----4------ --------- ----5---------------- —
6---------------- ----7---------------- ----0---------------- ----9----------------

14.0
4.7
7.4
24.3
.2
05
10.0
7.7
11.7
2.3

4.0
3
150
20.5
.1
04
25
10.7
13.0
1.0

4.1
.03
4.4
230
.9
14.1
19.4
15.0
17.2
.7

2.2
13
0.6
73
1.4
97
17.6
90
20.4
13

10.1
.3
11.3
22.9
.07
4.1
22.6
135
10.1
1.3

6.4
5
4.1
42.1
.2
3.3
14.9
4.2
230
.67

Total**--------- -----

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

5 to 0---------- -----

40.2

501

60.4

500

516

46.0

•Not Including trade with FRG.
**Column« may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: Calculated from VH. (1904).

Poland

Romania

404

Table (22)
Commodity Pattern of USSR Trad# with D m l o p t i Capitalist Conntrlas
(total exports and imports, respectively - 100)
Exports
1975 1977

1960

16
250
540
39

1.6
199
56-5
6.0

6
10.7
71
25

166

9.6

11.6

6.3*

36

4.4

31

2.6

0.7

0.6

0.6

—

0.9

0.5

0.6

1965

1970

Food, beverages and tobacco 5.9
Raw materials
36.6
Mineral fuels
26.2
Chemicals
2.3
Manufactured goods classified
chiefly by materials
22 9
Machinery and transportation
equipment
1.9
Miscellaneous manufactured
articles
0.4
Commodities and transactions
not classified according
to kind
0.2

53
344
334
32

1965 1970

Imports
1975 1977

1960

232
10.0
0.1
12.3

61
4.9
0.2
10.1

17.0
3-2
03
7.6

136
4.6
0.4
69

21.6
4.1
5
12.4

17.2

27.7

306

26.1

34. *

326

40.0

36.6

391

26.2

3-7

65

36

4.4

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Note: The columns do not always add up to 100, because of rounding.
Source: For 1965*1977 from Roves (1979), for 1960 calculated from UN. (1962).
*Induding miscellaneous manufactured articles.

i
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T»M# (23)
GoocrapMc OMiibvttoa of Sooiot Foroiga Trad*
(S o f total tn d o)
1965

Eiporte
1970
1975

I960

1965

Imports
1970 1975

1980

Eastern Europo

56

53

47

42

56

57

41

43

DCs

18

19

26

32

20

24

36

35

LDCs

15

18

14

14

11

11

11

11

Sourer From Coopor (1442), p. 460.
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T«M* (24)
■»port SpartiHntton la Soaiat Union
Satectad Prodact
(1960-1976)
■UttonaaMetoat
Coal
net xx/Q

Crude Oil
MtS/Q

euMeaaar

ailUoa metric tons

thousand
metric too*

Natural Gas
cetx/Q

IreaOra
netxx/Q

Manganese
Ora
xx/Q

Chromite
Ora
xx/Q

I960

4.0*

20X

.4*

20*

18*

52*

1965

6.3*

27S

■3*

25*

15*

57*

1970

9. IS

24*

2%

29*

23*

74*

1975

52%

26*

2.4*

23*

21*

61*

1976

6.6S

2#*

4.4*

22*

20*

51*

Note;

Q * domestic output
x-stmptonports
xx ■ wnbodM in rotated exports (♦ simpla exports)
M » simpie import
MX - embodied in rotated imports (• simple imports)
a e tx -x -M
net xx«xr-MM (net embodied exports)

Sourer lromCDoban 1979, p. 372-373)

Table (23)

Export Specialization in Soviet Union
Selected Products
(1960-1976)
On thousand metric tons)
Copper
netxx/Q

1960

—

lead
netx/Q

zinc
netxx/Q

Aluminum
netx/Q

12

5

11

1965

22

16

12

32

1970

22

12

6

44

1975

25

9

5

40

Note:

Q* domestic output
x - simple exports
xx - embodied in related exports (+ simple exports)
M » simple import
MM - embodied in related imports (+ simple imports)
n etx*x-M
net xx « xx - MM (net embodied exports)

Source: (from Dohan 1979, p. 374).
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ToMo (26)

Sortot Uoios food Im ports

(ttNHSttOM)
-13&S.

oazQ.

U

19.1

41.5

49-3

122

59.1

99.9

126.9

Too

57

22.6

202

70.9

Row Sugar

—

1467.6

3003-3

3939.

39.8

501.1

322.9

694.

3-1

334.9

6793

995-1

355

1132

602.3

737.

■ im
Cotfoo
Coco* boost

Rico
Fruit &Frosft Borrios
Eggs (fflillloa)
Sourer (Azov 1992, p. 41).

JSflS
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TtM* (20)
Soriat Im ports at m c fttim r
(millJoa «€ raNos)
Star* of Maettaory
lo t
1913
1931
1950
1955
I960
1965
1970
1975
1977

1079
667
1310
2755
5066
7253
10556
26670
30097

179
*66
262
633
1507
2423
3706
6666
11269

Sourer CalculatedIran Dolan (1979), p. 371.

16X
53*
2 IX
30X
29X
33X
35*
33*
37X

410

Table (2 9 )
•rt«la af Sevtet Ualee Macbieerg laperta
Selected ItaaM
1977
(Percentage)
Metal Working

Metal Working

WMltfltttt.

Ml (ring
Eflutnment

Metallurgical
fautnmant

Oil Refining end

Eeatarn Europe

56*

811

14*

33*

40*

DC*

42*

63*

43*

38*

57*

29*

43*

29*

3*

Other

2%
Food Induatrg

■Bwiamtnt

Chemical Induatrg Timber, Paper,and
Efllllnmint

Celluloae Equipment

Eeatarn Europe

74*

21*

9*

DCd

26*

79*

89*

Other

0

0

Source: Extracted from (DoAan 1979, p. 386-87).

2*
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TaMo (30)
Ssvtet Imports or liK ttaary sad
Trassport Iqsipraosttrora tb » Wort

T ost

1955
1956
1957
1950
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1960
1969
1970
197!
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Imports at star*
ol donmtic mschinory
ims&MSt in tiio
following y««r
(poromt)

V«taoiaU£
domra, com nt
pricsc, f.oJ>.
(millions)

Estimated rab4*
valno.la 1969
lnwstmsntpriera
ftmiBow)

104
139
120
123
177
310
390
436
402
409
366
395
457
639
009
905
040
1,126
1.574
2,094
4.104
4,259
4,571

140
100
166
150
227
393
472
510
467
561
421
436
499
721
966
913
796
959
1,091
U16
2,207
2,262

2.0
2.4
1.0
1.6
22
34
3.6
3-6
2.0
3-2
22
22
2.4
32
3-0
3-4
2.0
3.0
3-2
3.4
5-6
5-5*

ILL

ILL

Soares: (Hanson 1970, p. 22).
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TiMsC*!)
Do— tic Prodactbm of Soms la d u triss v i a
Largs Imports of M wtiiwry from DCs
Papsr &C*Unks»

I960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977

BqnlpoMOtfx

Equipment for

Q-Val

M-Val

Q-Val

M-Val

Q-Val

M-Val

20
42
94
135
144
156

33
37
91
150
213
250

200
330
339
576
623
667

167
167
216
636
1132
1722

126
199
300
436
462
a

a
a
75
272
309
296

Q-Output In domestic pricM.
M » Imports ia foreign trad* routes.
Soares: Dofcsn(1979),p. 301.

Sbosmaking
Q-Val
15
14
25
27
27
a

M-Val
n
a
13
49
47
40

TABU (32)
Exports of StB cW Good* by Soai-Portpfeory
to LDCa (ia mUlioa of
Dollars) aad
(M r P if f iit ig u to Total lasporta of tfc*a* Countries

Latin Amrica

lazfl
Primary Good*
Manufactured Goods
Total*

P-S-S*.

X
(92X)
( 7X)

X
206 (15*)
1029 (76X)
1345

X
469 (17X)
1226 (45*)
2664

(66X)
(13%)

709 (24X)
2941 (60X)
3657

1467 (24X)
2066 (34%)
5966

9655 (6IX)
2199 (l&X)
12067

1749 (2IX)
6403 (76*)
9196

3643 (25X)
4006 (29X)
14033

1252
101
>355

iazs
Primary Goods
Manufactnr*d Goods
Total*

4239
666
4666

iM

Primary Good*
Mi mrfactnradGoods
Total*

*rofel does not add op to summation of categories of primary and manufactured goods
do* to extustoo of SITC9.
Sourer. Calculated from OH. (1962).

TABU (33)
Impacts of Sslsctsd Goods Bp Somi-Poripborp
from LDCs'Ua millfcwi a( O j. DoUscs) sad tM r
Pwew U p t «s Total b p octs oC tbooo Cosatrlos
to Swd-Porlpborp
Utto A B tlla
1922
Primary Goods
Mamtfactwad Goods
Total*

354

X

(00*)

EastEnropo

Sort* Onion

X
696 (00*)
164 (10X)
067

1356 (02*)
206 (17X)
1640

65

(19*)

3397
307

(06*)
( 7X)

2470 (07X)
365 (12X)
2039

4101 (03*)
717 (14X)
4021

(07X)
(11*)

4613 (9IX)
416 ( OX)
5055

6347 (67X)
030 (11*)
7237
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1925
Primary Goods
Mamtfactarod Goods
Total*

4160

1902
Primary Goods
Mamtfactarod Goods
Total*

9461
1214
10022

*Total doss not add up to gntnmattai ol primary and manufactured goods duo to

«Ktustoao(snC9.
Sower Calculated from (021.1902).
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Table (34)

Commodity Group Breakdown of the East European
Countries' and DCs 1Imports from LDCs
(in Percent of Total Imports)
East Europe

Soviet Union

DCs

1SZ 5
SITC 0 and 1
SITC 2 and 4
SITC 3
SITC 5
SITC 7
SITC 6 and 6

20.6
29.0
37.0
1.0

.6

560
14.0
14.0
2.7
.5

9-5
7.0
66.0
1.0
2.0

10.6

11.6

11.0

SITC 0 and 1
SITC 2 and 4
SITC 3
SITC 5
SITC 7
SITC 6 and 6

164
19.4

61.0

6.0
5.5

19.60

14.0
12.0

70.7

.6

1.0

1.1

.2
7.0

.4
9.9

12.0

53 3

3-5

Note: Totals do not add up to 100* due to omission of SITC 9.
Source: Calculated from UN. (1962).

Table (3 5 )

Commodity Group Breakdown of the East European
Countries' and DC's Imports to LDCs
(in Percent of Total Exports)
East Europe

Soviet Union

DCs

14.2
3-4

65

112

4.5

35

1.6

11.6

1.2

12.0
39.9
26.0

32
24.5
7.1

9.2
45-9

15.I

4.0
33
16.5
1-9
22.9
4.2

10.6
4.4
2.5
10.4
42.4
27.6

1915.

SITC 0 and 1
SITC 2 and 4
SITC 3
SITC 5
SITC 7
SITC 6 and 6

25 8

1SL80
SITC 0 and 1
SITC 2 and 4
SITC 3
SITC 5
SITC 7
SITC 6 and 6

4.4
1.6
11.3
37.7
29.0

Note: Totals do not add up to 100$ due to o m is s io n of
SITC 9.
Source: Calculated from UN. (1982).
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(371
x sso f ICAs
Turnkey contract

AOtypes ol contracts where ttta
supply baa significant on-sit*
installation or supervision
responsibilities for the supplied

complete plant
UOMHtag

Supply of tacbnology and/or
procaas for faas or product
o w a parted of tJxoa.

Technical Antistatic* Contract

Transfar of supplier's patast
fights, design &manufacturing
techniques for particular produces).

Sub-Contracting

Production Cooperation
(contractual J/Vs)
while thoea involving more
produced

sub-assemblies of a similar degree
Joint Venture in a Third World Country

Whan tb* Wastara firm usually
provides tba technical kaow- how and somatiinas machinery
to cover its product shortage*.
a. Vartieal co-productlon, with
on* partaar producing relatively
simple components or materials
advanced tactmology ara
b
by tb* other, often using inputs
from former.
b. Horizontal co-production, wbara
each partner producer components/
or sophistication.
Co-owners of capital, co
management, and sharing of risk

and profit in the venture.
JointVantura in a Socialist Country
Source: Prom (Harold and Kaztov (19A3J, p.

Sam* as above.
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Table (36)
Percentage Breakdown of ICAs in
Different Forms
1973
Co-production and specializations
Delivery of plant or equipment
Joint ventures:
Involving marketing only
(3.6*)
Involving production, m arket and R and D (6.3*)
Tripartite co-operations
Licensing
Joint tending or Joint projects
Sub-contracting
Source: UU. (1979), p. 22

45.2*
17.4*

16.9*
6.4*
6 . 1*

4.2*

3-6*
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Table (39)

Component Elements of 2 Id ICAs Surveyed*
Carleton Study
%

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
5.
9.
10.
11.
12.
1314.
15.
16.

Managerial Services
Capital equipment sale
Complete plant sale
Custom design of plant/equipment
Training of East personnel
Technical assistance (know how)
License
Supply of parts and components to Eastern Europe
Supply of parts and components to West for
production in West
Supply of parts and components to West for marketing
in West
Production specialization, same end product
Production specialization, full line of goods
Quality control
Coordination of marketing/servicing
Joint projects in 3rd country
Joint research and development

♦Survey conducted in 1975.
Source: from (McMillan 1977, p. 1190).

6.7
25.4
20.2
22.9
46.6
60.1
47.2
52.6

46.8
39.9
19.3
55
25.2

31.2
24.3
23.9

Table (40)

Major Western Participants
in ICAs
(1977)
1
Share in ICAs

West Germany

21 .4*

France

14.4*

Austria

7.0*

Japan

7.4*

Italy

9.1*

United Kingdom

7.0*

Sweden

6.2*

Source: Paliwoda (1961), p. 104.

Table (41)

Major Western Participants in ICAs
End of 1970s
% Share in ICA
West Germany

more than 25$

France

more than 10$

U.SA.

more than 10$

Italy

more than 10$

United Kingdom

between 5 - 6$

Austria

between 5 - 6$

japan

between 5 -6 $

Sweden

between 5 -6 $

Source: (McMillan 1961, p. 62).
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TlMa (42)
ta t- T « t M o U il Coopttattoa

lot 1970*

Bstimatod Numbrra
ot Agraamantt Conctudad

Parcantof
Subtotal

Subatanttra, noc-aquitf agraamaots*
wtta waatarn Anns
Bulgaria
Csacboatovalcia
Garman Damocratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Total

63
77
4ft
455
324

5
6

4
33

24

9

10ft

m

21

1367

100

Agraamaots vrftli WaatarnFlnns
lor Joint Pro^acts in Third Country
Bulgaria
Czacboaiovatta
Ganuaa Damocntlc Rapubtte
Hungary
rO B N

Romania
USSR
Total

12

19
25
76
71

5
7
10

30

2ft

2ft
11

26

10

157"

too

*TU»w agraamants fall wrtbin two broad typac l. Compansation agraamants; 2. Coproduction, production staring, product specialization and subcontracting.
Sourer: from (McMillan 19ft 1, p. 57).
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T ab le (4 3 )

Joint Ventures Agreem ent Between East Europe ana
Western Firms
1922
Bulgaria

-

1923.

1971

1975.

1926

197Z

19Z6.

1979.

19.6Q

19.6.

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

_

Hungary

-

2

4

4

4

5

6

6

6

Poland

-

-

-

-

-

1

1

1

1

Romania*

3

4

5

7

9

7

6

6

6

♦Plus one more not furth er identifiable (General M aritim e Co.)
Source: (Herold and Kazlov 1963, P- 41).

i
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Tabtu (44)
Rast-Waat Joint Vanturaa ia t te V a t
aad LDCa
i i t f t k t « t of Om 1970*
IMmated nmnbar

Parent of Subtotal

I n t t a LPCa

Bulgaria

1

20

Hungary

2

40

Poland

1

20

Romania

1

20

Soviat Union, CiacboelovaJcia, GDR

0

o
200

In DO

Bulgaria

29

9

Caacboaloaatta

24

6

Gannan Democratic Republic

20

7

Hungary

51

16

Poland

75

25

Romania

32

11

USSR

73

24

304

loo"

Source: McfcflHan 19ftl,p. 5fl).
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Table (45)

Breakdown of ICAs between U.S. and Hast Europe
by Different Industries
(as of January 1, 1976)
Number
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing: (347)
Food
Textile, lumber, paper, print
Chemical, drugs, rubbers
plastic, glass
Metals
Machinery excluding electric
Machinery &equipment electric
Transport equipment
Transport, communication
Finance, hotels and other
Industry not specified

Percentage

6

1.2

15
45

3-1
9-3

72%

21
23
99

24

20.5
4-5
16.7
14.1
4.9

27
35

56
7.2

22

90

66
6

Total

4-3
4.7

461
331383

Source: from (Marer and Miller 1977, p. 23)
Total does not add up to 100 due to rounding.

1.2

100*
231333=
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Table (46)

Percentage breakdown of ICAs by Industry
(1976)
Chemical Industry

26.1$

Mechnical engineering and machine tools

22.3

Electrical equipment and electronics

17.5

Transport equipment

9.6

Metallurgy

6.3

Light Industry

63

Agricultural and food industries

4.5

Other industries

3.5
100.00

Source: (UH. 1979, p. 19).

Table (47)
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Percentage Breakdown of ICAs by Industry
(I960)
Chemical Industry

24AX

Electrical equipment and electronics

16.1

Mechnical engineering and machine tools

16.5

Transport equipment

12.6

Light Industry

9.1

Metallurgy

7.4

Food and agriculture

6.1

Other industries

5.4
100.00

Source: McMillan

(1981), p.63
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TeH* ( 4 8 )
ladaatrtao' S k trw la Iha Tatol Namber «f ICAa, v lth B raatdava I f Caaatrg
1978
(h rc iil)
Country

Chamtcal

Buiyard

—

Hungary

14.5

Poland

16.7

OCR

14.5

Romani*

Metallurgy

Tnnaport
Equipment

Mechanical 8
Machine Tool*

Electrical A
Electronic Agriculture

Light
Induatrg

Other

9.1

45.5

18.2

27.3

—

2.6

11.0

17.1

32.9

5.3

11.8

3.9

7.4

9.3

27.8

14.9

5.6

13.

5.6

—

14.3

57.2

—

14.3

—

__

39.3

10.7

21.4

10.7

10.7

_

Czachoalovakl*

33.3

—

11.1

44.4

11.1

_

Jovial Untan

36.4

13.2

5.4

20.2

12.4

2.3

—

71

__
62

3.9

Source: (U.N. 1979, p. 20).

I

Table (49)

429

Brazil Sectoral Growth Rates

Nonmetallic minerals
Metal products
Machinery
Electrical machinery
Transport equipment
Paper and products
Rubber
Chemical and pharmaceuticals
Textiles, clothing
Source: (Baer (1983), p. 1??)-

1971-74

1975-80

11.6

7.8
9.9
7.1
6.5
4.4
7.7
59
8-7
4.5

7.1
19.6

22.1
6.7

12.0
15-2
3-9

CHAPTER VI
tf.1. SOME CONCLUDING. REMARKS

Throughout

this dissertation, I have attem pted to show that

none of the schools, approaches, presented here are successful in
devising

a 'theory' of East-West economic relations.

For instance, the

dependency school, which criticizes the neo-classical school for not
incorportating into its analysis of underdevelopment an account of
socio-political differences which exist among LDCs and DCs, when it
comes to analysis of East-W est economic interaction falls into the
same trap.

Frank and Wallerstein, for example, lose sight of the fact

that the organization institution prone work o f trade in the Soviet
Union is different from that of the capitalist countries,1 and this
country is, to a large exrent, able to protect itself from the harmful
effects of economic interactions with the W est.

The dependency

school, however, more than any other schools, approaches, discussed
here is successful in pinpointing, and warning against, the problems,
or perils, which such economic interactions

may entail

for the

socialist countries.
The Eastern European economists' approach lies at the other
end

o f the

spectrum .

This

approach correctly

em phasizes

the

differences in the socio-economic conditions of capitalist and socialist
countries.

In contrast to the dependency school, however, it fails to
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grasp, or to assign enough weight to the problems associated with the
East-W est economic interactions.

The Eastern European economists'

approach tends to stress the harmonious aspects of these relations,
and to downplay the areas of potential conflicts..

Consequently, in

contrast to the dependency school, it believes East-W est economic
relations will be highly beneficial to the socialist countries.
The dependency school and the Eastern European economists'
approach

pro d u ce

som e

argum ents

w hich

understanding of East-W est economic relations.

are

p lau sib le

in

However, it is more

difficult to evaluate the neo-classical school's contributions to such an
understanding.

On the one hand, some of the non-theoretical authors

in this tradition have presented schemes which take into account the
differences in the institutional frameworks of trade in the socialist
and capitalist countries.

For example, Franklin D. Holzman2 perhaps

more than any other orthodox authors, dem onstrates a profound
understanding
w orks

are

interactions.

of

such

v alu ab le

institutional
in

differences3 As a result, his

com prehending

E ast-W est

econom ic

On the other hand, most of the 'theoretical' neo-classical

economists, by employing a pareto optimal marginal analysis in the
investigatio n
1
2

of

the

so cialist

countries'

trade

and

investm ent

A point which I will disscuss further shortly.
Although the orthodox economists credit Holzman as the first author who has attempted
to theoretically evaluate the Soviet Union’s trade behavior, they also criticize him for
not being 'theoretical' enough. (See Chapter II) Based on my knowledge, however,
Holzman has not so far attempted to employ marginal analysis in the investigation of
East-West economic interaction. Therefore, I do not categorize him as a "theoretical
neo-classical" economist.
3 See in particular Holzman (1983).
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behaviors, have produced some of the least relevant theses.

Their

theses are irrelevant, not because they do not 'fit fact,' but because
they violate their own principles.

This occurs because the pareto

optimal marginal rules are presumably the necessary conditions for
the optimum in the perfectly competitive market economy.
From the beginning I have stated that my goal is by bringing
these schools together and pinpointing their problems, to contribute
to both a better understanding of East-W est economic relations and
to devising a possible 'theory' of such interaction.

My research

indicates that such a theory should consider at least the following
points.
H istorically, one motive for establishm ent o f state foreign
monopoly and the emergence o f the autarkic model of development
in countries of Eastern Europe was to insulate the domestic economy
and the planning process from the uncertainties of the world market.
A ccordingly, it seems valid to ask w hether or not the increased
contact between these countries and the West has increased their
vulnerability to the changes in the capitalist world.

Surely, the

economic crisis, inflation, and monetary problems o f the capitalist
world are not without effect on the economies of the East European
countries, as was the case during the stagflation of the early 1970s
which certainly contributed to the balance of payments difficulties of
some East European countries.4

Beyond its impact upon the balance

4 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion, for a study o f the effects o f
stagflation on the Eastern Europe see Portes (1980).
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of payment, with expanded economic relations, changes in the world
market prices (e.g. oil) will to some degree influence indirectly the
investm ent and consumption decisions of these countries.

(Portes

1980) The overall impact of such price changes would be further
enhanced inasmuch as world prices are employed in intra-CM EA
trade.

(Bomstein 1979, pp. 304-5)

increasd

E ast-W est

econom ic

More importantly, however, the

interaction

makes

the

process

of

planning more difficult, because foreign trade becomes less amenable
to prediction and planning.

(Nyiri 1982,, p. 23)

There exist, however, varying degrees of vulnerability among
the centrally planned economies to the changes in the capitalist
world market.

W hile a large, resource rich country such as the

Soviet Union enjoys the option of autarky and the ability to maintain
a high degree of independence, the sm aller countries of Eastern
Europe are much more in need of economic relations with the West.
As P asztor

(1980)'s calculation indicates,

whereas

Hungary,

for

instance, in 1978 imported about 28% if its national income from the
non-Socialist countries, the highest percent among East European
countries, the Soviet Union imported 3.3% of its national income from
the non-socialist countries.

Hence, the degree of susceptibility of

Hungary to the changes of the world market is much higher than that
of the Soviet Union.
The admission that East European countries are to some degree
vulnerable to the changes in the capitalist world m arket is not
synonymous with accepting the dependency schools' argument that
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these countries are a functional part of the capitalist world market
and their logic of development is determined by the forces of the
capitalist market.

To accept the dependency school's contention and

to place Eastern European countries within

the confines of the

capitalist world economy means overlooking the differences in goals
and

institutions

of these

two different econom ics

systems.

It

furtherm ore means ignoring the tension w hich exists between the
logic of market and the logic of plan.

It is a mistake, for instance, to

believe that the Soviet import of Western technology and machinery
is for the purpose of producing commodities which are competitive
on the world market and then exporting them in order to make
profit.

The Soviet Union acquires Western technology, equipment

and machinery all as factors accelerating the development of the
dom estic

forces

of production and

"spurring the im agination

of

designers," even if after a few years or decades Soviet products
appear on the Western markets.

(Kozma 1982, p. 30)

In short, while the foreign trade of East European countries is
subject to external influences, it cannot be understood in terms of the
logic of the capitalist world market.

In addition to the fact that East-

West economic relations only account for a small percentage of social
products in majority of these countries,5

because of the foreign

trade monopoly and central planning nature of these societies, the
im pacts

originating

outside

cannot

assert

them selves

With the exception of Hungary and probably Romania.

directly,
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im m ediately and particularly
econom ic process.

w ithout lim itations

in the

domestic

In contrast to the capitalist countries, rising

foreign price levels in East Europe do not penetrate immediately into
domestic producer and consumer prices, hence affecting the level of
incomes and demand.

At the same time, changes in export prices do

not affect branches producing for exports and consequently affect
the level of income and employment.
1980)

(Simai 1977, p. 3 and Portes,

The inability of external forces to directly and immediately

affect the domestic process of E ast European countries should be
sought in the organization of foreign trade in these countries.

For

example, in the Soviet Union, foreign trade is conducted by state
trading corporations, each specializing in im port and export of a
particular product over which

they

have a com plete

monopoly.

Profitability plays no role in the conduct of these corporations whose
operations are tightly controlled by the m inistry of foreign trade.
Such control is exerted through detailed plans for volume and prices
of imports and exports.

The trading corporations based on plan

specifications purchase goods at prevailing domestic prices and then
export them at the prevailing world market price.

Similarly, these

corporations purchase goods for import at world market prices and
then sell them to domestic enterprises at the prevailing
prices.

internal

The differences between either comes or goes to the Soviet

state reserves.

Neither the enterprises whose products end up in the

w orld market, nor those who receive goods produced outside the
country, have any interest in or knowledge of world market prices,
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because

these prices in

no

way directly

employment levels of these enterprises.
Szym anski

1982,

p.

64

and

affect the

income

(Szymanski 1981, p. 522,

H olzm an

1983)

Therefore,

application of government economic policy enables m itigation
external effects.

or

the
of

(Simai 1977, p. 3)

The state plan for foreign trade determines the amount and
kind of goods which are necessary to "domestic production beyond
expected domestic resources."

(Szymanski 1981, p. 522)

export, then, is simply to cover the costs of imports.

The role of
The planners

examine domestic production to locate these products that "are either
likely to be produced in excess of domestic requirem ents, or can
easily be expanded" in order to choose goods for exports.
522)

(Ibid., p.

Although as was mentioned previously, most items which are

imported from the West are machinery and equipment, and imports
in a way are used as a "vehicle of expansion drive," foreign trade is
not carried on based on the principles of com parative advantages.
Moreover, any attempt by the Western powers to completely isolate
the

E ast

European

countries

at

w orst

w ill

lead

to

slightly

deaccelerating the economic development of these countries, because
they mainly rely on their own collective and individual economic
resources

and reciprocal trade of CMEA countries

approxim ately
(Stepanov 1981)

th re e -fifth s

of

th e ir

ex tern al

accounts

trad e

for

turnover.

The employment o f government policies enables

these countries to distribute losses due to the change in international
economic conditions in accordance with the hierarchy o f economic
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policy objectives.

(Simai 1977, p. 3)

Such action may lead to

abandonment or postponement of an economic policy, but does not
imply the "dependency" of these countries to international economic
d evelop m en t.
The exam ination of the recent trends in the East European
countries rejects Stalin's contention that these countries are isolated
from the capitalist market is no longer valid.

Eastern Europe is not

isolated from the world m arket and is in fact to some degree
vulnerable to its effects.

More im portantly, these countries may

respond to the capitalist market forces, but they are not governed by
them .

In their interaction with the capitalist countries, Eastern

Europe's trade and investment decisions are not determined by the
logic of world market, though to some extent they may b e ' affected;
their products are not produced for the sake of making profit, but as
a means for obtaining desired use values.

Moreover, although one

can concede that the Eastern European economies are weaker than
those

of DCs,

they

do

not exhibit

the

characteristics

of

the

dependency school’s semi-peripheral states, because the state foreign
trade

monopoly

and centralized

econom ic

adverse effects of the world market.
or reduce "dependency."
At

this

vulnerability,

point
w hat

m ediate

the

In other words, they eliminate

(p. 35)
one

is

planning

the

may
best

transitional societies in general?

w onder,

given

the

problem

foreign

trade

strategy

for

of
the

This is a difficult question and I do

not feel in a position to even attem pt to answer it, but there are
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som e points that I would like to outline.

W hile autarky was

historically necessary in the context of "construction of socialism" in
one country industrialization, it has become more evident that the
continuation

o f that policy for sm aller, less resources

countries of Eastern Europe is not possible.

abundant

Until these societies

becom e technologically in pace with the DCs and intra-bloc trade
expands to a point that meets all their requirem ents, trade with
capitalist countries will continue.

If this is true, the challenge faced

by East European countries is to devise a foreign trade model which
can

increase their export capacity, reduce their vulnerability

e x te rn a l

fo rc es,

developm ent.

and
Any

at

the

sam e

p articular

tim e

approach,

enhance

to

econom ic

export-oriented

model,

im port led growth, etc. must be evaluated in terms of its relative
costs and benefits with respect to the above criteria.
p ath ,

because

there

ex ists

a

great

d iv e rsity

There is no one
of

reso u rces.

potentialities, and level of developm ent among these countries.

It is

precisely the recognition and emphasis on the specificity of economic
and institutional conditions of Eastern European countries which is
m issing

in the discussion of the

schools presented

here.6

Any

attem pt to construct a 'theory' of economic relations between the
East and the W est must recognize these specificities.

Such a 'theory'

by placing economic analysis within the social and political contexts

6 In a now classic article, Palma (1978) raises the same criticism o f some of the
dependency school's authors.
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of these societies will be able to explain with m ore percision the
mechanism of the East-W est interaction.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
Organization of Trade:

A n o th er
em phasized

the

foreign trade.

g roup

of

n e o -classical

organizational

aspect

eco n o m ists

of the

who

have

socialist countries'

Brada and Jackson (1978) for exam ple1 , employ the

"normative theory o f orgaization" in their study of foreign trade
organizations of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
They start by arguing that "traditional theory of foreign trade
capitalism explains the behavior
between" the character
profits.

of firms as the

result

under

of interplay

of com petition among firms, prices

(Brada and Jackson 1978, P.

294)

and

W hat they believe is

lacking in the traditional approach is "an analysis of the internal
organization of

trading unit."

(Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 295)

This, they believe, is true for the organizations performing under
conditions o f planned economy.
com petitive

environm ent,

"(A)n

price

or

organization facing a
planning

given

inform ation,

and

incentive system w ill perform its assigned tasks differently under
differing

form s

of internal

organization."

internal organization is appropriate to one
may prove

to be inappropriate

operate in a different environment."

Furtherm ore,

"if the

type of environment, it

should the organization
This latter

a problem facing both "capitalist and socialist

seek to

point, they argue, is
organizations" which

have extended their operations to the international sphere.

(Brada

1 Hewett (1974) has also studied the effect o f organization on the behavior o f
centrally planned economies.
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and Jackson 1978, P. 295)

They then proceed to survey the forms of

organization employed by large American firms, Japanese trading
companies and the countries of Eastern Europe, and
their development

try to evaluate

based on the "normative theory o f organization."

In the case of centrally planned economies, Brada and
d istin g u ish

three

organization

of these countries.

of the

1960's,

d istin c t

They argue

in

the

that

foreign

until

trade

the

reforms

Ministry o f

Foreign Trade purchased products

from branch ministries for export.

This organizational structure was

quite

ofthese

appropriate

Because the
with
of

the

developm ents

Jackson

for

the

needs

countries

at the

tim e.

bulk of foreign trade of Eastern European countries was

each other.

b ilateral

agreem ent

between the Foreign Trade M inistries of the countries.

Moreover,

the

com m odities

In this form of trade, the volume and composition

agreed

longer.

w ere

determ ined

through

upon prices were maintained for a

period of a year or

"Since prices are fixed and trade flows determ ined by

protocol, there

is no marketing

(Brada and Jackson 1978,

for the Ministry of

Foreign Trade"

P. 311) and noneed to make any attempt

to establish a direct line between

producers and exporters.

Brada and Jackson believe that although the traditional form of
organization of trade in Eastern Europe "may have
for

the

conduct

of

intra-C M EA

trad e,

it

been appropriate

preclu d ed

responsiveness to, and export performance on, W estern
(Brada and Jackson 1978,
follow ing

reasons

such

P.

312)

form

optim al
markets."

Nevertheless they argue for th

of organization

appropriate even in dealing with Western countries.

w as

the

m ost

First of all, not

only the volume of exports to the West was low, but the exports
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mainly consisted of raw materals and foodstuff, for
interactions

between

Moreover, "linking
autom atically

to

direct producers

w orld-m arket developm ents
of domestic

are

required.

is

inconsistent w ith

economic activity, to say

of the planning of foreign trade

payments."

exports

the activity of domestic enterprises directly and

detailed central planning
nothing

and

which few

and the

(Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 312)

balance

Furthermore, the

shortage of experts who have direct knowledge of W estern
and

of

markets

business practice was another factor in the endurance of the

traditional form of foreign trade organization which was viewed as
the best way of "making full use of the
trade officials."

existing

cadres of foreign

(Brada and Jackson 1978, P. 313)

Despite these considerations in the favor of the

traditional

form, by the late 1960's a series of reforms in the organization of
foreign

trade was conducted.

had been

According to Brada and Jackson, there

some econom ic developm ents

changes

in the foreign trade

organizations.

w as

increas

w ith

an

in

trade

the

manufacturing in exports was growing.
of

large

integ rated

established.

production

which demanded

some

More specifically,

there

W est,

w ere

industrial
granted

the

units

called

associations

D om estically, these associations were

association
the

rig h t

engage

decisions.

directly

in

Brada and Jackson believe that such

w ere

Globally,
enterprises

foreign

departm ents were established within associations and
enterprises.

of

given greater

and sometim es individuals
to

share

In the new system a number

freedom in making productio and investment
the

and

trade

individual
a pattern of

organizational change is consistent with their theory that:

"Global
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structures arose exactly in those areas where th
new

structure appeared to be greatest

of the

old form

conspicuous."

of organization

net benefit of the

and where the
appeared

to

deficiencies
be

the

most

(Bradaa and Jackson 1978, P. 315)2

In Brada

and Jackson's

account, despite

the

correctness" of foreign trade reform s in the late

"conceptual

1960's and the

establishment of a global form of organization, in the early 1970's
there was a move towar reenacting greater
trade.

centralization of

foreign

The reasons for such a move, according to Brada and Jackson,

must be mainly sought in the development in the West.
1960's

when

the

foreign

trade

reform s

were

In the late

im plem ented,

the

international markets for both goods and currency had been stable
for some time.

Consequently,

of international

m arkets

appeared quite simple.
international

to

for th architect of reforms
the dom estic

In the early

markets changed.

The

collapse

OPEC

situations
foreign

severly

in

the

international

limited

the

abilities

of

developments

that

situation.

the

m arket.

These

newly-established

to keep up with

"The rapid and automatic
characterizes

Also

the capitalish world

product

trade departments and associations

developments in the West.
external

foreign-exchange

led to a chaoti international monetary

disorder

have

of the Bretton Woods

worldwide inflation and recession in much o f
created

migh

1970's the situation on the

system, and the problem s of recycling
earnings

enterprises

the linking,

the

response

the
to

global organization

2 According to Brada and Jackson: "The greatest increase occurred in the
number o f export
organiztion dealing with machinery,
transport
equipment,
and manufactured consumer goods, the total of such organization doubling
between 1968 and 1972." (Ibid., P. 315)
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turned

from

an

circumstances."

advantage

to

a

liability

(Brada and Jackson 1978,

P.

in
36)

these

unsettled

No wonder that

the idea of increasing the role of the M inistry of Foreign Trade
gained so much support

among the central authorities.

Brada and Jackson conclude that the organizational response to
the problem o f creating a direct link betwee exporters of certain
products such as machinery to consumer has been sim ilar in all
econom ic

system s.

organizational
systems.

The

changes

have

profits

been

benefits

and

different

in

costs
these

o

such

econom ic

In the socialist counties, for example, the world-wide

inflation and shortages of
fall

actual

and

lossesfor

the early seventies resulted in large wind
individual

exporting

enterprises

with

consequent pressure on domestic equilibrium , particularly because
the change in organization had been accompanied by granting more
autonomy to these enterprises in regards to such domestic affairs as
pricing and investment decisions

APPENDIX n
M athem atical

Explanation

o f Brada's M odel

Let's start with Brada's general model, in which a joint venture
is located in an Eastern European country and produces one output
Q, with the use of m inputs (X) provided by the Western partner:
X= ( X i
n).

Xm ), and n inputs (Y) purchased domestically: Y=(Yi,

Y

The production function is then: Q=F(Xi, ...Xm- Y i,....Y n). The

output is sold at fixed price P.

The inputs X and Y are acquired by

the respective partners at constant per unit costs C j(i=l,....,m ) and
Cj (j=l,....,n)

The price actually paid by the joint venture for iinput

(Y) is Wj = Cj (j=l,...,n).

Furthermore, the host government allows the

Western partner to appropriate a fixed share S of the firm’s
accounting profit, which is

n = P . Q - V X - WY

where VX = X Vi .X i and WY - X W j. Yj
W

In the case of Rumania, Brada argues that the Rumanian
government as the owner of all factors of production derives its
profits not only from its share of joint venture profits but also from
sales of inputs to the joint venture.

As a result in the country the

profit of joint ventures dominated by the Rumanian government can
be shown by the following:
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Ilj.v. = £ (Wj - Cj ) Yj + PQ - VX - WY

The maximization of total profit under this condition requires:

1.

differentiating with respect to X.
P Q x -V

2.

differentiating with respect to Y.
(Wj - C j ) + PQy

The joint venture's maximizing conditions are clearly different from
those desired by either partner in maximizing its own profit.1 Thus
Brada concludes "to the extent that each -------------------

1

The Western partner wants to maximize
II - 2 (Vi - Ci) X i + S(PQ - VX - WY)

(1)

1*1

where
II*
is the total profit accuring to the Eastern partner. The first order
condition for (1) is to differentiate it with respect to Xi and Yj (profit
maximizing conditions) imply:

PQxi

- Vi - (v i - c i/ s ) and PQ yi = Wj

with Qxi and Qyj representing the partial derivatives o f Q with respect to Xi
and Yj respectively.
A similar exercise with respect to (2) generates the resource conditions
desired by the Eastern Partner.
PQxi= VI

W j-C j
PQ yi = W i - ____
1-S

The two sets o f conditions for factor allocation are clearly different and are
different from those of joint ventures (see Svejan and Smith 1982)
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partner seeks to negotiate the resource allocation which maximizes
his profits, the joint venture will have a lower level of total profits to
share between the partners." (Brada 1977, P. 173)
The Hungarian situation is different. Most joint ventures
in

H ungary

engage

in

manufactured in Hungary.

trade

activ ities,

exporting

a

product

According to Brada, since in Hungary

there are at least partly functioning markets, there is no reason "to
anticipate that Hungarian inputs to jo in t venture will be excessively
over priced.

Furthermore, the Hungarian partner has no particular

interest in the benefits that over paym ent for such inputs could
provide to the

Hungarian suppliers of inputs." (Brada 1977, P, 174)

Brada assumes the price at which the Hungarian partner supplies the
product to the joint venture will be fixed at the contract price of P;
the joint venture sells the product at fixed price P.

The Western

partner also accrues some costs as a result of distribution and sales
of the product which is a function of the volume of sales:
D = D(Q)
where D is the distribution cost.

The Western partner's profit is then:
n = X {(P - P') Q - D (Q)}

This profit is maximized when:
P - P' = Da
The volume of sales, according to him must also be the
volume of production of the Hungarian partner, whose profit comes
not only

from

a share

o f jo in t venture profits

producing the product sold by the venture.

but also

from

Assum- ing the costs of
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production depend on Q, then C = C (Q).

The Hungarian partner's

profit is:

II* = (1 - S) {(P - p') Q - d (Q)} + P'Q - C (Q)

The profit will be maximized when:

a n * /3 Q = (1 - S)(P - P' - D ) + F - C = 0

(3)

Brada argues that if the price at which the joint venture
sells the product P 1 is set by negotiation at C , the marginal cost of
production, the equation (3) will reduce to: P - P' = D q
Then,
regarding

the

there is no disagreem ent between the partners

operation

o f joint

venture.

C onsequently

Brada

believes there exists the possibility that Hungarian joint venture will
be a

"relatively

efficient

user o f resources

and

untroubled

by

conflicts over resource allocation between two parties." (Brada 1977,
P. 175)
In Yugoslavia the situation is different.

The Western

partner wants the joint venture to maximize the following profit
function:
II = S (PQ - VX - WY)2
Because in Yugoslavia markets exist,

Brada believes that

as in the case o f Hungary, there is little possibility for Yugoslav
partner or for any other source in Yugoslavia to distort the prices of

2

The first

order profit maximizing conditions arc PQx = Vi and PQy =Wy
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inputs utilized by the joint venture.

He assumes that prices of such

inputs are held constant at their cost of production.

Thus he argues

"the existence of markets for inputs of both partners resolve one of
the fun- damental conflicts evident in the Rumanian jo in t venture."
(Brada 1977, P. 177)
He however argues that the conflicts between partners
continue to exist due to the "differences in property right."

In

contrast to the capitalist firms which seek to maximize profits, the
Yugoslav firm is interested in maximizing income per worker.

The

income per worker is equal to wage rate plus profit per worker. Let's
assume L represents the Yugoslavia labor input to the joint venture,
W i the wagerate and the joint venture total profits; the income per
worker is:

>

I = [(1 - S)/ L ]+ Wi (4)

3

It is the Yugoslavia intention to maximize equation (4). The first
order profit maximizing conditions are:

a i/a x i

= [(1-S) / l ] (p q x - W i) = o

pqx

= Wi

9I/3Yj = (1 - S) (PQ l - Wi ) - [(1- S)/L](PQ - VX - WY) = 0

3 Where II = PQ - VX - WY.
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PQ l = W i + (PQ - VX - WY)/L

Brada

argues the Yugoslav workers utilize the same rules

as the W estern partner for determ ining the employment of non
labor input.

However they seek different levels of employment for

the labor input. It is at this point that the conflicts between two
partners arise.4
B rada,

after

following conclusions:

presenting

his

m odels,

arrives

at

the

"In all three cases, differences in property

rights between the two participants in the East- W est joint venture
may create conflicts of interest. The narrowest the scope of property
rights of the socialist partner, the greater the availability of m arket
generated information on the true value of socialist inputs, the more
circumscribed this area of conflict appears to be." (Brada 1977,

P.

180)

Sveinar and

S m ith s Model:

In their model, the parties act as if maximizing the weighted product
of their utilities:
Max U = Ig w

ujfD

where Uw and U d are the utility functions of the Western and
domestic partner, respectively, Xw is the bargaining power of the
Western partner and X d the bargaining power of the domestic
4

The Yugoslav worker-managers wish to allocate non-labor input so that
the value of the marginal product equals the input price. But in the case
o f labor input they wish to equate the value o f the marginal product of
labor to the actual income per worker.

452

partner. As they believe it is the relative power which matters, it
is convenient to assume X d = 1- X where 0£ X
and X d = 1- X. The
utility function then can be written as:

U = I® UO-V)

In
to be

(l)

the case of Rumania they take each partner's utility

identical with

their profit

function.

Assuming the

Western

partner's profit function to be:

n = I (Vi - Ci ) X j + S(PQ - Vi X i - Wj Yj)

(using

the same

notations which

were used

in analysis of

Brada's

m odel)
The Rumainan partner's profit function is:

IT =

S (Wj - C j) Y j+ (1 - S)(PQ - Vi X i - WjY j)

Substituting

n and IT* in equation (1) we get the following:3

U = 11*11* <1-* ) =(

(Vi -c i)Xi +S(PQ-ViXi -Wj Yj ))*

((Wj-Cj)Yj+(PQ-ViXi-WjYj))(l-lr >

3

This equation differs slightly from what they have actually used in their
article.
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The maximization of the above equation will lead according to their
calculations:

PQxi = Q
PQ yj = Cj

which means that 'marginal value'
corresponding per unit cost of input.
159)

of each input equals

the

(Svejnar and Smith 1982, P.

AEP E N E IX —II I
E x p o rt O rien te d

M odel o f D evelopm ent

The cornerstone of the export-oriented model is intensification
of the socialist countries' participation in the international division of
labor

and

development.

adam ant

opposition

to

the

policy

of

inw ard-looking

About the latter point, the proponents of the model in

fact argue what makes the export-oriented developm ent topical in
CMEA countries today is the concept of import substitution, more
exactly,

the conception

w hich declares

the fundam ental

task

of

economic policy is to satisfy the need of these countries primarily
from internal resources.

This conception dom inated the Eastern

European countries' economic policy for decades and proved to be
unsuccessful under the condition where the sources of extensive
growth had been exhausted.

Under this condition, there remain no

other sources o f developm ent than to increasing productivity and
improving efficiency.

The Eastern European economists argue that

the im port-substitution policy in practice never was lim ited to only
imports of machinery from capitalist countries.

It indeed usually

entailed a growing need for material imports; in other words the
im port-substitution
import-intensive.

developm ent turned

out

(Koves 1978, P.P. 115-117)

to

be

in

fact

very

All this would be no

problem, if there were enough exports to counter balance them, but
these countries have never paid enough attention to development of
exports aimed at the Western markets.

It is this lack of attention

that the export-oriented model of development intends to overcome.
"The Eastern European countries give up their long lasting tradition

455

of

im port-substitution,

growth

model,

all

and

other

subordinate to this task."

sw itch
factors

over
of

to

the

econom ic

export-oriented
policy

m ust

be

(Csaba 1983, P. 69)

The proponents of the export-oriented model of development
believe that the Eastern European countries must realize that at a
tim e when
econom ic

the

im provem ent of efficiency

developm ent,

dom estically

is

to

m anufacture

neither possible

is

the

everything

nor necessary

framework of a large community.

only

even

way of

econom ically
w ithin

(Csaba 1983, P .117)

the

In this

context the domestic productive factors must be engaged only in
selected areas, where the volume of production in each of these areas
is large.

The goods are then produced not only for the domestic

market but also sometimes mainly for the foreign markets.

(Rosati

1979, P. 55)
Therefore the proponents of the model suggest an intensive
participation in the international division of labor.

They argue such a

participation is not a passive process but it involves a series of
consciously directed, continuous activities:

It means the formation of

an export structure in accordance with the natural advantage of the
country,

w hile

considering

the

markets.

(Veress 1974, P. 342)

tendencies

of

the

international

According to the Eastern European

economists, the specialization in the selected areas alone will not
bring any advantage if "the relations of prices (costs)" internally and
externally

are

identical,

and

if

proportional to the scale of output.

the

costs

of

production

are

Fortunately, they maintain that

because of differences in "productive factors, natural conditions, and
historical processes of development" in particular countries there
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exist consideration "different relations of prices and costs."

Thanks

to this phenomenon, "rational specialization makes it possible to
ach iev e

sig n ific a n t

a d v a n ta g e s”

international division of labor.
As

a

re su lt

of

the

from

p a rtic ip a tio n

in

the

(Rosati 1979, P. 55)
"rational

specialization,"

a

country

participating in the international division of labor can gain more
goods and services than it can gain by using its resources within a
closed economy.

The country's needs are satisfied by products that

are less expensive and of better quality.

Low costs result from the

fact that goods are produced where the costs of production are the
lowest and also from an appropriately large scale of activity.
large scale of production

in turn

allows

the use of the

The
latest

technology, and consequently production of goods of high quality.
Another factor contributing to production of goods of high quality is
the fact that specialization enables the country to concentrate its
research and developm ent only on selected areas and obtain the
better results.

(Rosati 1979, P.P. 55-56)

Specialization and the export oriented model of course entails
an active im port policy, because in the case of products that a
country can't profitably produce, whose development is constrained
by limited resources or markets, it must follow a deliberate strategy
of imports.

(Veress 1974, P. 342)

The increase in imports from the

W est is im portant also for two other reasons:

1.

requirem ents of periods of intensive developm ent;1
requirements of integration of the CMEA countries.

Because of
2. Because of
Therefore both

1 The argument is similar to what was presented earlier in the chapter
three.
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the domestic development in individual Eastern European countries
and cooperation plans among them necessitates increased Western
imports.

(Koves 1978, P. 118)

On the latter point, it is argued that due to the high import
contents of exports o f some Eastern European countries (i.e. Hungary)
to other socialist countries, even those socialist countries that have so
far tried to orient themselves only to the socialist markets, have
been

forced

indirectly.

to

im port

considerably

from

the

(Koves 1978, P. 118),(Koves 1981, P. 56)

W est,

although

There are two

alternative waysto meet the increased import requirement, either by
a rapid growth of exports or by running more deeply into debts.
(Veress 1974, P. 347)
how ever,

prefer

the

The proponents of the export-oriented model,
first

alternative,

partly

because

the

credit

relations between East and W est are primarly motivated by political
and ideological views, which make reliance upon Western credits
undesirable.
th at

the

(Czerkawski 1982, P. 77)

im ports

can

not

be

Furthermore it is believed

financed

by

credits

fo r

ever;

consequently there must be a considerable acceleration of exports to
the West as a basic condition for maintaining a high rate of imports.
(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 99)
The CMEA countries must however rationalize their imports
and increase the efficiency of their use.

For example N. Shomelev

(1979) argues that according to some estimates not less than 15
percent of the imports of the Eastern European countries belong to
the category of forced imports.

These are first of all im ports of

machines which are produced at acceptable technological standards
in CMGA countries.

But which, due to the overstrained domestic plan
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an insufficient consideration of mutual requirements, are chronically
underproduced
co u n trie s

in

these

rese rv e s

increasing.

countries.

of

In

u n in stalled

addition,

im p o rta n t

in

the

CMEA

eq u ip m en t

are

Such reserves naturally do not yield any export returns.

(Shmelev 1979, P. 319)

Eastern European countries' endeavours to

overcome these shortcomings will be of tremendous benefit to their
balance of payments.
The basic problem is recognized to be the fact that for a long
time too wide a range of products has been produced in and exported
from CMEA countries.

(Veress 1974, P. 345)

The export-oriented

model therefore suggests that the economic policy decisions must be
supported that select on the basis of external economic requirements
those

industries,

plants

and

activities

products saleable on the world markets.

which

produce

efficient

At the same time those

industries which are 'only' capable of imports substitution, and those
which produce costly goods or obsolete goods must be given less
su p p o rt,

or

Furtherm ore
con d itio n s
encouraged.

th e ir

p ro d u ctio n

m ust

the enterprises which
m ust

receive

m ore

be

to ta lly

export more

investm ent

term in ated .

at advantageous

reso u rces,

and

be

(Bognar 1976, P. 231), (Simai 1977, P. 9) and (Kozma

1972, P.P. 26-7)
The specialization and export-oriented model is recommended
for all the Eastern European countries, but it is considered a must
policy for the medium and the smaller countries of Eastern Europe.
It is believed that in the medium and small countries, an effective
development of forces of production without a dynamic foreign trade
and more intensive participation in the international division of labor
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is impossible.

(Veress 1974, P. 336)

A. Koves (Koves 1975) for

instance argues that the small Eastern European countries are highly
foreign

trade

sensitive;

im ports

are

needed

not

only

for

the

development of the economy but also for the m ere operation of the
e c o n o m y .2

F or this reason Koves argues that the growth must be

export-oriented.

(Koves 1975, P. 317)

Sim ilarly E. Tabaczynski

(1981, P. 108) argues that a medium sized country like Poland also
needs to specialize and adopt the export-oriented model, because it
cannot afford to produce all kinds of different products either for the
Eastern or for the Western markets.
There is

how ever a

group of

the export-oriented

model's

supporters who strongly believes that this model will be successful
only if it is implemented within the framework o f CMEA countries'
integration.

(Bogomolov 1979c, P. 307)

"No doubt, the problem

number one in the field of economic connection w ith the non-socialist
world is the extent of our 'export expansion'.

H ere we are facing

common tasks, and combination of efforts on a collective basis right
in

th is

field

is

the

m ost

im portant

and,

indispensable precondition for common success."
307)

w h at

is

m ore,

an

(Bognar 1979, P.

And, under the present conditions, and particularly in the long

run, a more and more active participation of CMEA countries in the
international
cooperation

d iv isio n

of

of production

lab o r

by

acquires

w ay

of

sp ecializatio n

special im portance

fo r

2 The import elasticity of the Hungarian economy according to Bognar
(1976) is very high. Assuming the planned growth rate to be 5 - 6
percent per year, imports must increase by at least 9 - 1 0 percent
annually. (Ibid., p. 238)

and
their
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accelerated and intensive economic growth.

(Bogomolov 1979c, P.

308) and (Shmelev 1979, P. 317)
They

argue

the

significance

of

specialization

and

export-

expansion w ithin the fram ework of CMEA cooperation is further
enhanced when one considers the difficulties which emerge as a
result of intensification of the economic relations with the West.

The

difficulties include a growing technical and technological dependence
of a number of im portant branches of industry, appearance of a
double standard of quality in the economic exchange in different
geographic directions, creation of stocks of equipment with different
characteristics,
(Bogomolov

parallel

1979c,

developm ent

P.

309)

of

It is

som e

argued

production,

how ever

that

etc.
such

difficulties will be considerably reduced when the collaboration with
the West takes place under the conditions and requirements of long
term

CMEA cooperation.

"Experience indicates

that cooperative

collaboration with the capitalist countries brings on the whole the
necessary results only in cases when it is carried out in a purposeful
and close coordination with the tasks of expanding socialist economic
integration."

(Bogomolov 1979c, P.309)

In terms of imports from

the West, it is argued that "our import pattern [must] be changed in
favour of buying com plete equipments, manufacturing licenses and
technological know how, concentrating at the same time on those
fields

w here

traditions

and

there
w here

are

dom estic

advantageous

division of labour is feasible."

production

and

participation

in

(Kozma 1974, P. 23)

developm ent
the

CMEA

It is further

argued that even today there exists the possibility of taking over
advanced W estern technology, adapting it and exchanging it between
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/

countries within the CMEA region.

(Kozina 1974, P. 24)

Such action

is in particular important as far as the rationalization of imports is
concerned.
Some of the export-oriented model of development's adherents
believe not only that Eastern European countries must be specialized
in

production

of

selected

products,

but

th at

concentrate their exports on selected markets.
are

exported

to

too

many

m arkets,

it is

they

also

m ust

When the products
not

possible

to

put

substantial forces either on marketing or to consum ers' services
which w ould ensure Eastern European countries' com petitiveness.
(Veress

1974, P. 346)

The m arket concentration

is

especially

significant for those products such as automobiles for which the
question o f service and spare parts is of param ount im portance.
(Tabaczynski 1981, P. 108)

There are those economists who on the

other hand believe that Eastern European countries must produce
those kinds of goods which can be sold on every market; and they
suggest that the level of technology in the socialist countries must
reach a level which can produce goods capable of satisfying the
specific needs of different markets.

(Mandel and Muller 1974, P. 40)

Regardless of whether the target must be a selected market or many
markets, the importance of marketing activities must be recognized.
It is generally believed that getting better access to Western markets
is necessary to promote Eastern Europe’s exports; and the better
access to Western market can only be achieved through sophisticated
marketing activities.

(Bognar 1979, P. 13)

It is further argued that

since Eastern European countries for a long period of time have
ignored m arketing, they must now put a considerable effort into
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im proving

th e ir

distribution

and prom otional

markets.

m arketing

ac tiv itie s
aspects

in clu d in g

of selling

on

o rg an izatio n ,
the W estern

They must also enlarge their distributional networks, and

expand

their

advertisem ents,

(K ossut

1981,

P.P.

112-113)

and

encourage those types of investments which attempt to improve "the
esteem" of Eastern European products on the world markets.

(Bognar

1976, P. 230)
The

ex p o rt-o rien ted

m odel

importance of agricultural exports.

does

not

lose

sight

of

the

The proponents o f the model

admit "an old truth in economics" that after a country has attained a
certain nutritional level, the elasticity of demand for agricultural
products in that country is lower than that for industrial products.
However, they argue that the Eastern European countries must take
advantage of the fact that elasticities of agricultural products are
different in various regions of the world.

(Bognar 1979, P. 239)

Or

as B. Kadar argues the development of agriculture in Eastern Europe
should

be

products,

directed
because

tow ards
the

m arket

special
for

products

mass

instead

products

is

of

practically

saturated in the non-socialist countries, and their price is low.
other

hand

K adar

asserts

th at

the

mass

On the

in te rn a tio n a liz atio n

"of

nourishment” and the shift in demand of "social groups in the higher
income brackets" in the DCs towards the special products of other
countries; along with the intensification of income differentiation in
DCs have created an excellent opportunity for production and exports
of special products (Kadar 1983, P.P. 306-7)

At any rate, the export-

oriented model does not limit specialization and export concentration
only to the realm of industry; rather it is a comprehensive program
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which covers every aspect of economic activities; and it supports
every policy which helps to improve export potential of the Eastern
European economies.
For instance E. Tabaczynski believes the Industrial Cooperation
agreements between East and West are important insofar as they
help Eastern European countries on the choice and marketing of
specialized

products,

because

ICAs

enable

these

countries

to

concentrate on research and investment outlays on specific products
and to rely on the technical experiences and subdeliveries of the
W estern partner.

A. Voinov (1975) also advocates ICA, which

encourages specialization w hich in turn promotes product quality.
Tabaczynski also highly regards joint ventures because "[t]his is the
new direction of promising development for the future specialization
of our industry.

It should stimulate our managers to take further

steps toward concentration and specialization of production and the
further elimination o f unnecessary production item s.1'
1981, P. 103)
quality

of

(Tabaczynski

Because the joint-venture operations depend on the

joint-m anagem ents

(including

the

E astern

European

management), and in the cases where products are produced for the
W estern markets such operations depend on how quickly they react
to the changes in market situation.
learning

p o ssib ility

for

the

This condition provides excellent

Eastern

E uropean

m anagers,

and

preapares them for the task of export specialization because one of
the most im portant factors for the success of the export-oriented
model is

considered

to be

the capability

requirements of market demands.

of adaptation

to the

The importance of the adaptation

to differentiated demands is further enhanced, when the weight of
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manufactured goods in particular consumer goods in the structure of
exports is considerable.
The ICAs are in general praised not only because their long-run
and self-financing character make them profitable from the point of
view of balance of payments, but also because they stimulate the
expansion of trade of individual commodity groups and consequently
contribute to raising the level of specialization.

(Bogomolov 1979c,

P.P. 308-309)
The

export-oriented

m odel's

adherents

furtherm ore

believ e

that only a thoroughgoing reform in the system and central planning
of the Eastern European countries w ill guarantee the success of their
p o lic y .3

It is not possible to be integrated into the world economy

with an economic system "which was devised to an

applied for

implenting an inward-looking strategy in a huge country with vast
extensive resources."
m odel requires
enterprise lev el.5

(Csaba 1983, P. 20)4

decision

making

The export-oriented

and freedom

of action

at the

The improvement of the export structure should

start with a better utilization o f existing

production

equipment,

improvement of the quality of products for export, and the widening
or narrowing down the assortment o f goods; in addition it cannot be
separated from a better organization of sales and the assessment of
3 The details o f their suggested reforms are far beyond the scope o f this
chapter. For an indication about such reforms see (Mandel and
Muller 1974) for example.
4 Even the Soviet Union, they argue, today is not in a position o f
enjoying possession o f unlimited natural resources.
5 Such freedom o f action must be accompanied by linking the activities
o f these enterprises to the world market. For most enterprises
incentive alone is not enough to encourage them to take necessary
actions; in most cases pressure, in the form of world market effects,
is needed to provoke action. (Bognar 1979, p. 14)
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market demand, which all require decision making at the enterprise
level.

(Koves 1979, P.P. 334-35)

It is believed that the enterprises,

if permitted, can more efficiently study Western consumer’s habits,
their consumption structure and their way of life and consequently
show

quick

reaction

to any

changes

which

they

may

observe.

Furtherm ore, it is argued that historically in Eastern E urope the
centrally

decided productive investm ents have alm ost exclusively

been made with the aim o f import substitution or of increasing
exports to other socialist countries.

"It follows from their character

that in m ost cases they could contribute only a little to exports to
capitalist countries that require a high degree of flexibility from
producers."

(cited in Koves 1978, P. 113)

the

reasons

above

that

the

It is for a combination of

export-oriented

m odel

dem ands

a

thoroughgoing reform in the system of centrally planned economy.
The supporters o f the export-oriented model are aware of the
problem which may arise as a result of the adoption of their model,
that is the problem of increasing the vulnerability of Eastern Europe
to the changes in the world economy.
advantages
disadvantages.

of

th e ir

m odel

w ill

However they believe the

p rev ail,

an d

outw eigh

its

In principle, they maintain that Eastern Europe can

continue to plan production on the basis of the size and needs of the
home market, and try to export the surplus only for the purpose of
acquiring the indispensable imports.

Such a policy, however, is a

dangerous road to follow, because it "restrains the development of
the forces of production to the dim ensions o f one country and
through it renounces the advantageous of the economies of scale and
also exploitation of possibilities of stemming from the division of
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labor."
w ithout

(Veress 1974, P.P. 342-43)
specialization

and

Furthermore, it may state that

narrow ing

dow n

the

structure

of

production, giving up autarky, the economic development of Eastern
European countries will basically remain extensive.

Since the sources

of extensive development in these countries have been exhausted,
the continuation of the policy of extensive development will cause
Eastern Europe to lag behind the advanced capitalist countries, and in
the hierarchy of the international division of labor they will have to
be satisfied with an even more modest place than that of the present.
(Pasztor 1980, P. 91)
A. Koves asserts that if the export-oriented development is
discarded, Eastern European countries have to give up the boosting of
their imports from the West.

Without funds provided by the export

of goods it is unrealistic to believe that Eastern Europe can continue
to im port from the W est, and the West will continue to provide
additional financial means to support Eastern Europe's demands for
imports.

W ithout Western imports of machinery the desire to reduce

technological backwardness is hardly realistic, and the increase of
internal CMEA trade will also be in jeopardy.6

"If Eastern Europe

renounces the export-oriented development, then sooner or later, the
implementation of all the economic plans and tasks in which Western

6 M. Mandel and J. Muller (1974, p. 37) raise the same issue: "the
necessity of implementing an export-oriented economic policy is
first o f all justified by the fact that this is the only way to bring
about a more intensive cooperation between the economies o f the
socialist countries. In the long run, we can develop the socialist
relations vitally important for us only if the economy is able to
produce--in accordance with the requirements o f export
orientation-competitive goods willingly bought by our most
important natural partners, the socialist countries."

467

im ports

play

conseq u en ces

a

considerable
w ould

be

role

slow

would

be

endangered.

te ch n o lo g ical

and

The

econom ic

development, stagnation o f the standard of living, preservation or
widening of the technological gap separating the CMEA countries
from the more advanced countries, and the long-range production of
the current export pattern."

(Koves 1981, P. 130) and

(Krasznai and

Laki 1982, P. 57)?
The export-oriented model on the other hand on the basis of
expedient specialization and the requirem ents of the international
division of labor will guarantee the raising of technological standards,
economic efficiency, and the [raising of] standard of living in the
CMEA countries.

(Krasznai and Laki 1982, P 31)

However, the

export-oriented development, some argue, is not a smooth process
and "can be approached only in the long run and gradually. .
(Mandel and M uller 1974, P. 39)

Consequently, in general export

specialization in engineering and in other branches of manufacturing
is considered to be highly desirable.

(Shmelev 1979, P. 38)

It is

realized such a task is a prolonged process and its completion is
beyond the 1980s.

Meanwhile in order to provide enough resources

and contribute to achieving such a task the volume and efficiency of
traditional exports of CMEA countries must be increased.

(Shmelev

7 Koves believes 'the probability of such type of withdrawal cannot be
completely precluded today if the world political conditions o f EastWest trade change unfavorably—especially if the deterioration in
the international situation were accompanied by worsening
balance-of-payment difficulties.
But we must be aware that this
would be a step backward, which beside being unjustifiable from the
point o f view o f economic development, would throw back the
economic and social development o f CMEA countries enormously."
(Koves 1981, p. 130) also (Krasznai and Laki 1982, p. 62)"
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1979, P. 318)

However it is emphasized that the concentration on

traditional exports is

only

of

short-term

nature,

partly

because

internally it is impossible to continue with the traditional pattern of
trade, i.e. to import the finished products and to export the raw
materials.

The structure of production in the socialist countries has

changed drastically

and

they m anufacture a growing

volume of

finished products and consume an increasing share of their own raw
m aterials

and

energy;

consequently

difficult to export raw materials.

it

is

becom ing

(Nyiri 1982, P. 19)

increasingly

In the case of

the Soviet Union for instance Koves (1979, P. 333) argues it is
important for this country to find ways and methods enabling it to
export manufacturing goods, because the Soviet Union, one of the
major exporters of oil and raw materials, these days finds it difficult
to increase the production of these products to a sufficient amount to
cover both the domestic needs and allocate some for exports.

In the

short-run however Koves argues that it has no choice but to sell to
the Western countries raw materials and in particular oil and natural
gas in order to increase its receipts from its exports, and support the
restructuring o f the economy towards production

and exports of

m anufacturing goods.
There are some Eastern European economists who believe that
the export specialization on manufacturing goods is not sufficient.
They speak of exports of "technical cultures."
cultures"

they

im ply

undertaking

By [the] "technical

"the developm ent

of com plete

systems and their introduction into the economies of our partners.
For this frees them not only from production but also from the whole
or a great part of systems design and organization."

(Kozma 1974, P.

469

25)

For example in Hungary they speak of development of health

culture which includes:

the organization system of health network;

health systems; development,

design and production of m edical

instruments; design and furnishing of hospitals and sanatoria, etc.
is argued that "'selling* of the technical cultural

m ultiplies

It
the

efficiency of external economic connections, be it the whole culture
or some larger interrelated parts of it, precisely because they relieve
the im porting

partners

(Kozma 1974, P.P. 25-26)

of organization

and

adaptation

troubles."
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